9911796707
TMI Blog2012 (5) TMI 236X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ld that:- There evidences to attribute that the said transaction took place only to benefit the managing trustee or his relatives except that the funds of the trust were routed through the trustees to the vendor which merely exhibits the expediency which prevailed at that relevant time. Cancellation of registration - charitable purpose - section 2(15) - held that:- it makes it crystal clear that the amended provision of s.2(15) of the Act will come into fore only that the advancement of any other object of general public utility shall not be a charitable purpose, 'if it involves the carrying on of any activity in the nature of trade, commerce or business…'. In the case under consideration, the assessee trust did not in anyway involve itself in indulging in carrying on of any activity in the nature to any trade, commerce or business. Therefore, the question of bringing the assessee trust's case under the ambit of the amended provisions of s. 2(15) of the Act doesn't arise. - Decided in favor of assessee. - DIT(E) was not justified in resorting to cancel the registration granted to the assessee trust earlier - Decided in favor of assessee. - IT APPEAL NOS. 1321 & 1420 (AHD.) OF ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... (7) Students Welfare fund 13,91,330 Total 1,90,01,319 ( ii ) According to the AO, as the above amount was not credited in the income and expenditure account, but, directly credited to the balance sheet, the assessee was required to explain the claim of exemption with documentary evidence in support of its claim. ( iii ) After due consideration of the assessee's explanation as recorded in his impugned order, the AO had observed thus: "3.The explanation of the assessee is carefully considered. The assessee has contended that the Board of Trustees has power to appropriate the current income towards the corpus of the trust and such appropriation would not constitute to the current income liable to tax. This statement of the assessee clearly shows a failure on the part of the assessee-trust to disclose its true and correct income and further the assessee has claimed, that even during the course of assessment proceedings the amount received from the students can be converted to corpus which in fact is not permissible as per law. It is seen that the trust has been collecting funds under various heads from their students. The fees contribute ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s after having received the same. It appears that AO has mixed up the facts of Educational Research Fund with the other funds such as building fund, library fund, staff welfare fund, student welfare fund etc. The distinctions between the same are that the former is mainly appropriation at 50% out of tuition fees whereas the later is specifically donated by the parents/students but the bifurcation of the aggregate amount is made as per the decision of board of trustees such as 30% towards building fund and educational Research Fund etc., as pointed out in reply dt. 15.11.2010 (see page 19 of paper book). The copy of ledger account of the respective funds filed before AO clearly proves this contention of the appellant. Therefore, the conclusion reached by AO that such appropriation would constitute current income liable to tax is not justified.' ( v ) After due consideration of the assessee's submissions, the CIT(A) had observed that: "5.5. I have considered the submissions made and contentions raised by the Counsel for the appellant and I have also gone through the assessment order. The short point to be decided in this ground of appeal relates to the nature of contributions to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... v. CIT (82 ITR 363) (SC). The copy of ledger account of different corpus funds produced by the appellant trust shows that amount has been credited to each fund account of each receipt from the parents/students. It appears that the AO has confused the educational infrastructural fund with the aforesaid different corpus funds. There is a distinction between the two inasmuch as the credit to different corpus funds is directly on the basis of the amount received from the parent/student whereas in case of educational infrastructural fund account, the credit is by way of appropriation at every month from tuition fees. This distinction is clearly evident from the receipts issued by the trust and copy of ledger account produced. The contention of AO relating to the appropriation of the said contribution to different funds as per the resolution made by the Board of Trustees deserves to be rejected because the resolution passed by the Board of Trustees merely provides for the quantum required for different purposes and they are the best judge to decide it considering the requirements or future needs of the school. The parents/students have made contribution with a clear understanding as it ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ourse of scrutiny, the assessee had claimed this as a corpus donation. The assessee could not furnish any evidence in support of the claim that the fees and funds collected from the students was a corpus donation. The fees contributed from students and their parents were for services to be rendered by the school. The contribution by the students and parents are quid pro quo (for service rendered mutually). It was, further, contended that these were not donations, but, payments for admission and services to be rendered by the school; that in the statement of income filed along with the return of income; the amount of corpus donation was shown as Nil. It was, further, argued that it was because the entire donation of Rs. 1.90 crores has not been shown in the Income Expenditure account, but, directly credited to the balance sheet and no separate claim of deduction u/s 11(1)(d) of the Act in respect of corpus donation has been claimed in the return. ( vii ) We have duly considered the submissions of the either party, thoroughly perused the relevant case records and also the voluminous paper book containing, inter alia, copies of (i) audited annual account with tax audit report; ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... omputer education etc., As rightly taken refuge by the CIT(A) in the ruling of the Apex Court in the case of Kedarnath Jute Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. CIT [1971] 82 ITR 363 to outwit the AO's contention that the so-called contribution should have been reflected in the I E account. The AO had rather failed to distinguish the receipt of corpus funds from tuition fees, namely, to credit the different corpus fund is directly on the basis of the amount received from the parents/students; whereas under 'Educational infrastructure fund account' the credit is by way of appropriation at every month from tuition fees. At a glimpse of the sample copy of Receipt produced by the assessee as part of evidence ( P 81 82 of paper book), it was noticed that: Page 81: "Receipt towards trust's Corpus Fund Received with thanks contribution towards trust's corpus fund of Rs . *I affirm the donation to Corpus fund Sign of donor" Page 82: Receipt No .. Form No . Std: . Name: .. Fees received as under: Quarterly/monthly tuition fee (quarter/per month) . Term fee (one term) Stationary Workshop fee Comput ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he trustees. Such a decision has to be taken by the board of trustees after taking into consideration of various factors and such a commercial decision cannot be questioned by the revenue authorities unless it smacks of any personal gain to the trustees. However, in the present case, the funds provided by the trust has been paid to the vendor, of course, through the trustees and their relatives, but, even that was made in view of the restrictions on transfer of agricultural lands. It is not the case of AO that the purchase of said land was intended by the trustees for their own benefit or gain on the contrary the evidence produced by the appellant clearly establish that it was a prudent decision taken by the trustees in the interest of trust and acted in a manner as any assessee of sound commonsense would have acted. The banakhat clearly shows that the purchase was made for and on behalf of the appellant trust and not for the personal benefit of the trustees. As regards, the contention of AO as to the completion of the transaction, it was contended by the appellant that the delay was caused for the reasons beyond its control inasmuch as the Government policies, finalization of TP S ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ion, the execution of banakath for purchase of land, entrusting the construction contract and payment of advance to the contractors etc., are nothing but steps taken in this direction so that the same cannot be treated as improper utilization of trust funds. The aforesaid decisions were found to be as a man of prudence would have taken in such circumstances. Both these contractors are not related to the trustees of the appellant trust. It is also not the case that the trust has lost money by giving such advance to them. Under the circumstances, I find that the advance given by the appellant trust to both these contractors cannot be said to be improper utilization of trust funds." ( c ) Excessive salary and motor cars provided to the Managing trustees: "12. (page 24) ..I find considerable force in the contention of the appellant that the comparison of salary and other benefits by way of motor car provided to the trustees with the principal and other staff of the school is totally misplaced. It is stated by the appellant that Shri M.N. Kapadia, is born-educationalist of third generation and, therefore, he has inherited education and school management in his blood. He has intro ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s. 36,23,725/-. The Schedule B-1 showing expenses for the object of the trust totaling to Rs. 5,80,05,990 clearly shows that the funds have not been utilized for the benefit of family of managing trustee as alleged by AO. Even, the balance sheet as on 31.3.2008 shows that Shri M.N. Kapadia has advanced money to the appellant trust inasmuch as there is an outstanding credit balance of Rs. 66,66,512/- even other family members have advanced money to the appellant trust. There is also force in the contention of the appellant that the schools run by the trust are under supervision and control of the Education Board and other Government authorities who have not found that the funds have been utilized for the personal benefit of the family of the trustees. Under the circumstances, the findings given by AO about the utilization of trust fund for the benefit of family of the trustees is unfounded and liable to be rejected. The appellant is, therefore, entitled to exemption u/s 11 and 12 of the Act. The AO is, therefore, directed to allow the aforesaid exemption while computing the total income of the appellant trust." During the course of hearing, the argument of the Revenue was that the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s, therefore, submitted that the said purchase was not made by the trustees for their own purposes or diverted the funds for their benefits as alleged by the Revenue. Refuting the Revenue's contention that neither the transaction should have been entered into through its trustees nor the funds be utilized for purchase of agricultural lands, it was countered by the assessee that the agricultural land could be purchased only by an agriculturist as provided in s.36G of the Bombay Land Revenue Code and Smt. Rupali N Kapadia being an agriculturist, the banakhat was entered into in her name only; that the assessee had not made any investment for acquiring land as alleged by the Revenue, but, in fact, it was a fund saving device and that the trustees have never at any point of time claimed that the said transaction was carried out for their benefits. With regard to the alleged difference in purchase consideration of Rs. 3.5 crores and Rs. 4.5 crores, it was explained that on perusal of banakhat, it is clear that the assessee had to bear various expenses, costs and fees such as permission for conversion of agricultural lands into non-agricultural land for conversion, the assessee were ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e also perused the confirmation of accounts furnished by Sonalben J Jakasania placed at P 89 of paper book. There were also no documentary evidences to attribute that the said transaction took place only to benefit the managing trustee or his relatives except that the funds of the trust were routed through the trustees to the vendor which merely exhibits the expediency which prevailed at that relevant time. Moreover, the utilization of the trust fund was not for purchase of agricultural land as investment, but was a stepping stone to set up an educational institution in that land. We, therefore, do not find any infirmity in the conclusion of the CIT(A) on this point. With regard to the observation of the AO that the funds of the trust cannot be said to be properly utilized for objects of the trust as no sale-deed had been executed or any construction work was carried out, we find that both the contractors - whom the money was advanced towards the construction work to be carried on at the proposed site -in their letters dt. 20.11.2010 confirmed before the AO that they were in receipt of advances for the proposed construction work. This goes to prove the genuineness and dedication ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n acknowledged by: ( i ) Visamokids (pages 98 - 104 of P.B); ( ii ) Gujarat Research Organization Unity Planning (Group) (pages 107 108 of P.B) ( iii ) Manav Sadhna Gandhi Ashram (page 109 of P.B) ( iv ) Proch.org (page 110 of P.B.) In view of the facts and circumstances as deliberated upon in the foregoing paragraphs and also the reasons recorded exhaustively and elaborately in the impugned order by the CIT(A), we are of the considered view that the assessee trust was entitled to exemption u/s 11 and 12 of the Act. The department appeal is dismissed. We shall now take up the assessee's appeal for adjudication. II. I.T.A.No.1420/A/2011 - (By the assessee trust): 5. The issue, in brief, was that the assessee was granted registration No. HQ I/32(N.4)89-90, u/s 12A(a) of the Act by the CIT, G-I, Ahmedabad way back on 21.3.1990, . However, the Ld. DIT(E) had slapped a show-cause notice on 10.2.2011 u/s 12 AA(3) of the Act on the assessee to show cause as to why the registration granted earlier should not be cancelled for the following reasons: "During the course of assessment proceedings for AY 2008-0 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... uted this fact i.e., the activities carried on by the assessee trust are not genuine furthermore, there is no indication in the show-cause notice dated 10.2.11 ( supra ) that the activities carried on by the assessee trust are not genuine on the contrary, it is seen that the affairs of the assessee trust would clearly indicate that the undersigned has taken judicial notice of a notorious fact which has been given judicial benediction by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Attar Singh Gurmukh Singh v. ITO [1991] 191 ITR 667 (SC) and the Hon'ble Calcutta High Court in the case of Mehmudabad Properties Pvt. Ltd v. CIT [1972] 85 ITR 500 (Cal). In this case, the main notorious facts are that the trust has been indulging in taking donations from the students, indulging in transactions of commercial nature within the family group itself, clearly violating the provisions of section 11(1)(d) and 13(1)(c) of the I.T. Act, 1961. These notorious facts would further stare in the face of the so-called genuineness of this trust. The foregoing paras would amply demonstrate that the activities of this trust are not only non-genuine in nature but also some of its activities would fall outside the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n the following words: " Placing reliance on the decision of Hon'ble High Court of Allahadbad in the case of Allahadbad Agricultural Institute v. Union of India [2007] 291 ITR 116/163 Taxman 67 (All), the DIT(E) justified the cancellation of registration of the assessee trust. Further, the DIT(A) had observed thus: "(On page 11) (iii) the aforesaid purchase of land transaction of the trust clearly indicates that in addition to education, the trust is also having activities of commercial nature. However, the legislature in its wisdom in order to remedy this mischief, inserted proviso to section 2(15) of the Act, 1961 in the nature of amendment by the Finance Act, 2008 w.e.f. 1.4.2009 i.e., AY 2009-10. The provisions of section 2(15) of the Act, after the aforesaid amendment w.e.f. 1.4.09 is reproduced here below: .. The Ld. Counsel has vehemently argued that the activities carried on by the assessee-trust cannot be said to commercial in nature, when the audited annual accounts for this year are scanned through. There is a huge deficit of Rs. 75,18,264/- and it has also incurred expenses totallin ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ase plus decision. This view has been approved by the Constitution Bench of the Hon. Supreme Court in Krishnakumar v. Union of India [1990] 4 SCC 207 (SC) and also in CIT v. Sun Engineering Co. Pvt. Ltd [1992] 198 ITR 272 (SC) (per J.S. Anand J). ( v ) Viewed from another angle also, the registration granted to this trust vide order dated 21.3.1990 did not confer any right or entitlement regarding operations of section 11,12 and 13 of the I.T. Act, 1961 or any other provisions of I.T. Act, 1961 which are to be decided by the AO on merits. It is further seen from the aforesaid facts and the judicial decision of the Allahabad High Court ( supra ) that registration granted u/s 12AA of this trust can be cancelled even with regard to the legal position of pre-amended period to section 2(15) of the I.T. Act, 1961 which would take effect from AY 1990-91 onwards. This position is further buttressed by the decision of Hon. Supreme Court in the case of Hemalatha Gargya v. Commissioner of Income-tax and another [2003] 259 ITR 1 (SC) wherein their Lordships had held that the question or rule of consistency does not preclude the Department from initiating appropriate action unde ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 2(15) of the I.T. Act, 1961 by the Finance Act, 2008 w.e.f. AY 2009-10, Shri N.H. Kapadia Education Trust has lost the status of charitable organization. Its activities, proprio vigore , are being carried on commercial lines. Shri N.H. Kapadia Education Trust, though, was granted registration in principle by CIT, Gujarat-I, Ahmedabad vide order dated 21.3.1990 did not carry out any activity which has charitable object and also by invoking Doctrine of Just cause in the light of the observations of Hon'ble Supreme Court in 259 ITR 1 (SC) ( supra ), I strongly conclude that the activities of Shri N.H. Kapadia Education Trust are not genuine charities and are being carried out not in consonance with its objects, bereft of any element of charity. Accordingly, the registration granted earlier by the then CIT, Gujarat-I, Ahmedabad vide order dated 21.3.1990 is cancelled w.e.f. 21.3.1990 i.e., AY 1990-91 onwards." 6. Aggrieved, the assessee has come up with the present appeal before this Bench. It was submitted during the course of hearing that it is now well-settled position in law that the sub-section (3) inserted in s.12AA of the Act w.e.f. 1.11.2004 empowers the CIT to cancel r ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... hout prejudice to the above and in the alternative, the appellant submits that the reasoning given by DIT(E) is not justified both on facts and in law as under: ( a ) As regards taking donations from the students, the appellant has dealt with this issue at length in the quantum proceedings so that the same is not repeated here for the sake of brevity but the same may be referred to for the purpose of this appeal also (Refer to P 116 to 136 of PB). Reliance is placed on the decision of Maharashtra Academy of Engg. Educ. Research (Maeer) v. CIT 133 TTJ 706 (Pune) wherein registration was cancelled mainly on the ground that the institution had collected donations, thus adopted some wrong means of collection of fees, the CIT could not enter into the area of investigation of source and application of income and so long as it was not the case that the trust was not imparting of education doubted or challenged by CIT. ( b ) As regards the allegedly indulging into the transactions of commercial nature within the family group, the DIT(E) has discussed in para (ii) of the order also and, hence, both are dealt with together as under: The appellant had explained in its reply dt ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... .10B. The appellant submits that there was no such failure because part -II of Annexure in this form requires reporting of application or use of income or property for the benefit of trustee etc., but in the present case, since income or property was neither used nor applied for the benefit of trustee etc., there was no question of reporting the same. 3.4.4 It is contended by the DIT(E) in view of undertaking in form 10A, the appellant should have communicated the alteration in the term of the trust. However, DIT(E) has failed to appreciate that there was no alteration in the object clause of the trust deed when there is expansion of the educational activity of running school at a new place. The DIT(E) has failed to appreciate that there is distinction between the objects of the trust and the powers of the trustees to implement the said objects. The steps taken to acquire the land for constructing the school at S.G Highway was the exercise of powers to carry out the object of education. It was held in the case of CIT v. Kshatriya Girls Schools Managing Board [245 ITR 170 (Mad)] that when the object of trust was to utilize income for imparting education through school and trus ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... , Hon'ble President of India, Dr. S. Radhakrishnan. ( iv ) It has been held in the case of M.P. Madhyam v. Jt. CIT (89 TTJ 770) (Ind) that where the predominant object is to carry out the charitable purpose and not to earn profit it would not lose its charitable character merely because some profit arises from the activity - CIT having failed to specify as to how profit-making was predominant activity of assessee instead of carrying out charitable purpose, was not justified in canceling registration under s.12A. similarly, it was held in the case of Jyoti Prabha Soc. (87 ITD 126) (Del) that having utilized the whole income for educational purposes as per its objects without having any profit motive, is entitled to hold registration. 3.6.1 Lastly, the DIT(E) has cancelled registration w.e.f. 21.3.1990 which is wholly illegal, unlawful and unjust. It is surprising that DIT(E) by relying upon the assessment for AY 2008-09 made by AO, cancelled the registration from the date of grant, though there was no evidence on record to show that the activities carried out in the past were non-genuine or in accordance with the objects of the trust. The DIT(E) has not brought on record ev ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ctivities of commercial nature which was hit by the proviso to s. 2(15) inserted by Finance Act 2008 w.e.f. 1.4.2009 - AY 2009-10; and lastly (4) s. 12AA inserted by Finance Act (No. 2) of 1996 w.e.f. 1.4.1997 empowers the Commissioner to examine the objects of the trust w. r. t. the definition of 'charitable purpose ' along with newly inserted proviso to s. 2 (15). The issues are dealt with chronologically in the following manner: (1). The activities of the trust were not genuine in nature: It is a well known fact that the assessee trust is one of the pioneers in the City in imparting education to the needy (public) by running a chunk of educational institutions for decades. It was the allegation of the DIT(E) that the activities of the assessee by way of taking donations from the students, indulging in transaction of commercial nature within the family group which, according to the DIT(E), were the violation of s.13(1)(c) of the Act. Incidentally, a similar issue in the assessee's own case has already been exhaustively deliberated upon by this Bench in the Revenue's appeal ( supra ) wherein it has been observed that the activities of the assessee trust were within the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nd to upgrade the schools belonging to the Board, the trustees have been given power to construct buildings and to lease out the properties. Though the powers given to the trustees are found in the object clauses, a fair reading of the objects clause would show that they are mere powers conferred on the trustees and they cannot be regarded as objects of the trust. The Apex Court in Aditanar Educational Institution's case [1997] 224 ITR 310, held that a distinction/difference should be made between the corpus, objects and powers of the trustees. When the distinction between the objects and powers are kept in mind, clauses (c) to (e) are only powers of the trustees which is made explicit by clause (f). That apart, clause 3(g) of the trust deed also makes it clear that the income from the properties should be utilized to implement the objects mentioned in clauses 3(a) and 3(b). Therefore, we are of the view, the object of the trust is education and it is not to make profit. As held by the Supreme Court the acid test is whether the object is to make profit. But, in construing the objects, one has to weed out the powers of the trustees and when the objects of the assessee are seen, we a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... other object of general public utility shall not be a charitable purpose, 'if it involves the carrying on of any activity in the nature of trade, commerce or business '. In the case under consideration, the assessee trust did not in anyway involve itself in indulging in carrying on of any activity in the nature to any trade, commerce or business. Therefore, the question of bringing the assessee trust's case under the ambit of the amended provisions of s. 2(15) of the Act doesn't arise. At this juncture, it would be more appropriate to quote the ruling of the Hon'ble Madras High Court cited supra - of course at the cost of repetition, - wherein it has been held that " Therefore, we are of the view, the object of the trust is education and it is not to make profit. As held by the Supreme Court the acid test is whether the object is to make profit. But, in construing the objects, one has to weed out the powers of the trustees and when the objects of the assessee are seen, we are of the opinion; the assessee-trust has been founded solely for educational purposes and not for earning profit." As already made it clear that the assessee trust had, in fact, indulged in purchase of agricul ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... essee do not fall within the meaning of 'charitable purpose' as per proviso to section 2(15) inserted with effect from 1.4.2009. Quite clearly, as we have observed earlier, such an objection cannot be the basis to invoke section 12AA(3) so as to cancel the registration already granted to the assessee under section 12A of the Act. In our considered opinion, registration already granted to the assessee could not have been re-visited by the Commissioner on the basis of the reasoning aforesaid since his power to cancel registration under section 12AA(3) was confined to the examination as to whether the activities of the assessee society/association are genuine or that the same are not being carried out in accordance with the stated objects. In the light of the discussion emerging from the order of the Commissioner, in our considered opinion, action taken by the Commissioner does not fall within the parameters of section 12AA(3) of the Act and, therefore, the impugned order is bad in law. 9. At this stage, we may hasten to add that we are not commenting on the merits of the issue as to whether the activities of the assessee fall within the meaning of expression 'charitable purpose' pe ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... . Therefore, one has to examine the correctness of the cancellation of the registration in terms of the language of s. 12AA as prescribed in sub.s. (1) and particularly in cls. (a) and (b) of the section. So far as the running of the educational institution is concerned, even the AO while passing assessment orders for several years, has held that the trust is entitled for exemption under s.10(23C)(iiiad). If the Revenue Officer himself is qualifying this trust as an educational institution and then granting the said exemption, then as a result it was not justifiable on the part of the CIT to hold such a conflicting view which can be said to be altogether contrary to the facts of the case. The allegation was that the books of account were not found in a proper manner. Because of the absence of the books of account, it was also doubted whether the educational fees received from the students was ever applied for the purpose of education. In the present case, the trust being an educational institution and undisputedly imparting education, therefore, it was not justifiable on the part of the CIT to deny the registration. Nevertheless, the application of income and the utilization of fun ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 12AA of the Income-tax Act,1961, cancellation of registration was provided where the registration was granted under clause (b) of sub-section (1). Further, cancellation under sub-section (3) was also provided where the registration was obtained at any time under section 12A (whether under clause (a) or clause (aa) of sub-section (1) of section 12A). But this power of cancellation of registration under section 12A came to be incorporated by way of amendment introduced by the Finance Act, 2010, with effect from June 1, 2010. Now with effect from June 1, 2010, the power vests with the Commissioner to cancel the registration granted under any of the clauses of sub-section (1) of section 12A. The assessee-trust obtained registration in December, 1974. Based on this, the assessee got exemption of Income-Tax in the assessments under section 143(3) for the assessment years 1996-97 to 2005-06. The Director of Income-Tax cancelled the registration under section 12AA(3) with effect from assessment year 2002-03 by his order dated June 30, 2009. The Tribunal set aside the order of cancellation. On appeal to the High Court : Held, dismissing the appeal, that the cancellation of registration ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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