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Issues Involved:
1. Violation of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. 2. Excessive delegation of powers under Clause 8 of the Control Order and violation of Article 14. 3. Lack of rational nexus between the prohibition and the objective. 4. Interpretation of Clause 8 of the Control Order regarding prohibition vs. regulation. 5. Violation of principles of natural justice. 6. Violation of Clause 11 of the Control Order. 7. Contradiction with the spirit and object of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. Detailed Analysis: 1. Violation of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution: The petitioners argued that the notification imposes unreasonable restrictions on their right to trade under Article 19(1)(g). The Court acknowledged that the onus is on the State to justify the reasonableness of the restriction. The Court considered various factors, such as the nature of the statute, the object it seeks to serve, and the existing circumstances. The Court concluded that the restriction was reasonable, temporary, and aimed at addressing a national sugar shortage. The Court cited previous judgments to support the view that restrictions on essential commodities can be reasonable if they ensure equitable distribution and availability at fair prices. 2. Excessive Delegation of Powers and Violation of Article 14: The petitioners contended that Clause 8 of the Control Order suffers from excessive delegation of powers and creates a monopoly favoring sugar mills, thus violating Article 14. The Court held that the Control Order was passed under Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, which provides sufficient guidelines and checks to prevent misuse of power. The Court also found that the notification was regulatory, not arbitrary, and had a rational nexus with the objective of increasing sugar production and equitable distribution. The Court rejected the argument of excessive delegation and held that the notification did not violate Article 14. 3. Lack of Rational Nexus: The petitioners argued that there was no rational nexus between the prohibition and the objective of increasing sugar production. The Court found that the restriction was justified as it aimed to divert sugarcane to mills, which have a higher recovery rate of sugar compared to khandsari units. The Court noted that the mills' hydraulic process yields 9.5% to 11.5% sugar recovery, while the open pan process used by khandsari units yields only 4% to 6%. The Court concluded that the restriction had a rational nexus with the objective of increasing sugar production and ensuring equitable distribution. 4. Interpretation of Clause 8 of the Control Order: The petitioners argued that Clause 8 does not contemplate a complete prohibition but only regulation of working hours. The Court interpreted the words "period or hours" in Clause 8 to mean that the clause allows for both complete prohibition for a period and regulation of working hours. The Court held that the notification was consistent with Clause 8 as it imposed a temporary ban for a specific period, which is within the scope of the clause. 5. Violation of Principles of Natural Justice: The petitioners claimed that the notification violated the principles of natural justice as it was issued without hearing them. The Court acknowledged the general applicability of natural justice principles but held that the notification was of a legislative character, which excludes the requirement of a hearing. The Court cited previous judgments to support the view that legislative measures do not require adherence to natural justice principles. The Court also noted that the emergent nature of the situation justified the absence of a hearing. 6. Violation of Clause 11 of the Control Order: The petitioners argued that the notification violated Clause 11 of the Control Order, which requires a hearing before revoking a license. The Court held that the temporary suspension of the operation of power crushers did not amount to a revocation of licenses. The Court interpreted Clause 11 to apply only to permanent revocation, not temporary suspension. Therefore, the Court found that the notification did not violate Clause 11. 7. Contradiction with the Spirit and Object of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955: The petitioners argued that the notification contradicted the spirit and object of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, by frustrating equitable distribution and production of sugar. The Court held that the notification was in line with the objectives of the Act, which aims to ensure equitable distribution and availability of essential commodities at fair prices. The Court found that the notification was a reasonable measure to address the sugar shortage and did not contradict the Act's objectives. Conclusion: The Court dismissed all the contentions raised by the petitioners, except the argument that the differentiation between vertical and horizontal power crushers was discriminatory. The word "vertical" in the notification was struck down as violative of Article 14. However, since the notification had already spent its force, no relief was granted to the petitioners. The Court provided guidelines for future policy considerations, emphasizing the importance of a fair hearing and the need for objective and balanced measures. The petitions and appeal were dismissed without any order as to costs.
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