Home Case Index All Cases Indian Laws Indian Laws + SC Indian Laws - 2010 (12) TMI SC This
Forgot password New User/ Regiser ⇒ Register to get Live Demo
2010 (12) TMI 1187 - SC - Indian LawsLand grabber under Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act - nature of Property in question - building or land - Maintainability of application - building with its appurtenant land - the property in question is a building or land - Special Tribunal has jurisdiction to entertain an application in respect of a house property with its appurtenant open land or not? - HELD THAT - The Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 was enacted to prohibit the activity of land grabbing in the State of Andhra Pradesh and to provide for matters connected therewith. As per Section 1(3), the Act applies to all lands situated within the limits of urban agglomeration as defined in Clause (n) of Section 2 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 and a Municipality. As per Section 1(3-A), the Act applies also to any other lands situated in such areas as the Government may, by notification, specify. In view of such inclusive definition of land', grabbing a building attached to the earth amounts to land grabbing for the purposes of this Act. Hence, the High Court erred in holding that the Act applies to the land but not to the buildings. The High Court was clearly wrong in holding that if an application is filed seeking possession of building along with its appurtenant land, because the building in question is in existence on the land and is surrounded by the vacant land, it cannot be said that it is a case of grabbing of land - The distinction drawn by the High Court between building with appurtenant land and land along with building is artificial and hyper-technical and it defeats the very purpose of the legislation. In the light of the definition of land' under Section 2(c) of the Act, both the above descriptions practically mean the same thing vis- -vis land grabbing' and there is no logic or justification for drawing a distinction between them. Hence, the High Court erred in holding that the application filed by the appellant was not maintainable before the Special Tribunal. The High Court also erred in holding that only occupation of the open land and construction of a building thereon can be treated as land grabbing and that occupation of a building along with open land cannot be treated as land grabbing under the Act. When the land along with the building existing thereon is occupied, it will amount to land grabbing - the application filed by the appellant under Section 7-A of the Act before the Special Tribunal was maintainable and that the Special Tribunal had necessary jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute raised therein. The impugned order of the High Court is liable to be set aside and the order of the Special Tribunal and judgment of the Special Court are liable to be restored - Appeal allowed.
Issues Involved:
1. Validity and authenticity of the Sale Deed dated 5th February 1969. 2. Jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal under the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982. 3. Definition and scope of "land" under Section 2(c) of the Act. 4. Applicability of the doctrine of res judicata. 5. Correctness of the High Court's interpretation and subsequent judgment. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Validity and Authenticity of the Sale Deed: The appellant, Safiya Bee, claimed ownership of the disputed property through a registered Sale Deed dated 5th February 1969, executed by Mohd. Hussain. The respondent contested this claim, alleging that the Sale Deed was fabricated and Mohd. Hussain was not of sound mind at the time of execution. The Special Tribunal, after considering the evidence, held that Mohd. Hussain executed the Sale Deed in a sound state of mind and received consideration for it. Thus, the appellant was deemed the rightful owner of the property. 2. Jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal: The respondent argued that the Special Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to entertain the appellant's application because the dispute involved a house property, not just land. The Special Court initially upheld this contention, but the High Court later reversed this decision, stating that the Act applies to lands, including lands with buildings. The Supreme Court confirmed that the Special Tribunal had jurisdiction, emphasizing that the definition of "land" under Section 2(c) of the Act includes buildings, structures, and other things attached to the earth. 3. Definition and Scope of "Land" Under Section 2(c) of the Act: The High Court and the Supreme Court examined whether the term "land" in the Act encompasses buildings and structures. The High Court initially drew a distinction between "building with its appurtenant land" and "land along with building," concluding that the Special Tribunal had no jurisdiction in cases involving buildings with appurtenant land. The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that the definition of "land" under Section 2(c) includes buildings and structures, making the appellant's application maintainable before the Special Tribunal. 4. Applicability of the Doctrine of Res Judicata: The High Court in its judgment dated 4th July 2000 had already decided that the Special Tribunal had jurisdiction. The respondent did not challenge this decision, making it final and binding. However, the High Court in its later decision revisited the issue, claiming that the previous decision was interlocutory and did not operate as res judicata. The Supreme Court criticized this approach, emphasizing that judicial discipline required the later Bench to refer the matter to a larger Bench if it disagreed with the earlier decision. 5. Correctness of the High Court's Interpretation and Subsequent Judgment: The Supreme Court found that the High Court erred in its interpretation of the Act and its application to the case. The High Court's distinction between "building with appurtenant land" and "land along with building" was deemed artificial and hyper-technical. The Supreme Court held that the inclusive definition of "land" under Section 2(c) meant that the appellant's application was indeed maintainable before the Special Tribunal. The Supreme Court also highlighted the importance of judicial discipline and the binding nature of decisions by Benches of equal or larger strength. Conclusion: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment dated 18th April 2007, and upheld the orders of the Special Tribunal and the Special Court. The respondent was directed to deliver the disputed property to the appellant within two months, with enforcement by the Revenue Divisional Officer if necessary.
|