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Showing 21 to 40 of 274 Records
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1989 (1) TMI 347 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... bstance in it. Evidently, with a view to get over this difficulty the Tribunal thought it fit to construe the words other articles in entry 41 ejusdem generis with the preceding words. While we do not subscribe to the theory that the words other articles occurring in entry 41 should be read ejusdem generis with the preceding words because of the use of the word other , we are of the opinion that tread rubber is in effect rubber or at any rate a rubber product . Having regard to the language of both the entries and the use to which it is put, it would be more appropriate to place tread rubber under entry 101 as rubber or at least as a rubber product , rather than placing it under entry 41 as an article made of rubber. For the above reasons, we agree with the Tribunal that tread rubber is taxable under entry 101, and not under entry 41 though for different reasons. The tax revision case, accordingly, fails and is dismissed. No costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 150. Petition dismissed.
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1989 (1) TMI 346 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... h notice under section 12(5) of the Act has been issued. Legal question having been examined in the decision of this Court reported in 1988 70 STC 153 (Piplani Sweets v. Sales Tax Officer), the Sales Tax Officer is now to enquire into the facts after giving opportunity to the petitioner to file his return, submit objection and explain the materials collected. 4.. In view of the aforesaid discussion, there is no scope to interfere with the notice given under section 12(5) of the Act. The writ applications are dismissed. No costs. Proceedings shall continue after giving notice to the petitioner. P.C. MISRA, J.-I agree. Writ applications dismissed.
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1989 (1) TMI 345 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... electronic systems............... We have today, while disposing of T.C. No. 948 of 1987 (State of Tamil Nadu v. B.P.L. India Ltd. 1990 76 STC 199), taking note of the ratio of the highest court in the land, in Nat Steel Equipment Pvt. Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise 1988 69 STC 58 (SC), held that the said item could only fall under entry 41-A. This ruling must govern the present cases also. Having expressed our view, on the point involved, we do not think it fair and proper to throw out the writ petitions filed by the appellant, on the ground of existence of other statutory remedies. Accordingly, these writ appeals are allowed, the common order of the learned single judge, dismissing the writ petition, is set aside and the writ petitions will stand allowed. As a consequence the earlier orders of the assessing authority, treating the item as falling under entry 41-A alone will survive and stand. We make no order as to costs in both the writ appeals. Writ appeals allowed.
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1989 (1) TMI 344 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ontract, in no way related to the contract by which M/s. A.V. Yohannan and Sons obtained the goods from the Rajasthan dealer. There is no material to hold that the movement of the goods from Rajasthan to this State was as a result of any contract between M/s. A.V. Yohannan and Sons and the assessees or that it was in the course of inter-State trade. On the facts found by the Tribunal, the conclusion that there is no sale of manure by the Rajasthan dealer to the assessees, that M/s. A.V. Yohannan and Sons have never acted as an agent or intermediary so as to make the assessees the receiver of the goods in Kerala and the indication afforded by non-issue of C forms by the assessees reinforce the conclusion that the plea of the assessees that they were only second sellers of the manure in this State, is justified in law. 3.. We are of the view that the decision of the Appellate Tribunal does not call for any interference. We dismiss these tax revision cases. Petitions dismissed.
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1989 (1) TMI 343 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Mohan Jewellery 1988 71 STC 256), held that the purchase turnover of silver wares of the respondentassessee is not assessable to purchase tax under section 5A of the Act. The Revenue has come up in revisions. 2.. We heard counsel for the Revenue Mr. N.N.D. Pillai. It was submitted that the earlier decision of this Court in T.R.C. No. 136 of 1984 (Mohan Jewellery s case 1988 71 STC 256) is pending in appeal before the Supreme Court of India and so the decision, relied on by the Appellate Tribunal, requires reconsideration. We are of the view, that as at present advised, no material was brought to our notice to take a view different from the one taken by an earlier Bench of this Court in T.R.C. No. 136 of 1984 (Mohan Jewellery s case 1988 71 STC 256). Following the said decision, we are further of the view that the decision of the Appellate Tribunal is justified in law. No interference is called for in these revisions. The tax revision cases are dismissed. Petitions dismissed.
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1989 (1) TMI 342 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ction (3) of section 5 of the Central Sales Tax Act cannot be extended to the purchase of the said goods by the petitioner, since the purchase by the petitioner is not a purchase preceding the export-purchase, but is a purchase removed by one more step. Of course the main question considered by the Tribunal was whether the raw hides and skins and the tanned hides and skins are same goods or different? It is not really necessary for us to express our opinion on this question since we have held that in any event the purchase of raw hides and skins by the petitioner cannot be brought within the purview of sub-section (3) of section 5 of the Central Sales Tax Act. (Of course we have held in State of A.P. v. Mohd. Basheer and Company 1989 72 STC 185 1988 7 APSTJ 231 that the tanned hides and skins and raw hides and skins are one and the same goods for the purpose of the Central Sales Tax Act). The T.R.Cs. are accordingly fail and they are dismissed. No costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1989 (1) TMI 341 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ent-it is immaterial whether the appeal is confined only to the rate of tax under the Act or whether it involves other issues besides the rate of tax under the Actthe appellate authority does have the power to receive the forms, on proof of sufficient cause as contemplated by rule 12(7) of the Central Sales Tax (Registration and Turnover) Rules, 1957. Of course the above decision was given in relation to C forms. But rule 12(7) refers not only to C forms but also to E-I forms and some other forms. Thus in view of the above decision, it can be held that E-I forms produced even subsequent to the finalisation of the assessment before the first assessing authority can be looked into, if sufficient cause as contemplated by rule 12(7) is established. In view of the same, this point has to be held in favour of the assessee. Hence, we do not find any reason to interfere with the order of the Tribunal. So this T.R.C. is dismissed. No costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 150. Petition dismissed.
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1989 (1) TMI 340 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e been dismissed by the impugned order by holding as follows The question whether freight could be included in the turnover or not had been finally adjudicated between the parties under this order after a reference of the Honourable High Court and it could not be re-examined by the assessing authority. It is not disputed before us that the department had not filed any revision or other proceedings before the Honourable High Court or before the Additional Judge (Revisions), Sales Tax after order dated 6th June, 1979 was passed and, therefore, the order had become final as between the parties. In view of the aforesaid facts and the legal position as was decided between the parties, after hearing the learned Standing Counsel I find that there is no error of law involved in the impugned order passed by the Sales Tax Tribunal. In the result, all the seven revisions fail and are dismissed with one set of costs which is assessed at Rs. 200 (rupees two hundred). Petitions dismissed.
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1989 (1) TMI 339 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... contention, Gopalan Nambiyar, C.J., observed as follows ........Even going by the terms of explanation (1) to section 2(xxi), what was argued by the counsel for the petitioner was that rubber trees cannot be taken as timber in the well-understood sense of the term, as explained, for instance, in Black s Dictionary, page 1653. Whatever be the meaning of this expression we are clear on the terms of exhibit P1 the contract to cut and sell trees standing on the land was a sale of goods or of movable property and, therefore, that will attract the relevant definitions under the Sales Tax Act. In this case, the assessing authority was correct in its conclusion that the turnover was liable to be assessed................. 6.. In the light of the above, we are of the view that the sale of rubber trees was rightly brought to tax in the assessments of the assessee, for the years 1980-81 and 1981-82. 7.. These tax revision cases are without merit. They are dismissed. Petitions dismissed.
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1989 (1) TMI 338 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he Act, is wholly incorrect in law. To my mind, from a reading of the said extract, it is amply clear that notice under section 21 in question was issued only for the purposes of fishing and roving enquiries in the present case. The view taken to the contrary by the Sales Tax Tribunal in the impugned order is, therefore, erroneous in law. Learned Standing Counsel has also submitted that the mention of making enquiry in a stage subsequent to issuance of notice under section 21 of the Act would not invalidate the initiation of said proceedings. This submission is, however, incorrect in view of the aforesaid entry in the order sheet, which sets out the object of issuance of notice under section 21 of the Act for making enquiries. In this view of the matter the submission made by the learned Standing Counsel, in my opinion, has got no substance. In the result, the revision succeeds and is allowed with costs, which are assessed at Rs. 200 (rupees two hundred). Petition dismissed.
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1989 (1) TMI 337 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... er and water a drink or drink-money to celebrate an occasion. The word drink is explained as follows To swallow as a liquid to smoke to empty, as a glass, bowl, etc. to absorb to take in through the senses-to swallow a liquid to take intoxicating liquors to excess. Since Rasna is only a concentrate and not a liquid, it will not come within the expression drinks or beverages . Moreover, there is no material to show that Rasna sold by the assessee was bottled or canned and sold under brand name. 4.. Since Rasna is only a soft-drink concentrate and not a drink or liquid as such, but only a raw material for the preparation of softdrinks, we are of the view that Rasna will not come under entry 25-P of the First Schedule to the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, before its amendment by Act 19 of 1980. The Tax Appellate Tribunal was justified in holding so. We concur with the said decision. 5.. No interference is called for in this tax revision case. It is dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1989 (1) TMI 336 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... purchased by the assessee, was used by him for the manufacture and sale of jali . From a perusal of the assessment order, however, it is clear that the assessee had sold sariya worth Rs. 7,500 to M/s. Kuldeep Engineering Works and the same was also not accounted for in the books of the assessee. Under these circumstances, the Sales Tax Officer had also estimated sales of sariya at Rs. 10,000. The very same figure has been affirmed by the Sales Tax Tribunal in the impugned order. On the basis of the finding recorded by the Tribunal, I find that the Tribunal is not in error in holding that the assessee had also sold sariya . Learned counsel for the assessee had not been able to satisfy me as to how the said finding recorded by the authorities below is vitiated in law. Thus both the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the assessee fail. In the result, the revision fails and is dismissed with costs which are assessed at Rs. 200 (rupees two hundred). Petition dismissed.
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1989 (1) TMI 335 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... te is dealing would attribute to it. The ordinary words in every day use are, therefore, to be construed according to their popular sense. Going by these decisions we have no hesitation in holding that arms and ammunition enumerated in entry 157 of the First Schedule will not take in air-guns and pellets. In common parlance when a dealer in arms is referred to, the people will not understand a dealer in air-guns. In the case in question the respondent is only a dealer in stationery and allied goods and he sells along with other things, air-guns and pellets also as toy items. Such a person in ordinary parlance cannot be referred to as a dealer in arms. 7.. In the tax revision case, the petitioner also refers to the clarification issued by the Government under section 59A. Since such a clarification will not bind a quasi-judicial authority, the point rightly is not pressed before us. We, therefore, confirm the order of the Tribunal and dismiss the revision. Petition dismissed.
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1989 (1) TMI 334 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ance with the rules, has been accepted by the Tribunal. The question, therefore, is whether this fact, coupled with the attendant circumstances, justify the conclusion of concealment reached by the assessing authority. The Tribunal has merely said that this fact alone is not sufficient to prove concealment, without taking into account the attendant circumstances and even caring to see the tax due on that transaction had been paid or not. It is, therefore, clear that the Tribunal has set aside the order of the Deputy Commissioner in the appeal before it, without recording the requisite findings to sustain the conclusion. The Tribunal must, therefore, decide the appeal afresh, taking into account of the facts and circumstances relevant for deciding the question of concealment. Consequently, the revision is allowed, the impugned order of the Tribunal dated 23rd February, 1987 is set aside. The Tribunal shall now decide the appeal afresh in accordance with law. Petition allowed.
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1989 (1) TMI 333 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... y occurred in taking the necessary steps. It is, therefore, obvious that no cause, much less sufficient cause, was assigned by the department, for the delay in filing the appeal. The finding of the Tribunal that no sufficient cause has been shown to condone the delay, does not therefore, call for any interference. This alone is sufficient to reject the revision. The revision is dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1989 (1) TMI 332 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... olly unwarranted and that the attachment of bank account has nothing to do with the receipt of the bank guarantee furnished by the petitioner along with the security bond. The respondent is expected to merely acknowledge receipt of the same so that necessary orders can be passed by the appellate authority. It is not the case where the security offered is not acceptable or something like that. On a consideration of the entire facts, I find that the petitioner is justified in seeking the relief asked for in this writ petition. 4.. In the result, this writ petition is allowed and the respondent is directed to receive the bank guarantee produced by the petitioner and acknowledge receipt of the same to enable the petitioner to approach the appellate authority for grant of stay, pending disposal of the appeal. In so far as the operation of the bank account is concerned, it will depend upon the interim orders to be passed by the appellate authority. No costs. Writ petition allowed.
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1989 (1) TMI 331 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ort point canvassed by the Revenue is that the Tribunal having held that the wastage of Rs. 13,00,000 was attributable to the total purchases made against form III-B, erred in not having apportioned the wastage and in not having found out the wastage proportionate to Rs. 29,00,000 representing the purchases made against form III-B but used in the job-work. It was argued that the entire wastage to the tune of Rs. 13,00,000 should not have been substracted from Rs. 29,00,000, but wastage should have been apportioned to work out the purchases used in the job-work. On principle, what the Revenue urged may be correct, but the fact remains that the Tribunal recorded a finding of fact that on the facts and circumstances of the case penalty could be levied only to the tune of Rs. 1,28,000 and that being so, I see no error in the Tribunal s judgment. For the reasons, both the revisions of the assessee as well as of the Revenue are dismissed. No order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1989 (1) TMI 330 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... y of assessees and to such transactions sub-section (2) of section 6 of the Constitution (Fortysixth Amendment) Act, 1982 clearly provides exemption where the tax has not been collected on such supply between the period specified therein. It is only such transactions and by such assessees for this period prior to 2nd February, 1983 that the Tribunal rendered its decision by the impugned order. Sub-section (2) applies notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) which means that even if the tax liability arises by virtue of sub-section (1) the exemption would be available to the assessees in respect of the tax not collected for such supply during the specified period. Following the above decision, it must be held that the Tribunal s order in the present case also has to be understood as indicated herein and the tax liability of the assessee has to be determined accordingly. Consequently, the revision is dismissed subject to the above observations. Petition dismissed.
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1989 (1) TMI 329 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ng the learned counsel for the parties, I find that there is considerable force in the attack made by the learned counsel for the assessee to the effect that in regard to the aforesaid claim of exemption made by the assessee for the goods sent to the ex-U.P. principals, the impugned order passed by the Tribunal is not a speaking order. As such, this part of the order passed by the Tribunal deserves to be set aside for the decision afresh as the Tribunal being the last fact finding authority is obliged to discuss all the necessary facts in arriving at its conclusion in case of affirmance in its judgment. In the result, the revision succeeds and is allowed in part as stated above. The impugned order passed by the Sales Tax Tribunal is set aside only in regard to the claim of the assessee regarding the goods claimed to have been sold on behalf of ex-U.P. principals with directions to the Tribunal to rehear the matter and decide afresh. Costs on parties. Petition partly allowed.
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1989 (1) TMI 328 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... such transactions sub-section (2) of section 6 of the Constitution (Fortysixth Amendment) Act, 1982 clearly provides exemption where the tax has not been collected on such supply between the period specified therein. It is only such transactions and by such assessees for this period prior to 2nd February, 1983 that the Tribunal rendered its decision by the impugned order. Sub-section (2) applies notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) which means that even if the tax liability arises by virtue of sub-section (1) the exemption would be available to the assessees in respect of the tax not collected for such supply during the specified period. Following the above decision the same direction has to be given in this case also. Accordingly, the Tribunal s order has to be understood in the above manner and the tax liability of the assessee has to be determined accordingly. This revision of the department is dismissed subject to these observations. Petition dismissed.
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