1988 (10) TMI 95 - AT - Income Tax

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Whether the Tribunal has the power to condone the delay in filing an appeal under section 269G of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
2. Applicability of section 5 of the Limitation Act to appeals before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal.
3. Whether the Tribunal can be considered a "court" under section 5 of the Limitation Act.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Tribunal's Power to Condoned Delay:
The primary issue was whether the Tribunal had the authority to condone a delay in filing an appeal under section 269G of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The appeal was filed 26 days late, and the transferor sought condonation citing health issues and logistical difficulties. The Tribunal examined the provisions of section 269G, which stipulates that an appeal should be filed within 45 days from the date of the order or 30 days from the date of service of the order, whichever is later. The Tribunal concluded that it did not have the power to condone the delay, as the application for condonation was not presented within the statutory period specified in section 269G(1).

2. Applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act:
The Tribunal considered whether section 5 of the Limitation Act, which allows for the condonation of delays if sufficient cause is shown, could be applied to appeals before it. The learned counsel for the assessee argued that section 5 should apply, citing decisions from various High Courts. However, the Tribunal noted the preponderance of judicial opinion, including decisions from the Andhra Pradesh High Court, Kerala High Court, Calcutta High Court, and Gujarat High Court, which held that section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal as it is not a "court." The Tribunal also referred to the Delhi High Court's decision in Deen Dayal Goyal v. ITAT, which emphasized public policy considerations and concluded that section 5 could not be invoked for appeals before the Tribunal.

3. Tribunal as a "Court":
The Tribunal examined whether it could be considered a "court" under section 5 of the Limitation Act. The learned counsel for the assessee argued that the Tribunal should be considered a court based on various legal definitions and the removal of secrecy provisions in its proceedings. However, the Tribunal referred to the Madras High Court's decision in R.M. Seshadri v. Second Addl. ITO and other judicial pronouncements, concluding that the Tribunal is not a "court" within the meaning of section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Tribunal also noted that Chapter XX-A of the Income-tax Act, which deals with the acquisition of property, includes a specific definition of "court" that does not encompass the Tribunal.

Conclusion:
The Tribunal dismissed the appeal as barred by limitation, holding that it did not have the power to condone the delay under section 269G of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and that section 5 of the Limitation Act did not apply to appeals before the Tribunal. The Tribunal emphasized that it is not a "court" within the meaning of section 5 of the Limitation Act and that public policy considerations supported this interpretation. The Tribunal did not delve into the merits of the reasons for the delay, as the legal framework did not permit condonation in this context.