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Showing 161 to 178 of 178 Records
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1984 (5) TMI 18 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... p Sampatram v. CIT 1953 24 ITR 481, referred to by my learned brother, was laying down a principle of law, namely, as to whether the silver bars in which the assessee of Calcutta in that case was dealing lying in Bikaner and not transacted upon in any manner still formed a part of the stock-in-trade and was liable to tax. On the contrary, in the case in hand, it is a mere quantification of the correct figure to be arrived at in the process of arithmetical calculation or computation. It involves no question of law at all. Since, however, the question as framed by this court calling for a reference under s. 256(2) of the Act has a larger ambit, it has necessitated us to go into the facts for the purpose of finding out as to whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of this case, the Tribunal was right in its computation of the amount of deduction to be allowed to the asses see. There lies the whole difference between the decision of the Supreme Court and the instant case.
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1984 (5) TMI 17 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Failure To Disclose Fully And Truly, Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... (2) CIT v. Burlop Dealers Ltd. 1971 79 ITR 609 (SC), (3) Sheo Nath Singh v. AAC of IT 1971 82 ITR 147 (SC), (4) Gemini Leather Stores v. ITO 1975 100 ITR 1 (SC), (5) Parashuram Pottery Works Co. Ltd. v. ITO 1977 106 ITR 1 (SC), (6) Indian and Eastern Newspaper Society v. CIT 1979 119 ITR 996 (SC) and (7) General Mrigendra Shum Sher Jung Bahadur Rana v. ITO 1980 123 ITR 329 (Delhi). We are clearly of the view that no mistake has been committed by the Tribunal in passing its order dated April 19, 1974, wherein it has been held that, in the facts and circumstances of this case, the reopening of the assessment under s. 147(a) was incompetent. In view of these circumstances, question No. 1 referred to above is answered in the affirmative. In view of our answer to question No. 1 in the affirmative, all the rest of questions Nos. 2 to 4 have become unnecessary and redundant and need not be answered. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs.
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1984 (5) TMI 16 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Burden Of Proof, Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... -tax authority, passed thereon was pressed into service to show any conflicting decision. The voluntary disclosure of M/s. Vasudhara Textile Mills could not, in the circumstances, be treated as the gospel truth. In any case, it was a pure question of inference to be drawn from the circumstances which was within the domain of the authorities. No fault in that regard can be found with the view taken by the Appellate Tribunal. Mr. Nehra was emphatic that the affidavit had to be looked into and then alone the Tribunal could come to a conclusion. However, he has not been able to elaborate as to what precisely is his view about looking into the affidavit . It does not mean that any elaborate enquiry was required to be made into the affidavit or its contents, a matter purely discretionary with the Appellate Tribunal. For the foregoing reasons, there is no merit in this petition which fails and is hereby dismissed. Under the circumstances, however, there will be no order as to costs.
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1984 (5) TMI 15 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Burden Of Proof, Failure To File Return In Time, Penalty, Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... findings recorded by the Tribunal thus show that both the reasons given by the assessee for its failure to file the returns in response to the notices issued under s. 148 were unsustainable and that it was a deliberate decision, i.e., a wilful act on the part of the assessee not to file the returns in response to the notices issued under s. 148 of the Act. In view of the aforesaid findings recorded by the Tribunal, it cannot be said that penalty could not be imposed on the assessee under s. 271(1)(a) of the Act. We are, therefore, of the opinion that, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the penalty provisions under s. 271(1)(a) were attracted on the failure of the assessee to file its returns in compliance with the notices under s. 147/148 of the Act. In the result, questions Nos. 1 and 2 are both answered in the affirmative i.e., against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
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1984 (5) TMI 14 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Firm, Registration ... ... ... ... ..... reject, if the defect continues and not to reject if the defect is removed. The provision has now been amended to remove any such misconception regarding the use of the word may in s. 185(3), but, in our view, the meaning was just the same as before. We may point out that there are several decisions showing that the word may has to be read equivalent to shall . The leading case being Julius v. Oxford 1880 5 AC 214. Whenever the conditions are satisfied, the power must be used. It means that when the application continues to be defective, it has necessarily to be rejected by the ITO. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal had no special jurisdiction by which it could allow an unauthorised or irregular application being treated as a proper application, and, accordingly, the Tribunal was wrong in directing the registration of the firm. The question is answered in the negative, in favour of the Department and against the assessee. The Revenue will get its costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 500.
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1984 (5) TMI 13 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Charitable Trust, Exemptions ... ... ... ... ..... to be matter manifestly of public utility. Therefore, we must characterise both the objects in question as charitable or at least objects of public utility within the definition of s. 2(15) which has defined charitable Purpose as relief to the poor, medical relief and advancement of any other object of general public utility. We may also say that while deciding the appeal of the assessee, both at the AAC stage as well as before the Tribunal, the conclusion arrived at in the case of Bharat Krishak Samaj was followed and both these appellate authorities concluded that the assessee s income was exempt under s. 11 of the I.T. Act, 1961. We, accordingly, answer the question referred to us in the affirmative following the judgment in Bharat Krishak Samaj. For the sake of clarification, it may be stated that though the question referred in the case was the whole or any portion of the income, it appears to us that the whole of the income is exempt. Parties will bear their own costs.
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1984 (5) TMI 12 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Advance Tax, Reference ... ... ... ... ..... ule 40 may apply. One of the considerations which might be relevant was that the return was only for Rs. 9,962, but as the income had to be dependent on the share from the two firms which were separately to be assessed, eventually the income assessed was Rs. 1,78,693. An estimate regarding this amount could not have been filed because the assessment of the assessee had to await the ascertainment of the income of the two firms. In any case, the question whether interest should be or should not be charged depended on a number of facts which made the case unfit for the application of section 154. Even now, we do not know the facts relevant to rule 40 and the application of section 217 as it existed at the relevant time. So, we think it is a question of fact rather than a question of law. And as the facts are not ascertained, we do not see how a question of law arises. In the circumstances, we are compelled to reject the application, but leave the parties to bear their own costs.
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1984 (5) TMI 11 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Appeal To AAC ... ... ... ... ..... hen there is a competent appeal. In fact, something can be said for the view that when an appeal lies under section 246(c), then the only point in issue is the interest under section 139 of the Act. As, in the present case, we do not have to analyse this question, we would refrain from dealing with the same. We would only refer to the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Mohanlal Soni v. Union of India 1983 143 ITR 436, where it was held that an appeal lies also against an order imposing interest under section 139. The aforementioned decision of the Delhi High Court has elaborately examined the various decisions regarding the scope of an appeal under section 246 and we do not find any reason to differ from the same. We accordingly answer the question referred to us in the affirmative on the basis of the judgment of this court in CIT v. Mahabir Parshad and Sons 1980 125 ITR 165, aforementioned. The answer is in favour of the assessee, but there will be no order as to costs.
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1984 (5) TMI 10 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... has to be in the negative in the sense that the order is not erroneous and, therefore, not prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue. The addition of the sum of Rs. 40,750 to the (income of the) firm would have been erroneous. Moreover, section 68 of the Act only applies when the explanation is not accepted, but if the explanation is accepted, then the section does not apply. Turning now to the case of penalty which is covered by the second question, the Tribunal held that the matter was outside the jurisdiction of the Commissioner. On this part of the case, the decision of this court in Addl. CIT v. Achal Kumar Jain 1983 142 ITR 606, has been referred to us in which it was held that the Commissioner is not justified in setting aside the assessment order to direct initiation of penalty proceedings. Following the same, we answer the second question in favour of the assessee and against the Department, but leave the parties to bear their own costs in all the three references.
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1984 (5) TMI 9 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Company, Contingency Reserve, Surtax ... ... ... ... ..... 116 being the credit balance in an account styled as contingency reserve should be treated as a reserve as on the first day of the previous year in computing the capital of the company for the purposes of the Companies (Profits) Surtax Act, 1964 ? Similar questions except for the amounts have arisen in past years also. For the assessment year 1963-64, a reference made in respect of the super profits tax assessment of this assessee, the Punjab National Bank Ltd., involved similar questions. It was held that the sums credited in contingency reserve, charity reserve and other similar amounts were reserves as they did not relate to any real existing liability. Similar situation exists in the present assessment. Following that judgment, we answer the questions referred to us in the affirmative. The amounts transferred to contingency reserve are reserves . They have to be treated as such for the purpose of the Companies (Profits) Surtax Act, 1964. Parties will bear their own costs.
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1984 (5) TMI 8 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Profession Tax, Refund Of Tax, Tax Deducted, Tax Liability ... ... ... ... ..... xpiry of the Ordinance, the amount became refundable. It is difficult to accept this contention either, partly for the reasons already discussed above inasmuch as the payments were made during the lifetime of the Ordinance and the obligations and liabilities accrued and incurred under the Ordinance could not be affected by the expiry of the said Ordinance in the absence of any contrary intention. Although this principle is well settled, I am tempted to refer to a Full Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Tarak Chandra Mukherjee v. Ratan Lal Ghosal, AIR 1957 Cal 257, where an observation was made that an Act, though itself temporary, may create permanent rights. A similar view has been taken by me in a recent Bench decision in the case of Shree Gopal Krishna Sinha v. State of Bihar 1984 AIR 1984 Pat 235. In the result, there is no merit in the application which is accordingly dismissed, but the parties are left to bear their own costs. S.N. JHA J.--I agree.
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1984 (5) TMI 7 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Failure To Disclose, Penalty, Quantum, Undisclosed Stock ... ... ... ... ..... in pursuance thereof and the question was whether the penalty was to be levied on the basis of the first return or the one filed in pursuance of notice under s. 148 of the Act. This is, however, not the question in the case before us, and it is, there therefore, unnecessary to refer to the judgments cited. It can also be argued that if the revised return was valid under s. 139(5) of the Act, it might take the place of the original return for all intents and purposes. We, however, need not discuss this aspect of the matter as there is a finding of the Tribunal to the effect that the original return filed on October 15, 1965, was the basis of the assessment. We, therefore, hold that the penalty leviable was to be calculated on the basis of the provisions of s. 271(1)(c) of the Act, as they stood prior to their amendment in 1968, and thus answer the question accordingly in favour of the assessee and against the Department. We, however, leave the parties to bear their own costs.
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1984 (5) TMI 6 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Demurrage Paid To Railways ... ... ... ... ..... peal against the award did not postpone the right and, consequently, the accrual. This may be so in a case where the property is acquired when the amount of compensation is quantified and not in a case where the property is requisitioned, as in the instant case. The compensation was also assessed in the assessment year 1967-68 and the appeal before the Tribunal was pending in respect of the assessment year 1967-68, when the present reference arose. We do not know the fate of that appeal. Thus, it would appear to us that the amount of compensation awarded is certainly not assessable in the assessment year 1963-64, and, therefore, we restrict our answer to the question referred to us and would not say in which particular year this amount has to be assessed. In this view of the matter, we answer the question referred to us in the negative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Department. The assessee will be entitled to costs of this reference. Counsel s fee Rs. 500.
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1984 (5) TMI 5 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n application has been submitted to the Income-tax Officer before the end of the accounting year and that application should be in accordance with section 184 and rules 22 to 24 (ii) the firm should be evidenced by an instrument of partnership (iii) the instrument should specify the shares of the partners. (iv) the partnership should be valid and genuine and actually be constituted as specified in the instrument. As the conditions were satisfied, the order of cancellation of the registration of the firm was set aside under section 186(1) of the Act. In our opinion, the decision of the Tribunal as rendered in its consolidated order dated March 16, 1983, is correct and no referable question of law arises out of its order. The Tribunal has rightly rejected the application under section 256(1) of the Act filed by the Commissioner of Income-tax in respect of the aforesaid five assessment years. These applications under section 256(2) of the Act fail and they are hereby dismissed.
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1984 (5) TMI 4 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Short-term Deposits ... ... ... ... ..... e earning of such interest is neither the normal business activity nor incidental to the business of the assessee-company ? The only dispute regarding the said sum is whether it should be classified under the head Business or under the head Other sources . We are of the view that this raises a question of law and we would accordingly direct the Tribunal to state a case regarding the above question of law to this court. Parties will bear their own costs.
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1984 (5) TMI 3 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Appeal To Supreme Court ... ... ... ... ..... of the objector is deemed to have been made already and no abatement arises in proceedings under section 261 of the Act. As mentioned above, the objector has asserted that the deceased assessee executed a will in her favour on February 15, 1971. She has also appended copy of that will to her counter-affidavit. Despite time granted, rejoinder affidavit has not been filed to this counter-affidavit for the Revenue. There is no basis consequently to assume that the will relied upon by the objector is not genuine. In the result, the objector alone needs to be treated as representing the estate of the deceased assessee, Chhedi Lal, for the purposes of these proceedings. We, therefore, permit the petitioner to bring on record Smt. Chhedana, the objector, as the legal representative of the deceased assessee and dispose of the applications accordingly. The petition for certificate for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court be listed for hearing in the week commencing on July 23, 1984.
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1984 (5) TMI 2 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Company, Income Tax, Preference Shares, Rebate On Super Tax And Income Tax, Super Profits Tax
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1984 (5) TMI 1 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Defects, Limitation, Petition Filed In Time, Petition To High Court For Directing Reference, Practice
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