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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 62 Records
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1962 (10) TMI 74 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ued by the Central Board of Revenue on 24th August, 1928 (see Income-tax Circulars, Vol. II, page III) saying that the cost of audit and similar operations conducted specially for income-tax purposes, whether in connections with assessments, either appeals or with revision petitions, cannot legally be allowed as a deduction from taxable profits, is based on the above decision of the Madras High Court. This circular is clearly not in accord with the view we have expressed on the question of permissibility of deductions under section 10(2)(xv) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. For the foregoing reasons, our answer to the question referred to us is that the sum of ₹ 14,000 paid by the assessee to the income-tax adviser for his services during the assessment proceedings before the Income-tax Officer is a permissible deduction under section 10(2)(xv). The assessee shall have costs of this reference. Counsel's fee is fixed at ₹ 150. Question answered accordingly.
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1962 (10) TMI 73 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ing on a firm. We have discussed above that an unchallenged assessment of the firm may preclude a person shown as partner of the firm from contending that there was no valid firm in existence, though in fact there may be no firm validly constituted brought into existence. But that by itself, in our opinion, would not preclude the said partner from contending in his personal assessment that the share income of the minor partner should not be included in his income because the minor partner has not in fact been admitted to the benefits of partnership. For the reasons stated above, in our opinion, the answer to the first question is that the appeal of the assessee was not barred as regards the contention that Gulu had not been admitted to the benefits of partnership and therefore her share income was not liable to be included in his income. Our answer to the second question is in the negative. The Commissioner shall pay the costs of the assessee. Questions answered accordingly.
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1962 (10) TMI 72 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ducting the said valuation as on January 1, 1939, from the full value of the consideration, which the assessee had received and which, it was common ground between the parties, was ₹ 1,16,75,108. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner had proceeded to determine the value of its assets as on January 1, 1939. As against the said valuation arrived at by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, the assessee had raised objections before the Tribunal which objections the Tribunal had to consider on their merits. In so far as the Tribunal has failed to do so and has proceeded on the erroneous view which it has taken that it was not necessary to deal in detail with the evidence produced before the income-tax authorities, the Tribunal has clearly misdirected itself and has also not applied its mind properly to the material on record. In the view that we have taken our answer to the fourth question must be in the affirmative. We answer accordingly. There will be no order as to costs.
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1962 (10) TMI 71 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... cilitate the carrying on of the money-lending business, and, secondly, on the ground that it was incurred to protect the stock-in-trade of the assessee, viz., the deposit of ₹ 27,000. We fail to see how the reputation of the assessee was involved in the suit filed by the Bharat Bank. We have already held that there was no evidence that the deposit of ₹ 27,000 had at any time become the stockin-trade of the assessee's money-lending business. It has not been established that the rights and liabilities of the guarantee broking business were taken over as a running concern by the partnership firm carrying on money- lending business. Legal expenses were incurred to get rid of a liability which was capital in nature. This contention of Mr. Khanna also, therefore, fails. For reasons stated above, our answer to the first question is in the affirmative, and answers to the second and third questions are in the negative. Assessee shall pay the costs of the Commissioner.
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1962 (10) TMI 70 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... uld be made in the valuation as shown in the balance-sheet. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the value of the depreciable assets as shown in the balance-sheet of the company is not liable to be adjusted with reference to the written down value of such assets as per the income-tax records. The Commissioner has succeded in part and failed in part. The hearing in respect of the matters on which the Commissioner has failed has taken considerably more time than the hearing of the matter on which he has succeeded. Taking every circumstance into account, we think that the fair order to pass in this case would be that the Commissioner do pay to the respondent a sum of ₹ 1,000 by way of costs and we order accordingly. The questions have been reframed by us. There will be no order on the Civil Application No. 7 of 1962 for amending the questions which has been made by the petitioner. There will be no separate order for costs in connection with that application.
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1962 (10) TMI 69 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the most be argued that until the quantum was decided upon by the trustees no specific amount could be said to be payable to Champavahoo. But in the present case not only the quantum was determined but the payment was also made to Champavahoo. In our opinion, therefore, the assessment in the hands of Champavahoo was not invalid. It must also be remembered that the income-tax department even in the year of assessment, as in the earlier four years, regarded it as properly assessable in the hands of Champavahoo, and actually levied assessments and recovered the same from her. Champavahoo also has not objected to the said assessments in her hands, and the said amount, therefore, has already been taxed. According to us, therefore, the income-tax authorities were not entitled to bring the amount to tax again in the hands of the assessee. In the result, therefore, our answer to the question referred to us is in the negative. The assessee will get their costs from the Commissioner.
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1962 (10) TMI 68 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... onsider. any order of its officers under the Act and to make such orders as would subserve the objects and purposes of consolidation proceedings. The change in allotment, as a result of an appeal, may produce a chain of reactions and affect the rights of a number of persons which cannot be satisfactorily adjusted in appeal but under its general powers the Government may make such orders as would prevent the right of all or a large number of landowners from being affected. Without such a power, as we have said above the whole scheme of consolidation may fail because there would be no remedy in a civil court and finality being given to the appellate order would produce an impasse which must necessarily defeat the object of the Act and the process of consolidation. In this view of the matter, in our opinion, this (1) A.I. R. (1959) Punj. 157. petition is without force and is dismissed with costs. BY COURT -In view of the majority opinion the Writ Petition is allowed with costs.
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1962 (10) TMI 67 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s in the possession of the Income-tax Officer. The Tribunal in the course of its judgment has in express words stated as under "Admittedly, in the instant case, the Income-tax Officer never considered this matter." In view of this statement by the Tribunal, it is not open to us to go behind the same and permit the Commissioner of Income-tax to agitate the matter. In view of the finding of the Tribunal that the Income-tax Officer never considered this matter, the position, on the authorities, is clear. As the Income-tax Officer has not considered this matter at all, it was not open to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner to take the same into account and give the directions which he has thought fit to give. In the result, our answer to the question is in the negative. We order the Commissioner to pay to the respondents the costs of the reference. There will be no order on the Civil Application No. 6 of 1962 filed by the Commissioner for altering the question raised.
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1962 (10) TMI 66 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s committed theft as soon as Z's dog has begun to follow A. (1). A takes an article belonging to Z out of Z's possession without Z's consent, with the intention of keeping it until he obtains money from Z as a reward for its restoration. Here A takes dishonestly; A has therefore committed theft. It will be seen from the said illustrations that a temporary removal of a dog which might ultimately be returned to the owner or the temporary taking of an article with a view to return it after receiving some reward constitutes theft, indicating thereby that temporary deprivation of another person of his property causes wrongful loss to him. We, therefore, hold that the facts found in this case clearly bring them within the four comers of s. 378 of the Indian Penal Code and, therefore, the courts have rightly held that the appellant had committed the offence of theft. No other Point was pressed before us. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1962 (10) TMI 65 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n section 4(3)(i). If a trust carries on business and the business itself is held in trust and the income from such business is applied or accumulated for application for the purpose of the trust, which must of course be of a religious or a charitable character, the conditions prescribed in section 4(3)(i) are fulfilled and the income is exempt from taxation. This exemption cannot be defeated even if the business were to be conducted by somebody else acting on behalf of the trust. Proviso (b) to section 4(3)(i) has application only to businesses which are not held in trust, and the field of its operation is, therefore, distinct and separate from that covered by section 4(3)(i). This is the view taken by the Bombay and the Kerala High Courts, in the decisions referred to above and we find ourselves in respectful agreement with that view. The question is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. The department will pay its costs. Counsel's fee ₹ 250.
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1962 (10) TMI 64 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... it petitions are allowed and the proceedings challenged therein are quashed and a writ of mandamus will issue forbearing the respondent therein from taking further ation on the basis of the Kerala Land Tax Act, 1961, Act 13 of 1961, or the rules framed thereunder. 173. In reply to view of the fact that the writ petitions are allowed because of the Act being declared unconstitutional, I am not expressing any opinion regarding any other contentions that have been taken regarding the applicability or otherwise of the Act to particular cases even on the assumption that the Act is a valid piece of legislation. These questions do not arise for consideration for the present. 174. As the State has not even discharged the duty cast upon it under Section 6(3 by specifying the necessary form for enabling the parties concerned, to claim reller under Section 6(2) of the Act, within the time mentioned in the Act, the Stale will pay the costs of the petitioners in all these writ petitions.
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1962 (10) TMI 63 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... to be kept on the premises, but that its loss by theft was a circumstance which was so far probable as to be an occurrence incidental to, if not inseparable from, the manner in which it had to be kept." The principle contained in these observations is quite applicable to this case. In fact, this is an a fortiori case. It is not suggested in this case that cash had to be kept in the premises for carrying on the business. Be that as it may, it has not been established that the loss resulting from the theft has arisen out of the conduct of the business and is incidental to the trade. It is not included within any of the deductions permissible under section 10(2) of the Act. For these reasons, we think that the view of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal cannot be successfully impugned. We accordingly answer the question in favour of the department and against the assessee. But, in the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs. Question answered in the negative.
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1962 (10) TMI 62 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... , that parties aggrieved by an award made by such an arbitrator should be denied the protection of the relevant provisions of the Arbitration Act as well as the protection of the appellate jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 136. There is some force in this connection., It appears that in enacting section 10A the Legislature probably did not realise that the position of an arbitrator contemplated therein would become anomalous in view of the fact that he was not assimilated to the status of an Industrial Tribunal and was taken out of the provisions of the Indian Arbitration Act. That, however, is a matter for the Legislature to consider. In the result, the preliminary objection raised by the respondents in the appeals before us must be upheld and the appeals dismissed on the ground that they are incompetent under Article 136. The appellants to pay the costs of the respondents in C A. No. 204 of 1962. No order as to costs in C. A. Nos. 182 and 183 of 1962. Appeal dismissed,
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1962 (10) TMI 61 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e even a voluntary payment can be one, which is not casual or non-recurring, the test for determining whether a payment is non-recurring or not in the case of a voluntary payment, cannot be said to be whether the payee has a right to expect it or not, because if the payee has a right to expect it, it would cease to be a voluntary payment. We do not propose to go into a detailed discussion of the submissions urged before us, though prima facie we are inclined to agree with the view put forward by Mr. Palkhivala, because it is not necessary to answer the said question in view of our answer to the earlier question. In the result, therefore, question No. 1 is not answered because it is not pressed. Our answer to question No. 2 is in the negative and in view of our answer to question No. 2, question No. 3 need not be answered. Assessee will be entitled to get three-fourths of the costs from the department. No order on the notice of motion. Question No. 2 answered in the negative.
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1962 (10) TMI 60 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... heir individual capacity. They would thus have an interest both as coparceners and as partners at the same time in what was essentially joint family business. Such a situation, as laid down by the Supreme Court, is not permissible and such a partnership is not one which can be constituted under law. In view of what we have stated above, it is not necessary for us to consider any other aspect of the matter. As no valid partnership was created, the business continued to belong to the Hindu undivided family of Pitamberdas Bhikhabhai and the whole of the income of that business for the assessment year in question was liable to be assessed in the hands of the aforesaid Hindu undivided family. Our answers to the questions, therefore, are (1) in the negative, (2) the whole of the income of the said business is properly taxable in the hands of the Hindu undivided family of Pitamberdas Bhikhabhai. The assessees will pay to the Commissioner costs of the reference fixed at ₹ 400.
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1962 (10) TMI 59 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... carry out this intention that the Legislature has stated in proviso (b) to section 10(2)(vi) that the deeming provisions will apply "subject to the provisions of clause (b) of the proviso to sub-section (2) of section 24". There is nothing in proviso (b) to section 24(2) which supports the contention of the learned Advocate-General. Under the circumstances, the sum of ₹ 3,17,662 being the balance of the unabsorbed depreciation would be available for the purpose of set-off against the income of ₹ 5,614 under the head "income from property". There is a decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Jaipuria China Clay Mines Private Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax , to which the learned Advocate-General very fairly invited our attention, which lends support to the aforesaid conclusion. Our answer to the question is in the affirmative. The applicant will pay to the respondent the costs of the reference. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1962 (10) TMI 58 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ased to be its trading liability in the year 1955 by reason of the expiry of three years, and thus barring the remedy of the labourers and workmen to recover that amount by way of suits. The answer to this question has been given by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Bombay Dyeing and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. State of Bombay 1958 S.C.R. 1122 . At page 1135, their Lordships observed "The position then is that, under the law, a debt subsists notwithstanding that its recovery is barred by limitation...." That being the principle of law laid down by their Lordships, it is hardly possible to sustain the view taken by the Tribunal, that the trading liability incurred by the assessee in respect of the said amount of ₹ 30,190 had ceased to be its trading liability in the year 1955 by reason of the expiry of the period of three years. We therefore answer the question referred to us in the negative. We make no order as to costs. Question answered in the negative.
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1962 (10) TMI 57 - SUPREME COURT
What is the effect of the retrospective operation of s. 31 introduced by the Punjab Pre-emption (Amendment) Act, 1960 (X of 1960) in the parent Act of Pre- emption (No. 1 of 1913)?
Held that:- We are satisfied that the respondents are entitled to claim that they should be given an opportunity to prove their case that as tenants of the lands in suit they have a right to claim preemption. Incidentally, when the respondents filed the present suits, they had a right to preempt under the relevant provisions of the Act as they stood at that time; by the amendment, that right has been taken away, but instead they claim another right by virtue of their status as tenants of the lands, and this right is, by the retrospective operation of s. 31, available to them. We must accordingly set aside the decrees passed by the High Court and send the matters back to the trial Court with a direction that it should allow the respondents an opportunity to amend their claims by putting forth their right to ask for preemption as tenants under the amended provision of 8.
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1962 (10) TMI 56 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the order of dismissal was void because the rules relating to the holding of an enquiry against non-gezetted public servants, called the Disciplinary Proceedings (Administrative Tribunal) Rules, 1951. were discriminatory and that in holding the enquiry against him the Tribunal had violated the rules of natural justice?
Held that:- If the order may be supported on any finding as to substantial misdemeanour for which the punishment can lawfully be imposed, it is not for the Court to consider whether that ground alone would have weighed with the authority in dismissing the public servant. The Court has no jurisdiction if the findings of the enquiry officer or the Tribunal Prima facie make out a case of misdemeanour, to direct the authority to reconsider that order because in respect of some of the findings but not all it appears that there had been violation of the rules of natural justice. The High Court was, in our judgment, in error in directing the Governor of Orissa to reconsider the question. The appeal must therefore be allowed and the order passed by the High Court set aside. Having regard to the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs in this Court and the High Court.
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1962 (10) TMI 55 - SUPREME COURT
Whether in a writ in the nature of certiorari filed under Art. 226 of the Constitution the party or parties in whose favour a tribunal or authority had made an order, which is sought to be quashed, is or are necessary party or parties?
Held that:- In the present case Phudan Manjhi and Bhagwan Rajak were parties before the Commissioner as well as before the Board of Revenue. They succeeded in the said proceedings and the orders of the said tribunal were in their favour. It would be against all principles of natural justice to make an order adverse to them behind their back; and any order so made could not be an effective one. They were, therefore, necessary parties before the High Court. The record discloses t ?at the appellant first impleaded them in his petition but struck them out at the time of the presentation of the petition. He did not file any application before the High Court for impleading them as respondents. In the circumstances, the petition filed by him was incompetent and was rightly rejected.
That order was made on July 3, 1962; and the special leave petition was- filed on July 18, 1962. Even in the special leave petition the said two parties were not impleaded. Learned counsel for the appellant suggests that this Court may at this very late stage direct them to be made parties and remand the matter to the High Court for disposal. This request is belated and cannot, therefore, be granted. In this view it is not necessary to express our opinion on the other questions raised. Appeal dismissed.
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