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2008 (8) TMI 816 - HC - VAT and Sales TaxWhether the provisions of section 14B(7)(ii) and (iii) of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948 providing that proceedings shall be decided within a period of 14 days from the commencement of enquiry proceedings are directory or mandatory? Held that - Adjudication process is a public duty cast on a public officer for a public good. The purpose is to check evasion of tax. Failure to complete the adjudication process within 14 days will only give premium to the action of the tax evader. Thus Provisions of section 14B(7)(ii) and (iii) of the State Act are directory in nature and consequently failure to decide such proceedings within the time prescribed will not result into abatement of proceedings. W.P. dismissed.
Issues Involved:
- Whether the provisions of section 14B(7)(ii) and (iii) of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948, providing that proceedings shall be decided within a period of 14 days from the commencement of enquiry proceedings, are directory or mandatory. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Nature of the Time-Limit under Section 14B(7)(ii) and (iii): The core issue revolves around whether the 14-day time limit prescribed for the completion of enquiry proceedings under section 14B(7)(ii) and (iii) of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948, is mandatory or directory. The petitioner argued that the time limit is mandatory, and failure to adhere to it should result in the abatement of proceedings. The petitioner relied on various judgments to support this contention, including State of Haryana v. Rajeshwar Parshad and Hardit Singh Bhagat Singh v. Excise and Taxation Officer. 2. Examination of Relevant Judgments: The court examined several judgments to determine the nature of statutory time limits. In State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava, it was held that the question of whether a statute is mandatory or directory depends on the intent of the Legislature, considering the nature, design, and consequences of the provision. Similarly, in Banwarilal Agarwalla v. State of Bihar, the Supreme Court emphasized that no general rule can be laid down, and each case must be decided based on legislative intent. 3. Legislative Intent and Public Duty: The court noted that section 14B(6) of the State Act provides for the release of goods and vehicles within 72 hours to ensure the unhindered movement of goods. The 14-day time limit for completing enquiry proceedings is intended to expedite the process but does not imply that non-compliance would invalidate the proceedings. The adjudication process involves public duty aimed at preventing tax evasion, which is a public good. 4. Procedural vs. Substantive Provisions: The court observed that procedural provisions, even when using the word "shall," may not be mandatory if no prejudice is caused by non-compliance. This principle was upheld in various cases, including Topline Shoes Ltd. v. Corporation Bank and P.T. Rajan v. T.P.M. Sahir, where it was held that procedural time limits are often directory to ensure the efficient functioning of statutory duties. 5. Conclusion on the Nature of the Time-Limit: The court concluded that the 14-day time limit in section 14B(7)(ii) and (iii) is directory. The purpose of the provision is to expedite the adjudication process, but failure to comply within the specified time does not invalidate the proceedings. The provision aims to ensure speedy disposal of disputes but does not create a substantive right for the petitioner to claim abatement of proceedings due to non-compliance. Final Judgment: The court held that the provisions of section 14B(7)(ii) and (iii) of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948, are directory in nature. Consequently, failure to decide the proceedings within the prescribed time does not result in the abatement of proceedings. The writ petitions were dismissed, affirming the directory nature of the time limit and upholding the penalty imposed on the petitioner.
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