2024 (2) TMI 99 - HC - Customs

Refusal to amend 21 bills of entry - interpretation of statute - scope of Section 149 of the Customs Act - HELD THAT - The text of the proviso makes it clear that amendment is permissible only on the basis of documentary evidence that was in existence at the time the goods were cleared, deposited or exported. Significantly, the provision does not record that the relevant documentary evidence should have been produced or submitted at the time of clearance of goods. In this connection, learned counsel for the petitioner also placed on record a communication dated 13.11.2020 with regard to difficulties faced by traders in the implementation of CAROTAR. The said communication recognises that importers are not required to submit Form I while filing bills of entry as per Rule 4 of CAROTAR and that Rule 5 does not prescribe that the proper officer should ask for Form I in every case where a preferential duty claim is made. The said communication is in consonance with Section 149 of the Customs Act. The finding by Deputy Commissioner has been recorded based on the misconception that the ambit of Section 149 is confined to the rectification of inadvertent and/ or bona fide errors. There is nothing in the language of Section 149 that justifies such a curtailed reading of the scope thereof. The impugned order calls for interference. As indicated earlier, the relevant question to be considered when an application for amendment is submitted is whether documentary evidence in support of the claim for exemption from BCD was in existence at the time of clearance of goods. The matter is remanded to the Deputy Commissioner for reconsideration so as to determine whether Form I in respect of bills of entry at Sl.Nos.1 8 of the table at page 2 of the impugned order and both the certificate of origin and Form I in respect of bills of entry at Sl.Nos.9 21 of the table at page 2 of the impugned order were in existence at the time of clearance of the goods under the relevant bills of entry. Petition disposed off by way of remand.

Summary

Issues:
The petitioner challenges the refusal to amend 21 bills of entry related to imported goods for automotive parts. The main issue revolves around the interpretation of Section 149 of the Customs Act regarding the authorization of document amendments after goods have been cleared for home consumption.

Details of the Judgment:

Issue 1: Interpretation of Section 149 of the Customs Act
The petitioner imported components for automotive parts from the Republic of Korea and the Kingdom of Thailand under specific exemption Notifications. The petitioner claimed Basic Customs Duty (BCD) exemption for some bills of entry but cleared others for home consumption due to delays. The request to extend exemption benefits and reassess the bills of entry was initially rejected by the 2nd respondent. The petitioner argued that the rejection was based on a misinterpretation of Section 149, which allows for amendments based on documentary evidence existing at the time of clearance. The court agreed with the petitioner's interpretation and remanded the matter for reconsideration by the Deputy Commissioner to verify the existence of necessary documents at the time of clearance.

Issue 2: Misconception in the Impugned Order
The impugned order incorrectly limited the scope of Section 149 to rectifying inadvertent or bona fide errors. The court clarified that the provision allows for amendments based on documentary evidence existing at the time of clearance, not just for error rectification. The Deputy Commissioner was directed to reevaluate the petitioner's request by verifying the presence of required documents at the time of clearance for all relevant bills of entry.

Conclusion:
The court found in favor of the petitioner, emphasizing the importance of verifying the existence of necessary documentary evidence at the time of clearance for claiming exemption benefits under the Customs Act. The matter was remanded for reconsideration by the Deputy Commissioner, with a directive to provide a personal hearing to the petitioner. The reevaluation process was mandated to be completed within two months from the date of the court's order, with no costs imposed on either party.