2016 (3) TMI 660 - HC - Customs

Seeking direction to stop proceeding with the cases under Section 16 of the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulations) Act, 1992 - No jurisdiction of Director General to decide the review applications filed at the instance of DRI - Held that - Section 16 of the Act, 1992 confers very wide powers of review upon the Director General. Also it contemplates review of judicial orders inasmuch as it states that the reviewing authority may call for and examine the records of any proceedings . Therefore, the Director General has full power to deal with an application filed by DRI inasmuch as the power of review can be exercised by the Director General either suo motu or otherwise . - Decided against the petitioner

Summary

Issues:
- Jurisdiction of the Director General of Foreign Trade under Section 16 of the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992.
- Applicability of the judgment in Samir Kohli & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors.
- Interpretation of Section 16 of the Act, 1992 regarding the power of review by the Director General.
- Comparison of the provisions of the Delhi Development Act, 1957 with the Act, 1992.
- Reliance on Supreme Court judgments in Union of India and Others Vs. Dhanwanti Devi and Others, and Padma Sundara Rao Vs. State of T.N. and Others.

Jurisdiction of the Director General:
The writ petitions sought to restrain the Director General of Foreign Trade from proceeding with cases under Section 16 of the Act, 1992. The petitioners argued that the Director General lacked jurisdiction to decide review applications filed by the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI). However, the court held that Section 16 confers broad review powers on the Director General, allowing for a comprehensive examination of decisions or orders. The court emphasized that the Director General could review judicial orders and exercise the power of review suo motu or upon application.

Applicability of Samir Kohli Judgment:
The petitioners relied on the judgment in Samir Kohli & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors. to support their argument against the Director General's jurisdiction. However, the court found this judgment inapplicable to the present case as it pertained to Section 41 of the Delhi Development Act, 1957, which differed significantly from the provisions of the Act, 1992. The court highlighted the distinct nature of the two legislative frameworks, emphasizing the need to consider the specific context and provisions of each statute.

Interpretation of Section 16 of the Act, 1992:
Analyzing Section 16 of the Act, 1992, the court noted that the provision explicitly allowed for the review of judicial orders by the Director General. By enabling the examination of records from any proceeding, the section granted the Director General broad authority to assess the correctness, legality, or propriety of decisions or orders. This wide scope of review powers distinguished Section 16 from the provisions of the Delhi Development Act, 1957, reinforcing the Director General's authority in the context of foreign trade regulations.

Comparison with Delhi Development Act, 1957:
Drawing a parallel between the Act, 1992, and the Delhi Development Act, 1957, the court underscored the differences in their statutory frameworks. Citing Supreme Court precedents, the court emphasized the importance of contextual analysis in legal interpretations. The court highlighted that decisions should not be applied mechanically without considering the specific factual and legal contexts in which they were made, reinforcing the distinctiveness of each legislative scheme.

Reliance on Supreme Court Judgments:
In relying on Supreme Court judgments, including Union of India and Others Vs. Dhanwanti Devi and Others, and Padma Sundara Rao Vs. State of T.N. and Others, the court emphasized the need for a nuanced approach to legal precedents. The court stressed the importance of aligning judicial decisions with the factual circumstances of each case, cautioning against a rigid application of legal principles divorced from the specific context. Ultimately, the court dismissed the writ petitions, finding them lacking in merit based on the comprehensive analysis of the relevant legal provisions and precedents.