9911796707
TMI Blog2017 (8) TMI 418X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... so include contracts, license or lease for collection of items other then toll, parking fees and for mining and quarrying. Therefore, there is no legislative mandate to collect tax at source or the octroi collected under Section 206C(1C) of the Act. No fault can be found with the impugned order of the Tribunal. - Decided in favour of assessee and against Revenue. - Income Tax Appeal No. 91, 92, 97 of 2008 - - - Dated:- 1-7-2017 - M. S. Sanklecha And Manish Pitale, JJ. Mr. A. Parchure B. Mohta, Advocate for the Appellant Mr. N.S. Bhattad, Advocate for the Respondent JUDGMENT ( Per M. S. Sanklecha, J. ) These three appeals under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (the Act) challenges the common order dated 21st May, 2008 passed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Nagpur (Tribunal). The impugned common order relates to the assessment years 2005-2006, 2006-2007 2007-2008. 2. All the three appeals were admitted on 20th March, 2009 on the following identical substantial questions of law : 'i) Whether the Tribunal is correct in law in holding that there is no liability to collect tax at source under Section 206C(1C) of the Income Tax Act ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) confirmed the view of the Assessing Officer and held that the amount collected by the agent/licensee of the respondent as octroi would be covered by Section 206C(1C) of the Act. This on the ground that the octroi collected is similar/identical to a toll. Thus, the appeals of the respondent/assessee were dismissed. 7. On further appeals for the three subject assessment years, the Tribunal by the impugned order allowed respondent/assessee's appeal. The impugned order hold that Section 206C (1C) of the Act obliges a person who grants an agency/license, or in any other manner transfers his right in respect of parking lot, toll plaza or a mine and quarry to another person, then while receiving the amount so collected from such other person i.e. agent/licensee (the transferee of its right), the respondent/assessee should also collect tax at source. However, the above obligation is only restricted to parking lots, toll plazas and mine or quarry. This obligation does not extend to octroi. The impugned order further draws a distinction between toll plaza and octroi as popularly understood. Therefore, it concludes that a collection of toll to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e placed reliance upon the impugned order and submits that legally and commercially toll is considered to be distinct and differ from an octroi. Thus, it is submitted that there is no occasion to interfere with the impugned order of the Tribunal. 12. We find that the impugned order of the Tribunal is a detailed order and it has examined in depth the difference between the meaning of the word 'toll' and 'octroi' and pointed out how differently the two words are legally and popularly understood. The Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India empowers the State to levy octroi as found in Entry 52 of List II thereof. While Entry 59 of List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India empowers the State to collect tolls. Thus, the basic constitutional difference between that two levies. Further, Section 127 of the Maharashtra Municipal Corporation Act, 1949 lists out the power of the Corporation to impose tax as listed therein and it separately enumerates 'octroi' and 'toll'. This again is indicative of the fact that legally 'octroi' as a tax is distinct from a 'toll' as a tax. Further, we note the impugned order also plac ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t a court should not be over zealous in searching ambiguities or obscurities in words which are plain. 32. In Prakash Nath Khanna v. C.I.T., 2004 (9) SCC 686, this Court has explained that the language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of the legislative intent. The legislature is presumed to have made no mistake. The presumption is that it intended to say what it has said. Assuming there is a defect or an omission in the words used by the legislature, the Court cannot correct or make up the deficiency. Where the legislative intent is clear from the language, the Court should give effect to it (Delhi Financial Corporation v. Rajiv Anand, 2004 (11) SCC 625; Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Road Rollers Owners Welfare Association, 2004(6) SCC 210). 33. In B. Premanand and Ors. v. Mohan Koikal and Ors., (2011)4 SCC 266 this Court has observed as follows: The literal rule of interpretation really means that there should be no interpretation. In other words, we should read the statute as it is, without distorting or twisting its language. We may mention here that the literal rule of interpretation is not only followed by Judges and lawyers, but it is al ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
|
