1968 (3) TMI 107 - SC - Customs

The initiation and continuance of criminal proceedings in good faith cannot amount to contempt of the criminal court. To constitute contempt of court, something calculated to obstruct or interfere with the due course of justice or the lawful process of the courts

Issues:
1. Contention of appellant regarding contempt of magistrate and violation of constitutional protection under Art. 20(3) of the Constitution.
2. Proceedings for imposition of penalty under s. 112 of the Sea Customs Act and trial for offences under s. 135(b) of the same Act.
3. Discretion of customs officers to stay proceedings during the pendency of criminal trial.
4. Allegation of violation of Art. 20(3) of the Constitution by appellant.
5. Abandonment of contention regarding violation of Art. 14 of the Constitution.

Detailed Analysis:

1. The appellant contended that the threatened proceedings for imposition of penalty on him for alleged complicity in smuggling gold amount to contempt of the magistrate and violate constitutional protection under Art. 20(3) of the Constitution. The High Court rejected these contentions, stating that the customs officers were acting in good faith and discharging their statutory duties under the Sea Customs Act. The initiation and continuance of proceedings by customs officers did not amount to contempt of court as it did not obstruct the due course of justice. The court cited precedents to support this view, emphasizing that the customs officers' actions were authorized by the Act and not motivated by any improper motives.

2. The judgment highlighted that identical issues arise in proceedings for imposition of penalty under s. 112(b) of the Sea Customs Act and in a trial for an offence punishable under s. 135(b) of the same Act. It was noted that the Sea Customs Act allows for parallel proceedings, where penalties can be imposed by customs officers while the criminal court trial is imminent. The court clarified that the power of adjudicating penalties and confiscation under the Act is vested in customs officers alone, and the criminal court cannot make this adjudication. The judgment emphasized that the customs officers' actions were within their jurisdiction and not in excess of it.

3. The appellant also raised concerns regarding the violation of Art. 20(3) of the Constitution, claiming that he would be compelled to enter the witness-box and potentially incriminate himself during the proceedings under ss. 111 and 112. The court analyzed that while the appellant was accused of an offence, there was no compulsion on him to be a witness against himself at that stage. The court differentiated between compulsion from another person or authority and voluntary testimony by the accused. It was noted that the appellant had not been summoned to give evidence in the proceedings under ss. 111 and 112, and the court refrained from expressing an opinion on the potential invocation of Art. 20(3) in such a scenario.

4. The judgment addressed the appellant's argument regarding the violation of Art. 14 of the Constitution, which was raised before the High Court but later abandoned. The High Court had rejected this contention, and the appellant did not pursue it further. Consequently, the court did not delve into this issue in detail, as it was no longer part of the appellant's argument.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, emphasizing that the proceedings initiated by the customs officers were lawful, not contemptuous, and did not violate the constitutional provisions cited by the appellant. The court clarified the roles of customs officers and the criminal court in adjudicating penalties and highlighted the distinction between compulsion and voluntary testimony in the context of constitutional protections. The abandonment of the Art. 14 contention by the appellant further streamlined the focus of the judgment.

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