2002 (3) TMI 44 - SUPREME COURT

Whether after the quashing of a notification under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 a fresh period of one year is available to the State Government to issue another notification under section 6?

Held that:- While interpreting a provision the court only interprets the law and cannot legislate it. If a provision of law is misused and subjected to the abuse of the process of law, it is for the Legislature to amend, modify or repeal it, if deemed necessary. The legislative casus omis sus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative process. The language of sec tion 6(1) is plain and unambiguous. There is no scope for reading something into it the period was further stretched to have the time period run from the date of service of the High Court's order. Such a view cannot be reconciled with the language of section 6(1). If the view is accepted it would mean that a case can be covered by not only clauses (i) and/or (ii) of the proviso to section 6(1), but also by a non-prescribed period. The same can never be the legislative intent.

The plea relating to applicability of the stare decisis principle is clearly unacceptable. If the Legislature intended to give a new lease of life in those cases where the declaration under section 6 is quashed, there is no reason why it could not have done so by specifically providing for it. The fact that the Legislature specifically provided for periods covered by orders of stay or injunction clearly shows that no other period was intended to be excluded and that there is no scope for providing any other period of limitation. The maxim "actus curiae neminem gravabit" highlighted by the Full Bench of the Madras High Court has no application to the fact situation of this case. The appeals are accordingly disposed of and the subsequent notifications containing declaration under section 6 of the Act are quashed.