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2022 (9) TMI 1490 - SC - Indian LawsCorruption - acquiring assets disproportionate to the known source of income - Investigating Officer wrongly declined to consider the explanation offered by the Respondent No. 1 as regards the allegations and also failed to take into consideration the lawful assets of the Respondents - Accused persons had disclosed their income to the income tax authorities in accordance with the provisions of the Income Tax Act - principle of preponderance of probability - discharge (by High Court) from the prosecution in exercise of revisional powers meant for doing substantial justice - Scope of exercise of Revisional power at the stage of charge. Whether the High Court committed any error in discharging both the Accused from the charges levelled against them? HELD THAT - The reason why the impugned orders passed by the High Court are utterly incomprehensible is because the High Court has not been able to comprehend the true scope and ambit of Section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The High Court has also not been able to comprehend in what set of circumstances the revisional powers Under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are to be exercised - the High Court seems to be labouring under a serious mis-conception of law as is evident from the two impugned orders and such erroneous mis-conceptions need to be eradicated. The learned Counsel appearing for the State rightly submitted that at the stage of consideration of discharge Under Section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure only a prima facie case is to be seen and the Special Court having recorded a satisfaction with regard to the existence of a prima facie case there cannot be said to be any material error or illegality in the orders assailed before the High Court. The primary consideration at the stage of framing of charge is the test of existence of a prima facie case, and at this stage, the probative value of materials on record is not to be gone into - The provisions which deal with the question of framing of charge or discharge, relatable to (i) a sessions trial or, (ii) a trial of warrant case, or (iii) a summons case, are contained in three pairs of Sections under the Code of Criminal Procedure. These are Sections 227 and 228 reply in so far as, the sessions trial is concerned; Sections 239 and 240 reply relatable to the trial of warrant cases; and Sections 245(1) and 245(2) reply in respect of summons case. The Sections (mentioned in above para) indicate that the Code of Criminal Procedure contemplates discharge of the Accused by the Court of Sessions Under Section 227 in a case triable by it, cases instituted upon a police report are covered by Section 239 and cases instituted otherwise than on a police report are dealt with in Section 245. The three Sections contain somewhat different provisions in regard to discharge of the Accused. As per Section 227, the trial judge is required to discharge the Accused if the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the Accused . The obligation to discharge the Accused Under Section 239 arises when the Magistrate considers the charge against the Accused to be groundless . The power to discharge Under Section 245(1) is exercisable when the Magistrate considers, for reasons to be recorded, that no case against the Accused has been made out which, if unrebutted would warrant his conviction . Sections 227 and 239 reply provide for discharge being made before the recording of evidence and the consideration as to whether the charge has to be framed or not is required to be made on the basis of the record of the case, including the documents and oral hearing of the Accused and the prosecution or the police report, the documents sent along with it and examination of the Accused and after affording an opportunity to the parties to be heard. On the other hand, the stage for discharge Under Section 245 is reached only after the evidence referred to in Section 244 has been taken. Despite the slight variation in the provisions with regard to discharge under the three pairs of Sections referred to above, the settled legal position is that the stage of framing of charge under either of these three situations, is a preliminary one and the test of prima facie case has to be applied -- if the trial court is satisfied that a prima facie case is made out, charge has to be framed. In the case of Som Nath Thapa 1996 (4) TMI 515 - SUPREME COURT , a three-Judge Bench of this Court, after noting the three pairs of Sections i.e. (i) Sections 227 and 228 reply in so far as the sessions trial is concerned; (ii) Sections 239 and 240 reply relatable to the trial of warrant cases; and (iii) Sections 245(1) and (2) qua the trial of summons cases, which dealt with the question of framing of charge or discharge, stated thus if the court were to think that the Accused might have committed the offence it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be that the Accused has committed the offence. It is apparent that at the stage of framing of a charge, probative value of the materials on record cannot be gone into; the materials brought on record by the prosecution has to be accepted as true at that stage. In the context of trial of a warrant case, instituted on a police report, the provisions for discharge are to be governed as per the terms of Section 239 which provide that a direction for discharge can be made only for reasons to be recorded by the court where it considers the charge against the Accused to be groundless. It would, therefore, follow that as per the provisions Under Section 239 what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not that a ground for convicting the Accused has been made out - The suspicion referred to by this Court must be founded upon the materials placed before the Magistrate which leads him to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged. Therefore, the words a very strong suspicion used by this Court must not be a strong suspicion of a vacillating mind of a Judge. That suspicion must be founded upon the materials placed before the Magistrate which leads him to form a presumptive opinion about the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged. The provisions of discharge Under Section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure fell for consideration of this Court in K. Ramakrishna and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr. 2000 (9) TMI 1089 - SUPREME COURT , and it was held that the questions regarding the sufficiency or reliability of the evidence to proceed further are not required to be considered by the trial court Under Section 239 and the High Court Under Section 482. Scope of exercise of Revisional power at the stage of charge - HELD THAT - The revisional power cannot be exercised in a casual or mechanical manner. It can only be exercised to correct manifest error of law or procedure which would occasion injustice, if it is not corrected. The revisional power cannot be equated with appellate power. A revisional court cannot undertake meticulous examination of the material on record as it is undertaken by the trial court or the appellate court. This power can only be exercised if there is any legal bar to the continuance of the proceedings or if the facts as stated in the charge-sheet are taken to be true on their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence for which the Accused has been charged. It is conferred to check grave error of law or procedure - This Court in Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency Pvt. Ltd. v. Central Bureau of Investigation 2018 (4) TMI 3 - SUPREME COURT , has held that interference in the order framing charges or refusing to discharge is called for in the rarest of rare case only to correct the patent error of jurisdiction. The High Court has acted completely beyond the settled parameters, as discussed above, which govern the power to discharge the Accused from the prosecution. The High Court could be said to have donned the role of a chartered accountant - The High Court has completely ignored that it was not at the stage of trial or considering an appeal against a verdict in a trial. Section 13(1)(e) of the Act 1988 makes a departure from the principle of criminal jurisprudence that the burden will always lie on the prosecution to prove the ingredients of the offences charged and never shifts on the Accused to disprove the charge framed against him. The legal effect of Section 13(1)(e) is that it is for the prosecution to establish that the Accused was in possession of properties disproportionate to his known sources of income but the term known sources of income would mean the sources known to the prosecution and not the sources known to the Accused and within the knowledge of the Accused - The Accused cannot make an attempt to discharge this onus upon him at the stage of Section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. At the stage of Section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Court has to only look into the prima facie case and decide whether the case put up by the prosecution is groundless. The impugned orders passed by the High Court discharging the Accused persons from the prosecution are hereby set aside. The Special Court shall now proceed to frame charge against the Accused persons in accordance with law and put them to trial - Appeal allowed.
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the High Court erred in discharging the accused persons from prosecution under Section 13(2) read with 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and Section 109 of the IPC. 2. The burden of proof and the role of the Investigating Officer in considering the explanation provided by the accused. 3. The legal standards and procedures applicable at the stage of framing charges under Section 239 of the CrPC. 4. The scope and limits of the High Court's revisional powers under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the CrPC. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Whether the High Court erred in discharging the accused persons from prosecution under Section 13(2) read with 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and Section 109 of the IPC: The Supreme Court found the High Court's decision to discharge the accused as erroneous. The High Court failed to appreciate that at the stage of framing charges, the court is only required to see if a prima facie case is made out. The Supreme Court emphasized that the probative value of materials on record should not be gone into at this stage. The High Court had erroneously conducted a detailed examination of the evidence, which is not permissible at the stage of framing charges. 2. The burden of proof and the role of the Investigating Officer in considering the explanation provided by the accused: The Supreme Court clarified that under Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, the burden is on the accused to satisfactorily account for the assets found to be disproportionate to their known sources of income. The Investigating Officer is not required to accept the explanation provided by the accused during the investigation. The Court cited its previous rulings, including K. Veeraswami v. Union of India, to assert that the Investigating Officer's role is to collect material and not to adjudicate on the accused's explanations. 3. The legal standards and procedures applicable at the stage of framing charges under Section 239 of the CrPC: The Supreme Court reiterated that the test at the stage of framing charges is whether there is a ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offense. The Court emphasized that a detailed evaluation of the evidence or a meticulous consideration of the possible defenses is not required at this stage. The Court held that the word "groundless" in Section 239 means that there must be no basis for presuming that the accused has committed the offense. 4. The scope and limits of the High Court's revisional powers under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the CrPC: The Supreme Court noted that the High Court's revisional powers are limited and should not be exercised in a routine or casual manner. The High Court should interfere only to correct a manifest error of law or procedure that would result in injustice. The Court observed that the High Court had overstepped its revisional jurisdiction by conducting a detailed examination of the evidence and substituting its own findings for those of the trial court. Conclusion: The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court's orders discharging the accused, and directed the Special Court to proceed with framing charges and conducting the trial. The Court clarified that its observations were confined to the legality of the High Court's orders and should not influence the trial court's determination of the accused's guilt or innocence.
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