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2024 (3) TMI 991
Validity of SCN proposing to declare the petitioners as wilful defaulters - Classification of Account as NPA - Impact of CIRP proceedings under IBC - Declaring the petitioners as wilful defaulters in terms of the Master Circular on Wilful Defaulters issued by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) on July 1, 2015 - whether the injunction order passed by the writ court against the respondent-Bank, on the premise that the NPA classification was de hors the Master Circular, can be a relevant consideration for vitiating the Show-cause Notice? - HELD THAT:- In the present lis, even if the best case of the petitioners is taken into consideration, applying the Pandemic Circulars of the RBI extending the time for making good defaults, on and from November 30, 2020, the petitioner no. 1 was a defaulter. Apparently, no repayment has been made since then. Thus, it cannot be said that merely because the NPA classification is clouded in a writ petition, the respondent-Bank cannot proceed with the wilful defaulter proceeding.
However, it is made clear that the purported communications of the petitioners handed over by the Bank at the time of arguments cannot be looked into at this stage, having not been referred to in the Show-cause Notice. The principle laid down in MOHINDER SINGH GILL & ANR. VERSUS THE CHIIEF ELECTION COMMISSIONER, NEW DELHI & ORS. [1977 (12) TMI 138 - SUPREME COURT] is squarely applicable as well, precluding the respondent from furnishing new grounds which were not there in the original Show cause Notice.
Show-cause Notice contains reference to the assets of the petitioner nos. 2 to 9, who were Directors of the Company, which assets are not part of the assets of the borrower-Company - HELD THAT:- A Show-cause Notice need no plead in detail the full particulars of the requirements of the Master Circular but is required merely to outline the broad spectrum of offences committed by the borrower, its Directors and the guarantors to be labelled as wilful defaulters. The proper stage for consideration of compliance of Clause 2.6 on all other aspects is the order passed by the Wilful Defaulter Identification Committee on consideration of the Show-cause Notice and the reply thereto. Hence, the merits of the said allegation cannot be considered in detail.
Sufficient ingredients to justify the allegations have been spelt out in the Show-cause Notice to bring the same within the broad purview of the Master Circular. The said ingredients, read in conjunction with the FAR and other documents which may be relied on by the Bank, are to be taken in conjunction at the time of consideration by the Wilful Defaulter Identification Committee and not at the show-cause stage. The composite effect of the documents and the broad allegations made in the Show-cause Notice are the subject-matter of adjudication by the said Committee, and thereafter the Review Committee. At the stage of Show-cause Notice, the court cannot adopt a fault-finding approach but such a Notice is to be seen in the perspective of disclosing sufficient ingredients to make the noticee aware of the nature of allegations made against it.
Moreover, it is well-settled that under normal circumstances, courts are loathe to interfere at the show-cause stage since the noticee has the remedy of giving a reply thereto available to it. The merits of the allegations and defences can only be gone into by the first committee while deciding the matter.
Thus, a wilful defaulter proceeding does not come within the contemplation of Section 14 or Section 96 of the IBC, which primarily pertains to legal actions to foreclose, recover or enforce security interest, or recovery of any property of the debt-in-question.
In P. MOHANRAJ & ORS. VERSUS M/S. SHAH BROTHERS ISPAT PVT. LTD. [2021 (3) TMI 94 - SUPREME COURT], the Supreme Court has repeatedly highlighted, particularly in paragraph nos. 35.2 and 35.3, that the moratorium concerns not merely recovery of debt but any legal proceeding even indirectly relatable to recovery of any debt. Hence, the moratorium applies to recovery proceedings and proceedings which directly or indirectly “relatable” to such recovery. A wilful defaulter proceeding cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be said to be even remotely relatable to recovery of debt but is merely an off-shoot of the debt. The corpus of debt is not the subject-matter of a wilful defaulter proceeding, unlike a recovery proceeding, but is a mere stimulus to spur the wilful defaulter proceeding into motion.
Petition is disposed of by directing the respondent-bank to serve a copy of the Forensic Audit Report and/or any other document, on which the bank intends to rely to substantiate the show-cause allegations, on the petitioners within a week from date.
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2024 (3) TMI 990
Declaration of Wilful Defaulter of the petitioner - Liability of Directors - It is argued that in none of the Committee Orders, any cogent ground has been made out under the Master Circular of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) for declaration of Wilful Defaulters - HELD THAT:- The petitioner admittedly parked some amounts from its sales realizations not in the cash credit account but in a different account opened with a different Bank, that is, the ICICI Bank, Darjeeling Branch. Hence, at a time when the borrower-Company was duty-bound to channelize its entire funds through the respondent no. 1-Bank due to its agreement with the latter, it failed to meet such obligation, which was a condition of the cash credit facility, and routed some money through a different bank account. Such act is sufficient to come within the purview of diversion of funds as contemplated in the Master Circular.
Admittedly, an agreement was entered into in the year 2004 which was much prior to the directions of the Central Government to take over management from the borrower-company. Even the Division Bench order of this Court directed the management to be continued by the borrower-Company. Hence, the lame excuse of the workers’ interest is mere lip-service in the mouth of the petitioner, since the borrower-company, evidently without knowledge or permission of the lender-Bank, had transferred the security, invoking the umbrella of the Central Government directions - The moratoria contemplated in the IBC were introduced for the protection of the corporate debtor in order to facilitate resolution. Such legal fiction, however, was created only in order to sustain the business of the company in the hands of the successful resolution applicant, inter alia, to protect the interests of the workers and the business of the unit in general. However, even if CIRP commences, the Directors, who were the masterminds in control and charge of affairs of the Company at the relevant juncture, cannot be absolved of any wilful default committed by the borrower-Company at the relevant juncture.
In the present case, the petitioner was a Director and at the helm of affairs, responsible for the business operations of the company. The business decisions of the Company are attributable to the Directors, who are the living hands of the company which is a juristic person. Thus, the petitioner cannot be absolved of the wilful default committed by the borrower-Company in his capacity as a director and promoter, irrespective of an ongoing Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process.
There are no patent irregularity or perversity in the impugned decisions or the procedure adopted by the Committees for arriving at the same, sufficient to interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
The petition is dismissed on contest without any order as to costs.
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2024 (3) TMI 989
Seeking winding up of respondent company - Failure to pay outstanding dues - section 434 of the Companies Act, 1956 - HELD THAT:- The affairs of the respondent company in liquidation appear to be completely wound up. It is not feasible to proceed further in the winding up company. On perusal of OLR No.6/2024 including the documents on record, no other assets are available for realization of the dues of the creditors. All the assets of the company in liquidation had already been sold by the Bank and realized its dues. No secured creditors are available despite the issuance of notice. Therefore, this Court is of the considered opinion that this company petition deserves to be closed under the provisions of Section 481 of the Companies Act, 1956 and Rule 282 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959.
Accordingly, it would be just and reasonable in the circumstances to pass the order that the company in liquidation be dissolved from the date of this order. Consequently, the company is in liquidation viz. M/s. STI Phoenix Wear Private Limited stands dissolved - Petition disposed off.
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2024 (3) TMI 761
Seeking waiving off the payment of Court fees in refiling the Compensation Application against the order of the Competition Commission of India - Section 26(2) of the Competition Act, 2002 - HELD THAT:- Rule 4(3) of the Competition Appellate Tribunal Rules, 2009 provides for waiving the fee, taking into consideration the economic condition or indigent circumstances of the Appellant. Herein, it is claimed that the “Advocate” was not really an Advocate and he withdrew the Compensation Application without the instructions from the Appellant. Also relying upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in RAFIQ AND ANOTHER VERSUS MUNSHILAL AND ANOTHER [1981 (4) TMI 255 - SUPREME COURT] and also of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in SOHANLAL ARYA VERSUS THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH [2019 (11) TMI 1816 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT] it is claimed that his fee, may be waived for filing the Appeal.
In the first judgment of Rafiq & Anr. relied upon by the Appellant, it is noted that there was an ex-parte order of dismissal of Appeal, which was passed by the Hon’ble High Court on non-appearance of Appellant’s Learned Counsel on the date of Hearing and the application, was made by the Learned Counsel for Recalling the Order and for permission to participate in the hearing of the Appeal, rejected on ground of unexplained delay in presenting the Application to the Court. The Hon’ble Apex Court held that rejection of the Application was not justified as a Party, should not suffer for the inaction, deliberate, omission or misdemeanour of his agent i.e. the Lawyer. The case relied upon is distinguished in the sense that the Lawyer, did not appear and defaulted, but, in the instant case, he was very much present in the Hearing, and the Appellant, was also fully aware of the proceedings.
Even assuming that the Appellant, was not aware of the fact that Mr. Sumit Jain, was not an Advocate or Chartered Accountant, Company Secretary or Cost Accountant, and he withdrew the Compensation Application, without instructions of the Appellant, waiver of fee, in re-filing the Compensation Application, has to be justified, as per the Rule 4(3) of the Competition Appellate Tribunal Rules, 2009, which provides for waiver, after taking into consideration the economic condition or indigent circumstances of the Appellant. Having gone through the Appellant’s submissions, this Tribunal, does not find any such economic condition or indigent circumstances, which justifies the waiver of the fee. Therefore, the Fee for Re-filing the Compensation Application, cannot be waived.
Application dismissed.
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2024 (3) TMI 697
Criminal proceedings against the Directors - Petitioner contending that financial transactions, inherently civil in nature, were wrongly dragged into criminal litigation - Applicability of vicarious liability in criminal proceedings - Invocation of inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 CrPC - criminal breach of trust, cheating, dishonestly inducing delivery of property, forgery and criminal conspiracy - HELD THAT:- It is manifested that the criminal contents are emanated from the alleged financial transaction took place between the present applicants along with their company namely M/s Dignify Builtech Private Ltd. and opposite party No. 2. Although financial transaction between them is admitted, however, route of money transaction has been disputed by both the parties. Opposite party No. 2 came with the case that there was bipartite financial transaction/agreement between the opposite party No. 2 and the accused company. Thus, opposite party No. 2 has directly transferred the amount in the account of accused company, having considered the negotiation took place between them. However, present applicants came with the case that it was a tripartite agreement between the parties involving one more company namely M/s Shubhkamna Builtech Private Ltd. Thus, it appears that there was circuitous route in transferring the money through another corporate being M/s Shubhkamna Builtech Private Ltd.
It would not be befitting to make any comment on the summoning order, however, technicality, if any, is not sufficient to drop the entire criminal proceeding initiated at the behest of opposite party No. 2. In this eventuality, it is always open to the present applicant to raise this objection before the court concerned, who is not bound with the police report submitted under Section 173 CrPC and the court can issue summons, having considered the facts and circumstances of the case and the material available on record, against the other person as well, who has not been arraigned in the charge sheet. He would be at liberty to take action under Section 319 CrPC. Sections 190 and 204 of the CrPC does not restrict the jurisdiction of the court concerned in issuing process against any accused, if warranted.
It is admitted to the parties that no final winding up order has been passed under the Companies Act and, while appointing provisional liquidator, company court/tribunal can impose certain conditions/limitations upon the provisional liquidator. Thus, it is evident from the relevant portion of order dated 20.9.1997 passed by Hon’ble Delhi High Court that provisional liquidator had been appointed with limited power to take all the assets, books of account and the record of the company. Exhaustive power has been given to the liquidator under the provisions of the Companies Act which, in fact, is applicable after the conclusion of winding up proceedings, therefore, there are no force in the submission that criminal proceedings should not have been initiated without sanction of the court competent - Even assuming that there is requirement of prior sanction of the court competent to institute a case on behalf of company under liquidation, no limitation has been imposed on the power of the court concerned to entertain the criminal prosecution launched in the ordinary course under the provisions of the code of criminal procedure. Provision relating to the prior sanction before filing litigation on behalf of the company is required only to ascertain the financial liabilities of the company and to secure its funds.
The opposite party No. 2 has not committed any illegality in instituting a criminal proceeding against the present applicants, who have been arraigned in the FIR for the offence under several sections of the IPC.
The criminal proceeding initiated on behalf of respondent No. 2 against the present applicant is maintainable and learned Magistrate has rightly taken cognizance on the police report submitted under Section 173 CrPC. On the facts as mentioned in the FIR prima facie commission of offence is made out against the present applicants, who are the directors of the accused company and were throughout instrumental in inducing the present applicant to purchase the land situated near NOIDA Express Way and dishonestly misused the money for other work which they had received from opposite party No. 2 in lieu of transferring the land which was agreed upon between the parties to be purchased for opposite party No. 2. Disputed question of fact has been raised by the learned counsel for the applicants in order to prove the innocence of the present applicants which can more appropriately be scrutinized by the trial court.
In the facts and circumstances of the present case, there are no abuse of the process of Court nor any justifiable ground to pass an order so as to secure the ends of justice. No ground is made out warranting indulgence of this Court in exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to quash the criminal proceeding as prayed for.
The instant application under Section 482 CrPC, being misconceived and devoid of merits, is dismissed.
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2024 (3) TMI 647
Initiation of prosecution proceedings for the alleged offence of non-copliance with Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) obligation - Company fall within the purview of section 135 of Companies Act or not - whether the reserves created out of amalgamation (as in this case), can be kept out of “Net Worth” in the years following the year of amalgamation? - HELD THAT:- Corporate social responsibility (CSR) or corporate social impact is a form of international private business self-regulation which aims to contribute to societal goals of a philanthropic, activist, or charitable nature by engaging in, with, or supporting professional service volunteering through pro bono programs, community development, administering monetary grants to non-profit organizations for the public benefit, or to conduct ethically oriented business and investment practices.
In the present case the amalgamation took place on 01.04.2008 - All assets, liabilities, properties & interest of the Transferee Company was vested into the Transferee Company (petitioner no. 1) vide order dated July 14, 2009 of the Hon’ble Court and order dated 09.08.2011 when the other companies (2) merged with the petitioner Company - Thus as per Section 2(57) of the Act. The Company gets the benefit of Section 2(57) of the Act, for the said financial year and not there after (subsequent financial years) - But the Company herein continued filing the Balance Sheet for the subsequent financial years being 2011-2012, 2012-2013, 2013-2014 & 2014-2015 in this case to take the benefit of amalgamation, year after year, to avoid their corporate social liability for which the case has been initiated by the complainant.
There is thus sufficient materials on record making out a prima facie case against the petitioners in respect of the offences alleged, and as such the case is required to be permitted to proceed towards trial. Interference at this stage would amount to abuse of the process of Court.
Revision dismissed.
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2024 (3) TMI 411
Seeking grant of bail - long incarceration of the applicant without any hope of commencing the trial at least for a few years - serious ailments with which the applicant has been suffering at the age of 62 years - offences punishable under Section 447 of the Companies Act, 2013 and Sections 417, 420 r/w 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 - HELD THAT:- The Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Jainam Rathod [2022 (4) TMI 1421 - SUPREME COURT] has granted bail to the applicant who was being prosecuted for violation of the provisions of Section 447 of the Act of 2013 as well as various provisions of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, including Sections 406, 417, 418, 420, 467, 468, 471, 474 and 477A. A Special Leave petition preferred by the appellant was dismissed by the Supreme Court on 27th January, 2020 with observations that it was always open for the appellant to move a fresh application for bail - The Hon’ble Supreme Court has also noted it’s judgment in the case of Serious Fraud Investigation Office V. Nittin Johari [2019 (9) TMI 570 - SUPREME COURT] while granting bail to the appellant Jainam. The appellant was released in light of the fact that in the absence of a fair likelihood of the trial being completed within a reasonable period, personal liberty of the appellant is to be protected in case of delay in conclusion of the trial.
It is well settled that if co-accused in the case are equally placed, meaning thereby, on the same pedestal then there is no reason to deny bail to the accused where other co-accused are not in custody.
Indubitably, investigation is over and the applicant’s detention is no more required in judicial custody. Nothing is to be recovered at the instance of the applicant. Almost all the evidence is in the form of documents, which is in the custody of the respondent No. 1. Learned Senior Counsel would contend that there is no reasonable apprehension of the applicant absconding or fleeing away from justice since he has always been co-operating with SFIO’s investigation for which he has been called for almost 30 times. A look out notice has already been issued against the applicant which shall deter him from leaving the country. Learned Senior Counsel submits that the applicant would surrender his passport - Since the case is predominately based on documentary evidence and investigation will mainly involve analysis of accounting entries and financial statements and other documents, the Counsel submits that there would no question of tampering with the same.
Dehors merits and demerits as well as the statutory embargo as contemplated in Section 212 (6) (ii) of the Act of 2013, powers of this Court under Article 21 of the Constitution are unfettered, in the sense, while exercising constitutional jurisdiction, statutory restrictions, per se, do not oust the ability of this Court to grant bail on the ground of violation of part – III of the Constitution; inarguably, statutory restrictions vis-a-vis constitutional jurisdiction will have to be harmonized.
The applicant – Hari Sankaran be enlarged on bail subject to fulfilment of conditions imposed - bail application allowed.
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2024 (3) TMI 359
Seeking grant of Anticipatory bail - maintainability of application under Section 438 of the Cr.P.C. - reasons to believe - non-bailable offences contained in Sections 437, 438 and 439 of the Cr.P.C. - HELD THAT:- Section 437 and Section 439 of the Cr.P.C. relate to grant of Bail to any person who has been ‘arrested’ or is in ‘custody’. Section 438 of the Cr.P.C., on the other hand, gives a power to the Court to grant Anticipatory Bail to a person who is yet to be ‘arrested’ or taken into ‘custody’.
In BHARAT CHAUDHARY AND ORS. VERSUS STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS. [2003 (10) TMI 692 - SUPREME COURT] the Supreme Court has held that the power under Section 438 of the Cr.P.C. is available to the High Court and the Court of Sessions, even when cognizance is taken or a chargesheet has been filed.
In RAVINDRA SAXENA VERSUS STATE OF RAJASTHAN [2009 (12) TMI 1063 - SUPREME COURT], the Supreme Court reiterated that Anticipatory Bail can be granted to an accused at any time, so long as the accused has not been arrested. The High Court or the Court of Sessions cannot refuse to exercise its powers under Section 438 of the Cr.P.C. and leave the matter to the Magistrate only on the ground that the challan has now been presented.
Coming to the principles that would be applicable while considering the application of the Applicant(s) for grant of Anticipatory Bail, there is no gainsay that the Applicant(s) would have to show that they have ‘reason to believe’ that they may be arrested - As held by the Supreme Court in GURBAKSH SINGH SIBBIA VERSUS STATE OF PUNJAB [1980 (4) TMI 295 - SUPREME COURT], the belief that the Applicant(s) may be so arrested must be founded on reasonable grounds and not on mere ‘fear’ or a ‘vague apprehension’.
In the present case, the applicant(s) have met the above test. The learned counsel(s) for the Applicant(s) have placed reliance on various judgments of this Court wherein the accused, who had been similarly summoned by the same Magistrate, were taken into custody and had to suffer the ignominy of being in jail for a long period of time before they were granted Bail by this Court.
As far as merit is concerned, in SATENDER KUMAR ANTIL VERSUS CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION & ANR. [2022 (8) TMI 152 - SUPREME COURT], the Supreme Court had placed cases where additional conditions of compliance of provisions of Bail are to be met, including Section 212 (6) of the Act, in ‘Category C’. It was held that where the accused has not been arrested consciously by the prosecution, there is no need for further arrest of the accused at the instance of the Court.
In the entire process of investigation leading to the filing of the complaint, the Applicant(s) were never arrested by the respondent and it is not disputed that the Applicant(s) have cooperated in the investigation. Applying the test as laid down by the Supreme Court in Satender Kumar Antil, therefore, the Applicant(s) are entitled to grant of Anticipatory Bail.
It is, therefore, ordered that in case of arrest, the Applicant(s) be released on bail subject to fulfilment of conditions imposed - bail application allowed.
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2024 (3) TMI 292
Restoration of struck name of the company from its register - default in non-filing of the Financial Statements and Annual Returns - Section 248(5) of the Companies Act, 2013 - HELD THAT:- Admittedly the impugned order was passed since the appellant had failed to produce documents to show it was still in possession of the asset and it had paid all water bills, electricity bills and rent receipt(s). It is submitted the financial statement could not be filed with the ROC inadvertently since father of the present directors was old and ill and it being a joint family set up with an incomplete professional/legal guidance and even their Chartered Accounts had unfortunately expired - the act of the Respondent in striking off the appellant from the rolls of ROC had caused a grave prejudice to the appellant herein, more specifically when the public notice issued by ROC was aimed at weeding out shell companies.
Though the annual accounts of the years stated above though were duly prepared but could not be filed, for the reasons stated above, the non-compliance appear to be inadvertent, non-deliberate and unintentional. Admittedly the appellant is ready to comply with all the statutory provisions once the name of the company is restored by the ROC. Thus there are no reason why its name should not be restored as no prejudice would be caused to the ROC if its name is restored. It is not the case of the ROC that the appellant is a shell company or was at any time engaged in syphoning of funds.
It is deemed just and equitable to restore the name of the appellant company to the record of ROC and thus the impugned order set aside to restore the name of the company to the Register of Companies subject to the compliances fulfilled - appeal alowed.
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2024 (3) TMI 189
Oppression and Mismanagement - inherent powers of NCLT to cause audit of accounts or to make such orders as may be necessary - Section 241 & 242 of the Companies Act, 2013 - allegations of siphoning funds, breach of agreements, and failure to maintain proper books of account - whether NCLT is empowered to direct audit and is it required to give a finding of fraud before ordering the audit by independent Auditor? - HELD THAT:- As per Rule 11 of the National Company Law Tribunal Rules, 2016, Tribunal may make such Order as may be necessary for meeting the ends of justice or to prevent, abuse of the process of Tribunal - It is seen that no pre-conditions are given in the said Rules for exercising of these inherent powers by the Tribunal. The Tribunal has directed conduct of audit through independent Auditor to ascertain the correct facts in the light of allegations and counter allegations by the parties to the dispute in Company Petition filed under Section 241 & 242 of the Companies Act, 2013, which was being adjudicated upon by them.
The issues raised in this appeal were considered by Three Member Bench of this Tribunal in the case of Archer Power System P. Ltd. Vs. Cascade Energy P. Ltd. & Ors. [2020 (8) TMI 583 - NATIONAL COMPANY LAW APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, NEW DELHI] where it was held that We are of the opinion that imposition of forensic audit and calling for the report of forensic audit before the Tribunal is a measure to help the Tribunal to appreciate the issue on the basis of an independent report so as to ensure that the case is processed with due regard to rights and obligations of contesting parties would be in the interest of justice.
The Tribunal under Rule 11 of NCLT Rules, 2016 has the inherent powers to cause audit of accounts or to make such orders as may be necessary for meeting the ends of justice and there are no fault in the impugned order on this account - the present Appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed.
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2024 (3) TMI 27
Professional Misconduct - Chartered Accountant (CA) - Significant failures to adhere to Standards on Auditing (SAs), gross negligence, and lack of professional skepticism - Non-recognition of interest cost on Bank Borrowings classified as NPAs - False reporting under CARO - Failure in performing of required audit procedures - Inappropriate Opinion on the Financial Statement for the FYs 2014-15 to 2016-17 - Non-implementation of Quality Control Measures at the Engagement Level - Non-submission of Audit File for the FY 2014-15 - penalty and sanctions.
HELD THAT:- The EP has made departures from the Standards and the Law, in his conduct of the audit of Bilcare Limited for the FYs 2014-15, 2015-16 and 2016-17. In light of the foregoing discussion, findings on each article of charge listed out in the SCN, are stated below:
(a) The EP committed professional misconduct as defined by clause 5 of Part I of the Second Schedule of the CA Act, which states that a CA is guilty of professional misconduct when he "fails to disclose a material fact known to him which is not disclosed in a financial statement, but disclosure of which is necessary in making such financial statement where he is concerned with that financial statement in a professional capacity".
This charge is proved as the EP failed to disclose in his report the material non-compliances by the company as explained in Para 16-22 above.
(b) The EP committed professional misconduct as defined by clause 6 of Part I of the Second Schedule of the CA Act, which states that a CA is guilty of professional misconduct when he "fails to report a material misstatement known to him to appear in a financial statement with which he is concerned in a professional capacity".
This charge is proved as the EP failed to disclose in his report the material non-compliances by the company as explained in Para 16-22 above.
(c) The EP committed professional misconduct as defined by clause 7 of Part I of the Second Schedule of the CA Act, which states that a CA is guilty of professional misconduct when he "does not exercise due diligence or is grossly negligent in the conduct of his professional duties".
This charge is proved as the EP failed to exercise due diligence in the audit of the company in accordance with the SAs and applicable regulations, as explained in Para 16-44 above.
(d) The EP committed professional misconduct as defined by clause 8 of Part I of the Second Schedule of the CA Act, which states that an EP is guilty of professional misconduct when he "fails to obtain sufficient information which is necessary for expression of an opinion, or its exceptions are sufficiently material to negate the expression of an opinion".
This charge is proved as the EP failed to conduct the audit in accordance with the SAs and applicable regulations and failed to analyse and report the appropriateness of accounting policy for recognition of interest cost on NPA loans in the financial statements as explained in Para 16-44 above.
(e) The EP committed professional misconduct as defined by clause 9 of Part I of the Second Schedule of the CA Act, which states that an EP is guilty of professional misconduct when he "fails to invite attention to any material departure from the generally accepted procedure of audit applicable to the circumstances".
This charge is proved since the EP failed to conduct the audit in accordance with the SAs as explained in Para 16-44 above.
Therefore, it is concluded that the charges of professional misconduct enumerated in the SCN dated 14.07.2023 stand proved based on the evidence in the Audit File, the Audit Report issued by EP, the submissions made by EP, the annual report of Bilcare for the FYs and other materials available on record.
Penalty and sanctions - HELD THAT:- It is the duty of an auditor to conduct the audit with professional skepticism and due diligence and report his opinion in an unbiased manner. Statutory audits provide useful information to the stakeholders and public, based on which they make their decisions on their investments or do transactions with the public interest entity - Section 132(4) of the Companies Act, 2013 provides for penalties in a case where professional misconduct is proved. The seriousness with which proven cases of professional misconduct are to be viewed, is evident from the fact that a minimum punishment is laid down by the law.
Considering the proven professional misconduct, the nature of violations, principles of proportionality and deterrence against future professional misconduct, we in exercise of powers under Section 132(4)(c) of the Companies Act, 2013, hereby order:
I. Imposition of a monetary penalty of Rs 3,00,000/- upon CA Ratan Laxminarayan Rathi;
II. In addition, CA Ratan Laxminarayan Rathi is debarred for 2 years from being appointed as an auditor or internal auditor or from undertaking any audit in respect of financial statements or internal audit of the functions and activities of any company or body corporate.
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2024 (2) TMI 1294
Maintainability of complaint against the petitioner - Dishonour of Cheque - vicarious liability of Non-Executive Director - issuance of a legal demand notice to the accused company and its directors - HELD THAT:- It is trite that the Non-Executive Director is not involved in the day to day affairs of the company or in the running of its business. Further, when a complaint is filed against the Director of the company, who is not a signatory of the dishonoured cheque, specific averments have to be made in the pleadings to substantiate the contentions in the complaint that such Director was incharge of and responsible for conduct of the business of the company unless such Director is designated Managing Director or Joint Managing Director.
A bare reading of para 3 of the complaint shows that in the complaint it has not been substantiated that in what manner the petitioner/accused no. 4 was incharge of and responsible for conduct of the business of the accused company, which elaboration was mandatory since the petitioner is neither a signatory to the cheque nor was he the Managing Director or Joint Managing Director of the accused company. This being the position, the complaint is not maintainable against the petitioner.
In view of the undisputed status of the petitioner as a Non-Executive Director and further regard being had to the fact that the petitioner is neither signatory to the cheque nor Managing Director or Joint Managing Director of the accused company, making him stand the trial would be an abuse of process of Court.
Appeal disposed off.
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2024 (2) TMI 1261
Effect of resignation from Directorship - Removal of name of the Petitioner as a Director of Respondent No. 4-company - HELD THAT:- Although certain compliances on the part of the company were necessary, however, in the peculiar facts of the present case, it is clear that the company itself did not commence its business, as also the other director being a foreign director did not take any steps in that regard. Added to this was the Covid-19 pandemic period during which such compliances could not be made. All these circumstances ought not to weigh against the petitioner, for deletion of his name as a director from the record of the Registrar of Companies. This also for the reason that severance of the petitioner’s relationship as a director of the company took effect from 1 September 2021 as per the petitioner’s letter dated 24 August 2021 received by the company. This is the legal consequence as brought about by Section 168(2) of the Companies Act, 2013.
Except for certain forms not being filled by the company within the prescribed time, there does not appear to be any other gross default or illegality or any other justifiable reason for the Registrar of the Companies to give effect to the resignation of the petitioner, in the official records, as maintained by him. This is fortified from the contents of the reply affidavit of the official respondents which categorically state that even the explanations / comments and / or compliances as demanded by the Registrar of Companies from respondent No. 4/company were reported to be not answered by the company. This was a default on the part of a non-functional company. Thus, this is clearly a case where the company itself was stillborn.
Petition allowed.
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2024 (2) TMI 1188
Violation of principles of natural justice - Interim Demand Notice demanding stamp duty issued without adequately scrutinizing the case, and without going into the details along with all the supporting documents in the matter - HELD THAT:- The Petitioner had filed an Appeal challenging the Order dated 14th September 2021 on 2nd November 2021. A hearing was held in the said Appeal on 7th June 2023 and Petitioner filed its written submissions on 7th August 2023. Despite the same, and despite a period of more than 2 years having elapsed, Respondent No. 2 has not passed any order on the said Appeal. It is informed that the Presiding Officer of Respondent No. 2, who heard the said Appeal on 7th June 2023, has changed. In these circumstances, it would be in the interests of justice that Respondent No. 2 is directed to re-hear the Appeal and pass an order in the said Appeal filed by the Petitioner, in accordance with law, within a period of four months from the date of intimation of this Order.
Further, since, the said Demand Notice dated 16th March 2022 and the letter dated 23rd January 2024 had been issued by Respondent No. 3, pursuant to the said Order dated 14th September 2021, which is the subject matter of the aforesaid Appeal, it would also be in the interests of justice that, till the said Appeal is re-heard and an order is passed on the said Appeal, the said Demand Notice dated 16th March 2022 and the said letter dated 23rd January 2024 remains stayed.
Respondent No. 2 is directed to re-hear Appeal No. 227 of 2021 filed by the Petitioner and pass an Order, in accordance with law, expeditiously and, in any case, within a period of four months from the date of intimation of this Order - Till the said Order is passed by Respondent No. 2 on the said Appeal, the Demand Notice dated 16th March 2022 and the letter dated 23rd January 2024 issued by Respondent No. 3 shall remain stayed and the Petitioner shall be permitted to operate its ICICI Bank Account.
Writ petition disposed off.
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2024 (2) TMI 1095
Prayer for being excused of any criminal liability and relieved of the alleged defaults complained of by the respondent in the notice dated 6.10.2020 - prayer for an injunction restraining the respondent / Registrar of Companies (ROC), West Bengal from initiating criminal proceedings in respect of any of the matters referred to in the notice dated 6.10.2020 - section 463(2) of the Companies Act, 2013 - HELD THAT:- In the present case, the respondent did not pass any reasoned order pursuant to the reply given by the Company on 17.11.2020. This letter was a detailed reply to the impugned Notice dated 6.10.2020. Criminal proceedings were instituted in June, 2023 after almost 3 years from the date of issuance of the preliminary findings letter. In the present case, the respondent issued the Notice dated 9.11.2023 which is a supplementary Inspection Notice from the Office of the Regional Director after filing of the present writ petition. Thus, the petitioner’s apprehension was correct and ultimately came true by issuance of the Notice dated 9.11.2023.
The Departmental Circular dated 20th June, 2016 relied on by the respondent is an internal document. The contents of the circular are mostly illegible. In any event, the consent/sanction referred to in section 470(3) of The Code of Criminal Procedure would only be applicable where the prosecution has exceeded the limitation period due to the requirement for sanction from the concerned authority.
The reasons persuade the Court to allow the prayers in the writ petition and excuse the petitioners and each one of them of any criminal liability in respect of the alleged defaults complained of by the respondent in the impugned notice dated 6th October, 2020. The respondent is accordingly restrained from instituting or proceeding with any criminal proceedings in respect of the matter referred to in the notice dated 6th October, 2020 or take any further steps in respect thereto.
Petition allowed.
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2024 (2) TMI 977
Constitutional Validity of Rule 37(8) of the Companies (Incorporation) Third Amendment Rules, 2016 - rejection of conversion of the Petitioner's company from an “Unlimited Liability Company” to a “Limited Liability Company” - HELD THAT:- This Court is of the opinion that the lacuna in the Companies (Incorporation) Rules, 2014 is being sought to be cured by the 2016 Amendment. Since the purpose of the amendment is to cure the defects which existed in the law by giving discretion to the RoC to satisfy himself that there are sufficient means in the company to answer their debts even after conversion, it cannot be said that it would operate only to applications filed after the 2016 amendment. Merely filing an undertaking as mandated under Section 18(3) would not take care of the interests of the creditors which is now sought to be protected under the 2016 amendment.
The Division Bench of this Court in its [2020 (3) TMI 527 - DELHI HIGH COURT] had only directed the RoC to decide the application of the Petitioner afresh in accordance with law. As of today there is no challenge to the 2016 Regulations. This Court is of the opinion that since the 2016 Amendment was only curative in nature and only intended to protect the interests of the creditors, the amended rules, therefore, must apply to applications which are pending with the RoC, and the same must apply to the application of the petitioner/company. The right of the Petitioner for conversion from unlimited company to limited company has not been taken away. In fact, the petitioner/company had no vested right to be granted a certification of conversion to a limited liability company.
The reasons given by the RoC for rejecting the application of the Petitioner on the ground that various prosecutions have been filed by the Serious Fraud Investigation Organization against the Petitioner for offences under the Companies Act and the IPC and that the e-Form 27 which was to be filed with the Registrar of Companies was not in compliance with Rule 37 of the 2016 Rules cannot be said to be so perverse especially keeping in mind the interest of the shareholders and the interest of the creditors. The RoC has also observed that the petitioner/company has suffered substantial financial losses and has a net deficit in current liabilities over the assets in excess of Rs. 2100 Crores. The registrar was also not provided with an NOC or undertaking from all the shareholders to support the conversion application and the petitioner did not even issue a public advertisement inviting objections from various creditors/stakeholders on the issue of conversion.
The anxiety on the part of the Registrar of Companies that the creditors and stakeholder should not be left high and dry cannot be said to be completely unjustified.
Petition dismissed.
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2024 (2) TMI 976
Legality of SFIO Investigation - Alleged incorrect address mentioned in Form No.10 filed by the petitioner/Company with Registrar - Invocation of Section 12 of Companies Act, 2013 for the alleged non-maintenance of the registered office at the address mentioned in Form No.10 filed before the Registrar - HELD THAT:- Once investigation has commenced under Section 210, the statute does not render the Government of India powerless, to assign the investigation under Section 212 to the SFIO. It neither results in duplication of investigation, nor takes away any right of the petitioner. Sub-section (2) clearly mandates that once the SFIO is entrusted with investigation under Section 212, any other investigation already initiated shall not be proceeded further and further, those agencies who are/were conducting any investigation, shall transfer all the relevant documents and records in respect of those offences to the SFIO. The powers of SFIO is statutorily determined from sub-section (3) to sub-section (17) of Section 212 and for conduct of investigation there is procedure in place which need not require elaboration at this juncture.
The submission of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner is that when the proceedings under Section 210 are underway, assignment of investigation to the SFIO cannot take place. The strength on which the said submission is made is that there should a report under Section 210, as is directed, and only then the investigation can be handed over to the SFIO. The effect of such submission is that handing over of investigation to the SFIO, should precede a final report under Section 210. This submission is sans countenance as it travels on a slippery slope. Section 210 does speak of a report, the report can be either interim or final it need not be the final report only - It is entrusted to the SFIO which is created under the Act, i.e., in terms of Section 211 with elaborate functions under Section 212. The protection to any Company from duplication of proceedings is kept tight under sub-section (2) of Section 212 and above all, and after all, it is investigation.
A bleak attempt is made by the learned senior counsel to submit that the phrase ‘interim report’ is found only in sub-section 11 of Section 212, and nowhere in Section 210 suffers from want tenability, as observed hereinabove, the report under Section 210, can either be interim or final. The said report will not result in any penalty being imposed straight away against any Company. It is for the purpose of investigation. Investigation is for the purpose of unearthing the alleged unethical activities of any Company, in the case at hand, the petitioner/Company. The Apex Court, in plethora of cases, has observed that with the advancement of technology, economic offences have become a real threat to the functioning of the financial system of the country. Those offences become a great challenge for Investigating Agencies to detect and comprehend intricate nature of transactions, as also the role of persons involved therein.
No reasons provided to invoke Section 212 of the Act - non-application of mind - HELD THAT:- The statement of objections are, in defence of interim report necessitating assignment of investigation. If the Union of India has thought it fit to entrust the investigation to the SFIO, owing to certain factors which have emerged while conduct of investigation under Section 210 and in public interest, this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would not by a stroke of pen, annul such opinion of the Union of India, unless it is contrary to the statute or the action is demonstrably arbitrary. Neither of the two is present in the case at hand, as the projection of the two, by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner is sans acceptance. Therefore, there is no warrant to interfere at this stage.
Insofar as the judgments relied on by the leaned senior counsel in support of his submissions in the case of MODERN DENTAL COLLEGE AND RESEARCH CENTRE v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH [2016 (5) TMI 1366 - SUPREME COURT] and in the case of UTTAM DAS CHELA SUNDER DAS v. SHIROMANI GURDWARA PRABANDHAK COMMITTEE [1996 (5) TMI 431 - SUPREME COURT] are inapplicable to the facts situation at this juncture. Reliance is placed on paragraph 60 of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of MODERN DENTAL COLLEGE AND RESEARCH CENTRE which deals with doctrine of proportionality. It is the submission that the statute should be used only for the designated proper purpose. In the considered view of the Court, the statute is used for the designated proper purpose. Proportionality is not what can be considered at this stage of the proceedings. The stage, as observed in the course of the order, is conduct of investigation and the Apex Court is clear that investigation process should not be interdicted or annihilated unless the grounds projected are in support of such interdiction - the judgments relied on would not lend any support to the submissions of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner, in any manner. The action impugned does not suffer from any statutory aberration and therefore, the petition does not deserve any entertainment.
Petition dismissed.
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2024 (2) TMI 775
Manipulation of voters’ list for the tenure of office bearers of the association from 2021 to 2023 by the named appellant defendants - inclusion of members whose membership had expired but renewed illegally - Order 7 Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code - HELD THAT:- It is not necessary to go into the issue whether the dispute between the parties was covered by Section 241 of the said Act. The reason given by the learned judge that the remedy sought by the plaintiffs could not be availed of by them because of their lack in number is in my opinion a plausible one. I also agree with the learned judge that availing of this remedy was conditional upon grant of an application by the tribunal to waive the eligibility requirement which would result in unnecessary consumption of time.
It is added that if the plaintiffs approached the tribunal for dispensing with the eligibility criteria, there was no guarantee that the tribunal would allow the application. In the event the tribunal rejected the application the plaintiffs would have to approach the civil court. The plaintiffs were justified in availing of a certain remedy rather than one which did not exist but could come into existence on fulfillment of an uncertain condition.
The plaintiffs’ decision to directly approach this court to file the civil suit was a proper step. Hence there are no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment and order dated 8th February, 2023 - impugned judgement upheld.
Appointment of independent officer or court appointed officer to act as an Administrator of the Association - appointment of independent officer or court appointed officer for smooth running of the day to day work of the Association and also only to meet the expenses of the Association to the extent to pay the salary of the employees of the AssociationInjuncting the present executive committee from taking any decision related to any financial matter on behalf of the Association or to spend any money - HELD THAT:- The election procedure of the association conducted in the year 2021 for election of the elected executive committee of the association from 2021- 2023 was challenged in this suit. It was said that the electoral roll was manipulated and fabricated showing membership of members whose membership had expired or wrongfully renewed. With this untrue voters’ list, the election was conducted by the defendants so as to elect executive committee members who were not eligible to be elected.
During argument it was conceded by both learned counsel that even after extension by the Registrar of companies, the term of the executive committee had come to an end and could not be continued to run the association. The interest of the members of the association would be best subserved if an election of the executive members of the association was conducted under the aegis of the court through an administrator. The administrator would be first responsible for preparation of a true and correct voters’ list of eligible members and then convene and hold an Annual General Meeting of the appellant association.
The appeal is disposed of by holding that the suit is maintainable before this court.
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2024 (2) TMI 571
Condonation of delay of 18 days in preferring the instant Company Appeal - Section 421(3) of the Companies Act, 2013 - only ground pleaded for delay was the alleged indisposition of the 2nd Appellant - bonafide reasons for condoning the delay or not - HELD THAT:- Where the delay in preferring an Appeal/Restoration Application/Review etc. is not wanton or intentional, the Court would not be justified in rejecting the ‘delay condonation application’ on the basis that the Applicant had not produced a medical certificate, to show that he/she was ill and the Doctor had advised him/her to take rest, as per decision in Marry Susheela V. Shalee Kasturibai [2014 (4) TMI 1302 - MADRAS HIGH COURT].
When substantial justice and technical consideration are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the opposite party, cannot claim to have vested right in justice being denied to him / them, because of a non-deliberate delay. There cannot be any presumption or assumption that the delay as occasioned, wantonly, or on account of culpable negligence or on account of malafides - refusing to condone the delay can even result in a ‘meritorious matter’ being thrown out at the early stage and cause of justice being defeated. Also that, when the delay in question is condoned, the highest thing that can happen is that the case will be decided on merits after hearing the parties.
This ‘Tribunal’ on a careful consideration of respective contentions, on going through the facts and circumstances of the instant case comes to a ‘cocksure conclusion’ that the delay of 18 days in preferring the instant ‘Appeal’ has occurred on account of the indisposition of the 2nd Appellant, the authorised signatory of the 1st Appellant. Furthermore, on 01.05.2023, five days before the expiry of limitation period, the 2nd Appellant / MD and the authorised signatory of the 1st Appellant underwent tooth extraction, tooth implant etc. and the two weeks period came to an end of 14.05.2023 and the further delay of 10 days from 14.05.2023 to 24.05.2023 had occurred, according to the Appellants in the course of 2nd Appellant furnishing instructions in regard to the preferring of Appeal along with ancillary applications.
This ‘Tribunal’ by resorting to an elastic approach and the delay of 18 days that has occurred is covered within the further limitation period of 45 days prescribed in proviso to Section 421(3) of the Companies Act, 2013, condones the said delay of 18 days subject to a condition that the Petitioners/Appellants are hereby directed to pay a cost of Rs. 8000/- (Rupees eight thousand only) to the Prime Ministers’ Relief Fund to be paid within two weeks from today.
Appeal allowed.
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2024 (2) TMI 570
Prayer for reception of additional documents and to consider the revival of the Company - Respondent / ROC had not followed the procedure u/s 248(1) of the Companies Act, 2013 - ‘Notices’ u/s 248(1) were not sent - ingredients of Section 248(6) of the Companies Act, 2013 not taken note of - HELD THAT:- The power of a Tribunal, to permit additional evidence to produce/documents are within the jurisdiction of the Appellate Authority. A document not pertinent to decide the dispute/controversy in a given proceeding/suit, is not to be accepted as Additional Evidence. Besides this, if there is any lacuna or gap in evidence to be filled up, the discretionary power conferred upon the ‘Appellate Authority’ does not authorise the Appellate Authority to fill the gap in question.
This Tribunal on going through the impugned order [2023 (8) TMI 1429 - NATIONAL COMPANY LAW TRIBUNAL CUTTACK] passed by the Tribunal is of the considered view that additional evidence is not to be accepted by this Tribunal, just because the documents/evidence will tilt the decision in Petitioner/Appellant’s favour - In fact, the ‘Tribunal/Court of Law’ is to see whether the Petitioner/Appellant lacked due diligence to be seen and he cannot be allowed to fill up the ‘Lacuna’ at the belated stage. As a matter of fact, the production of Additional Evidence, is not to be allowed, when an individual does not satisfy the Court of Law / Tribunal that such evidence was not within the knowledge or could not be produced with ‘Due diligence’.
This Tribunal on going through the impugned order is of the earnest opinion that the Appellant had not preferred IA No. 19/CB/2023 in CP No. 70/CB/2020 within a two years period, as enjoined as per Section 420(2) of the Companies Act, 2013 and indeed, the IA No. 19/CB/2023 in CP No. 70/CB/2020 came to be filed before the Tribunal on 16.12.2022 after a lapse of two years period on 16.12.2022. Therefore, the Tribunal had rightly opined that IA No. 19/CB/2023 in CP No. 70/CB/2020 was not to be considered in regard to the reception of additional documents/additional evidence.
Appeal dismissed.
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