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1975 (8) TMI 140 - HC - Indian Laws

Issues Involved:
1. Status of the land as "muafi Devasthani" and its implications.
2. Legal status of Fosuram as a lessee or an occupancy tenant.
3. Interpretation of "public, charitable or religious institution" under Section 168(2)(viii) of the M.P. Land Revenue Code.
4. Whether an idol or deity qualifies as a "disabled person" under Section 168(2)(v).
5. Conditions under which a lease ceases to be in force under Section 168(4) and the second proviso to Section 168(2).
6. Validity of the notice given to Fosuram to desist from cultivation.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Status of the Land as "Muafi Devasthani":
The land in question was identified as "muafi Devasthani," meaning it was a rent-free grant to a temple. The court presumed that the temple was a public religious institution within the meaning of entry (viii) of Section 168(2) of the M.P. Land Revenue Code unless proven otherwise. The burden of proof lay on the party alleging it to be a private institution. The petitioners failed to prove or even allege that the temple was a private institution.

2. Legal Status of Fosuram:
The Board of Revenue held that Fosuram was a lessee under an oral lease from year to year. The petitioners contended that Fosuram had become an occupancy tenant, but this was rejected. The Khasra entries showed the land as "muafi Devasthani," and Fosuram was recorded as a sub-tenant in the kistabandi Khatauni of 1963-64. The only status Fosuram could have had at the commencement of the Code was that of a lessee of a disabled Bhumiswami.

3. Interpretation of "Public, Charitable or Religious Institution":
The petitioners argued that the Bhumiswami deity did not fall under the expression "public, charitable or religious institution" within the meaning of Section 168(2)(viii). The court noted that the expression could be misleading due to a misplaced comma but did not find it necessary to express a considered opinion on this matter. It was held that the temple was a public religious institution, and the deity was a disabled Bhumiswami.

4. Deity as a "Disabled Person":
The court held that an idol or deity is a "disabled person" within the meaning of Clause (v) of Section 168(2). The term "person" in this context includes juristic or artificial persons. The idol, being unable to act on its own, had to act through human agency, thus qualifying as a person with physical disability.

5. Conditions for Lease Cessation:
The second proviso to Section 168(2) states that any lease made in pursuance of this sub-section shall cease to be in force after one year of the determination of the disability by death or otherwise. The court clarified that this proviso is not exhaustive of the conditions under which a lease ceases to be in force. The expression "on the lease ceasing to be in force" in Section 168(4) includes both statutory cessation under the second proviso and contractual determination, such as by effluxion of time or the happening of a specified event.

6. Validity of Notice to Fosuram:
The lease was determined by a notice (Ex. P-1) calling upon Fosuram to desist from cultivating the land from July 1, 1964. The court held that the lease ceased to be in force on this date within the meaning of Section 168(4). Consequently, Fosuram was liable to be ejected on the application of the Bhumiswami deity.

Conclusion:
The court concluded that:
1. The temple was presumed to be a public religious institution.
2. The deity is a disabled Bhumiswami.
3. Fosuram was a lessee from year to year.
4. The lease ceased to be in force on July 1, 1964, and Fosuram was liable to be ejected.

The petition was dismissed, and the petitioners were ordered to pay Rs. 150 as costs to the first respondent. The outstanding amount of the security deposit was to be refunded to the petitioners.

 

 

 

 

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