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1966 (3) TMI 17 - SC - CustomsProsecution, confiscation and penalty (Customs) - Smuggling - Prosecution - Evidence - Confessional statement
Issues Involved:
1. Interpretation of Section 167(81) of the Sea Customs Act. 2. Admissibility of the appellant's statement under Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act. Detailed Analysis: 1. Interpretation of Section 167(81) of the Sea Customs Act: The appellant was prosecuted under Section 167(81) of the Sea Customs Act, read with Section 9 of the Land Customs Act. The High Court had disagreed with the Calcutta High Court's view in Sitaram Agarwal v. State, 1962 (2) Cri. LJ 43; (AIR 1962 Cal. 370), which suggested that only persons directly involved in the import of goods could be prosecuted under Section 167(81). The High Court held that even individuals not directly concerned with the import could be prosecuted. This interpretation was challenged, but the Supreme Court's decision in Sachidananda Banerjee v. Sitaram Agarwal, Cri. A. No. 192 of 1961, confirmed that the Calcutta High Court's interpretation was incorrect. The Supreme Court held that Section 167(81) also applies to individuals who may not be directly involved in the importation of prohibited goods. Consequently, the appellant's counsel conceded that the appellant would be guilty under Section 167(81). 2. Admissibility of the Appellant's Statement under Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act: The second issue was whether the statement made by the appellant to the Deputy Superintendent of Customs and Excise was admissible in evidence, considering Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, which excludes confessions made to police officers. The appellant argued that a Central Excise Officer under the Central Excise Act should be considered a police officer within the meaning of Section 25. The High Court had relied on the Supreme Court's judgment in State of Punjab v. Barkat Ram, (1962) 3 SCR 338, which held that a Customs Officer under the Sea Customs Act was not a police officer. The appellant cited the later decision in Raja Ram Jaiswal v. State of Bihar, (1964) 2 SCR 752, where an excise officer under the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act was deemed a police officer. The Supreme Court noted the differing opinions among High Courts on the interpretation of "police officer" in Section 25. The broader view, supported by the Bombay High Court in Nanoo Sheikh Ahmed v. Emperor, ILR (1927) 51 Bom. 78, considered any officer with police-like investigatory powers as a police officer. The narrower view, supported by the Patna High Court in Radha Kishan Marwari v. Emperor, ILR (1933) 12 Pat 46, restricted the term to police officers properly so-called. The Supreme Court examined the provisions of the Central Excise Act, noting that the primary purpose of the Act was to levy and collect excise duties, with investigatory powers being ancillary. Section 21 of the Act, which allows Central Excise Officers to exercise powers similar to those of police officers for inquiries, does not equate them to police officers. Unlike the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act, the Central Excise Act does not deem these officers as in charge of police stations. The Court concluded that even under a broad interpretation, Central Excise Officers are not police officers within the meaning of Section 25 of the Evidence Act. The Court also addressed the appellant's claim that the confession was obtained through threats, which would invoke Section 24 of the Evidence Act. The High Court had rejected this claim, and the Supreme Court found no reason to dispute this finding. Conclusion: The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's interpretation of Section 167(81) of the Sea Customs Act, confirming that individuals not directly involved in the import of prohibited goods could be prosecuted. It also ruled that the statement made by the appellant to the Deputy Superintendent of Customs and Excise was admissible, as Central Excise Officers are not considered police officers under Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act. The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant's conviction was upheld.
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