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Issues Involved:
1. Applicability of Customs Duty based on the date of vessel entry into territorial waters versus the date of presentation of the bill of entry. 2. Validity of the Government's power to rescind or modify exemption notifications. 3. Application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel against the Government. Summary: 1. Applicability of Customs Duty: The appellant imported palmolein oil, which was initially exempt from customs duty by Notification No. 129, dated 1-7-1977. The vessel carrying the goods arrived in Madras on 22-2-1979 but was not allowed to discharge the cargo until 2-3-1979. By this time, Notification No. 42, dated 1-3-1979, had come into effect, imposing a 12.5% customs duty. The appellant contended that the relevant date for duty assessment should be the date the vessel entered territorial waters (22-2-1979). However, the court held that "the relevant date for ascertaining whether duty is to be levied or not is the date on which the bill of entry was presented," which was 13-3-1979. The court referred to Sec. 15(1)(a) of the Customs Act, which states that the rate of duty applicable is the one in force on the date of presentation of the bill of entry. 2. Validity of Government's Power to Rescind or Modify Exemption Notifications: The appellant argued that the Government could not use S. 25 of the Customs Act, 1962, to impose duty. The court rejected this argument, stating that the Government has the power to grant exemption "wholly or partially" under S. 25 and can rescind or modify such exemptions as necessary. The court emphasized that the Government's power to issue, amend, or rescind notifications under S. 25 is well within its legislative authority. 3. Application of the Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel: The appellant claimed that the Government should be estopped from rescinding the exemption as it had induced reliance on Notification No. 129, dated 1-7-1977. The court found no promise by the Government to keep the exemption alive indefinitely. The court cited previous judgments, including Union of India v. Anglo V. Afghan Agencies and M.P. Sugar Mills v. State of U.P., which held that promissory estoppel cannot apply against legislative actions or in the absence of a clear promise. The court concluded that the doctrine of promissory estoppel was not applicable as the Government was acting within its statutory powers and no specific promise was made. Conclusion: The court dismissed the appeal, upholding the imposition of the 12.5% customs duty as per Notification No. 42, dated 1-3-1979. The court also granted leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, recognizing the need for an authoritative pronouncement on the interpretation of Sec. 12 of the Customs Act.
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