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Issues Involved:
1. Vires of Section 6(2) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. 2. Validity of the notification issued under Section 6(2) on October 17, 1952. 3. Whether the power to issue notifications under Section 6(2) was exhausted after the first notification. 4. Whether the notification violates Article 31 of the Constitution. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Vires of Section 6(2) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948: The appellants challenged the vires of Section 6(2) of the Act, arguing that it suffered from the vice of excessive delegation. They contended that the power delegated to the Provincial Government was unfettered and uncanalised, with no guidance provided for exercising the said power. The High Court held that the delegation involved in Section 6(2) was within permissible limits. The Supreme Court affirmed this view, stating that the legislative policy and principles were sufficiently enunciated in the Act, particularly in the preamble and Section 12(3), which provided guidance for fixing reasonable rent. Thus, the delegation did not suffer from the infirmity of excessive delegation. 2. Validity of the Notification Issued Under Section 6(2) on October 17, 1952: The appellants argued that even if Section 6(2) was valid, the impugned notification was invalid as it offended against Article 31 of the Constitution. They conceded that the Act itself was saved under Article 31B but contended that the notification amounted to fresh legislation, which Article 31B could not save. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, stating that if Section 6(2) was valid, the exercise of the power conferred on the Provincial Government could not be treated as fresh legislation violating Article 31. 3. Whether the Power to Issue Notifications Under Section 6(2) was Exhausted After the First Notification: The appellants argued that the power to issue a notification under Section 6(2) was exhausted after the first notification on June 23, 1949. They based this argument on the omission of the words "from time to time" in Section 6(2), which were present in the corresponding section of the earlier tenancy legislation and in Section 8(1) of the Act. The Supreme Court dismissed this argument, referring to Section 14 of the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904, which provides that any power conferred on the Government may be exercised from time to time as occasion requires. Thus, the power to issue notifications under Section 6(2) was not exhausted. 4. Whether the Notification Violates Article 31 of the Constitution: The appellants contended that the notification violated Article 31 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that since the Act was saved by Article 31B, Section 6(2) was also saved, and the power conferred on the Provincial Government was valid. Therefore, a notification issued by virtue of this power could not be challenged on the ground that it violated Article 31. Separate Judgment by Subba Rao, J.: Subba Rao, J., delivered a dissenting judgment, disagreeing with the majority on the vires of Section 6(2). He argued that Section 6(2) exceeded the permissible limits of delegated legislation as it conferred arbitrary and unguided powers on the Provincial Government. He emphasized that the legislature must lay down a definite policy and standard for the executive to follow, which Section 6(2) failed to do. Consequently, he held that Section 6(2) was void and the appeals should be allowed with costs. Conclusion: The majority judgment dismissed the appeals, upholding the validity of Section 6(2) and the notification issued under it, while Subba Rao, J., in his dissenting opinion, found Section 6(2) to be void for excessive delegation.
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