9911796707
TMI Blog2001 (2) TMI 1003X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... application under section 8 of the said Act was filed before this Tribunal on November 29, 2000, i.e., after a gap of four years. Therefore, the petitioner is required to explain the delay of these four years. Now Mr. Chatterjee, learned advocate appearing for the petitioner, submits that his agent advised him not to move against the order impugned, i.e., the order dated October 15, 1996, rather the said agent advised his client to appear before the concerned Commercial Tax Officer in regular assessment proceedings and produce books of accounts. The case commenced when the assessment was reopened and said order of reopening was made on October 15, 1996. Therefore, the fact remains that the order of reopening was not challenged during thes ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the present case a Chartered Accountant is involved. It is not the case of the petitioner that this Chartered Accountant was appointed by executing a regular Vakalatnama by which a lawyer is appointed. Therefore, the Chartered Accountant cannot represent a client as a lawyer is entitled to and a Chartered Accountant cannot claim the benefit which is given to a lawyer as per the Advocates Act. 3.. Thus we find that the advice claimed to have been given by the Chartered Accountant was given after the time-limit and Mr. Halder who claims himself to be a Chartered Accountant was never an advocate and so the decisions referred to by Mr. Chatterjee cannot have any application to the present facts and circumstances of the case. We also find tha ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... A.V. Venkateswaran, Collector of Customs, Bombay v. Ramchand Sobhraj Wadhwani) that if a petitioner has disabled himself from availing himself of the statutory remedy by his own fault in not doing so within the prescribed time, he cannot certainly be permitted to urge that as a ground for the court dealing with his petition under article 226 to exercise its discretion in his favour. 4.. Here the position is identical because it was the petitioner himself who allowed his remedy to become barred by limitation and he sat idly over the matter for years together. In a case which came up before this Tribunal, this Tribunal observed which was reported in (2000) 36 STA 182 [Shree Gopikishan Steel Works (P) Ltd. v. D.C.C.T., Chowringhee Circle] th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... bunal Act, 1987. The said section incorporates a statutory period during which a prudent person should challenge the validity of an action or order by which he has become aggrieved. The remedy under section 8 of the said Act is in the nature of a remedy as contemplated under article 226 of the Constitution. It is well-settled that such an application should not be presented with unreasonable delay. Here is a case where the application was presented after four years from the date of the order sought to be challenged. In the circumstances we find that the petitioner has miserably failed to explain the delay and his relief, if there be any, has become barred by limitation in the meantime. We do not find any ground to condone such delay and, th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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