2017 (11) TMI 1938 - SC - Indian Laws

Interpretation of statute - whether the provision of Section 24(1)(b) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 is governed by the proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the said Act or it has to be read as part of section 24(2)? HELD THAT - It is only occasionally that proviso is unrelated to subject matter of preceding section, it may have to be interpreted as a substantive provision. Ordinarily, a proviso is not interpreted as stating a general rule. Provisos are often added as saving clauses. A proviso must be construed with reference to the preceding parts of the clause to which it is appended. The proviso is ordinarily subordinate to the main section. A construction placed on proviso which brings general harmony to the terms of the section should prevail. A proviso may sometime contain substantive provision. Ordinarily, proviso to a section is intended to take out a part of the main section for special treatment. Normally, a proviso does not travel beyond the main provision to which it is a proviso. A proviso is not interpreted as stating a general rule, it is an exception to main provision to which it is carved out as a proviso. Proviso can not be construed as enlarging the scope of enactment when it can be fairly and properly constructed without attributing that effect. It is not open to read in the words of enactment which are not to be found there and which would alter its operative effect. It is apparent from the provisions of Section 24(1), that it contains a non-obstante clause with respect to any provision made in the Act of 2013 - It is also provided in Section 24(1)(b) that in case any land acquisition proceedings had been initiated under the Act of 1894 and, an Award under Section 11 has been made, such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the Act of 1894, as if the said Act had not been repealed. In DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY VERSUS SUKHBIR SINGH AND ORS. 2016 (9) TMI 1586 - SUPREME COURT , this Court has observed that Section 24(1) begins with a nonobstante clause, and thereafter, in the aforesaid paragraph 12, it has been observed that in respect of Section 24(1)(b), an important exception is carved out by Section 24(2). This Court nowhere held in said decision that the proviso to Section 24(2) is to be read as part of Section 24(1)(b), as was tried to be suggested. Through the non obstante clause in the opening part, exception has been carved out in Section 24(2) to section 24(1), proviso remains part of section 24(2) only. There is no dispute with proposition that exception had been carved out in section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. Whereas, the issue involved in the present case is different. The issue involved in the instant case is, whether the proviso is to be read as a part of Section 24(1)(b) or as a part of Section 24(2) as per settled principles of construction a proviso except out preceding portion of enactment to which it is appended. The same is appended to section 24(2) not to section 24(1)(b) under the Act of 2013. In our opinion, it was neither question raised in Sukhbir Singh, nor has it been answered. Thus, that decision, in our view, is of no value, to assist the cause of the respondents. The proviso to Section 24(2) is not applicable in the instant case, same is applicable where the Award had been passed 5 years before. In a case where Award has been passed within 5 years, the said proviso of section 24(2) cannot be said to be applicable. The submission made on the basis of the proviso cannot be said to be sustainable. The decision of the High Court cannot be said to be sustainable, and the same is hereby set aside - Appeal allowed.

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Applicability of Section 24(1)(b) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (the Act of 2013).
2. Interpretation of the proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the Act of 2013.
3. Continuation of land acquisition proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (the Act of 1894).

Detailed Analysis:

1. Applicability of Section 24(1)(b) of the Act of 2013:
The core issue was whether the provision of Section 24(1)(b) of the Act of 2013 is governed by the proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 24 or if it should be read as part of Section 24(2). The land acquisition for Delhi Metro Railways was initiated under the Act of 1894, and the award was pronounced on 14.09.2011. The compensation was deposited by the Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. (DMRC) before the commencement of the Act of 2013. The High Court directed that compensation should be paid under the Act of 2013, which DMRC contested.

2. Interpretation of the Proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the Act of 2013:
The Supreme Court discussed the rules regarding the construction of provisos, emphasizing that a proviso is meant to qualify or except something from the main enactment and should not be construed as enlarging the scope of the enactment. The Court held that the proviso to Section 24(2) must be read as part of Section 24(2) and not Section 24(1)(b). This interpretation avoids inconsistency and ensures that the legislative intent is preserved. The proviso to Section 24(2) deals with a situation where the award has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of the Act of 2013, and if compensation for the majority of land holdings has not been deposited, the acquisition does not lapse, but the beneficiaries are entitled to compensation under the Act of 2013.

3. Continuation of Land Acquisition Proceedings under the Act of 1894:
The Court clarified that Section 24(1)(b) of the Act of 2013 provides that if an award has been made under the Act of 1894, the proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the Act of 1894 as if it had not been repealed. This provision is distinct from Section 24(2), which applies if the award was made five years or more before the commencement of the Act of 2013, and either possession has not been taken or compensation has not been paid. The Court concluded that the High Court erred in holding that the compensation is required to be paid under the Act of 2013, as the proviso to Section 24(2) does not apply to the present case where the award was made within five years before the commencement of the Act of 2013.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's decision, ruling that the respondents are not entitled to compensation under the Act of 2013. The appeals by DMRC were allowed, and the special leave petitions seeking enhanced compensation under the Act of 2013 were dismissed. The Court reaffirmed that the proviso to Section 24(2) should be read as part of Section 24(2) and not Section 24(1)(b), ensuring that the legislative intent and the distinct application of these provisions are maintained.