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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 42 Records
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1954 (1) TMI 29 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ower of superintendence conferred by article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries C. J., in Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. v. Sukumar Mukherjee), to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. As rightly pointed out by the Judicial Commissioner in the case before us the lower courts in refusing to make an order for ejectment acted arbitrarily. The lower courts realised the legal position but in effect declined to do what was by section 13 (2) (i) incumbent on them to do and thereby refused to exercise jurisdiction vested in them by law. It. was, therefore, a case which called for an interference by the court of the Judicial Commissioner and it acted quite properly in doing so. In our opinion there is no ground on which in an appeal by special leave under article 136 we should interfere. The appeal, therefore, must stand dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1954 (1) TMI 28 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rce applied for a license to carry on his business at his shop but his application was rejected and he was prosecuted for contravention of the bye-laws. This court upheld the fundamental right of the aggrieved person under Article 19(1)(g) and held that the prohibition imposed by the bye-law became absolute in the absence of provisions authorising the issue of a licence and as the Municipal Board had put it out of its power to grant a license by granting a monopoly, the restrictions imposed were not reasonable within the meaning of Article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution & the bye-laws were accordingly void. See - 'Rashid Ahmed v. Municipal Board, Kairana', 1950 AIR(SC) 163 (A). 4. We hold that the bye-law No. 2 is void as being in conflict with the fundamental right of the petitioner under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution and the order passed thereunder cannot be allowed to stand. We accordingly set it aside with costs to the petitioner against the respondent.
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1954 (1) TMI 27 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... red to the tribunal. On the other hand, any person who could be a petitioner can continue the petition in spite of the death of either the petitioner or the respondents to the petition and on the original parties failing to prosecute it. These provisions have been made to ensure that the election process on which the democratic system of Government is based is not abused or misused by any candidate and that inquiry is not shut out by collusion between persons made parties to the petition or by their respective deaths. It is therefore clear that the provisions of the law relating to the impleading of parties are not necessarily fatal and can be cured. It is for the tribunal to determine the matter as and when it arises in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. For the reasons given above we are of the opinion that the decisions of the tribunal and of the High Court in this case were right. We accordingly dismiss the appeal with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1954 (1) TMI 26 - SUPREME COURT
Whether some of the provisions is to enable Government to confer monopoly rights on one or more persons to the exclusion of others and that creation of such monopoly rights could not be sustained under article 19 (6) is again without force?
Whether the charge of fee by public auction is excessive and is not in the nature of a fee but a tax ignores the fact that licence fee described as a licence fee is more in the nature of a tax than a licence fee?
Held that:- Under the rules every member of the public who wishes to carry on trade in liquor is invited to make bids. This is the only method by which carrying on of liquor trade can be regulated. When the contract is thrown open to public auction, it cannot be said that there is exclusion of competition and thereby a monopoly is created. For all these reasons we are of opinion that the contention that the provisions of the regulation are unconstitutional as they abridge the rights of the petitioner to carry on liquor trade freely cannot be sustained.
One of the purposes of the regulation is to raise revenue. By the provisions of section 24, duties can be imposed on the manufacture, import, export and transport of liquor and other excisable articles. Revenue is also collected by the grant of contracts to carry on' trade in liquors and these contracts are sold by auction. The grantee is given a licence on payment of the auction price. The regulation specifically authorises this. It is not a fee levied without authority of law. Appeal dismissed.
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1954 (1) TMI 25 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... there is no taxable turnover of that person. The petition proceeds on the assumption that the Sales Tax Officer, when he examines the return of the turn- over and the account books, would give a decision which would be contrary to the decision of this Court in Jai Prakash Budh Prakash v. The Sales Tax Officer, Kanpur and Others(1). No such assumption is justi- fied. It may be that the Sales Tax Officer has called for the account books to satisfy himself that the petitioner has no turnover at all besides the turnover which is exempted in the light of the decision of this Court, in which case, following the decision of this Court, he may have to drop the assessment proceedings and cancel the notice. No assumption can be made that the Sales Tax Officer will not correctly apply the law. The proceedings which he is taking at this stage are competent and appropriate. The petition, therefore, does not lie and is rejected. Petition rejected. (1) 1952 3 S.T.C. 185 (1952) A.L.J. 332.
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1954 (1) TMI 24 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ssee satisfied the requirements of the defini- tion of dealer in Section 2(b) of the Act. The next point is whether the jaggery that the assessee sold was agricultural produce within the meaning of Section 2(i). What Section 2(i) exempts is the sale by a person of agricultural or horticultural produce grown by himself or grown on any land in which he has an interest whether as owner, usufructuary mortgagee, tenant or otherwise. It would appear to apply only to sales of agricultural produce as such, and not to what the agricultural produce has been converted into by a process of manufacture. In this case by a process of manufacture the agricultural produce, sugarcane, was converted into jaggery, and it was the manu- factured product, jaggery, that was sold. The Appellate Tribunal was right in holding that the assessee was not entitled to the exemption implied in Section 2(i) of the Act. The petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250. Petition dismissed.
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1954 (1) TMI 23 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ale which liability is to be borne by the purchaser and the amount is to be collected by the seller not because he is entitled to it in his capacity as seller but because an obligation has been enjoined upon him to make the collection under the statute. In no view of the matter can it be said that the dealer is liable to further sales tax upon the collections made. With great respect to the learned Judge we think that the position has been correctly described in the passage above extracted. We think, therefore, that the view taken by the Tribunal, having regard to the (1) 1948 1 S.T.C. 193. (3) 1953 4 S.T.C. 125. (2) 1952 3 S.T.C. 230. (4) 1953 4 S.T.C. 338. clear provisions of the Act and the rules framed thereunder, that the tax collected by the registered dealer under Section 8-B of the Act does not constitute part of the turnover and is not liable to be taxed again, is correct. Each of these applications must be dismissed with costs, Rs. 250 in each. Petitions dismissed.
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1954 (1) TMI 22 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Commercial Tax Officer, which was left virtually intact, except for a direction to them that the failure to furnish the particulars could well be condoned. Even before the revision case was taken up for hearing, Mr. Pavithran for the respondent took a preliminary objection, that sub- sequent to the order dated the 26th November, 1952, against which the Government preferred this revision petition, there was an application by the assessee to the Tribunal itself to review that order, and there was a further order of the Tribunal on 23rd June, 1953. Mr. Pavithran con- tended that this revision petition was not competent. It is unnecessary to express any opinion on this point, except to observe that the question of the exclusion or otherwise of the turnover of about Rs. 19 lakhs was never the subject matter of the application for review or of the order thereon. The petition preferred by the Government fails on the merits, and is dismissed with costs, Rs. 250. Petition dismissed.
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1954 (1) TMI 21 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ax Officer, and it was against the order on appeal of the Commercial Tax Officer, that the further petition to the Board, which was eventually converted into an appeal under Section 12-A that was preferred. The appeal to the Commercial Tax Officer, and the further petition which culminated in an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal were really against orders of assessment as such, because the assessment was finalised by the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, in the course of which he negatived certain claims put forward by the assessee. The objection to the main- tainability of the appeal does not appear to have been taken before the Commercial Tax Officer, nor even before the Appellate Tribunal. Since that is the only ground taken up before us and since that ground is wholly without substance, there is nothing else except to confirm the order of the Appellate Tribunal, with a direction that full effect be given to it. We dismiss this petition with costs-Rs. 250. Petition dismissed.
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1954 (1) TMI 20 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... r the point. But he has clearly pointed out that he does not proceed on the consignment basis but finds as a matter of fact that Rs. 5,33,447-12-0 was received within the relevant period. He may have come to an erroneous conclusion of fact but there is no error of law warranting an order Section 21(2) of the Act. In view of the reasons given above I do not think that this applica- tion should succeed and I do not feel called upon to order the Board of Revenue to refer to this Court the questions as have been formulated. This decision should not be taken to mean that I have approved of the findings of the authorities below regarding the nature of the transactions between the petitioner and the subsidiary company, but such question must be decided where it arises to be decided and where it is raised in the proper manner at the proper time and upon proper materials. The rule is accordingly discharged. All interim orders are vacated. I make no order as to costs. Rule discharged.
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1954 (1) TMI 19 - TRAVANCORE AND COCHIN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ken regarding the ambit of Article 286(3) of the Constitution it is unnecessary for me to consider the other argu- ments on behalf of the State, namely (1) that Article 286 has no application to a pre-Constitution enact- ment of a State Legislature like the Travancore-Cochin General Sales Tax Act, 1125 (2) that cocoanut oil does not come within the Schedule to the Essential Goods (Declaration and Regulation of Tax on Sale or Purchase) Act, 1952 and (3) that the petitioner who is not an assessee to sales tax but only a purchaser of cocoanut oil from counter-petitioners 2 and 3 who collected the tax from him and paid it to the Government has no locus standi to maintain a petition like this do not arise for consideration. 5.. The petition fails and is hereby dismissed. The petition was mainly concerned with a number of important questions which were considered to be controversial at the time it was filed and in view of this I shall make no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1954 (1) TMI 18 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... y may discover something which necessitates the matter being taken up suo motu. All that sub-clause (6) of Sec- tion 12 requires is that before any assessment is enhanced, notice should be given to the assessee. We have already pointed out that what the Deputy Commissioner purported to do in this case was to set aside the assessment already made and make a fresh assessment himself. No doubt, a notice was issued to the assessee which fulfilled the require- ments of Section 12(6). The powers in sub-section (i) and sub-sec- tion (ii) of Section 12(2) are not mutually exclusive. In this case, the Deputy Commissioner purported to act suo motu, and in fact, he did act suo motu in making the final assessment. We therefore set aside the order of the Tribunal and hold that the appeals are maintainable. We direct the Appellate Tribunal to take the appeals on file and dispose them of according to law. There will, how- ever, be no order as to costs on these petitions. Petitions allowed.
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1954 (1) TMI 17 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the relationship of principal and commission agent at any time and constituted the transaction as one of purchase and sale between them is without any force and is not supported by any authority. We are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that the view taken by the Tribunal that there was only one sale and in respect of that one sale, tax could not be levied twice over by the department, once in the hands of the commission agent treating him as a dealer and a second time against the principal treating the same turnover as turnover of the prin- cipal, is perfectly justified, having regard to the provisions of the Act and the scheme underlying it. (1) I.L.R. 1952 Mad. 571 at page 586 3 S.T.C. 121 at page 133. For the foregoing reasons, T.R. Cases Nos. 4, 103, 134, 195 and 196 of 1953 are dismissed with costs, Rs. 250 in each. The other peti- tions, T.R. Cases Nos. 345, 350 and 352 of 1953 which are posted for admission are dismissed in view of our judgment. Petitions dismissed.
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1954 (1) TMI 16 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... three classes of interest specified, ownership, usufructuary mortgage or tenancy, is the right to the exclu- sive possession of the land. Any interest to be brought within the scope of the term otherwise in Section 2(i) of the Act must satisfy that generic requirement, the right to exclusive possession of the land itself. All that the assessees got under the contract was only an exclusive right to the usufruct, and that, in our opinion, can by no stretch of language be deemed to be an interest in land within the meaning of Section 2(i) of the Act. The Appellate Tribunal was right in holding that the assessees in this case were not entitled to exclude from the turnover the sale proceeds of arecanuts, because the assessees had no interest in the land on which the arecanuts were grown. These petitions fail and are dismissed with costs in T.R.C. Nos. 188, 190, 193, 200, 202, 221, 247, 256, 259, 265-Rs. 250 in each. No order as to costs in the other T.R. Cs. Petitions dismissed.
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1954 (1) TMI 15 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... wer to do so. Viewed in that light there is nothing to which objection can be taken. Certainly there is no error of law which this Court is called upon to correct at this stage. It is represented to us that, despite the order of the Appellate Tribunal which was on 31st March, 1952, nothing was done by the department. Possibly they thought filing this petition to revise that order absolved them of the duty to investigate further on the lines indicated by the Appellate Tribunal. Instructions of this kind issued either by the Appellate Tribunal or by this Court, when anything needing correction comes to its notice should be respected by the departmental authorities and we trust that it is in that light the whole problem will be viewed by the departmental authorities. The petition is dismissed but in the circumstances of this case there will be no order as to costs. (Counsel s fee Rs. 250 to enable the Assistant Government Pleader to certify for this amount.) Petition dismissed.
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1954 (1) TMI 14 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... facturer registered under sub- rule (1) of rule 18, he was entitled, under the provisions of sub-rule (3), to present the application for the previous month, i.e., the month even prior to the month of registration. The view taken by the Appellate Tribunal is fully justified by Form No. A9 read with sub-rule (3) and sub-rule (2) of rule 18 and calls for no revision. The other point raised in this case is against the exclusion from the turnover of Rs. 1,10,000. The finding of fact of the Appellate Tribunal was that this was only a deposit, more in the nature of security, and did not represent the sale price of the 287 drums of oil which the assessee borrowed. Subsequently, the assessee returned the oil in specie to the dealer from whom he had borrowed. Neither when the 287 drums were borrowed, nor when the Rs. 1,10,000 was deposited, was there a sale as defined by the Act. The view taken by the Appellate Tribunal was correct. The revision case is dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1954 (1) TMI 13 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... at in respect of the returns which should have been submitted before 10th February, 1949, there was no power or authority to condone the delay in making the returns and therefore the deduction should not have been granted. It was also contended that it was a condition precedent for claiming the deduction that the return should be submitted before the 25th of every month and that if the assessee did not do so he lost the right. In view of the new amendment introduced, which relates to procedure, we think that it is retrospective in its opera- tion and so long as the assessment was not completed, the concerned authority had ample power or discretion to condone the delay in sub- mitting the return or the omission to submit the return at all. No ques- tion of vested right accruing arises, and therefore the view taken by the Tribunal that the authority concerned could condone the delay is, in our opinion, correct. The petition is dismissed with costs, Rs. 250. Petition dismissed.
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1954 (1) TMI 12 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the buses became un- serviceable or became useless they sold them either as old buses or scrap. By reason of these isolated transactions, they cannot be treated as dealers in buses within the meaning of the Act. Unless it is established that they are dealers, the application of the remaining provisions of the Act does not arise. Each of these petitions is dismissed with costs, Rs. 250. Petitions dismissed.
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1954 (1) TMI 11 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s impossible of fulfilment, failure to satisfy the requirements of clause 8 did not disentitle the commission agents to the protection afforded by Section 8 particularly in view of the fact, that there has been a substan- tial compliance with such of the conditions of the licence as could be fulfilled. In view of this, it is not necessary to embark upon a discussion whe- ther clause 8 of the licence amounts to a mandatory direction or is merely a directive in its scope. As has been rightly pointed, no universal test can be possible for finding out, which is mandatory and which is directory. But, should a decision on this point be necessary, we are inclined to agree with the Tribunal that condition 8, necessitating the issue of cash bills, is only directory in its scope and not mandatory, and non-observance of such a directory clause in no way vitiates the exemption claimed by the commission agents. Each of these petitions is dismissed with costs-Rs. 250. Petitions dismissed.
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1954 (1) TMI 10 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
A Division Bench of Bombay High Court dealt with a case where a workman on his way to work was murdered. There was no evidence to show that the murder was due to any motive against the deceased workman. It was held that the death took place because of an accident arising out employment. The deceased was employment by Central Railway at Kurla station and he lived in the railway quarters adjoining the station. It was found as a fact that the only access for the deceased from his quarters to the Kurla Railway Station was through the compound of the railway quarters. On the particular day the deceased left his quarters a few minutes before midnight in order to join duty. While on his way, he was stabbed by some unknown persons. It is not disputed by the railway company that the deceased died as a result of an accident nor was it disputed that the accident arose in the course of employment.
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