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Issues Involved:
1. Whether the petitioner was a "person accused of an offence" within the meaning of Article 20(3) of the Constitution. 2. Whether the petitioner could be compelled to testify against himself under the Foreign Exchange (Regulation) Act, 1947. Detailed Analysis: Issue 1: Whether the petitioner was a "person accused of an offence" within the meaning of Article 20(3) of the Constitution. The petitioner, formerly the General Manager and later the Chairman and whole-time Director of United Commercial Bank Ltd., was arrested under Section 19B of the Foreign Exchange (Regulation) Act, 1947 (Exchange Act). The grounds of arrest detailed that the petitioner was responsible for unauthorized conversion of foreign exchange and furnishing false information to the Reserve Bank of India, thus contravening Sections 4(2) and 22 of the Exchange Act, punishable under Section 23. The petitioner contended that he was "a person accused of an offence" within the meaning of Article 20(3) of the Constitution, which protects against self-incrimination. He argued that the grounds of arrest and the subsequent First Information Report (FIR) filed under Section 154 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) formally accused him of an offence. The Court found that with the lodging of the FIR, the petitioner was indeed accused of an offence. The Court cited previous judgments, including M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra and Raja Narayanlal Bansilal v. Maneck Phiroz Mistry, which established that a formal accusation via an FIR constitutes being "accused of an offence." Despite the petitioner's name not being explicitly mentioned in the FIR, the Court concluded that the petitioner was included in the expression "the management and other officers of the United Commercial Bank Ltd." Issue 2: Whether the petitioner could be compelled to testify against himself under the Foreign Exchange (Regulation) Act, 1947. The petitioner was summoned under Section 19-F of the Exchange Act to give evidence regarding the forward exchange contract. He contended that this was violative of Article 20(3) of the Constitution, which protects against self-incrimination. The Court examined whether the petitioner, being accused, could be compelled to provide testimony. It referred to the case of State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad, which clarified that the protection against self-incrimination applies only to testimony that incriminates the accused. The Court stated that the petitioner could not refuse to provide information that did not tend to incriminate him. The Court concluded that the petitioner must appear before the Deputy Director and answer questions that do not tend to incriminate him. It declared that the petitioner is a person accused of an offence within the meaning of Article 20(3) but did not set aside the summons. Judgment: The petition was allowed to the extent that it was declared that the petitioner is a person accused of an offence within Article 20(3) of the Constitution. The petitioner must comply with the summons and provide non-incriminatory information. The same declaration was given for Writ Petition No. 165 of 1972.
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