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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 95 Records
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1966 (10) TMI 148 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ragraph (6) of paragraph 2 of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution, and is vested, inter alia, with the executive functions of the District Council. The validity of the Rules is not in issue. It is not contended that the Rules are ultra vires the Regulation. The discretion vested in the licensing authority by Rules 4, 5 and 7 is not restricted by condition No. 1 of the license. The licensing authority may refuse to renew or to issue the license if it finds that such a course would promote the interests of the Scheduled Tribes. In the present case, the Executive Committee found that the maximum limit of non- tribal traders had been reached, and in the interest of the tribals it was not desirable to issue license to more non-tribal traders. It is neither alleged nor shown that the Executive Committee discriminated between similarly situated persons. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. ORDER In accordance with the Opinion of the majority, the appeal is allowed with costs.
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1966 (10) TMI 147 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Emperor (A.I.R. 1926 Bom. 178.) and In re Ramasamier(A.I.R.'16 Cr. L.J. 713.). None of the cases cited either for the one side or the other directly arose under s. 198 first part in a committal proceeding. The later view is distinctly in favour of allowing the prosecution to continue except in those cases where the Code it sled says that on the absence of the complainant the accused must be either acquitted or discharged. The present is not one of those cases and in our judgment the Presidency Magistrate was right in proceeding with the inquiry by allowing the mother to carry on the prosecution, and under s. 495 the mother may continue the prosecution herself or through a pleader. We see no reason why we should be astute to find a lacunas in the procedural law by which the trial of such important cases would be stultified by the death of a complainant when all that the s. 198 requires is the removal of the bar. The appeal fails and it will be dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1966 (10) TMI 146 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... which we are inclined to accept acquired some support from the fact that section II makes the purchaser and not the seller primarily responsible for payment of the fee and it is only when the purchaser cannot be identified that the seller is made liable. Mr. Agarwala at first also urged that the fee under s. 11 (1) amounted to a tax and that it was in fact a sales tax. But at the last moment he stated that he- did not wish to press that contention and requested us not to express any opinion thereon. Since the contention is not pressed we need not express any opinion on that question and confine ourselves to the question as to the interpretation of the words "bought and sold" in that section. In our view the construction placed by, the High Court on s. 11(1) was a correct construction and therefore the respondent-committee had rightly charged the appellants with said fee. The appeals therefore fail and are dismissed with costs. One hearing fee. Appeals dismissed...
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1966 (10) TMI 145 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... k concerned with the encashment of the cheque were acting bonafide. There was no negligence on the part of the customer according to whose resolution, the cheque had to be signed jointly by two persons. The fraud could only be perpetrated because of the complicity of the employees of the bank, no doubt, with the help of one of the officers of the Union. The dishonesty of a particular officer of the Union was not the proximate cause of the loss to the bank. In our opinion, the case of G. C. Kurbar and Another v. Balaji Ramji Dange(A. 1. R. 1941 Bombay 274.) referred to in the judgment of the High Court has no application to the facts of this case. In the result, the appeal succeeds, the judgment of the Patna High Court is set aside and that of the Subordinate Judge restored. The appellants do not want a decree against respondent No. 7. Consequently, there will be no decree as against the said respondent. The other respondents must pay the costs of this appeal. Appeal allowed.
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1966 (10) TMI 143 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t be imposed before the end of the year. One possible way of imposition of penalty under section 10(7) of the Act may be to take proceedings under that provision, to come to a definite finding about the alleged fault or default of the dealer and to impose the penalty in certain permissible proportion to the quantum of tax liable to be assessed and to leave out the working of the amount to the proceedings of the assessment of the tax if the same have not yet taken place. That, however, is not the precise question with which we are faced at present. For the aforesaid reasons, the question referred to us is answered in the affirmative and it is held that penalty could be imposed by an appropriate authority under the Punjab General Sales Tax Act on a dealer under section 10(7) of the Act before the end of the year . Costs of the reference will be included in the costs of the writ petition. INDER DEV DUA, J.-I agree. PANDIT, J.-I also agree. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1966 (10) TMI 142 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ice of assessment and demand expired), interest at 18 per cent. per annum calculated on the amount then remaining due with effect from 1st February, 1964 (the date on which the period of thirty days prescribed in the notice of assessment and demand expired), till the date of final payment of the dues should also be recovered as arrears of land revenue, in terms of section 8(1-A). The imposition of penal interest has been effected by the Sales Tax Officer and not by the Collector. All that has been left to the Collector is the arithmetical computation of the actual amount to be recovered by way of interest. That, in my opinion, had necessarily to be left to the Collector because the Sales Tax Officer, when he issued the recovery certificates, would not be in a position to anticipate the date when the dues would be paid and consequently the amount of interest leviable thereon. This contention, therefore, must also fail. The petition is dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed.
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1966 (10) TMI 141 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tisfied that the authorities under the Sales Tax Act, such as Sales Tax Officer or the Commissioner of Sales Tax and persons appointed to assist him are executive officers. If they are executive officers, then it is clear that a vakalatnama or mukhtyarnarna filed in the case before them is required to be stamped with the court-fee stamp of Rs. 2 under the Court-fees Act and not under the Bombay Stamp Act. We must therefore hold that the second contention of the petitioner is also well-founded and the authorisation in each of these cases, which are in the form of a power-of-attorney, or mukhtyarnama or vakalatnama, as the case may be, is not required to bear a nonjudicial stamp of Rs. 3.30 under the Bombay Stamp Act, but shall bear court-fee stamp of Rs. 2 as provided in item 12 of the Second Schedule to the Bombay Court-fees Act. The result therefore is that each of the petitions is allowed and the petitioners are entitled to costs against the respondents. Petitions allowed.
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1966 (10) TMI 140 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tisfied that the authorities under the Sales Tax Act, such as Sales Tax Officer or the Commissioner of Sales Tax and persons appointed to assist him are executive officers. If they are executive officers, then it is clear that a vakalatnama or mukhtyarnarna filed in the case before them is required to be stamped with the court-fee stamp of Rs. 2 under the Court-fees Act and not under the Bombay Stamp Act. We must therefore hold that the second contention of the petitioner is also well-founded and the authorisation in each of these cases, which are in the form of a power-of-attorney, or mukhtyarnama or vakalatnama, as the case may be, is not required to bear a nonjudicial stamp of Rs. 3.30 under the Bombay Stamp Act, but shall bear court-fee stamp of Rs. 2 as provided in item 12 of the Second Schedule to the Bombay Court-fees Act. The result therefore is that each of the petitions is allowed and the petitioners are entitled to costs against the respondents. Petitions allowed.
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1966 (10) TMI 139 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of the Income-tax Act see Muthappa Chettiar v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1938 6 I.T.R. 725. , Seth Kalekhan Mahomed Hanif v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1963 50 I.T.R. 1. and Pulavarthi Viswanadham v. Commissioner of Incometax 1963 50 I.T.R. 463. In all these cases it has been laid down that once the assessment is reopened under section 34 the Income-tax Officer is not limited to the information which he had received and on the strength of which he had asked for a reopening of the case and reassessment of the assessee, and if he thereafter discovers that some other items of income have escaped assessment then he Is entitled to take them also into account and assess them if they had not for any reason been assessed earlier. For the reasons given above, we answer the question in the affirmative and against the assessee. The assessee will pay the costs of this reference which we assess at Rs. 100. Counsel s fee is also assessed at Rs. 100. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1966 (10) TMI 138 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... they have been obtained, e.g., if the raw material likely to deteriorate is in stock much in excess of the present requirement of the dealer, he can sell it without the fear of being booked for offence under this clause. Even if the dealer resells the goods which affords him a good margin of profit, he will come within this clause. Business expediencies must be acknowledged and due allowance given for the conduct of the business. (1964 Edition, page 176). 6. In the light of all that is stated above, we feel that the interests of justice require that there should be a further consideration of the matter before any penalty is imposed on the petitioner and for that purpose, we quash the orders impugned before us and direct a fresh disposal in accordance with the law. We need hardly add that we express no opinion on the controversy and that the authority concerned should reach its conclusion untrammelled by any observation, that we may have made in this judgment. Orders quashed.
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1966 (10) TMI 137 - SUPREME COURT
Period of limitation - Held that:- Appeal dismissed. It is well-recognised that a proviso is added to a principal clause primarily with the object of taking out of the scope of that principal clause what is included in it and what the Legislature desires should be excluded. Consequently, even if it be held that the effect of the Amending Act was that, under the principal clause of section 19(1), the reassessment of the under-assessed or escaped turnover in the case of the respondent could be taken up within a period of five calendar years, that provision became ineffective because of the continued existence of the proviso. The Amending Act had not come into force when the High Court decided the petition, and consequently, the High Court had no occasion to consider its effect.
The second piece of legislation brought to our notice was the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax (Second Amendment) Act, 1964 (Act 20 of 1964), by which also section 19(1) of the new Act was slightly amended. That amendment, however, has no bearing on the point which we are called upon to decide in this appeal, and consequently, needs no consideration.
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1966 (10) TMI 136 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the value of containers of hydrogenated oil is assessable to sales tax under the Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. Set aside the judgment of the High Court and direct that the answer to the question should be that the value of containers of hydrogenated oil is assessable to sales tax under the Act if there is an express or implied agreement for the sale of such containers. These appeals are, accordingly, allowed. At the time of grant of special leave this Court made a condition that the appellant will pay the cost of the respondent in any event.
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1966 (10) TMI 121 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the respondents are liable to be taxed under section 14-A of the Act in respect of their turnover on the transactions effected on behalf of their principals residing either in the Kasargod Taluk or in places in the former District of Malabar for the period from 1st November, 1956 to 31st March, 1957?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. The judgment of the Mysore High Court in these appeals should be set aside and the cases of the respondents should be remanded to the Commercial Tax Officer, Additional Circle, Mangalore, for ascertaining whether the disputed turnover had been included in the turnover of the non-resident principals of the respective respondents, and thereafter to proceed to make the assessments in accordance with law.
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1966 (10) TMI 120 - SUPREME COURT
RECOVERY - ARREARS OF SALES TAX - LIABILITY OF CERTIFICATE-DEBTOR TO PAY INTEREST IN PROCEEDINGS IN EXECUTION OF CERTIFICATE.
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1966 (10) TMI 119 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the order of the Board of Revenue dated the 25th August, 1958, was illegal because there was a contravention of the rule of limitation laid down by section 12(3)(i) of the Madras General Sales Tax Act inasmuch as the order of the Board of Revenue was made after a period of 4 years from the date on which the order of the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer was communicated to the assessee?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The doctrine of merger cannot be invoked in the circumstances of the present case.
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1966 (10) TMI 112 - SUPREME COURT
DEALER IN CHEWING TOBACCO — CLAIM FOR EXCLUSION OF PACKING MATERIAL FROM TAXABLE TURNOVER — WHETHER ALLOWABLE
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1966 (10) TMI 111 - SUPREME COURT
SALE OF CHEWING TOBACCO PREPARED FROM RAW TOBACCO — EXCISE DUTY PAID IN RESPECT OF RAW TOBACCO — WHETHER ALLOWABLE DEDUCTION
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1966 (10) TMI 106 - SUPREME COURT
Whether a dealer who pays excise duty on raw tobacco purchased by him is entitled to rebate of that duty in the computation of taxable turnover from the sale of chewing tobacco manufactured out of that raw tobacco?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. The Madras General Sales Tax Act deals with the levy of sales tax and section 5 provides for the rates of sales tax and the point at which tax is to be levied. The proviso could obviously not refer to tax other than the sales tax with which the whole Act, and especially the provisions of section 5, deals. It is intended to provide by the proviso that in the computation of taxable turnover of a dealer in respect of any goods included in clause (vii) the dealer is entitled to the rebate to the extent of sales tax paid by him on the raw tobacco used in the manufacture of those goods.
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1966 (10) TMI 101 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the petitioners can be said to be dealers in cotton within the meaning of the definition of "dealer" in section 2(6) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1953?
Whether the sale of 411 bales of Californian cotton effected by them during the assessment year 1953-54 can be included in their total turnover and be charged to sales tax?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. There was no intention on the part of the respondents to carry on business of selling cotton, and that the High Court was right in its conclusion
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1966 (10) TMI 79 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Powers of Court to rectify register of members ... ... ... ... ..... ing produced evidence of his title to the shares, to accept his request that the shares be transferred to the name of the 2nd respondent. I do not deem it necessary to discuss in detail the effect of this article. It is sufficient to state that the article does not deal with title of any person who has not acquired title by transmission and/or by process of law. It is clear on the facts which are disclosed in the minutes of the meeting held on 1st April, 1960, that Gordhanbhai had never acquired any title whatsoever in respect of these shares. Under the circumstances, I hold that the company has transferred the two shares in favour of the 2nd respondent and omitted the petitioner s name from its register of members in respect of these shares without any sufficient cause. The petitioner is accordingly entitled to the reliefs claimed in prayers and (b) of the petition. There will be an order in terms of prayers (a) and of the petition. Respondents to pay costs fixed at Rs. 500.
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