1963 (12) TMI 25 - SC - Indian Laws

Whether for the purpose of computing the period of 30 days prescribed under s. 116A (3) of the Act the provisions of s. 12 of the Limitation Act can be invoked. Held that - The requirement of a prescription by the special law of a period different from that prescribed by the First Schedule is satisfied in the present case. Even on the narrowest construction of the words different from those prescribed therefor in first schedule occurring the opening part of s. 29(2), the exclusion of time provided for by Art. 12 of the Limitation Act would be permissible in computing the period of limitation for filing the appeal to the High Court in the case before us. Appeal dismissed.

Issues Involved:
1. Applicability of Section 29(2) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 to appeals under Section 116A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.
2. Interpretation of "special or local law" and its period of limitation.
3. Applicability of Article 156 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act.
4. Exclusion of time under Section 12 of the Limitation Act for obtaining a copy of the order.
5. Relationship between the first and second limbs of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Applicability of Section 29(2) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 to appeals under Section 116A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951:
The court examined whether Section 29(2) applies to appeals under the Representation of the People Act. It was conceded that Section 116A is a "special or local law" and prescribes a period of limitation for appeals. The court held that Section 29(2) applies to such appeals, thereby allowing the provisions of Section 12 of the Limitation Act to exclude the time taken to obtain a copy of the order.

2. Interpretation of "special or local law" and its period of limitation:
The court discussed whether the period prescribed by the special law is different from that in the First Schedule of the Limitation Act. It was argued that even if the Limitation Act does not prescribe a period for a specific appeal, the special law's prescription of a period makes it "different." The court agreed, referencing the Bombay High Court's decision in Canara Bank Ltd. v. The Warden Insurance Co. Ltd., which held that the test of "a prescription of a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the First Schedule" is satisfied even when the First Schedule does not provide a period for such an appeal.

3. Applicability of Article 156 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act:
The court examined whether appeals under the Representation of the People Act could be considered "under the Code of Civil Procedure" for the purposes of Article 156. It was argued that the appeal, though conferred by the Representation of the People Act, is governed by the procedure of the Code of Civil Procedure. The court referred to decisions from the Calcutta and Madras High Courts, which held that an appeal governed by the procedure of the Code of Civil Procedure falls under Article 156.

4. Exclusion of time under Section 12 of the Limitation Act for obtaining a copy of the order:
The court held that Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act applies to appeals under Section 116A of the Representation of the People Act. This allows the exclusion of the time taken to obtain a copy of the order when computing the period of limitation. The court emphasized that the appeal procedure under the Representation of the People Act is governed by the Code of Civil Procedure, thereby attracting the provisions of Section 12.

5. Relationship between the first and second limbs of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act:
The court discussed whether the conditions in the first limb of Section 29(2) need to be satisfied for the second limb to apply. The majority opinion held that the two parts of Section 29(2) are independent and can apply to different situations. The second part, which begins with "for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law," is an independent provision and applies to all special or local laws, even if the first part's conditions are not met.

Conclusion:
The court concluded that the appeal under Section 116A of the Representation of the People Act is governed by the provisions of the Limitation Act, including Section 12, which allows for the exclusion of time taken to obtain a copy of the order. The appeal was dismissed with costs, affirming the High Court's decision.

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