1957 (9) TMI 42 - SC - Indian Laws

Whether after the commencement of the Constitution this Court could exercise its newly acquired jurisdiction under Art. 32 and issue a writ of habeas corpus as the detention of the petitioners was continuing even after the commencement of the Constitution? Held that - Order of dismissal having been passed before the Constitution and rights having accrued to the appellant State and liabilities having attached to the respondent before the Constitution came into force, the subsequent conferment of jurisdiction and powers on the High Court can have no retrospective operation on such rights and liabilities. Even if the order of dismissal of the respondent was a nullity on the ground that it was passed by disregarding the rules of natural justice, the High Court could not properly be asked to exercise its newly acquired jurisdiction and powers under Art. 226 to correct errors, irregularities or illegalities committed by the inferior departmental tribunal before the commencement of the Constitution, for then there will be no limit to its going backward and that will certainly amount to giving the provisions of Art. 226 a retroactive operation. This aspect of the matter does not appear to have been pressed in the High Court or adverted to by it. It is only on this ground that we are constrained, not without regret, to accept this appeal.

Issues Involved:
1. Jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226.
2. Principles of natural justice and fair play.
3. Validity of departmental proceedings and orders.
4. Merger of orders and retrospective application of the Constitution.
5. Availability and exhaustion of alternative remedies.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226:
The High Court exercised its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash the departmental proceedings and the orders passed therein, including the respondent's dismissal. The appellant State contended that the High Court had no power to deal with the order of dismissal, which was passed before the Constitution came into force. However, the High Court held that the order of dismissal did not become final until the Inspector General of Police dismissed the revision application on April 22, 1950, after the Constitution had come into force. Therefore, the High Court had jurisdiction to exercise its powers under Article 226.

2. Principles of Natural Justice and Fair Play:
The High Court found that the rules of natural justice and fair play were disregarded in the departmental trial. The District Superintendent of Police, who presided over the trial, also gave evidence in the proceedings, thereby becoming disqualified from continuing as the judge. This dual role created a bias against the respondent, vitiating the trial. The High Court concluded that the presiding officer had become disqualified on the ground of bias, and the departmental trial conducted by him was invalid.

3. Validity of Departmental Proceedings and Orders:
The High Court quashed the departmental proceedings and set aside the orders of dismissal passed by the District Superintendent of Police, the Deputy Inspector General of Police, and the Inspector General of Police. The High Court directed that if it were desired to proceed against the respondent, the trial should be presided over by a person other than the District Superintendent of Police who gave evidence in the case.

4. Merger of Orders and Retrospective Application of the Constitution:
The appellant State argued that the original order of dismissal passed before the Constitution could not be challenged under Article 226. However, the High Court held that the order of dismissal merged into the subsequent orders passed on appeal and revision. As the final order was passed after the Constitution came into force, the High Court had jurisdiction to quash all the orders. The Supreme Court, however, disagreed with this reasoning, stating that the original order of dismissal remained effective on its own strength and did not gain greater efficacy from subsequent orders.

5. Availability and Exhaustion of Alternative Remedies:
The appellant State contended that the respondent should have exhausted the alternative remedies available under the Police Act and the Regulations before filing a writ petition under Article 226. The Supreme Court acknowledged that while the existence of alternative remedies does not per se bar the issuance of a writ of certiorari, it is a rule of policy and convenience that the aggrieved party should exhaust other statutory remedies first. However, in cases where there is a denial of natural justice, the superior court may exercise its power to issue a writ of certiorari.

Separate Judgments Delivered:
- Majority Opinion: The appeal was allowed, and the High Court's decision was overturned. The Supreme Court held that the High Court could not exercise its powers under Article 226 to quash orders passed before the Constitution came into force.
- Dissenting Opinion (BOSE J.): Justice Bose disagreed with the majority, arguing that the High Court had jurisdiction to interfere under Article 226. He emphasized the importance of ensuring justice and fair play, and he would have dismissed the appeal.

Order:
In accordance with the majority opinion, the appeal was allowed.

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