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Issues Involved:
1. Whether the execution application is barred by limitation. 2. Whether the final decree was conditional. 3. Whether the period occupied by insolvency proceedings should be excluded under Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act. 4. Whether the period occupied by a third party creditor in seeking to execute the decree should be deducted. 5. Whether fraudulent concealment by the judgment-debtor provides a fresh starting point of limitation under Section 18 of the Limitation Act. Detailed Analysis: 1. Whether the execution application is barred by limitation: The primary issue in this case is whether the execution application filed on 4th October 1946, to execute a final decree passed on 6th December 1932, is barred by limitation. The previous execution application was dismissed on 9th September 1940, and more than three years had elapsed before the current application was filed. The High Court held that the application was barred under Article 182 of the Limitation Act, as more than three years had passed since the dismissal of the previous application. 2. Whether the final decree was conditional: The appellant contended that the final decree was conditional, as it required the payment of deficit court fees before execution could proceed. However, the court found that the decree was not conditional in the sense that some extraneous event was to happen before it could be executed. The payment of court fees was within the power of the decree-holder and did not prevent the decree from being executable from the date it was passed. 3. Whether the period occupied by insolvency proceedings should be excluded under Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act: The appellant argued that the period from 10th August 1937 to 14th December 1942, during which insolvency proceedings were ongoing, should be excluded under Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act. However, the court held that the insolvency proceedings were for a different relief and could not be invoked to exclude this period. The relief sought in insolvency was different from the relief sought in the execution application. 4. Whether the period occupied by a third party creditor in seeking to execute the decree should be deducted: The appellant also contended that the period occupied by one Tendulkar, who was a creditor of the decree-holder, in seeking to execute the decree should be deducted. The court found that the steps taken by Tendulkar to attach and execute the decree did not save limitation, as they were taken more than three years after the dismissal of the previous execution application. 5. Whether fraudulent concealment by the judgment-debtor provides a fresh starting point of limitation under Section 18 of the Limitation Act: The court found that the judgment-debtor had fraudulently concealed his ownership of the 'Prabhat' newspaper, thereby preventing the execution of the decree. Both the Subordinate Judge and the High Court concurred that this fraudulent concealment provided a fresh starting point of limitation under Section 48(2) of the Civil Procedure Code, allowing the decree-holder another 12 years to execute the decree. However, the court held that this did not provide a fresh starting point under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, as the fraud did not prevent the decree-holder from knowing his right to apply for execution. The appellant's argument that he was kept from the knowledge of his right to execute the decree was not supported by the facts, as he admitted knowledge of the judgment-debtor's ownership of the newspaper. Conclusion: The court concluded that the execution application was barred by limitation under Article 182 of the Limitation Act. The decree was not conditional, the period occupied by insolvency proceedings could not be excluded, and the steps taken by Tendulkar did not save limitation. While the fraudulent concealment by the judgment-debtor provided a fresh starting point under Section 48(2) of the Civil Procedure Code, it did not extend the limitation period under Section 18 of the Limitation Act. The appeal was dismissed with costs.
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