Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 356 Records
-
1995 (11) TMI 484
Issues: 1. Impleadment of Department of Space in land acquisition cases. 2. Jurisdiction of High Court in entertaining writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 3. Proper remedy for parties seeking impleadment in pending appeals.
Analysis: 1. The case involved the acquisition of land by the Department of Space, Government of India, for the Rocket Launching Station. The landowners filed for Reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act after dissatisfaction with the compensation awarded. The Subordinate Court substantially increased the compensation, leading to appeals by the Special Tehsildar in the High Court of Madras.
2. The High Court, through an interim order, directed the enhanced compensation amounts to be deposited in court. The Department of Space filed writ petitions seeking impleadment in the appeals and a stay on the deposit directive. The High Court, in its judgment, held that the Department of Space could not be considered an interested party and should not be impleaded. The appellants argued citing precedents where similar entities were allowed impleadment in land acquisition cases.
3. The Supreme Court dismissed the writ petitions as mis-conceived, stating that the proper course for impleadment was through the Appellate Court. The appellants should have applied to be impleaded as a party in the pending appeals instead of filing writ petitions under Article 226. The Court emphasized that the High Court should have considered the impleadment issue only in the context of the pending appeals. The dismissal of the writ petitions did not affect the appellants' rights to apply for impleadment in the pending appeals within two months, following the procedure laid down in relevant judgments.
Conclusion: The Supreme Court disposed of the appeals, emphasizing the correct procedure for seeking impleadment in pending appeals and highlighting that writ petitions under Article 226 were not the appropriate remedy for impleadment. The Court allowed the appellants to file applications for impleadment in the pending appeals within two months, to be considered by the High Court in accordance with the law laid down in relevant judgments.
-
1995 (11) TMI 483
Issues Involved: 1. Conviction and sentencing under Sections 302, 148, and 149 IPC. 2. Delay in examining eye witnesses. 3. Credibility of eye witnesses. 4. Post-mortem report discrepancies. 5. Non-examination of certain witnesses. 6. Alleged defective investigation.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Conviction and Sentencing under Sections 302, 148, and 149 IPC: The appeals were directed against the judgment dated March 24, 1993, by the High Court at Allahabad, which upheld the conviction and life imprisonment of the appellants under Section 302 read with Sections 148 and 149 IPC for causing the death of Amar Pal on October 11, 1978. The prosecution established that the appellants attacked the deceased with knives, inflicting sixteen injuries resulting in his death on the spot.
2. Delay in Examining Eye Witnesses: The defense argued that the eye witnesses, PW. 2 Ram Saran and PW. 3 Attar Singh, were examined almost after three weeks, and PW. 6 Dr. Rajveer Singh was examined after about 56 days. This delay was not explained by the prosecution, raising suspicion that the witnesses might have consulted others and fabricated their testimonies. The court acknowledged the delay but emphasized that convincing and reliable evidence should not be discarded solely due to delayed examination.
3. Credibility of Eye Witnesses: The defense contended that PW. 2 and PW. 3 were related to the deceased's family, thus their testimonies should be scrutinized with caution. They also highlighted inconsistencies in their statements. The prosecution argued that the witnesses were not close relations and had no motive to falsely implicate the appellants. The court found the testimonies of PW. 2, PW. 3, and PW. 6 credible and consistent, establishing the prosecution's case beyond reasonable doubt.
4. Post-Mortem Report Discrepancies: The defense pointed out that the post-mortem report noted two lacerated wounds, which the prosecution explained as the deceased having dashed against a wall. This fact was not initially stated by PW. 2 but was later mentioned in his deposition. The court found this explanation plausible and supported by the presence of blood marks on the wall, as noted by the Investigating Officer.
5. Non-Examination of Certain Witnesses: The defense argued that the non-examination of Ranbir, mentioned in the FIR as an eye witness, weakened the prosecution's case. The prosecution maintained that the quality of evidence, not the number of witnesses, mattered. The court agreed, stating that the non-examination of Ranbir did not affect the case's credibility.
6. Alleged Defective Investigation: The defense highlighted several investigative lapses, including the omission of crime number in the inquest report and the delayed examination of witnesses. The prosecution admitted these lapses but argued that they did not undermine the reliable evidence presented. The court cited a precedent, indicating that defective investigation should not lead to acquittal if the case is otherwise conclusively established. The court found the prosecution's evidence credible and dismissed the appeals, upholding the convictions and sentences.
Conclusion: The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, upholding the convictions and sentences under Sections 302, 148, and 149 IPC. Despite acknowledging investigative lapses and delayed examination of witnesses, the court found the prosecution's evidence credible and reliable, establishing the appellants' guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
-
1995 (11) TMI 482
Issues: Delay in filing an appeal under Section 5 of the Limitation Act read with Section 151 Civil Procedure Code.
Analysis: The application was filed by the DDA seeking condonation of a 182-day delay in filing an appeal from the order of the learned Single Judge dated September 24, 1993. The delay was attributed to various administrative and procedural issues within the department. The appellant claimed that the delay was due to the time taken to obtain certified copies of the judgment and decree, as well as procedural delays within the department. However, the court found the explanation provided by the appellant to be unsatisfactory. There were inconsistencies in the timeline of events, such as delays in contacting the advocate for drafting the appeal and obtaining certified copies, which were not adequately explained by the appellant.
The court noted that the appellant failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for the delays in the filing process. Despite claiming that the delay was due to governmental and departmental procedures, the court emphasized the need for proper justification for the delay in filing the appeal. The court referred to a previous judgment where departmental delay was condoned, but in this case, the appellant's negligence in explaining the delay adequately led to the dismissal of the application for condonation. The court highlighted that administrative delays must also be properly explained, and negligence or indolence in pursuing the matter cannot be condoned simply because the appellant is a State or Government Undertaking. The court emphasized that there cannot be different standards for limitations based on the entity filing the appeal.
In conclusion, the court held that the delay in filing the appeal was not satisfactorily explained by the appellant, indicating gross negligence on their part. Despite the appellant's argument that the delay was due to governmental and departmental procedures, the court dismissed the application for condonation of delay. Consequently, the appeal was rejected due to the failure to provide a valid explanation for the delay in filing the appeal.
-
1995 (11) TMI 481
Issues: 1. Disposal of three criminal revisions together. 2. Complaints filed under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. 3. Quashing of complaints by the learned Additional Sessions Judge. 4. Interpretation of Section 219 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 5. Validity of notice served on the respondents. 6. Liability of partners in a firm under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
Analysis: 1. The judgment involves the disposal of three criminal revisions together as they share common questions. The complaints were filed under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act by different petitioners against the respondents for dishonoring multiple cheques issued to discharge debts.
2. The learned Additional Sessions Judge quashed the complaints based on a previous court decision, which was later overturned by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court clarified that post-dated cheques are deemed to be drawn on the date mentioned, affecting the validity of the quashing decision.
3. The interpretation of Section 219 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was discussed, where it was argued that multiple cheques issued in the same transaction do not necessitate separate complaints for each dishonored cheque, especially when they are part of a single debt repayment.
4. The validity of the notice served on the respondents was challenged, contending that it was issued to the firm and not individually to each partner. However, compliance with Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was confirmed as the notice to the firm, represented by any partner, was deemed sufficient.
5. The liability of partners in a firm under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was analyzed. It was established that partners can be held responsible for the firm's conduct if they were in charge of and responsible for the business at the time of the offense. Lack of specific allegations against certain partners led to the dismissal of the complaints against them.
6. Ultimately, the revision petitions against certain partners failed due to insufficient allegations, while the complaint against the main respondent was allowed to proceed in the court of the Judicial Magistrate based on his direct involvement in issuing the dishonored cheques.
This detailed analysis covers the various legal issues addressed in the judgment, providing a comprehensive understanding of the court's decision and reasoning.
-
1995 (11) TMI 480
Issues Involved: 1. Liability of NTC for gratuity payable to an employee who ceased employment prior to the takeover of management. 2. Interpretation of Section 3(7) of the Textile Undertakings (Take Over of Management) Act, 1983. 3. Applicability of Section 6 of the Act concerning suspension of liabilities. 4. Construction of the Act in light of its Preamble. 5. Impact of the Textile Undertakings (Nationalisation) Ordinance, 1995 on the liability for gratuity.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Liability of NTC for gratuity payable to an employee who ceased employment prior to the takeover of management: The core issue was whether NTC was liable for the gratuity payable to an employee who had resigned before the management of the textile undertaking was taken over by the Central Government. The employee, respondent No. 2, had resigned on March 22, 1983, and claimed gratuity under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. The Controlling Authority initially directed respondent No. 3 (the original employer) to pay the gratuity. However, the Industrial Court later ruled that NTC could be liable if respondent No. 3 failed to pay. The High Court overturned this, holding that the liability arose before the takeover and was therefore the responsibility of respondent No. 3.
2. Interpretation of Section 3(7) of the Textile Undertakings (Take Over of Management) Act, 1983: Section 3(7) of the Act explicitly states that any liability incurred by the textile company in relation to the textile undertaking before the appointed day shall be enforceable against the concerned textile company and not against the Central Government or the Custodian. The Supreme Court agreed with the High Court's interpretation that since the liability for gratuity arose on the date of resignation (March 22, 1983), it was enforceable against respondent No. 3 and not NTC, as the takeover occurred on October 18, 1983.
3. Applicability of Section 6 of the Act concerning suspension of liabilities: The appellant argued that Section 6 of the Act, which allows the Central Government to suspend certain liabilities, should apply. However, the Supreme Court clarified that Section 6 pertains to liabilities accruing after the takeover and does not affect liabilities incurred before the takeover. Therefore, Section 6 could not be construed to suspend the liability for gratuity that arose before the appointed day.
4. Construction of the Act in light of its Preamble: The appellant contended that the Act should be interpreted in light of its Preamble, which aims to protect the interests of workmen. However, the Supreme Court emphasized that the clear language of Section 3(7) could not be restricted by the Preamble. The Court noted that the Preamble's reference to protecting workmen's interests pertained to those employed at the time of the takeover, not those who had ceased employment prior.
5. Impact of the Textile Undertakings (Nationalisation) Ordinance, 1995 on the liability for gratuity: The Court also considered the provisions of the Textile Undertakings (Nationalisation) Ordinance, 1995, which further supported the view that liabilities incurred before the takeover were to be borne by the original owner and not by NTC. The Ordinance explicitly stated that liabilities for the pre-takeover period were to be discharged from the compensation payable to the owner for the acquisition of the undertaking.
Conclusion: The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that NTC was not liable for the gratuity payable to respondent No. 2, as the liability arose before the management takeover. The appeal was dismissed, with no order as to costs.
-
1995 (11) TMI 479
The Supreme Court of India dismissed the appeal in the case of 1995 (11) TMI 479 - SC. Judges were Mr. S.P. Bharucha and Mr. B.N. Kirpal.
-
1995 (11) TMI 478
Issues: 1. Validity of the notification under Section 4 [1] of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953. 2. Exemption from acquisition based on adjacent properties. 3. Alleged invidious discrimination under Article 14 of the Constitution. 4. Discrepancy in survey numbers in the acquisition proceedings.
Analysis:
1. Validity of Notification under Section 4 [1]: The appellant argued that the delay between the publication of the preliminary notification under Section 4 [1] and the declaration under Section 6 rendered the notification invalid. However, the court held that the appellant purchased the property long after the notification was issued, making his purchase an encumbrance against the State. The court emphasized that the State is entitled to take possession with absolute title free from all encumbrances, and the appellant cannot claim a valid title to the property.
2. Exemption from Acquisition: The appellant contended that Anand Nursery was exempted from acquisition while his residential property was not, leading to discrimination under Article 14 of the Constitution. The court dismissed this argument, stating that the wrong exemption granted to Anand Nursery does not entitle others to the same benefit. The court clarified that invidious discrimination cannot be claimed based on the actions of the authorities in granting exemptions.
3. Discrepancy in Survey Numbers: The appellant raised an issue regarding the discrepancy in survey numbers mentioned in the acquisition proceedings. He argued that the mention of a different survey number in the notice under Section 9 invalidated the acquisition proceedings. The court rejected this argument, stating that as long as the main survey number is correctly mentioned in the notification under Section 4 [1], any details or subdivisions can be supplemented at a later stage without affecting the validity of the notification.
4. Conclusion: The court dismissed the appeal without any order as to costs, upholding the validity of the notification under Section 4 [1] of the Act and rejecting the appellant's arguments regarding delay, exemption, and survey number discrepancies. The judgment emphasized the State's right to possession free from encumbrances and clarified that administrative errors in exemptions do not constitute invidious discrimination under Article 14 of the Constitution.
-
1995 (11) TMI 477
Issues Involved: 1. Constitutional validity of Sections 5, 6, and 8 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. 2. Challenge based on Article 21 (Right to Livelihood), Article 14 (Equality before Law), and Article 19(1)(g) (Right to Carry on Business) of the Constitution of India.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Constitutional Validity of Sections 5, 6, and 8 of the Act: The petitioner challenged the constitutional validity of Sections 5, 6, and 8 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. Section 5 deals with the determination of fair rent for leased buildings, Section 6 imposes a ban on further rent increases except under specific conditions, and Section 8 restricts landlords from claiming or receiving rent exceeding the fair rent.
2. Challenge Based on Article 21 (Right to Livelihood): The petitioner argued that the combined effect of these sections impacts his livelihood, as he depends on the rental income from his buildings. The petitioner cited the Supreme Court decision in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, which included the right to livelihood under Article 21. The Court acknowledged that the right to livelihood is a part of the right to life, but found that the impugned provisions of the Act, by making rent static and not allowing for periodic revisions, unreasonably restrict this right.
3. Challenge Based on Article 14 (Equality before Law): The petitioner contended that the provisions are unjust, unreasonable, and arbitrary, thus offending Article 14. The Court noted that while the Act aims to protect tenants from unreasonable eviction and unfair rent, it must also be fair to landlords. The Court provided a hypothetical illustration to demonstrate the potential for unjust consequences, where identical buildings could have vastly different fair rents due to the static nature of rent fixation, thereby violating the principle of equality before the law.
4. Challenge Based on Article 19(1)(g) (Right to Carry on Business): The petitioner argued that the provisions impose unreasonable restrictions on his right to carry on the business of renting out buildings, violating Article 19(1)(g). The Court referred to the Supreme Court's interpretation of "business" in Sodan Singh v. New Delhi Municipal Committee, which includes any activity carried out for profit. The Court agreed that constructing buildings and letting them out for rent falls under "business" and that the restrictions imposed by Sections 5, 6, and 8 are excessive and arbitrary, failing to strike a balance between individual freedom and social control.
5. Justification and Historical Context: The Court reviewed the historical context and justification for rent control legislation, acknowledging its role in protecting tenants during times of economic instability. However, it emphasized that conditions have changed since the Act's enactment in 1965, and the static nature of rent fixation does not account for economic changes, inflation, or improvements in localities.
6. Legislative Scheme and Reasonableness: The Court concluded that the legislative scheme provided by Sections 5, 6, and 8 is mutually dependent and cannot stand alone. The lack of provisions for periodic revision of fair rent makes the scheme unreasonable. The Court declared these sections ultra vires the Constitution of India and void, as they do not meet the test of reasonableness required under Articles 14, 19(1)(g), and 21.
Conclusion: The Original Petition was allowed, and the provisions relating to fair rent (Sections 5, 6, and 8) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, were declared unconstitutional and void.
-
1995 (11) TMI 476
Issues Involved: 1. Whether the charge-sheet issued by the General Manager and consequential enquiry proceedings including show-cause notice of dismissal are hit by principles of natural justice? 2. Whether the action of the General Manager (1st respondent) is vitiated by personal bias? 3. Whether the writ petition is maintainable against the show-cause notice?
Detailed Analysis:
Issue 1 and 2: Principles of Natural Justice and Personal Bias
The petitioner challenged the enquiry proceedings initiated through a charge-sheet dated 16-8-1994, claiming they were illegal and arbitrary. The petitioner, a clerk with a clean record, sought exemption from a beautification program due to health issues, which led to a confrontation with the General Manager (1st respondent). Subsequently, a charge-sheet was issued alleging misconduct and insubordination. The petitioner argued that the entire proceedings were biased because the General Manager, who was the aggrieved party, framed the charge-sheet, appointed the Enquiry Officer, and issued the show-cause notice, violating the principle of "Nemo Judex in Causa Sua" (no one should be a judge in his own case).
The court emphasized the importance of natural justice, which includes the principles of impartial adjudication and fair hearing. The rule against bias is fundamental, ensuring that justice is not only done but also seen to be done. The court cited numerous precedents, including Rex v. Sussex, Franklin v. Minister of Town Planning, and Manak Lal v. Dr. Prem Chand, to illustrate that any decision influenced by bias is null and void. The court concluded that the General Manager's involvement in the proceedings inherently biased the process, rendering it invalid.
Issue 3: Maintainability of the Writ Petition Against Show-Cause Notice
The respondents argued that the writ petition was premature as it challenged a show-cause notice. However, the court held that the writ petition was maintainable in this case due to the inherent bias in the proceedings. The court referenced Union of India v. Brij Fertilisers Pvt. Ltd., which allows for judicial intervention at the show-cause notice stage if the proceedings are fundamentally flawed. The court noted that continuing the biased proceedings would only prolong the petitioner's humiliation and harassment.
Conclusion:
The court declared the enquiry proceedings initiated by the charge-sheet dated 16-8-1994 illegal and quashed them. However, it allowed the respondents to initiate fresh proceedings through an appropriate higher authority. The writ petition was allowed, and the respondents were directed to permit the petitioner to occupy the allotted quarters.
-
1995 (11) TMI 475
Issues: 1. Contempt of court proceedings initiated against the Municipal Corporation and its officials. 2. Allegation of bias against a judge hearing the contempt petition. 3. Recusal of the judge from hearing the contempt matter. 4. Impugned order dated 18.3.1994 challenged in appeal.
Analysis:
1. The case involved a contempt petition filed by an employee of the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation against the Corporation's officials for alleged non-compliance with a settlement agreement. The respondent sought to stay an inquiry based on a chargesheet issued after the settlement. The Division Bench of the High Court issued an interim stay on the inquiry, leading to an appeal against this order.
2. The respondent alleged bias against one of the judges, who had previously represented him as counsel in a related matter. Despite objections raised by the Corporation, the judge continued to hear the contempt petition. The judge's actions were criticized for not recusing himself due to the conflict of interest, which raised concerns about the fairness and impartiality of the proceedings.
3. The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of judges recusing themselves from cases where there may be a perception of bias, even if no actual bias exists. The failure of the judge to step down from hearing the contempt matter due to the objection raised compromised the integrity of the judicial process. The Court held that the judge should have recused himself to maintain public confidence in the judiciary.
4. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the impugned order dated 18.3.1994. The Court highlighted the need for the matter to be heard by a bench where the judge in question is not a member to ensure fairness and impartiality in the proceedings. The judgment underscored the importance of upholding the rule of law and ensuring justice is not only done but also seen to be done in the eyes of the public.
-
1995 (11) TMI 474
Issues: - Interpretation of Section 28 of the Contract Act regarding limitation period in insurance contracts. - Validity of a suit for declaration without consequential relief. - Consideration of amendment under Order 6, Rule 17 C.P.C. for seeking consequential relief. - Application of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act in the context of seeking declaratory relief. - Evaluation of the power of the court to allow amendments to pleadings after the limitation period has expired.
Analysis: The judgment revolves around a case where the appellant had insured his truck but lost it due to the misfeasance of the driver. The appellant sought a declaration of entitlement to the total loss of the truck from the Insurance Company. The Trial Court, District Judge, and High Court dismissed the suit, stating that a mere declaration without consequential relief for compensation was not maintainable. The appellant argued that the limitation period in the contract was void under Section 28 of the Contract Act, allowing a three-year limit from the discovery of loss. However, the courts held that the suit lacked the necessary consequential relief, as per Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, and refused to permit amendment under Order 6, Rule 17 C.P.C.
The judgment delves into the concept that an agreement with a shorter limitation than prescribed by law is void. It highlights that a suit should seek both declaration and consequential relief for effective remedy. The appellant's attempt to seek amendment seeking consequential relief after the limitation period was deemed impermissible. The court emphasized that the right to relief must be judged at the time of instituting legal proceedings, and amendments cannot be allowed to introduce new causes of action post-limitation period. The judgment distinguishes cases where amendments were allowed due to new facts arising after the suit was filed, which is not applicable in this scenario.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the decisions of the lower courts in refusing the amendment seeking consequential relief after the limitation period had expired. The judgment underscores the importance of seeking appropriate relief at the outset of legal proceedings and the limitations on amending pleadings post-limitation period.
-
1995 (11) TMI 473
Issues: - Duty demand on unaccounted crown corks used in the manufacture of Aerated Water - Applicability of Rule 57-1 of the Central Excise Rules - Allegation of clearing final product without payment of duty - Interpretation of Modvat Credit in relation to damaged crown corks - Lack of inquiry into procurement and utilization of materials for manufacturing
Analysis: The case involved an appeal by M/s. Punjab Beverages Pvt. Limited against a duty demand of &8377; 69,432.60 for unaccounted crown corks used in manufacturing Aerated Water. The duty demand was based on the allegation that the appellants did not dispose of 150882 crown corks as required by Rule 57F(4) of the Central Excise Rules. The main argument presented was that the wastage of crown corks during manufacturing was unavoidable and had been acknowledged by the department in previous instances. The appellants contended that Rule 57-1 of the Central Excise Rules, invoked for duty demand on Aerated Water, only applied to Modvat Credit on inputs, not final products. They argued that no suppression or misstatement occurred, and the demand should not extend beyond six months. Additionally, they claimed eligibility for Rule 57D(1) benefits and highlighted that damaged crown corks were still available during the proceedings. The Tribunal found the demand unsustainable, noting the lack of inquiry into other manufacturing materials, the absence of findings on the normality of reported wastage, and the untenable assumption of Aerated Water production solely based on damaged crown corks. The impugned order was set aside, and the appeal was allowed.
The Tribunal emphasized that the demand was not for disallowing Modvat Credit but for duty on the final product, Aerated Water, calculated based on reported waste crown corks. It clarified that Rule 57-1 applied only to Modvat Credit issues, not duty on final products. The lack of investigation into the procurement and utilization of other materials necessary for manufacturing Aerated Water was highlighted, indicating a crucial oversight in the authorities' findings. The Tribunal deemed the demand unreasonable, as it solely relied on the assumption that the reported damaged crown corks corresponded to the entire production of Aerated Water, without considering other essential components. The Tribunal also noted the appellants' significant production volume and duty payments, underscoring the insignificance of the reported crown cork wastage in relation to their overall operations. Ultimately, the Tribunal found the impugned order unsustainable due to the absence of factual support for the duty demand and set it aside, allowing the appeal.
-
1995 (11) TMI 472
Issues Involved: 1. Conviction under Section 302/201 IPC. 2. Circumstantial evidence: "last seen together." 3. Extra-judicial confession. 4. Recovery of dead body and its identification. 5. Disclosure statement leading to recovery of bones.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Conviction under Section 302/201 IPC: The appellant was convicted by the Special Court, Patiala, for the offenses under Sections 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), resulting in life imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 2,000, with an additional two years of rigorous imprisonment (RI) for default on the fine and two years RI for the offense under Section 201 IPC. Both sentences were to run concurrently. The appellant challenged his conviction and sentence under Section 14 of the Terrorist Affected Areas (Special Courts) Act, 1984.
2. Circumstantial Evidence: "Last Seen Together": The prosecution's case was based on circumstantial evidence, primarily the "last seen together" theory. PW-2, Tejinder Kaur, testified that the appellant took their daughters, Rozy and Pinky, on March 18, 1984, with the intention to kill them. Balwant Kaur, PW-4, allegedly heard the appellant declare his intent to kill the daughters at the bus stand. However, the court found inconsistencies and improbabilities in the testimonies of PW-2 and PW-4. The court noted a significant delay in lodging the FIR and found the conduct of PW-2 unnatural and untrustworthy. The evidence of PW-5, Mohinder Singh, was also found unreliable due to contradictions and the strained relations within the family. Consequently, the court concluded that the prosecution failed to establish the "last seen together" circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt.
3. Extra-Judicial Confession: The prosecution relied on an extra-judicial confession allegedly made by the appellant to PW-3, Satya Walia. The court highlighted that extra-judicial confessions are inherently weak evidence and require corroboration. The delay in lodging the complaint and the suspicious circumstances surrounding the confession led the court to rule out this evidence. The court noted that PW-3's statement was inconsistent and lacked credibility, further weakening the prosecution's case.
4. Recovery of Dead Body and Its Identification: The prosecution presented the recovery of Rozy's dead body from a canal and its identification by the appellant as a key piece of evidence. However, the court found that the identification process was flawed. PW-6 and PW-7, who testified about the recovery, did not know the appellant beforehand, and no identification parade was conducted. The court emphasized the importance of proper identification procedures, noting that the prosecution failed to provide a reasonable explanation for the lack of an identification parade. Consequently, the court ruled that the prosecution could not establish that the recovered dead body was that of Rozy or that the appellant had claimed it as his child's body.
5. Disclosure Statement Leading to Recovery of Bones: The prosecution also relied on a disclosure statement by the appellant, leading to the recovery of bones from the alleged place of cremation. The Trial Court had already ruled out the disclosure statement and the recovery of bones, and the Supreme Court agreed with this assessment. The court found that the bones recovered were not conclusively identified as Rozy's, and there were discrepancies in the prosecution's evidence regarding the age and type of bangles found. Additionally, key witnesses to the disclosure statement and recovery were not examined, further casting doubt on the prosecution's case.
Conclusion: The Supreme Court found that none of the four circumstances relied upon by the prosecution were established beyond a reasonable doubt. The court concluded that the Trial Court had erred in convicting the appellant based on weak and uncorroborated circumstantial evidence. The appeal was allowed, and the conviction and sentence of the appellant were set aside. The appellant's bail bonds were discharged.
-
1995 (11) TMI 471
Issues Involved: 1. Jurisdiction of the court to entertain the application. 2. Interpretation of the order dated October 31, 1984, regarding the transfer of leasehold rights. 3. Whether the transfer in question is a first or second transfer. 4. Obligation to pay differential premium for the transfer. 5. Validity of respondent No. 1's demand for premium. 6. Compliance with transfer guidelines by respondent No. 1. 7. Conditions to be imposed on the applicants for granting relief.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Jurisdiction of the court to entertain the application: The court asserted its jurisdiction under Section 457(1)(c) of the Companies Act, 1956, which empowers the liquidator to sell the company's property with the court's sanction. The court emphasized that it has the authority to issue necessary directions to effectuate the sale of the company's assets, including leasehold rights, during winding-up proceedings. The court dismissed the contention that Section 446 was relevant, clarifying that it deals with the stay of suits or proceedings, which was not applicable in this case.
2. Interpretation of the order dated October 31, 1984, regarding the transfer of leasehold rights: The court examined the order dated October 31, 1984, which granted consent for the transfer of leasehold rights without charging additional premium. The court noted that Clause 3 of the order restricted further transfers without fresh consent but clarified that the current transfer was the first transfer by the official liquidator to applicant No. 2 as a nominee of applicant No. 1. Thus, the order's restriction on further transfers did not apply.
3. Whether the transfer in question is a first or second transfer: The court determined that this was a first transfer by the official liquidator to applicant No. 2 as a nominee of applicant No. 1. The leasehold rights had not been previously transferred to applicant No. 1, and therefore, the restriction on further transfers did not apply. The court emphasized that the official liquidator's deed of transfer would be the first deed of transfer.
4. Obligation to pay differential premium for the transfer: The court rejected the respondent's demand for a differential premium of Rs. 65 lakhs, stating that the order dated October 31, 1984, exempted such a payment. The court held that respondent No. 1 was bound by its earlier decision to grant consent for the transfer without charging additional premium.
5. Validity of respondent No. 1's demand for premium: The court found no merit in respondent No. 1's demand for premium, reiterating that the transfer was the first transfer and that the earlier order exempted the payment of additional premium. The court also dismissed the allegation that applicant No. 2 was incorporated to evade the transfer fee, stating that respondent No. 1 failed to prove any fraud or circumvention.
6. Compliance with transfer guidelines by respondent No. 1: The court referred to the transfer guidelines published by respondent No. 1, which stipulated that no differential premium was payable for formal transfers, including transfers between holding and subsidiary companies. The court directed the applicants to pay the standard transfer fee of Rs. 10 per square meter and comply with the guidelines, ensuring the relationship between the holding and subsidiary companies continued for at least two years.
7. Conditions to be imposed on the applicants for granting relief: The court imposed several conditions on the applicants to ensure compliance and protect the interests of respondent No. 1: - The official liquidator was directed to execute the transfer deed in favor of applicant No. 2 within four weeks. - The applicants were required to pay the standard transfer fee of Rs. 3,27,600. - Applicants Nos. 1 and 2 were to file written undertakings ensuring the holding-subsidiary relationship continued for two years. - Applicant No. 1 was to furnish a written guarantee for applicant No. 2's performance for two years. - All costs, charges, and expenses related to the transfer were to be borne by applicant No. 2.
Conclusion: The court granted the relief sought by the applicants, directing the official liquidator to execute the transfer deed and respondent No. 1 to recognize the transfer without charging additional premium, subject to the conditions imposed. The court emphasized the binding nature of the earlier order and the compliance with the transfer guidelines.
-
1995 (11) TMI 470
Issues Involved: 1. Validity of the seizure under Section 110(2) of the Customs Act. 2. Whether there was a reason to believe for the seizure under Section 110(1) of the Customs Act. 3. Legality of the seizure by the commercial tax authorities.
Summary:
1. Validity of the Seizure under Section 110(2) of the Customs Act: The petitioners contended that the show cause notice regarding the seizures dated 3.3.94 and 10.3.94 was not served upon the owners of the goods within six months, making the seizure illegal under Section 110(2) of the Customs Act. The court examined whether the notices were served in accordance with Section 153 of the Customs Act, which allows service by registered post. The court concluded that the notices were validly served when sent by registered post and the burden of proof to rebut this presumption lay on the petitioners. The court held that the notices were presumed to be served within a reasonable time, thus the seizure was valid.
2. Reason to Believe for the Seizure under Section 110(1) of the Customs Act: The petitioners argued that there was no reason to believe for the seizures made on 16.2.94, 4.4.94, 10.3.94, and 7.4.94, making them illegal and without jurisdiction. The court noted that the Customs authorities had reasons to believe that the petitioners were attempting to export goods illegally by mis-declaration. The court emphasized that the belief should be considered as occurring in the minds of the seizing authority and not the court. The court found that the reasons for the belief were sufficiently documented and justified the seizures. The court upheld the seizures as legal, stating that the Customs authorities had the right to seize the goods based on the belief that they were liable for confiscation.
3. Legality of the Seizure by the Commercial Tax Authorities: In the case of Tirupati, it was argued that the seizure by the commercial tax authorities was also illegal as no reasons to believe were recorded for such seizure. The court examined the records and found that the commercial tax authorities had reasons to believe that the goods were liable for confiscation. The court held that the seizure by the commercial tax authorities was legal and justified.
Conclusion: The court dismissed both writ applications, holding that the seizures were valid and legal. The court emphasized that the Customs authorities had acted within their jurisdiction and had sufficient reasons to believe that the goods were liable for confiscation. The court also noted that the petitioners could raise their contentions in the confiscation proceedings before the competent authority.
-
1995 (11) TMI 469
Issues: 1. Maintainability of petition under Sections 397-398 of the Companies Act 2. Compliance with Section 399 of the Act for maintaining a petition 3. Jurisdiction of the court to entertain a petition under Sections 397-398 4. Relief sought under Section 397-398 versus winding up of the company 5. Just and equitable grounds for winding up the company
Analysis:
Issue 1: Maintainability of petition under Sections 397-398 of the Companies Act The petitioners filed a petition under Sections 397-398 of the Companies Act, seeking relief against oppression and prejudicial activities of the respondents. The court found that the petitioners did not comply with Section 399 of the Act, which is a condition precedent for maintaining a petition under Sections 397-398. The court held that the petition under Sections 397-398 was not maintainable due to the lack of compliance with Section 399.
Issue 2: Compliance with Section 399 of the Act for maintaining a petition The court emphasized that obtaining and filing consent in writing is crucial for maintaining a petition under Sections 397-398. The court noted that the petitioners failed to comply with Section 399, which is a jurisdictional requirement. The court rejected an amendment sought by the petitioner after a lapse of time, as it did not relate to procedural matters, and the petitioners did not show any special considerations in their favor.
Issue 3: Jurisdiction of the court to entertain a petition under Sections 397-398 The court clarified that jurisdiction to entertain a petition under Sections 397-398, post an amendment in 1991, vests with the Company Law Board, not the court. The court rejected the amendment sought by the petitioner, leading to the conclusion that the petition under Sections 397-398 was not maintainable. However, the court allowed the winding-up petition to continue.
Issue 4: Relief sought under Section 397-398 versus winding up of the company The petition primarily sought relief under Sections 397-398, but also included an alternative prayer for winding up the company. The court observed that the petition was primarily filed under Sections 397-398, and the allegations and averments supported this relief. The court dismissed the winding-up petition as the company was in a sound financial position and continuously provided bonuses to shareholders.
Issue 5: Just and equitable grounds for winding up the company The court highlighted the principle that winding up based on just and equitable grounds should be a last resort when other remedies are not efficacious. The court emphasized the importance of disclosing alternative remedies available to petitioners when seeking winding up. The court dismissed the winding-up petition as the company's financial position was sound, and the mere allegation of production fall in some years was not sufficient grounds for winding up.
In conclusion, the court dismissed the petition for winding up the company, emphasizing that the petitioner failed to establish grounds for such relief and did not comply with the necessary legal requirements, while also highlighting the importance of considering just and equitable grounds for winding up as a last resort.
-
1995 (11) TMI 468
Issues Involved: 1. Locus standi of the petitioners. 2. Relegation to a civil suit. 3. Violation of undertaking given to the Company Law Board (CLB). 4. Whether the sale of shares constitutes the sale of an undertaking. 5. Violation of Section 84(2) of the Companies Act and the Companies (Issue of Share Certificates) Rules, 1960. 6. Whether the removal of SSPL's name and entry of respondents Nos. 17, 18, and 19 in the register of members of GWL was "without sufficient cause". 7. Whether the prayer for rectification of the register of members is to be granted.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Locus Standi: The respondents argued that the petitioners lacked locus standi as they had no stake in the impugned shares and did not seek to have their names entered in the register of members. The petitioners countered that Tracstar, as a member of GWL, had the right to seek rectification under Section 111(4) of the Companies Act, 1956, which allows any member of a company to file a petition for rectification. The Company Law Board (CLB) agreed with the petitioners, stating that the section does not require a member to show personal interest in the shares in question, and thus Tracstar had locus standi. Similarly, the majority shareholders of SSPL (petitioners Nos. 2 and 3) were deemed to have locus standi as they were aggrieved by the transfer of shares. Petitioners Nos. 4 and 5, being shareholders of petitioners Nos. 2 and 3, were also allowed to join as parties.
2. Relegation to a Civil Suit: The respondents contended that the matter involved allegations of fraud and complex issues requiring oral evidence, and thus should be relegated to a civil suit. The petitioners argued that the facts were clear from the pleadings and documents, and the CLB could decide the matter. The CLB held that it had the discretion to decide whether to entertain the case or to relegate it to a civil suit, and in this case, it chose to deal with the matter itself based on the available evidence.
3. Violation of Undertaking: The petitioners argued that SSPL had violated an undertaking given to the CLB in C.P. No. 29 of 1992 not to dispose of the shares. The respondents countered that the undertaking was only valid until the disposal of the petition. The CLB noted that while the undertaking was intended to maintain the status quo during the proceedings, the petitioners should have sought an injunction from the High Court during the appeal process. The CLB concluded that there was no intentional violation of the undertaking by SSPL.
4. Sale of an Undertaking: The petitioners claimed that the sale of the shares constituted the sale of an undertaking under Section 293(1)(a) of the Act, which requires general body approval. The respondents argued that shares do not constitute an undertaking. The CLB agreed with the respondents, citing various precedents that an undertaking refers to the totality of the business and not just one asset. Thus, the sale of shares did not amount to the sale of an undertaking.
5. Violation of Section 84(2) and Share Certificate Rules: The petitioners argued that GWL violated Section 84(2) by issuing duplicate certificates without proper satisfaction that the originals were lost. The respondents contended that the term "lost" included deprivation and that GWL acted within its rights. The CLB found that GWL was aware that the certificates were with Tracstar and should have issued a notice to Tracstar before issuing duplicates. The CLB also held that the issue of duplicate certificates by a committee of less than three directors violated the Companies (Issue of Share Certificates) Rules, 1960.
6. Without Sufficient Cause: The CLB examined the circumstances of the transfer, noting the rapid sequence of events and the lack of transparency in the decision-making process by SSPL and GWL. The CLB found that the transfer was not bona fide and was done with an ulterior motive to prevent the majority shareholders of SSPL from controlling the shares. The CLB concluded that the removal of SSPL's name and the entry of the transferees' names were "without sufficient cause."
7. Relief: The CLB directed that the names of respondents Nos. 17 to 19 be removed from the register of members and the name of SSPL be restored. To protect the interests of the transferees, SSPL was ordered to pay them either the consideration they paid for the shares or the prevailing market price, whichever was higher. Until the payment was made, SSPL was not to exercise voting rights or transfer the shares. The duplicate certificates were to be surrendered and canceled.
In summary, the CLB found in favor of the petitioners, holding that the transfer of shares was done without sufficient cause and directing rectification of the register of members.
-
1995 (11) TMI 467
Issues Involved: 1. Jurisdiction of Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT) to hear mortgage suits. 2. Definition and scope of "debt" under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993. 3. Procedural and substantive rights of mortgagors under the Transfer of Property Act and Civil Procedure Code (CPC).
Summary:
1. Jurisdiction of Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT) to hear mortgage suits: The review application raised the issue of whether the Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT) has the jurisdiction to hear, try, and dispose of mortgage suits. The court initially directed the records to be transmitted to the DRT, but the defendants sought a review, arguing that the suit was within the jurisdictional competence of the civil court.
2. Definition and scope of "debt" under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993: The court examined whether a suit for recovery of mortgage debt falls within the jurisdiction of the DRT u/s 17 of the Act. The term "debt" as defined in Section 2(g) of the Act includes any liability alleged as due from any person by a bank or financial institution, whether secured or unsecured. The court concluded that a mortgage debt is included within the meaning of "debt" as defined u/s 2(g) of the Act, and thus, a suit based on a mortgage is a suit for recovery of a debt.
3. Procedural and substantive rights of mortgagors under the Transfer of Property Act and Civil Procedure Code (CPC): The defendants argued that the Transfer of Property Act and Order 34 CPC confer certain rights and protections on mortgagors, which would be lost before the DRT. The court rejected this argument, stating that the substantive law of mortgage and the covenants in the deed would still bind the Tribunal. The Act's provisions must receive an object-oriented interpretation to expedite the recovery of debts, and the Tribunal has the competence to try claims for recovery of debts based on mortgages.
Conclusion: The court held that the DRT has jurisdiction over suits for recovery of mortgage debts, and the term "debt" under the Act includes mortgage debts. The review application seeking to recall the order transmitting the suit to the DRT was rejected.
-
1995 (11) TMI 466
Issues: 1. Territorial jurisdiction of the court. 2. Validity of the interim order. 3. Application of the arbitration clause. 4. Allegations of conspiracy.
Analysis:
1. Territorial Jurisdiction of the Court: The main contention raised was whether the court had jurisdiction over the matter. The petitioner argued that the conspiracy and unfair treatment occurred in Calcutta, giving the court jurisdiction. However, the respondent argued that the entire cause of action arose outside the court's jurisdiction, as the tender process, submission, and arbitration clause specified Delhi. The court cited precedents to emphasize that for jurisdiction under Article 226, the cause of action must arise within the court's territorial limits. The court concluded that the records and actions related to the matter were outside its jurisdiction, leading to the dismissal of the writ application.
2. Validity of the Interim Order: The petitioner sought to vacate the interim orders of stay. The court, after determining lack of territorial jurisdiction, declared the interim order null and void. It highlighted that if a court lacks jurisdiction, any orders issued are invalid. The court dismissed the writ application due to the absence of territorial jurisdiction, allowing the petitioners to seek appropriate relief in a suitable forum.
3. Application of the Arbitration Clause: The respondent argued that the arbitration clause should apply, referencing a Delhi High Court decision. The clause specified that all disputes would be arbitrated in Delhi. The court acknowledged the validity of contractual agreements conferring jurisdiction on a specific court by mutual consent. It noted that the arbitration clause directed all disputes to be litigated in Delhi, further supporting the lack of jurisdiction for the current court.
4. Allegations of Conspiracy: The petitioner alleged conspiracy and unfair treatment, claiming jurisdiction based on these actions. However, the court found no substantial evidence to support these allegations. It emphasized that the mere presence of an office in Calcutta did not automatically confer jurisdiction. The court cited previous judgments to support its stance that the location of the office alone does not establish a cause of action within the court's jurisdiction.
In conclusion, the court ruled that it lacked territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ application due to the absence of any part of the cause of action within its limits. The interim order was vacated, and the writ application was dismissed, with the petitioners granted the liberty to pursue appropriate relief in a suitable forum. The judgment focused on the importance of territorial jurisdiction and adherence to contractual agreements, ultimately leading to the dismissal of the case before the court.
-
1995 (11) TMI 465
... ... ... ... ..... S.B. Majmudar, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
........
|