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TMI Blog2021 (7) TMI 346X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... . 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 based on reasoning which does not comport with a plain reading of the provisions of Section 35DD of the Act, and the understanding of how a demerger scheme operates. The interpretation of such provisions should align, wherever possible, with how ordinary men of commerce construe such business structuring operations. - Decided against revenue. Disallowance u/s 14A r.w.r. 8D - HELD THAT:- We are of the view that the Tribunal in calculating the disallowance as per the provisions of Rule 8D(2)(iii) of the Rules was not in order - Failure of the AO to record satisfaction - no reasons have been provided but only a conclusion has been reached that the AO was satisfied that the Assessee had incurred expenses to manage its investments which may yield exempt income, and Assessee grossly failed to calculate such expenses in a reasonable manner to ascertain the true and correct picture of its income and expenses. Consequently on the aspect of administrative expenses being disallowed, since there was a failure by the AO to comply with the mandatory requirement of Section 14 A (2) of the Act read with Rule 8D (1) (a) of the Rules and record his satisfaction as req ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... h: Mr. Shailender Singh, Senior Standing Counsel. RAJIV SHAKDHER, J: Preface: - 1. The above-captioned appeals are directed against a common order dated 28.01.2020, passed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal [in short Tribunal ] Pertinently, ITA 213/2020 and ITA 215/2020 concern assessment year [AY] 2007-2008 while ITA 214/2020 concerns AY 2008-2009. 1.1. On 13.01.2021, all three appeals were admitted and the following questions of law were framed. Questions of law framed in ITA 213/2020 and 214/2020 (i) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal erred in law in upholding the disallowance of ₹ 44,00,739/- claimed under section 35DD of the Act, being l/5th of expenses incurred in [the] assessment year 2004-05 on [the] demerger of certain units of NIIT and vesting of the same in the Appellant, on the incorrect premise that such deduction is allowable only in the hands of the demerged company (NIIT) and not the resulting company (Appellant)? (ii) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal erred in law in sustaining and not deleting the disallowance under Section 14A of the Act, to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Particulars Amount (Rs.) 1. Direct expenditure concerning exempt income [(refer Rule 8D(2)(i)] Nil 2. Interest expenditure not directly attributable to any particular income [(refer Rule 8D (2)(ii)] 1,02,88,677 3. % of average investments [(refer Rule 8D(2)(iii)] 76,28,534 TOTAL 1,79,17,211 3.2. The appellant/assessee carried the order, passed by the AO, in appeal to the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) [in short CIT(A) ]. The CIT(A), vide order dated 30.07.2013, partly allowed the appeal preferred by the appellant/assessee. The net result was that, while CIT(A) sustained the disallowance ordered by the AO under Section 35DD of the Act, the disallowance directed by the AO under Section 14A of the Act read with Rule 8D of the Rules was scaled down from the figure of ₹ 1,79,17,211/- to ₹ 82,05,031/-. Also, the CIT(A) rejected the aforementioned suo motu disallowance, as bei ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... lia, made the following disallowances. i. The amortised legal and professional expenses amounting to ₹ 44,00,739/-; being 1/5th of the total amount incurred under this head i.e. ₹ 2,20,03,694/- in the AY 2004-05, in connection with demerger. The deduction was claimed by the appellant/assessee under Section 35DD of the Act. ii. Disallowance of ₹ 1,56,08,262/-, after deducting suo motu disallowance of ₹ 7,79,063/-; this disallowance was made by the AO by invoking provisions of Section 14A of the Act and Rule 8D of the Rules. The break-up of the said figure is detailed out hereafter. S. No. Particulars Amount (Rs.) 1. Direct expenditure concerning exempt income [(refer Rule 8D(2)(i)] Nil 2. Interest expenditure not directly attributable to any particular income [(refer Rule 8D (2)(ii)] 66,48,325 3. % of average investments [(refer Rule 8D(2)(iii)] 97,39,000 Total ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... h this Court. ITA 215/2020 5. The appellant/assessee, on 12.01.2007, executed an agreement/ lease deed with the Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority [in short GNIDA ] concerning a parcel of land situated at Plot No. 2A, Sector Techzone (IT Park), GNIDA District, Gautam Budh Nagar, admeasuring about 20622.92 square metres. Under the said lease deed, the appellant/assessee was obliged to complete the construction of the superstructure within seven years of its execution, as per the layout and building plan approved by GNIDA. The tenure of the lease was fixed at 90 years; commencing from 12.01.2007; with the rights and interest in land reverting to GNIDA at the end of the tenure. [See: page 109 of the paper book] 5.1. Pertinently, in terms of the said lease deed, the appellant/assessee had the option, to either pay the annual rent of ₹ 7,08,913/- during the tenure of the lease, or in the alternative, a commuted and discounted one-time lease rent amounting to ₹ 77,98,042/-. The commuted and discounted lease rent was 11 times the annual lease rent. 5.2. The appellant/assessee opted for the second option for payment of lease rent, and accordingly, p ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s dismissed on 07.02.2014; and Shasun Chemicals Drugs Ltd. vs. CIT, (2016) 289 CTR 97 (SC)] ii. The Tribunal s view that the expression assessee in Section 35DD of the Act only refers to the demerged company, and upon demerger, the resultant company, which is the appellant/assessee, in this case, is nonexistent and comes into existence only after the demerger takes place, is both on law and on facts flawed. iii. The Tribunal lost sight of the fact that the demerger took place between two existing companies, and that the appellant/assessee was in existence on the date of the demerger. The Tribunal, thus, sustained the disallowance based on a case that was not even set up by the revenue. iv. As regards disallowance under Section 14A of the Act read with Rule 8D of the Rules being partly allowed by the Tribunal was concerned, the same was assailed, on the following grounds. a) The disallowance was based on the presumption that expenditure had been incurred in earning income which was exempt from tax. b) The Tribunal failed to note that, the AO had to arrive at a satisfaction that expenditure was indeed incurred in earning income, which was exempt from tax. Thi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... known as, NIIT Technologies Ltd. ii. The appellant/assessee had incurred ₹ 2,20,03,694/- on legal and professional expenses in AY 2004-2005 for pursuing the scheme of demerger. iii. The appellant/assessee had claimed deduction, in consonance with provisions of Section 35DD of the Act, of 1/5th of ₹ 2,20,03,694/-, i.e., ₹ 44,00,739/- for the first time in AY 2004-2005. Likewise, the said amount i.e. 1/5th of ₹ 2,20,03,694/- was claimed by the appellant/assessee in the subsequent years i.e. AYs 2005-2006 to 20082009. The claim was allowed only in AYs 2004-2005, 2005-2006 and 2006-2007. iv. The AO disallowed the claim in the AYs in issue i.e. AYs 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 on the ground that, it could be claimed only in the hands of the demerged company i.e. NIIT Ltd. and not in the hands of the appellant/assessee i.e. NIIT Technologies Ltd. This view has been sustained both by CIT(A) as well as the Tribunal. The argument of the revenue is, that the provision in Section 35DD of the Act uses the expression assessee and not assessees , and therefore, the deduction is available only in the hands of the demerged company in this case, i.e. NIIT Ltd., ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Ltd. got merged. In our opinion the language of the section is clear and there is no ambiguity, as who is entitled to claim the said deduction. In case of demerger, where the undertaking(s) which get demerged, may result in new entity and in said circumstances, the resultant company cannot incur expenditure before its birth. It is the parent entity, who initiates demerger of the undertaking(s) and incur expenditure for legal and professional expenses in relation to such demerger. The resultant company, come into existence as a result of demerger only, the word assessee in section 35DD of the Act cannot mean to include the resultant company. The decision relied upon by the assessee in the case of CIT Vs Bombay dyeing and manufacturing company limited (supra) relates to period prior to insertion of section 35DD of the Act, wherein the expenses related to amalgamation were allowed to the assessee as incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the business of the assessee.. In the said case the issue was of whether the legal and professional expenses incurred in relation to the amalgamation were revenue or capital in nature. The ratio of the said decision cannot be applicab ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... case (supra) did not, therefore, hold the field for a period of more than a few months and it could not be said that any assessee was misled into acting to its detriment on the basis of that decision. There was no decision of this Court in regard to the interpretation of sub- s. (1) of s. 80M prior to the decision in Cloth Traders' case (supra) and there was therefore no authoritative pronouncement of this Court on this question of interpretation on which an assessee could claim to rely for making its fiscal arrangements. The only decision in regard to the interpretation of sub-s. (1) of s. 80M given by any High Court prior to the decision in Cloth Traders' case (supra), was that of the Gujarat High Court in Addl. CIT vs. Cloth Traders P. Ltd. (supra) and that decision took precisely the same view which we are inclined to accept in the present case. It is, therefore, difficult to see how any assessee can legitimately complain that any hardship or inconvenience would be caused to it if the decision in Cloth Traders' case was overturned by us. If despite the decision of the Gujarat High Court in Addl. CIT vs. Cloth Traders P. Ltd. (supra), the assessee proceeded on th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r a subsidiary company, in which, shares are offered to the shareholders of the demerged company i.e. the original company. A Split-off occurs when the demerged entity segregates itself into various independent companies whereby the original or the parent company ceases to exist. 11.2. In this particular case, one of the undertakings of the demerged company i.e. NIIT Ltd. was transferred to another existing company i.e. NIIT Technologies Ltd./appellant/assessee. Thus, the resulting company, i.e. NIIT Technologies Ltd. was already in existence, and therefore, the argument that the deduction can be claimed only by the demerged company, which was in existence, and that the word assessee has been carefully used by the legislature, only to include the demerged company, is, misconceived. The legislature has used the word assessee having regard to the various ways in which the schemes are structured. Illustratively, two very broad mechanisms often used have been adverted to hereinabove. 11.3. Secondly, having regard to the fact that the deduction claimed by the appellant/assessee under the provisions of Section 35DD of the Act was allowed in the earlier AYs i.e. AY 2004-2005 to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... odrej Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. vs. DCIT, Mumbai Anr. (2017) 394 ITR 449 (SC) and CIT vs. Essar Teleholdings Ltd. 1 (2018) 401 ITR 445 (SC)] 12.4. Furthermore, though the Tribunal has restricted the disallowance to administrative expenditure, and that too, is pegged at 0.5% for the value of investments, which gave rise to income that was exempt from tax, it failed to examine as to whether the provisions of Section 14A of the Act were, in the first place, applicable, to the facts and circumstances arising in the present case. The Tribunal s view, as contained in paragraph 6 and 6.1 of the impugned order, is extracted hereafter. 6. Regarding the administrative expenses for earning the exempt income is concerned, we find that Hon ble Delhi in the case of ACB India Ltd. (supra) and the Special Bench in the case of ACIT Vs Vireet Investment Private Limited (supra ) has held it for considering disallowance towards administrative expenses, the investment which has yielded exempt income during the year under consideration should only be considered. 6.1 The assessee before the Ld. CIT(A) has accepted 20% of the certain expenses towards salary etc. of employees engaged in inve ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... elation to a case where an assessee claims that no expenditure has been incurred by him in relation to income which does not form part of the total income under this Act :] [Provided that nothing contained in this section shall empower the Assessing Officer either to reassess under section 147 or pass an order enhancing the assessment or reducing a refund already made or otherwise increasing the liability of the assessee under section 154, for any assessment year beginning on or before the 1st day of April, 2001.] 12.7. A careful perusal of Section 14A(2) of the Act would show that the AO is required to make a determination of the expenditure incurred, concerning the income which does not form part of the total income, if the AO is not satisfied, having regard to the accounts of the assessee, as to the correctness of claims made by the assessee about such expenditure. 12.8. Sub-section 3 of Section 14A of the Act makes it clear that the parameters stipulated in the said provision will also apply where the assessee claims that no expenditure has been incurred by him concerning income that doesn t form part of the total income under the Act. 13. Therefore, what emerge ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of this Court in H.T. Media Ltd. vs. Pr. CIT (2017) 399 ITR 576 (Del), being apposite, are extracted hereafter. Failure of the AO to record satisfaction 32. The question regarding the failure of the AO to record his dissatisfaction with the correctness of the Assessee's claim regarding administrative expenses of ₹ 3 lakhs arises in ITA 349 of 2015. Mr Raghvendra Singh is not entirely right in his submission that there is no question framed about the failure by the AO to record his satisfaction. In ITA 349 of 2015, the question framed by this Court by the order dated 15th October 2015 is in fact in two parts: viz., (i) Whether the AO recorded a proper satisfaction in terms of Section 14A (2) and Rule 8 (D) of the Rules and (ii) in calculating the disallowance at 0.5% of average value of investments as per clause (iii) of Rule 8 D (2) of the Rules? 33. The contention of Mr. Singh is that if there was a valid recording of satisfaction by the AO as required by Rule 8D (1), then there was no option available to the AO other than to apply Rule 8D (2) of the Rules. Therefore, even according to the Revenue, the applicability of Rule 8D (2) hinges on the rec ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... enses to manage its investments which may yield exempt income, and Assessee grossly failed to calculate such expenses in a reasonable manner to ascertain to ascertain the true and correct picture of its income and expenses. 37. In the considered view of this Court, the above observations of the AO in the assessment order are of a broad general nature not with particular reference to the facts of the case on hand. 38. The Court is also unable to agree with Mr. Singh that on this aspect there are concurrent findings of both the CIT (A) as well as the ITAT. The CIT (A) disallowed the exempt expenses by merely repeating what the AO had stated about the cost that is built into so called passive investments and simply recorded that the AO was bound to Rule 8D and, therefore, was justified in determining administrative costs at 0.5%. Here again, the CIT (A) failed to note that without the mandatory requirement, under Section 14A of the Act and Rule 8D of the Rules, of satisfaction being recorded being met, the question of applying Rule 8D (1) did not arise. 39. Turning now to the order of the ITAT, in para 33, it recorded the submission of the AR that the AO did not reco ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 98,042/- 9.7 As far as payment of one-time lease premium is concerned, the assessee has capitalized the said amount in its books of accounts. The Ground No. 4 of the appeal of the Revenue is factually incorrect because the premium has already been capitalized by the assessee and the issue in dispute is only in respect of the commuted one timely lease rent. 9.8 The Ld. CIT(A) after considering the decisions on the issue of when a particular expenditure has to be considered as capital expenditure, in the case of Empire Jute Co. Vs CIT 124 ITR 1 (SC); Lakshmiji Sugar Mills Co P Ltd Vs CIT 82 ITR 376 (SC) and Madras Auto Services (P) Ltd 233 ITR 468 (SC) allowed the claim of the assessee observing as under: 8.5.2 The appellant submitted that it had claimed deduction of ₹ 77,98,042 on account of payment of commuted lease rentals to Greater Noida Authority for Plot No. 2A taken on lease situated in Greater Noida Industrial Development Area District, Gautam Budh Nagar. The appellant had the option to either pay (a) the advance annual rent on yearly basis ; or (b) commuted one time lease rent for the period of lease and no lease rent would be payable by the appell ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ITR 376 , Hon ble Supreme Court held that the contribution made by the assessee under a statutory obligation for the development of roads which were originally the property of the Government and remained so even after the improvement had been done, being expenditure incurred for running of the business efficiently and conveniently and not for acquiring a capital asset was of revenue nature and not of a capital nature. 8.5.5 In the case of Madras Auto Service (P) I imited (233 ITR 468) the assessee tenant had spent the amounts in question in order to construct a new building after demolishing the old building. The new building, however, from inception was to belong to the lessor and not to the assessee. The assessee, however, had the benefit of the existing lease in respect of the new building at the agreed rent for a period of 39 years The assessee claimed deduction for the entire amount spent on construction of the building as revenue expenditure. Hon ble Supreme Court in the said case observed: In order to decide whether this expenditure is revenue expenditure or capital expenditure, one has to look at the expenditure from a commercial point of view. What advantage di ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... adjudicated. 9.9 We find that the Ld. CIT(A) has distinguished the expenditure in the capital field and expenditure incurred only to facilitate the carrying of the business more efficiently and profitably, which is revenue in nature. The onetime premium paid by the assessee has already been considered by the assessee as capital expenditure. The assessee had the option to pay the lease rental on year-to-year basis or as a one-time expenditure. The assessee has substituted the revenue expenditure which was to be paid on year-to-year basis and the nature of the expenditure remained same though it has been paid as a composite payment. Thus, it is clear that the expenditure incurred by the assessee is not capital expenditure. The expenditure was to be incurred on year to year basis for the period of lease of 90 years. The lesser gave the assessee two option. The first option was to pay on year to year basis and claim the same as revenue expenditure. The second option was provided by the lessor was to pay a composite amount for the period of lease as onetime payment. The lessor provided some benefit for making onetime payment. The assessee has chosen the second option and paid ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... discussed above, is one such example. The observations of the Supreme Court in Taparia Tools Ltd. vs. JCIT, (2015) 372 ITR 605 (SC), being relevant in this regard, are extracted for the sake of convenience. 14. The High Court has also observed that it was a case of deferred interest option. Here again, we do not agree with the High Court. It has been explained in various judgments that there is no concept of deferred revenue expenditure in the Act except under specified sections, i.e. where amortization is specifically provided, such as Section 35-D of the Act. (Emphasis is ours) 15. What is to be borne in mind is that the moment [the] second option was exercised by the debenture holder to receive the payment upfront, liability of the assessee to make the payment in that very year, on exercising of this option, has arisen and this liability was to pay the interest @ ₹ 55 per debenture. In Bharat Earth Movers v. CIT [2000] 245 ITR 428/112 Taxman 61 (SC), this Court had categorically held that if a business liability has arisen in the accounting year, the deduction should be allowed even if such a liability may have to be quantified and discharged at a fut ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... y to pay the discount had been incurred in the accounting year in question, the assessee was entitled to deduct the entire amount of ₹ 3,00,000 in that accounting year. This conclusion does not appear to be justified looking to the nature of the liability. It is true that the liability has been incurred in the accounting year. But the liability is a continuing liability which stretches over a period of 12 years. It is, therefore, a liability spread over a period of 12 years. Ordinarily, revenue expenditure which is incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of business must be allowed in its entirety in the year in which it is incurred. It cannot be spread over a number of years even if the assessee has written it off in his books over a period of years. However, the facts may justify an assessee who has incurred expenditure in a particular year to spread and claim it over a period of ensuing years. In fact, allowing the entire expenditure in one year might give a very distorted picture of the profits of a particular year. Thus in the case of Hindustan Aluminium Corporation Ltd. vs. CIT, (1982) 30 CTR (Cal) 363: (1983) 144 ITR 474 (Cal) the Calcutta High Court upheld t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f account are not determinative or conclusive and the matter is to be examined on the touchstone of provisions contained in the Act [See - Kedarnath Jute Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. CIT [1971] 82 ITR 363 (SC); Tuticorin Alkali Chemicals Fertilizers Ltd. v. CIT [1997] 227 ITR 172/93 Taxman 502 (SC); Sutlej Cotton Mills Ltd. v. CIT [1979] 116 ITR 1 (SC) and United Commercial Bank v. CIT [1999] 240 ITR 355/106 Taxman 601 (SC). 20. At the most, an inference can be drawn that by showing this expenditure in a spread over manner in the books of account, the assessee had initially intended to make such an option. However, it abandoned the same before reaching the crucial stage, inasmuch as, in the income tax return filed by the assessee, it chose to claim the entire expenditure in the year in which it was spent/paid by invoking the provisions of Section 36(1)(iii) of the Act. Once a return in that manner was filed, the AO was bound to carry out the assessment by applying the provisions of that Act and not to go beyond the said return. There is no estoppel against the Statute and the Act enables and entitles the assessee to claim the entire expenditure in the manner it is claimed. 21. In ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ng this deduction. 14.5. Thus, we are of the view that question nos. (i) and (ii), as framed in ITA 215/2020, should also be decided in favour of the appellant/assessee and against the revenue. It is ordered accordingly. Conclusion : - 15. For the foregoing reasons, the above-captioned appeals are allowed. As indicated hereinabove, all four questions of law, as framed, are decided in favour of the appellant/assessee, and against the revenue. 16. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. ---------------- Notes:- 1. Important principles of statutory interpretation 22. The legislature has plenary power of legislation within the fields assigned to them; it may legislate prospectively as well as retrospectively. It is a settled principle of statutory construction that every statute is prima facie prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implications made to have retrospective operations. Legal maxim nova constitutio futuris formam imponere debet non praeteritis i.e. a new law ought to regulate what is to follow, not the past, contain a principle of presumption of prospectivity of a statute. 23. Justice G.P. Singh in Princ ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to take away or impair an existing right or create a new obligation or impose a new liability otherwise than as regards matters of procedure. The general rule as stated by Halsbury in Vol. 36 of Laws of England (3rd Edn.) and reiterated in several decisions of this Court as well as English courts is that all statutes other than those which are merely declaratory or which relate only to matters of procedure or of evidence are prima facie prospective and retrospective operation should not be given to a statute so as to affect, alter or destroy an existing right or create a new liability or obligation unless that effect cannot be avoided without doing violence to the language of the enactment. If the enactment is expressed in language which is fairly capable of either interpretation, it ought to be construed as prospective only . If we apply this principle of interpretation, it is clear that sub-section (6) of Section 171 applies only to a situation where the assessment of a Hindu Undivided Family is completed under Section 143 or Section 144 of the new Act. It can have no application where the assessment of a Hindu Undivided Family is completed under the corresponding pro ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 37. When we examine the insertion of the proviso in Section 113 of the Act, keeping in view the aforesaid principles, our irresistible conclusion is that the intention of the legislature was to make it prospective in nature. This proviso cannot be treated as declaratory/statutory or curative in nature. *** Reasons in support 39. The first and foremost poser is as to whether it was possible to make the block assessment with the addition of levy of surcharge, in the absence of proviso to Section 113? In Suresh N. Gupta [CIT v. Suresh N. Gupta, (2008) 4 SCC 362] itself, it was acknowledged and admitted that the position prior to the amendment of Section 113 of the Act whereby the proviso was added, whether surcharge was payable in respect of block assessment or not, was totally ambiguous and unclear. The Court pointed out that some assessing officers had taken the view that no surcharge is leviable. Others were at a loss to apply a particular rate of surcharge as they were not clear as to which the Finance Act, prescribing such rates, was applicable. It is a matter of common knowledge and is also pointed out that the surcharge varies from year to year. However, the as ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... S) 640]. In para 17, following has been stated: (SCC pp. 459-60) 17. Ordinarily, a subordinate legislation should not be construed to be retrospective in operation. The Circular Letter dated 7-5-2003 was given a prospective effect. The father of the respondent died on 19-5-2000. There is nothing to show that even the Circular dated 9-8-2000 had been given retrospective effect. In any view of the matter, as the State of Jharkhand in the Circular Letter dated 7-5-2003 adopted the earlier circular letters issued by the State of Bihar only in respect of cases where death had occurred after 15-10-2000 i.e. the date from which the State of Jharkhand came into being, the High Court [ Shiv Kampal Sahu v. State of Jharkhand, 2005 SCC OnLine Jhar 507 : (2006) 2 AIR Jhar R 148], in our opinion, committed a serious error in giving retrospective effect thereto indirectly which it could not do directly. Reasons assigned by the High Court, for the reasons aforementioned, are unacceptable. There is no indication in Rule 8-D to the effect that Rule 8-D intended to apply retrospectively. 49. Applying the principles of statutory interpretation for interpreting retrospectivity of a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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