9911796707
TMI Blog2001 (4) TMI 948X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... delivered at Bhongir in Andhra Pradesh. At the time of delivery of goods at Bhongir Railway Station, it was found that some of the tea packets were in damaged condition and there was also a shortage of 15 Kgs of tea packets. The Station Master of Bhongir Railway Station issued a certificate of shortage and damage. The applicant thereafter preferred a claim for compensation with the 2nd respondent-General Manager, N. F. Railway at Gauhati and the General Manager, South Central Railway at Secunderabad under Section 78-B of the Indian Railways Act. As both the Railway administrations repudiated the claim of the applicant on 28-4-1987 the appellant issued a notice under Section 80, CPC to the respondents. On 16-9-1988, the General Manager of South Central Railway, Secunderabad, sent a letter to the appellant accepting the claim of the appellant for compensation to an extent of ₹ 26,844/- on equitable basis. The appellant did not agree for the offer made as above and wrote back to the General Manager of South Central Railway stating that the sum offered was not acceptable and that the Railways should pay the amount as claimed by it taking into consideration the extent of damage s ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on should be made within a period of three years from the date of entrustment of consignment of goods to the Railway administration for carriage in the Railways and, therefore, the claim must be made within a period of three years from the date of booking the consignment. In this category of cases, if there is no correspondence after booking, the claim should be preferred within a period of three years. In the second category to which, according to the appellant, the present claim belongs, i.e., when the Railway administration acknowledges the claim of the applicant/claimant and agreed for part-payment, the limitation will start running from the date of such acknowledgment. According to appellant's counsel, the claim in this case falls under the second category mentioned above and, therefore, not barred by limitation. According to appellant's counsel, in this case on 16-9-1988, the South Central Railway administration agreed for part payment of the claim to the appellant and offered, on the ground of their negligence, an amount of ₹ 26,844/- and so the limitation for the purpose of filing the application will start running not from the date of booking consignment and ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... CT. According to the learned counsel for appellant, when once the provisions of the Limitation Act are held to be applicable to the proceedings before R.C.T. then as per Section 18 of the Limitation Act the acknowledgment made by the Railways, i.e. the letter written by the Railways agreeing for part payment on 16-9-1998 is an 'acknowledgment' within the meaning of Section 18 of the Limitation Act, and therefore, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the said acknowledgment was signed. If this was considered, according to the Counsel for appellant, the claim of the appellant will be within time. He, finally, contends that the majority view of the RCT that the claim is barred by limitation is not correct. 12. On behalf of respondents-Railways Senior Counsel Sri Ramakrishna Rao appeared and contended that the Railway Claims Tribunals Act is a self-contained enactment and according to the provisions of Section 17 of the said Act, there is a clear period of limitation prescribed, and the claim in the present case is clearly barred by limitation. Section 17 of the Act reads : 17. Limitation : (1) The Claims Tribunal shall n ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... and the provisions of Limitation Act have no application to the applications made under the Railway Claims Tribunal Act. In that case, the Supreme Court held (paras 3 and 4) : Section 17(1)(c) of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply only to a suit instituted or an application made in that behalf in the civil suit. The Tribunal is a creature of the statute. Therefore, it is not a civil Court nor the Limitation Act has application, even though it may be held that the petitioner discovered the mistake committed in paying 'overcharges' and the limitation is not saved by operation of Section 17(1)(c) of the Limitation Act. Section 78-B of the Act provides that a person shall not be entitled to refund to overcharge or excess payment in respect of animals or goods carried by Railway unless his claim to the refund has been preferred in writing by him or on his behalf to the Railway Administration to which the animals or goods were delivered to be carried by Railway etc., within six months from the date of the delivery of the animals or goods for carriage by Railway. The proviso has no application to the facts of this case. An overcharge is also a charge, which w ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to decide as to the course of action to be followed. It Is, therefore, a fact-finding body and is not required to adjudicate upon the rights of the parties and has no adjudicatory functions. The Government is not bound to accept its recommendations or act upon its findings. The mere fact that the procedure adopted by it is of a legal character and it has the power to administer an oath will not impart to it the status of a Court. .....It is a familiar feature of modern legislation to set up bodies and tribunals, and entrust them with work of a judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative character, but they are not Courts In the accepted sense of that term, though they may possess, as observed by Lord Sankey, L.C. in Shell Co. of Australia's case 1931 AC 215 some of the trappings of a Court . 19. In any event this question is no longer res integra, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Birla Cement Works v. G. M., Western Railways [1995]1SCR5 . In that decision, the Apex Court has clearly held that the Railway Claims Tribunal is a creature of the statute and is, therefore, not a civil Court. Even in the judgment relied upon by the counsel for the appel ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ded to the claims under the Railway Claims Tribunal Act by virtue of the provisions of Section 17(1)(a) of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act. What is more, in view of the provisions contained in Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, Section 18 of the Limitation Act shall have no application to the proceedings before the Railway Claims Tribunal. The attempt made by the appellant's counsel to categorise the cases firstly as those in which there is no correspondence and secondly where the Railway Administration acknowledges liability, does not find any support from the provisions of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act. The limitation prescribed under Section 17(1)(a) is three years from the date of entrustment of goods for carriage by Railway, irrespective of the fact whether or not the Railway Administration acknowledges a part of the claim. 22. Section 17(2) of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, extracted above empowers the Tribunal to entertain an application beyond the period of limitation as prescribed in Section 17(1)(a), if the applicant satisfies the Claims Tribunal that he has sufficient cause for not making the application within such period. 23. In the result, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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