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Issues Involved:
1. Applicability of Section 14(1) of the Limitation Act. 2. Exclusion of time for pendency of infructuous civil proceedings. 3. Interpretation of "prosecuting with due diligence" under Section 14(1). 4. Relevance of preparatory steps in computation of limitation period. 5. Judicial precedents and their applicability to the current case. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Applicability of Section 14(1) of the Limitation Act: The primary issue was whether the consistent view that only the pendency of the infructuous revision should be excluded under Section 14(1) of the Limitation Act requires reconsideration. The court examined the history and purpose of Section 14, which allows for the exclusion of time spent in prosecuting another civil proceeding with due diligence in a court that is unable to entertain it due to jurisdictional defects or similar reasons. 2. Exclusion of Time for Pendency of Infructuous Civil Proceedings: The court analyzed whether the entire period from the date of the adverse order to the date of disposal of the infructuous revision should be excluded. The defendants argued that only the period between the filing and disposal of the civil revision petition should be deducted. The court noted that judicial precedents, including those from the Calcutta High Court and the Privy Council, supported the exclusion of the entire period occupied by the litigation, including the time taken for preparatory steps. 3. Interpretation of "Prosecuting with Due Diligence" under Section 14(1): The court emphasized that Section 14(1) intends to exclude the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting another civil proceeding with due diligence. The term "prosecuting" was interpreted broadly to include not just the actual pendency in court but also the time spent taking necessary steps to initiate the proceedings. The court held that the legislature used comprehensive words to cover the entire period of prosecution, including preparatory steps. 4. Relevance of Preparatory Steps in Computation of Limitation Period: The court rejected the narrow interpretation that only the period of actual pendency in court should be excluded. It held that the time spent taking indispensable and necessary steps preparatory to initiating proceedings in court should also be regarded as time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting the civil proceeding. This broader interpretation avoids anomalies and ensures that the time necessary for initiating proceedings is not unfairly included in the limitation period. 5. Judicial Precedents and Their Applicability to the Current Case: The court reviewed various judicial precedents, including decisions from the Calcutta High Court, the Privy Council, and the Supreme Court, which supported the broader interpretation of Section 14. The court also examined earlier decisions from the Madras High Court, which had adopted a narrower view due to the absence of a fixed period for filing revision petitions. However, with the introduction of Rule 41-A(2) prescribing a 90-day period for civil revision petitions, the court found no justification for limiting the exclusion to the period of pendency alone. Conclusion: The court concluded that both on authority and on the language of Section 14, there is no scope for limiting its ambit to the pendency of infructuous proceedings in a court of law. The time taken for taking indispensable and preparatory steps to institute proceedings, which ultimately prove to be fruitless, should also be excluded. The question was answered accordingly, and the second appeal was referred back to the division bench for final disposal.
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