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Issues Involved:
1. Applicability of Section 57(1) of the Wakf Act to the subsequent suit. 2. Whether the application by the Wakf Board was barred by limitation. 3. The impact of the knowledge of the Wakf Board's Chairman on the limitation period. 4. Consequences of declaring the decree void under Section 57(3) of the Wakf Act. Detailed Analysis: 1. Applicability of Section 57(1) of the Wakf Act to the Subsequent Suit: The court examined whether the subsequent suit (O.S. No. 432 of 1956) fell within the ambit of Section 57(1) of the Wakf Act, which requires notice to the Wakf Board in every suit or proceeding relating to title to wakf property. The court held that the words "relating to" or "in relation to" are comprehensive and can have both direct and indirect significance. The court cited judicial precedents, including Compagnie Financiee Due Pacifique v. Peruvian Guano Co., which supported a broad interpretation of such terms. Thus, the court concluded that the subsequent suit, which sought to declare previous decrees as fraudulent and collusive, did relate to the title to wakf property and fell within the scope of Section 57(1). 2. Whether the Application by the Wakf Board was Barred by Limitation: The court addressed the issue of whether the Wakf Board's application under Section 57(3) was barred by limitation. Section 57(3) allows the Wakf Board to apply for declaring a decree void within one month of coming to know of the suit or proceeding. The Wakf Board argued that it came to know of the relevant proceedings only upon receiving a letter from L.N. Ghulam Mohamed on 6-6-1964 and filed the application within one month of that date. The court initially found that the Board had knowledge of the proceedings earlier due to the involvement of Sri Sherfuddin, who was the Wakf Board's Chairman and also counsel in the case. 3. The Impact of the Knowledge of the Wakf Board's Chairman on the Limitation Period: The court scrutinized whether the knowledge of Sri Sherfuddin, as counsel for the Durga's representatives and Chairman of the Wakf Board, could be imputed to the Wakf Board. The court disagreed with the earlier judgment that pierced the corporate veil, holding that the knowledge of an officer in a different capacity does not constitute official knowledge of the corporate entity. The court cited Halsbury's Laws of England and other authorities to support this view, concluding that the knowledge of Sri Sherfuddin in his capacity as counsel did not equate to official knowledge of the Wakf Board. Therefore, the application was deemed to be within the limitation period. 4. Consequences of Declaring the Decree Void under Section 57(3) of the Wakf Act: The court acknowledged that declaring the decree void under Section 57(3) might lead to inconvenient consequences, potentially disturbing a state of rights unchallenged since 1952. However, the court emphasized that it must enforce the clear intent and purport of the law, irrespective of the consequences. The court did not express an opinion on the subsequent procedural steps, leaving it to the concerned court to decide whether the suit should be reopened and the Wakf Board notified and brought on record. Conclusion: The appeal was allowed, and the application by the Wakf Board was deemed within time. Consequently, the decree in the second suit was declared void under Section 57(3) of the Wakf Act. The court did not order costs throughout.
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