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2003 (7) TMI 619 - HC - CustomsPenalty - EXIM - import orthoxylene against the obligation to export phthalic anhydride - Show cause notice non-issuance of - Vicarious liability - Personal penalty - HELD THAT - In the present case what is of utmost importance is the fact that no notice to the petitioner was issued by the respondents. That being the case, there was a clear violation of the mandatory statutory provision contained in Section 4L of the said Act. That apart, there was a violation of the principles of natural justice. When the notice itself was not issued to the petitioner, no opportunity was granted to him and consequently, he was not heard, the adjudication order imposing a penalty on the petitioner would be illegal and would be liable to be set aside. Moreover, the question in this petition is not with regard to the imposition of a penalty on the company but with regard to the imposition of a penalty on the petitioner who happens to be a director in the said company. Therefore, the submissions of Mr. Chawla on this last aspect are not germane to the issues involved in the present petition. It would be relevant to note that though the aforesaid discussion has proceeded on the assumption that no prejudice has been caused to the petitioner, in point of fact prejudice has actually been caused to the petitioner. This is so because the show cause notice was not issued to the petitioner. Even the show cause notice issued to the company did not contain specific allegations against the petitioner to which he could reply. No opportunity as such was given to the petitioner to represent against the proposed imposition of penalty. Obviously, the petitioner was not heard before the order-in-original was passed whereby the aforesaid penalty was imposed upon him. The mere fact that he filed an appeal and was heard in the appeal would not alter the situation. The proceedings against him were void ab initio. Had the petitioner been issued a notice in terms of Section 4L of the said Act, he could have represented against the imposition of such penalty. He could have placed on record various facts and circumstances to show that no offence was committed by the company and that even if such offence was committed by the company, he had no hand in it. All these circumstances, if he were able to establish them, would have absolved him of the liability of penalty which he now bears like a garroter round his neck. So, even if the question of prejudice were to be taken up, it would be clear that the order-in-original as well as the Appellate Order imposing a penalty on the petitioner could not be sustained. As a result of the foregoing discussion, the order-in-original dated 27-7-1995/7-8-1995 and the Appellate Order dated 13-8-1997 passed by the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 respectively (being Annexures D and F respectively) are set aside to the extent that they impose a penalty on the petitioner. To this extent, the writ petition is allowed. Parties are left to bear their own costs.
Issues Involved:
1. Imposition of penalty without issuing a show cause notice to the petitioner. 2. Compliance with Section 4L of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947. 3. Vicarious liability of directors for the company's offenses. 4. Validity of a vague show cause notice. 5. Distinction between violation of principles of natural justice and a facet thereof. 6. Arbitrary selection of directors for penalty imposition. 7. Justification of the penalty and procedural aspects by the respondents. 8. Lifting of the corporate veil. Detailed Analysis: 1. Imposition of penalty without issuing a show cause notice to the petitioner: The primary issue was whether a penalty could be imposed on the petitioner, a director of the company, without a show cause notice being issued to him individually. The court found that the show cause notice dated 7-11-1994 was addressed only to the company and not to the individual directors, including the petitioner. The court emphasized that no specific acts of omission or commission were attributed to the directors in the notice, thus making the imposition of the penalty on the petitioner without a separate notice improper. 2. Compliance with Section 4L of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947: Section 4L mandates that no order of adjudication or imposition of a penalty shall be made unless a written notice is given to the person concerned. The court held that the petitioner, as a director, fell under the category of "other person concerned," and thus, a separate notice should have been issued to him. The court agreed with the petitioner's counsel that the provisions of Section 4L were mandatory and substantive, ensuring the right to be heard before a penalty is imposed. The failure to issue such a notice rendered the adjudication and imposition of the penalty invalid. 3. Vicarious liability of directors for the company's offenses: The court examined whether directors could be held vicariously liable for the company's offenses merely because of their position. It was concluded that unless specific acts of omission or commission are attributed to an individual director, they cannot be held vicariously liable. The court referenced several Supreme Court decisions, including State of Haryana v. Brij Lal Mittal and MCD v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi, to support this view. 4. Validity of a vague show cause notice: The court agreed that a show cause notice must clearly inform the person concerned of the grounds for the proposed penalty. A vague notice would prevent the individual from making a proper representation, thus violating the principles of natural justice. The court found that the notice in question was directed to the company and did not specify allegations against the petitioner, making it too vague and invalid. 5. Distinction between violation of principles of natural justice and a facet thereof: The court distinguished between a complete violation of natural justice principles (no notice, no opportunity, no hearing) and a violation of a facet of these principles (inadequate hearing, procedural lapses). The court held that the present case fell into the former category since no notice was issued to the petitioner, and thus, the question of prejudice did not arise. 6. Arbitrary selection of directors for penalty imposition: The court noted that only 5 out of 14 directors were penalized without any clear reason, suggesting an arbitrary selection. The respondents failed to provide a plausible explanation for this selective imposition of penalties, further undermining the validity of the notice and the subsequent penalty. 7. Justification of the penalty and procedural aspects by the respondents: The respondents argued that the notice was given to the company, which replied and participated in the proceedings, implying that the petitioner was aware of the notice. However, the court found this argument unconvincing, emphasizing that the mandatory requirement was for the adjudicating authority to issue a notice directly to the petitioner, which was not done. 8. Lifting of the corporate veil: The respondents suggested lifting the corporate veil to hold the petitioner liable. The court dismissed this argument, stating that such considerations would only arise if the mandatory provisions of Section 4L were complied with. Since no notice was issued to the petitioner, the adjudication order imposing a penalty was illegal and liable to be set aside. Conclusion: The court set aside the order-in-original dated 27-7-1995/7-8-1995 and the Appellate Order dated 13-8-1997 to the extent that they imposed a penalty on the petitioner. The writ petition was allowed, and the parties were left to bear their own costs.
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