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Showing 21 to 40 of 44 Records
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1960 (1) TMI 36 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... have an interest in the income-tax papers. It is difficult to appreciate have second respondent could be held to have an interest in the income-tax returns etc. If the petitioner wants to obtain contribution or to take credit for payment of income-tax made by her she would have to show first how much tax was paid. Anyway, such an interest is only problematical and not either direct or tangible. The second respondent would not, therefore, be entitled to the certified copies of the returns or the assessment orders thereon. A writ of mandamus will, therefore, be issued to the third Additional Income-tax Officer, Salem, directing him to conform to the provisions of section 54 of the Indian Income-tax Act, and not to grant copies of the returns filed by the late G.V. Ranagaswami Naidu and of the assessment orders for the years 1951-52 to 1956-57 to the second respondent. Rule nisi is absolute. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1960 (1) TMI 35 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ase of a factory which had only a working season, the position would be more or less the same, that is, the machinery was available only for a portion of the working season. We are not attempting to exhaust the classes of cases to which the second limb of the proviso to rule 4(3) would apply. We refer to these only by way of examples. But, as we understand the proviso to rule 4(3), there is no scope for working out proportionately on the basis of the time factor, where in the case of a seasonal factory the machinery was available for use throughout the working season, in which case the assessee would be entitled to the whole of the depreciation allowance permissible for the year under section 5(f). That test was obviously satisfied in this case, and the Tribunal was right in granting the deprecation allowance claimed by the assessee. On both the points taken, the petitioner State failed. The petition is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee ₹ 100. Petition dismissed.
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1960 (1) TMI 34 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Minister of National Revenue, which have been cited earlier, have decided against allowing expenses of raising loans, as being of a capital nature. In Associated Hotels of India Ltd. v. Commissioners of Income-tax the assessee issued debentures in 1916 with a provision to redeem them after the year 1921, on payment of bonus. It was decided, that bonus paid for redemption was an inadmissible allowance, as the view prevailed, that the debentures constituted capital receipts. We consider that the ratio of these decisions is applicable to the present case. Therefore, both on principle and authority, we come to the conclusion, that the sum of three lakhs of rupees raised by debentures was a capital receipt. To the question referred, we return the answer that the expenditure of ₹ 12,924 is a capital expenditure, not deductible under section 10(2)(xv). The assessee shall pay the costs of this reference, including advocate's fee ₹ 150. Question answered accordingly.
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1960 (1) TMI 33 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the notices concerned was "without reasonable cause" and that, therefore, the imposition of the penalty in each case was justified. The Tribunal itself ought to have (in its order concerned) considered this question (as to whether the failure to comply with the notices was without "reasonable cause") and given its finding. But it failed to do so. This does not affect there fact that the failure to comply was "without reasonable cause". Even if the Tribunal were to consider that question after, it will have go give its finding against the assessee on that question, in view of the decision of this court in Referred Case No. 9 of 1955 which is binding on it (the Tribunal). So, no purpose would be served by directing the Tribunal to decide that question a fresh. Therefore, we answer each of the two questions referred to us in the affirmative with costs to the Department. Advocate's fee ₹ 250, one set. Questions answered in the affirmative.
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1960 (1) TMI 32 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... 11 L.L.J. 190. or the lawyer we are not directly concerned in the present appeal. We have, however, referred to this decision because, in the course of discussion, the learned judge has expressed his dissent from the view taken by the Bombay High Court in regard to hospitals, and we wish to make it clear that, in our opinion, the criticism made by the learned judge against the inclusion of hospitals within s. 2(j) is not well-founded. Dealing with a similar case of an attorney, the Bombay High Court has taken the same view in National Union of Commercial Employees & Anr. And Meher (M.R.) & Ors. (Pereira Fazalbhoy & Co.) (1). We would accordingly bold that the High Court was right in holding that the dispute between the appellant and the respondents was an industrial dispute to which s. 251' of the Act applied. The order passed by the High Court on the writ petition filed by the respondents is confirmed and the appeal is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1960 (1) TMI 31 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ood at the relevant time, the Central Government was acting in a quasi-judicial capacity while deciding an application under r. 54. As such it was incumbent upon it before coming to a decision to give a reasonable opportunity to the appellant, who was the other party in the review application whose rights were being affected, to represent his case. In as much as this was not done, the appellant is entitled to ask us to issue a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the order of January 28,1954, passed by the Central Government. We therefore allow the appeal and setting aside the order of the High Court quash the order of the Central Government passed on January 28, 1954. It will, however, be open to the Central Government to proceed to decide the review application afresh after giving a reasonable opportunity to the appellant to represent his case. The appellant will get his costs throughout from the third respondent, who is the principal contesting party. Appeal allowed.
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1960 (1) TMI 30 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rgeable under the head Salaries . The Officer is not empowered to decide the fact itself. He may, of course, prima facie assume its existence in order to make a demand but that is not the same thing as saying that he can ascertain the fact when it is denied and enforce the provision. Mr. Kondaiah also argues that any objection taken under the clause relied upon by the petitioners must be taken within a reasonable time and if no objection is taken within such time, then the Income-tax Officer would be entitled to resort to the penal provisions. I do not see my way to uphold this contention. There is nothing said in the clause as to the time when an objection is to be taken. It would not, therefore, be permissible for the Income-tax Officer or the court, if the matter comes before it, to limit the time within which it could be taken. The result of the foregoing discussion is that these petitions must succeed. In each of these cases a mandamus will issue as prayed for with costs
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1960 (1) TMI 29 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... mselves or in combination with one or more other mechanical contrivances, by the combined movement and interdependent operation of their respective parts generate power, or evoke, modify, apply or direct natural forces with the object in each case of effecting so definite and specific a result. The assessee should have produced the necessary material before the taxing authorities to show that having regard to this general definition of machinery and to the type and nature of the washers and leather belts sold they could not but be regarded as spare or component parts of machinery. In the absence of any such material, it is not possible for us to answer the first two questions referred to us and we decline to do so. 3.. The answer to the third question is to be found in the decision in Messrs Govindram Ramprasad v. The Assessing Authority (Sales Tax) 1957 M.P.C. 286 8 S.T.C. 407., where also a similar question was raised. 4.. In the circumstances we make no order as to costs.
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1960 (1) TMI 28 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... g with his returns and at the end of every quarter. That expression also includes the amount of assessed tax. There remains for consideration one more argument of Mr. Mehta, and the argument is that the meaning which we have put on the expression prescribed time would have the effect of preventing his client from preferring any appeal and recovery proceedings would start on the expiry of the period of the notice. We do not think that the apprehension of Mr. Mehta is justified. An assessee, who has been served with a notice that he would be liable to pay penalty if he fails to pay the amount of the tax by the specified date in accordance with the time prescribed for the payment of such tax, can immediately take such action by way of appeal or otherwise, as he may be entitled to do, and we do not think it can be said that there was no order passed against him for the enforcement of penalty. In the result, the petition fails and will be dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed.
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1960 (1) TMI 27 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... se that they could not be exhibited for sale generally. But that is not decisive of the matter. The only test is whether the contract was for the sale of finished products. If the goods prepared by the assessee could not be sold to other customers the person who placed the order could be compelled to accept it or to pay damages to the printer. In fact, most of the cases cited to us including the one of the Privy Council related to goods prepared according to specific requisitions and to suit the requirements of individual customers. Yet, it was held that the contracts were for the sale of goods. For all these reasons, we hold that the payments made by the customers for the printed material in this case constituted the price of goods sold by the assessee and, therefore, the whole turnover was subject to tax. In the result, the revision is allowed and the order of the Tribunal is set aside. There will be no order as to costs in the circumstances of this case. Petition allowed.
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1960 (1) TMI 26 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... voked in the present case because the Andhra Act defines the word purchase as meaning a transaction involving acquisition of the goods specified in section 4, by one person from another, in the course of trade or business, for cash or for deferred payment (including payment in instalments) or other valuable consideration, but does not include any acquisition under a mortgage, hypothecation, charge or pledge. Admittedly, the possession of the goods was transferred and the price was paid after the coming into force of the Act. The fact that the contract was entered into anterior to the date of the Act does not, therefore, help the petitioner. There is no definition of purchase in the Sale of Goods Act. The word acquisition undoubtedly involves the actual transference of possession. That being the position, we cannot accede to this contention. In the result, these revision cases fail and are dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100 in each of the cases. Petitions dismissed.
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1960 (1) TMI 25 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... erved On this construction, those sales will fall within the definition in section 2(h) and will be taxable. The contention of the petitioner, highly technical and based on the non-insertion of the Explanation in section 2(h) must, in our opinion, be rejected as unsound. It follows that the Explanation does not contain any exhaustive definition of intra-State sales and it merely mentions one class of such sales that are taxable under the Act. The comprehensive definition is to be found in section 2(h) of the Madras General Sales Tax Act and for this purpose the Explanation must also be included therein. We therefore prefer the view taken by the Calcutta High Court in the Burma Shell s case 1957 8 S.T.C. 142. In the result, the petitions by the Deputy Tax Officer are allowed while the others stand dismissed. The judgment covers all the seven cases and the State be entitled to only one set of costs in all the petitions. We fix the counsel s fee at Rs. 250. Ordered accordingly.
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1960 (1) TMI 24 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ear that the turnover in respect of the goods held in stock immediately before 14th December, 1957, will be deemed to be equal to the total purchase value of the goods held in stock at that time. We see no reason to hold that the total purchase value of the goods is merely the price at which the goods were purchased and does not include the freight and other incidental charges contended by the petitioner. 7.. In the light of what is stated above the petition has to be partly allowed and we direct that the composition should be on the basis that the stock of sugar in the possession, custody or control of the petitioner immediately prior to 14th December, 1957, should be considered not as 754 bags as held by the Sales Tax Officer or as 554 bags as held by the Deputy Commissioner, but only as 154 bags as stated by the petitioner in his statement on 8th January, 1958. 8.. The petition is allowed in the manner and to the extent indicated above. No costs. Petition allowed in part.
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1960 (1) TMI 23 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... herefore with regard to the erstwhile Malabar District the Kerala State is entitled to impose a tax on sales taking place within the Malabar area under the Madras General Sales Tax Act. It may be that the burden or the liability of the Travancore-Cochin State to refund the tax wrongly collected by it under the Travancore-Cochin Sales Tax Act at Quilon has also devolved on the kerala State. But that burden or liability arising under a different Act does not merge in the benefit under the Madras General Sales Tax Act. Hence we are of the opinion that the petitioners remedy, if any, is to get a refund of the tax which has been collected from them wrongly by the Quilon Sales Tax Authorities and not to get the Perinthalmanna assessment set aside. In this view we hold that the order of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal is correct. We confirm the order of the Appellate Tribunal and dismiss the revision petition. In the circumstances of the case we order no costs. Petition dismissed.
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1960 (1) TMI 22 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... dence, it cannot remand the case for the purpose. We do not think it necessary to cite the several cases relied on by the dealer s Advocate in support of the argument that what the Tribunal cannot do, it ought not to direct others to perform. It is clear that fresh evidence can be produced at the appellate stage only under certain circumstances, and cases cannot be remanded to let in new evidence without such conditions precedent having been fulfilled otherwise those conditions would become futile requirements. It follows that the order of remand in the case is wrong. We therefore think the assessment of sales tax on the additional sum of Rs. 3,14,300 in the dealer s turnover has been wrongly made and should be reversed and the tax would therefore stand on the turnover minus the aforesaid amount. The dealer in this case is entitled to costs of this revision petition, and we fix the counsel s fee at Rs. 150. The order of the Tribunal is accordingly reversed. Petition allowed.
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1960 (1) TMI 21 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... industry. 6.. There was some debate at the Bar whether the declarations filed by the assessee were strictly in terms of the notification of the 24th November, 1953, so as to entitle the petitioner to claim the exemption granted by the notification. The Sales Tax Officer has not given any finding on this point and that is presumably because he rejected the claim for exemption on the view he took of the words vanaspati industry . That question can now properly be decided in the fresh assessment proceedings. 7.. For these reasons, the assessment order dated 6th August, 1957, of the Sales Tax Officer, Ujjain, as also the demand notice arising out of it for the payment of sales tax amounting to Rs. 1,671-9-9 by the petitioner are quashed. Having regard to the nature of the point for consideration, we think it would be proper to leave the parties to bear their own costs of this petition. The amount of outstanding security deposit be refunded to the petitioner. Assessment quashed.
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1960 (1) TMI 20 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... elf is beyond the power conferred by that provision. 14.. Sub-section (4) of section 24 of the Act as already mentioned provides The power to make rules conferred by this section shall be subject to the condition of the rules being made after previous publication for a period of not less than two weeks. It has to be noted that the notification of 28th September, 1957, was not even in existence when the prior publication of sub-rule (2) of rule 4 was effected by the State. 15.. It follows that in the absence of a rule prescribed under section 24 of the Act there is no valid provision enabling the State to tax the amount for which the goods were bought by the petitioner, and that this petition has to be allowed. We decide accordingly, though in the circumstances of the case without any order as to costs. 16.. In the view we have taken, it is unnecessary to consider the other points urged in support of the petition and they are not considered in this judgment. Petition allowed.
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1960 (1) TMI 19 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... mistake. 4.. Apart from these considerations, the record of this case makes it amply clear that every possible opportunity was given to the applicant to substantiate his case. This is apparent from the fact that the Assistant Collector of Sales Tax gave every opportunity to the applicant in order that the applicant may be in a position to substantiate his case. It would be reasonable to say that the applicant did not take advantage of the facilities offered to the applicant. It is now too late in the day to contend that a mistake has occurred which requires to be rectified. 5.. We have heard Mr. Ghael upon this application and apart from the two submissions which were made by the applicant s pleader before the Tribunal at the previous hearing, he has made no other submission. In these circumstances, we think that there is no merit in this rectification application. The application, therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs. Costs assessed at Rs. 45. Application dismissed.
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1960 (1) TMI 18 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ce then the Supreme Court has in Sundararamier and Co. v. State of Andhra Pradesh 1958 9 S.T.C. 298. held that section 2(h) read with section 22 of the Madras General Sales Tax Act authorised levy of sales tax and therefore the provisions of the Sales Tax Laws Validation Act would be attracted to such taxes as had been levied during the period stated in the Validation Act. Section 26 of the Travancore-Cochin Sales Tax Act is similar to section 22 of the Madras Act and so is the definition. It follows that the provisions of the Validation Act would be attracted to the tax levied on sales during 1954-55, which is within the period mentioned in the Act. Therefore the ground on which the dealer had been given relief in the case is legally incorrect and the part of the Tribunal s order in favour of the dealer is reversed. The order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner is restored and the revision petition is allowed with costs. Counsel s fee fixed at Rs. 150. Petition allowed.
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1960 (1) TMI 17 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d by him. When the matter came before the Supreme Court, an objection taken by the Additional Solicitor-General, that other remedies which were available under the U.P. Sales Tax Act not having been pursued, the respondent was not entitled to relief, was overruled, as it appeared that this objection had been abandoned by the AdvocateGeneral in the High Court. The Court then proceeded to hold that under section 72 of the Indian Contract Act, the respondent s claim for refund was well-founded. It will be observed that the vital distinction in the present case is, that the assessment order exhibit P-2 stands, and cannot be quashed by me. There is therefore no scope for the application of section 72 of the Indian Contract Act. The petitioner has therefore to be denied any remedy but he had his remedies for improper assessment in both jurisdictions, of which he did not avail himself. This petition is therefore dismissed, but in the circumstances without costs. Petition dismissed.
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