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Issues:
1. Consideration of the impugned judgment regarding the issuance of show-cause notice by the Collector under Section 211 read with Rule 108(6) of the Rules. 2. Determination of whether the Collector's exercise of suo motu jurisdiction within a reasonable time is sustainable. 3. Analysis of the petitioner's argument regarding the Collector's power to issue the notice after a significant period. 4. Examination of relevant case laws like Hindustan Times Ltd. v. Union of India and Uttam Namdeo Mahale v. Vithal Deo in support of the petitioner's contention. 5. Evaluation of the reasonableness of exercising suo motu power based on facts and circumstances of each case. 6. Review of the Collector's failure to provide reasons for the delay in taking action from 1992 to 1996. 7. Conclusion on the sustainability of the impugned judgment and dismissal of the special leave petition under Article 136 of the Constitution. Analysis: The Supreme Court considered a special leave petition questioning the validity of an impugned judgment regarding the issuance of a show-cause notice by the Collector under Section 211 read with Rule 108(6) of the Rules. The primary issue was whether the Collector's exercise of suo motu jurisdiction within a reasonable time was sustainable. The Court noted that the impugned notice was issued in 1996 concerning land held by the respondents since 1992. The High Court had quashed the proceedings, emphasizing the necessity of exercising power within a reasonable time. The petitioner argued that the property did not belong to the respondents, justifying the delay in issuing the notice. Citing precedents like Hindustan Times Ltd. v. Union of India and Uttam Namdeo Mahale v. Vithal Deo, the petitioner contended that the delay was permissible. However, the Court emphasized that the reasonableness of exercising suo motu power depended on the case's facts and circumstances, requiring the authority to provide reasons for any delay. In the case of Hindustan Times Ltd., the Court highlighted the importance of reasonableness in exercising power under relevant provisions. The Court's analysis indicated that the Collector's failure to explain the delay from 1992 to 1996 in the impugned notice rendered the exercise of jurisdiction after four-and-a-half years unreasonable. Consequently, the Court found no infirmity in the impugned decision, leading to the dismissal of the special leave petition under Article 136 of the Constitution. The judgment underscored the significance of providing justifications for delays in exercising statutory powers and upheld the principle of reasonableness in such matters.
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