2022 (8) TMI 2 - SC - Indian Laws

Validity of Notification dated 23.6.2005 - Constitutional Validity of Section 20 of Karnataka Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1973 - challenge to the Notification on the ground that the impugned notification was issued without adequately considering the objections taken by the writ petitioners and in excess of the power vested in the authority - lapsing of the acquisition which was in furtherance of the show cause notice issued under the 1973 Act on 14.10.1982 - HELD THAT - The High Court has dealt with the question of validity of Section 20 in a casual manner. That cannot be countenanced inasmuch as the Constitutional Court for answering the assail on this count, in the first place, need to examine the scheme of the 1973 Act, its objects and purposes as also the question whether the payment of amount specified as three hundred times the property tax payable in respect of such land on the date of publication would be a permissible method of determination of the amount or is per se unjust, unfair or unreasonable? Concededly, there can be different methods for valuation of property, including the method of capitalisation value. Further, it has to be considered as to whether it is an objective method and not illusory (as it is the case of the State that the amount determined under Section 20 is quite substantial, i.e., Rs.3.52 crore), in the present case. Additionally, if the 1973 Act and the provisions are ascribable to the objective predicated in Article 39(b) of the Constitution, then it would get protection or immunity from challenge in terms of Article 14, 19 or 31 of the Constitution. Furthermore, even if the High Court was right in observing that the 1973 Act came into force prior to coming into force of 44th Amendment to the Constitution on 20.6.1979, it would make no difference as Article 31C was already in force with effect from 20.4.1972 to the extent it has been validated by this Court in His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru 1973 (4) TMI 114 - SUPREME COURT . The High Court had held that in absence of an express provision regarding lapsing of acquisition in the 1973 Act unlike the 1894 or 2013 Act, it is not open to grant relief of setting aside impugned notification dated 23.6.2005 on account of efflux of time. In that, show cause notice (preliminary notification) is ordinarily issued when the competent authority is satisfied that for the purpose of executing any work of improvement in relation to any slum area or any building in such area or for the purpose of redeveloping any slum clearance area , or for the purpose of rehabilitating slum dwellers, it is necessary to acquire any land and it has been so decided in pursuance of the said provision. It is deemed appropriate to relegate the parties before the learned Single Judge of the High Court for reconsideration of the writ petitions afresh on its own merits and in accordance with law with liberty to both parties to amend the writ petition or file further better affidavit to defend the provisions in question and the action of acquisition, as the case may be - The appeals are disposed of.

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Constitutional validity of Section 20 of the Karnataka Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1973.
2. Adequate consideration of objections by the writ petitioners.
3. Lapsing of acquisition due to efflux of time.
4. Method of determining compensation for land acquisition.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Constitutional Validity of Section 20 of the 1973 Act:
The primary issue concerned the constitutional validity of Section 20 of the Karnataka Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1973. The section provided for compensation at the rate of three hundred times the property tax for acquiring land, which the petitioners argued was not equivalent to the fair market value, making it an illusory amount. The Single Judge of the High Court declared Section 20 as ultra vires, stating that the compensation must reflect the market value of the land, as per Sections 23 and 24 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The Division Bench upheld this declaration but noted that prescribing a new method for determining compensation was beyond the court's jurisdiction, leaving it to the State to amend the law. The Supreme Court noted that the High Court dealt with the issue in a cryptic manner without thorough analysis and remanded the matter for reconsideration, emphasizing the need to examine whether the method prescribed in Section 20 was just, fair, and reasonable.

2. Adequate Consideration of Objections:
The writ petitioners contended that their objections to the notification were not adequately considered. The Single Judge rejected this plea, and the Division Bench did not re-examine it due to the withdrawal of a related cross-appeal. The Supreme Court did not delve into this issue in detail, as it was not the primary focus of the appeals before it.

3. Lapsing of Acquisition Due to Efflux of Time:
The petitioners argued that the acquisition proceedings had lapsed due to the significant time gap between the preliminary notification in 1982 and the final notification in 2005. The Single Judge found no provision in the 1973 Act analogous to the 1894 Act that would support this claim. The Division Bench did not address this issue due to the withdrawal of a related cross-appeal. The Supreme Court noted that the High Court should re-examine this issue, considering whether the exercise of power was within a reasonable time frame.

4. Method of Determining Compensation for Land Acquisition:
The Single Judge held that compensation should be determined based on the market value of the land, not on the basis of property tax, as prescribed in Section 20 of the 1973 Act. The Division Bench modified this direction, stating that it was beyond the court's jurisdiction to prescribe a new method and that it was up to the State to amend the law. The Supreme Court emphasized the need for a thorough examination of whether the method prescribed in Section 20 was just, fair, and reasonable, and whether it provided an objective and substantial amount.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court set aside the judgments of the High Court and remanded the matter for reconsideration. The High Court was directed to re-examine the writ petitions afresh, including the constitutional validity of Section 20, the adequacy of consideration of objections, and the lapsing of acquisition. The parties were given liberty to amend their pleadings and file further affidavits. The Supreme Court clarified that the declaration of Section 20 as ultra vires by the High Court stood effaced, and the provision should be given full effect until further orders. The High Court was urged to dispose of the petitions expeditiously.