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DEFINITION OF 'MANUFACTURING PROCESS' IN ONE STATUTE CANNOT BE APPLIED TO ANOTHER STATUTE

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DEFINITION OF 'MANUFACTURING PROCESS' IN ONE STATUTE CANNOT BE APPLIED TO ANOTHER STATUTE
Mr. M. GOVINDARAJAN By: Mr. M. GOVINDARAJAN
September 7, 2009
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            Every Act has a separate part containing definition of various terms for the words used in that Act. Similarly also are in the Rules made under the provisions of the relevant Act. The meaning of a particular word used in the Act is constrained to the definition of that word enumerated in that Act.  Different meanings are adopted in different laws for a same word. For example the word 'wage' has not uniform definition in all labor laws. Each labor law has its own meaning for the word 'wage'. In such case the meaning of the term 'wage' in one Act could not be applied to the meaning of the term 'wage' in another Act.   Likewise the definition of 'manufacturing process' in one statute cannot be applied to another statute.  This is well explained by the Supreme Court in 'Qazi Noorul H.H.H. Petrol Pump V. Dy. Director, ESI Corporation' - 2009 -TMI - 34786 - (SUPREME COURT).

            The matrix of the fact of the case runs as follows:

            The appellant is running a petrol pump (public retail outlet) for dispensing petrol/diesel. The Deputy Director, Employees' State Insurance Corporation, Regional Office, Kanpur issued a notice to the appellant directing the appellant to make contribution under the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 ('Act' for short) from August 1993 to May, 2000 and interest on the aforesaid amount failing which recovery shall be issued under Sections 45-C and 45-G of the Act. The appellant filed a writ petition before Allahabad High Court against this. The High Court dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant. Aggrieved by the order of the High Court the appellant filed this appeal before the Supreme Court. 

            The question framed by the Supreme Court in this case is whether the appellant is covered by the ESI Act. The Act in the first instance applies to all non seasonal factories. Sec. 2(12) of the Act defines the term 'factory' as any premises including the precincts thereof-

·  whereon ten or more persons are employed or were employed for wages on any day of the preceding twelve months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of power or is ordinarily so carried on; or

·  whereon twenty or more persons are employed or were employed for wages on any day of the preceding twelve months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on without the aid of the power or is ordinarily so carried on, but does not include a mine subject to the operation of the Mines Act, 1952 or a railway running shed.

The Act adopted the definition of the term 'manufacturing process' as defined in the Factories Act and thus holds good for determining the applicability of the Act. The term 'manufacturing process' has been defined in the Factories Act, 1948 as under:

"Manufacturing Process" means any process for-

·  making, altering, repairing, ornamenting, finishing, packing, oiling, washing, cleaning, breaking up, demolishing or otherwise treating or adapting any article or substance with a view to its use, sale, transport, delivery or disposal;

·  pumping oil or water or sewage or any other substance;

·  generating, transforming or transmitting power; or

·  composing types for printing, printing by letter press, lithography, photo-gravure or other similar processes, or book binding; or

·  constructing, reconstructing, repairing, refilling, finishing or breaking up ships or vessels; or

·  preserving or storing any articles in cold storage;

·  tapping, collecting, cross matching and keeping in bottles, the blood or whole human blood.

As per the definition of 'manufacturing process' as applicable to the Act, pumping oil is applicable to ESI. 

            The Supreme Court analyzed the term 'manufacturing process'. It may be stated that the words 'manufacturing process' in different statues have different meanings. In Central Excise Act, the word 'manufacture' means bringing into existence a new different commodity, though this is not the definition of 'manufacturing process' in the Factories Act. One cannot apply the definition of 'manufacturing process' in one statute to another statute.

            Pumping oil is manufacturing process under the provisions of ESI Act.  The appellant does the work of pumping oil.  When one goes to a petrol pump for getting petrol or diesel the petrol or diesel is in a tank and it does not on its own flow from the tank to the pipe and thereafter into the vehicle, but only by means of a pump by using power. 

            The appellant contended that one should see the object and intention of the statute. The Supreme Court held that it is well settled that once the statute is clear, the literal rule of interpretation applies and there is no need to go into the object and intention of the statute. In this case Section 2(14-AA) of the Act states that the 'manufacturing process' shall have the meaning assigned to it in the Factories Act, 1948. In the Factories Act, 1948, Section 2(k) of the Act includes pumping oil as a manufacturing process.

            The Supreme Court held that the only rule of interpretation which applies to the facts of the present case is the literal rule of interpretation, which means that we should go simply by the wording of the statute and nothing else and there is no scope for applying any other rule of interpretation. In the opinion of the Supreme Court, the language used in Section 2(k)(ii) of the Factories Act, 1948 is clear. Hence the Act applies to the appellant and the Department was right in issuing notice to the appellant for making contribution and interest thereon for the period in question.

 

By: Mr. M. GOVINDARAJAN - September 7, 2009

 

 

 

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