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Issues Involved:
1. Jurisdiction of the Special Judge 2. Validity of the Sanction for Prosecution 3. Competence of the Investigating Officer 4. Framing of Charges 5. Merits of the Case Detailed Analysis: 1. Jurisdiction of the Special Judge: The appellant contended that the Special Judge, Poona, lacked jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offences and that they should have been tried by a court-martial under the Army Act. The court examined the provisions of the Army Act, 1950, particularly sections 125 and 126, which provide mechanisms to resolve jurisdictional conflicts between criminal courts and court-martials. It was concluded that the designated officer under section 125 had not exercised discretion to decide the forum for trial, and therefore, the criminal court's jurisdiction was not barred. Additionally, section 7 of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952, which states that offences specified under section 6 shall be triable by special judges notwithstanding any other law, was found to confer exclusive jurisdiction on the Special Judge. 2. Validity of the Sanction for Prosecution: The appellant argued that the prosecution lacked valid sanction under section 6(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The court examined the sanction order, which was issued in the name of the Central Government and signed by the Deputy Secretary. Evidence from P.W. 36 confirmed that the Deputy Secretary was competent to accord sanction on behalf of the President. The court held that the sanction was valid and complied with the requirements of Article 77 of the Constitution. 3. Competence of the Investigating Officer: The appellant questioned the competence of Jog, an Inspector of Police, to investigate the case without the requisite permissions under section 5A of the Prevention of Corruption Act and section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act. The court found that Jog was specially authorized by the Inspector-General of Police and that the investigation, though irregular, did not cause any prejudice to the accused. Further, the general consent by the Bombay Government under section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act was deemed sufficient. 4. Framing of Charges: The appellant challenged the framing of charges, arguing that the Special Judge had no jurisdiction to try offences other than those specified in section 6(1) of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952. The court referred to section 7(2)(b) of the Act, which allows a special judge to try any offence that can be charged under the Code of Criminal Procedure at the same trial. The court also addressed the issue of conspiracy charges involving both public servants and non-public servants, holding that the offence of criminal conspiracy under section 120A of the Indian Penal Code was applicable. The court found no merit in the objections to the charges. 5. Merits of the Case: The appellant argued that the evidence of Lawrence, treated as a decoy or trap witness, was unreliable and lacked corroboration. Both the Special Judge and the High Court had accepted Lawrence's evidence, corroborated by independent witnesses in material particulars. The court found that the evidence of Lawrence was sufficiently corroborated, implicating the appellant in the conspiracy and the actual smuggling of goods. The court rejected the appellant's contention that the High Court had erred in its appreciation of evidence. Conclusion: The Supreme Court dismissed both the appeals, upholding the conviction of the appellant (accused No. 1) and the acquittal of accused Nos. 2 and 3. The court found no merit in the technical objections and confirmed the findings of the lower courts based on the corroborated evidence.
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