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2009 (5) TMI 996 - SC - Indian LawsCommission of an offence u/s 341 IPC - Construction/tarring of the road - difficulties in ingress and egress to and from his house for a short while - Allegations against Managing Director and the Directors of the Company - Vicarious liability - M/s Gharda Chemicals Limited is a deemed public limited company registered and incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 - Appellant No. 1 (Accused No. 1) is the Chairman cum Managing Director of the said Company - Appellants 2 to 5 are the Directors thereof and the Appellant No. 6 is an Architect. It is stated that Appellants 1 and 3 are no longer associated with the Company - first respondent lodge a FIR after he allegedly found that the work had been continuing - Allegations at that point of time were confined to Accused Nos. 8, 9 and 11 at the first stage and to Accused Nos. 8, 10 and 11 at the second stage - Accused Nos. 7 to 10 were workers of the Company. HELD THAT - The statement made by the first respondent that accused Nos. 1 to 5 were managing the affairs of the Company and had instigated accused No. 6 to construct the road must be viewed. It is one thing to say that the Company had asked the accused No. 6 to make construction but only because the accused Nos. 1 to 5 were its Directors, the same, in our opinion, would not be sufficient to fasten any criminal liability on them for commission of an offence u/s 341 of the IPC or otherwise. Appellants herein were not at the site. They did not carry out any work. No overt act or physical obstruction on their part has been attributed. Only because legal proceedings were pending between the Company and the Bombay Municipal Corporation and/or with the first respondent herein, the same would not by itself mean that appellants were in any way concerned with commission of a criminal offence of causing obstructions to the first respondent and his parents. We have noticed hereinbefore that despite of said road being under construction, the first respondent went to the Police Station thrice. He, therefore, was not obstructed from going to Police Station. In fact, a firm action had been taken by the authorities. The workers were asked not to do any work on the road. We, therefore, fail to appreciate that how, in a situation of this nature, the Managing Director and the Directors of the Company as also the Architect can be said to have committed an offence u/s 341 of the IPC. The ld Additional CJM, therefore, in our opinion, was not correct in issuing summons without taking into consideration this aspect of the matter. The Managing Director and the Directors of the Company should not have been summoned only because some allegations were made against the Company. Indisputably, there might have been some delay on the part of the appellants in approaching HC but while adjusting equity the HC was required to take into consideration the fact that in a case of this nature the appellants would face harassment although the allegations contained in the Complaint Petition even assuming to be correct were trivial in nature. HC furthermore has failed to take into consideration the fact that in the first information report no allegation in regard to acts of common intention or common object on the part of the appellants was made out. Appellants were not named as accused therein. It is, therefore, really difficult to appreciate as to on what basis the Complaint Petition was filed. Therefore, the impugned judgment and order of the High Court is set aside. The appeal is allowed. The order summoning the appellant is quashed.
Issues:
1. Criminal liability of the accused under Section 341 of the Indian Penal Code. 2. Vicarious liability of the Managing Director and Directors of the Company. 3. Application of legal principles in summoning the accused. Analysis: Issue 1: Criminal liability of the accused under Section 341 of the Indian Penal Code The case involved a dispute regarding the construction of a road leading to the first respondent's residence. The first respondent filed complaints against the Company's officers and workers, alleging wrongful restraint under Section 341 of the IPC. The accused, including the Managing Director and Directors, were summoned based on these complaints. However, the Supreme Court observed that the accused did not physically obstruct the first respondent or his family. The Court emphasized that the essential elements of wrongful restraint include voluntary obstruction, prevention of movement, and the victim's right to proceed. Since the accused were not present at the site and did not engage in any physical obstruction, the Court held that they could not be held criminally liable under Section 341 of the IPC. Issue 2: Vicarious liability of the Managing Director and Directors of the Company The Court addressed the question of vicarious liability of the Managing Director and Directors of the Company. It was argued that since the accused were officeholders, they could be held responsible for the actions of the Company's workers. However, the Court clarified that the Indian Penal Code does not impose vicarious liability unless expressly stated. Merely holding positions in a company does not automatically make individuals criminally liable for the company's actions. Therefore, the Court concluded that the Managing Director and Directors could not be summoned solely based on allegations against the Company. Issue 3: Application of legal principles in summoning the accused The Court criticized the lower court's decision to summon the accused without considering the lack of direct involvement or physical obstruction by the accused. Citing previous judgments, the Court emphasized that summoning an accused in a criminal case should involve a careful examination of the evidence to determine if an offense is prima facie committed. The Court highlighted the need for magistrates to scrutinize the evidence and assess the truthfulness of allegations before summoning accused individuals. In this case, the Court found that the Complaint Petition did not establish a criminal offense or justify summoning the accused. Therefore, the Court quashed the order summoning the appellants based on the lack of legal grounds for their criminal liability. In conclusion, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned judgment and order, allowing the appeal and quashing the order summoning the appellants.
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