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Showing 21 to 29 of 29 Records

• 1951 (1) TMI 28 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
  
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  ... ... ..... the offence is not the accused in the case. Though Jacob may be made liable if the proper procedure had been followed as a partner of the firm-on that question I do not express my final opinion be is not liable as the firm is the person who made the default and who should have been prosecuted. The learned State Prosecutor relied upon the judgment of Chandra- sekhara Aiyar, J., in Akulu Paddayya Naidu, In re(1). In that case the notice was served on the firm represented by one of the partners and both the partners of the firm were accused. As both the partners were made accused, the learned Judge presumably treated the firm as accused and convicted both the partners who constituted the firm. In this case I cannot treat the firm as the accused as one of the accused only was prosecuted in his personal capacity. I agree with the Court below and hold that the order of acquittal is correct. The appeal is therefore dismissed. Appeal dismissed. (1) 1947 1 S.T.C. 165 1947 M.W.N. 603.

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• 1951 (1) TMI 27 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
  
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  ... ... ..... t out to us what materials the authorities should have considered which they did not consider. It appears to us that they considered all available materials and came to a conclusion. Learned Advocate for the appli- cants did not say that the authorities made the assessment order dis- honestly or vindictively. He suggested that the order was made capriciously. But no evidence has been placed before us to enable us to accept the suggestion. It may be that the authorities were wrong, but that does not mean that they were capricious in the finding they made. In this case, on the facts before us, we hold that the authorities did apply their mind and tried their best to come to a correct conclusion. Even if they were wrong, the applicants cannot be helped in any way. On these considerations we answer the question in the affirmative. The respondent is entitled to the costs of these proceedings. Certified for two Counsel. HARRIES, C.J.-I agree. Reference answered in the affirmative.

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• 1951 (1) TMI 26 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
  

  Meeting and Proceedings – Power of Company Law Board to Order Meeting to be Called

  
  
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  ... ... ..... order staying the order of Mookerjee, J., but it was thought that the meeting which had been ordered to be held had not been held. It now transpires that the meeting ordered by Mookerjee, J., had been held and therefore the stay order which this Bench issued was wholly infructuous. The stay order issued by this Bench was ultimately vacated, and in any event it never was effective. What effect the meeting ordered by the court will have upon the subsequent meeting in December is a matter on which we express no opinion. A point was taken as a preliminary point that no appeal lay in this case. I do not think it is necessary to discuss that matter, but I wish to make it clear that we do not hold that an appeal does lie. However as there are no merits in the appeal it is unnecessary to consider that preliminary point, because even if an appeal lay it would fail. In the result therefore this appeal must be dismissed with costs. Certified for one counsel. Banerjee, J. mdash I agree.

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• 1951 (1) TMI 23 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
  

  Power of court to rectify register of members and Winding up – Liability as contributories of present and past members

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• 1951 (1) TMI 22 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
  

  Winding up – Powers of tribunal on hearing petition

  
  
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  ... ... ..... He held that since the vast majority of the shareholders of the firm were in Pakistan, the order of the Assistant Custodian, declaring the firm to be an evacuee firm and taking over its properties is correct. This is obviously wrong. The Assistant Custodian at Madras cannot take over properties belonging to a company registered in Calcutta, i.e., in West Bengal, to which neither the Ordinance nor the Act extends. Then the Custodian went on to make a curious order, namely, that the share of the 25 non-evacuee shareholders in the not assets of the firm will be refunded to them, but they cannot do any business in the name of the firm in this district. Evidently, the Custodian did not realise that in effect he was ordering the winding up of the company. He had no jurisdiction to pass any such order and any proceeding for having the company wound up must be taken only in the High Court at Calcutta. His order also must be, and is hereby, quashed. There will be no order as to costs.

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• 1951 (1) TMI 21 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
  

  Meeting and Proceedings – Representation of corporation at meetings of companies & creditors

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• 1951 (1) TMI 20 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
  

  Meeting and proceedings – Power of Company Law Board to order meeting to be called

  
  
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  ... ... ..... earned counsel for the respondent, objected to the appointment of a chairman by the court on the ground that thereby the court would be interfering with the internal management of the company which it had no jurisdiction to do. But we find that section 79(3) itself contemplates the giving of directions by the court as to the manner in which a meeting of the company can be held and conducted. Section 76 expressly confers on the Court the power to call or direct the calling of a general meeting of the company. If the court can call for a meeting, we presume the court can also appoint a person to conduct that meeting, who will be the chairman to preside over it. We, therefore, modify the order of the learned Judge and direct that the meeting may be conducted by the advocate to be appointed by us in this order who will preside at the meeting as its chairman. He shall also scrutinise the proxies which had been duly deposited in time under article 42 of the Articles of Association.

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• 1951 (1) TMI 19 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
  

  Winding up - Suits stayed on winding-up order, Debts of all descriptions to be admitted to proof and Preferential payments

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• 1951 (1) TMI 1 - SUPREME COURT
  

  Whether petitioner has been denied the fundamental right of equality before the law and the equal protection of the laws guaranteed to him by Article 14 of the Constitution.?

  Held that:- The discrimination, if any, was not brought about by the two Ordinances, but by the circumstance that there was no Income-tax Act in Nabha and consequently there was no case of assessment pending against any Nabha assessees. In any case the provision that pending proceedings should be concluded according to the law applicable at the time when the rights or liabilities accrued and the proceedings commenced is a reasonable law founded upon a reasonable classification of the assessees which is permissible under the equal protection clause and to which no exception can be taken. In our opinion the grievance of the alleged infringement of fundamental right under Article 14 is not well founded at all.

  The protection against imposition or collection of taxes save by authority of law is secured by Article 265 and not by Article 31(1), the questions urged by Dr. Tek Chand do not really arise and it is not necessary to express any opinion on them on this application. Those questions can only arise in appropriate proceedings and not on an application under Article 32. In our judgment this application fails on the simple ground that no fundamental right of the petitioner has been infringed either under Article 14 or under Article 31(1) and we accordingly dismiss the petition.

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