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Showing 21 to 40 of 288 Records
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1990 (10) TMI 366 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Jaiswal and Others v. Dossibai N.S. Jeejeebhoy, has not been noticed at all by the Division Bench comprising two learned Judges of this Court which delivered the judgment in Avtar Singh and Others v. Jagjit Singh and Another, and hence, to the extent, that the judg- ment in Avtar Singh's case takes the view that the principle of res judicata is applicable to an erroneous decision on jurisdiction, it cannot be regarded as good law. In our opinion a court which has no jurisdiction in law cannot be conferred with the jurisdiction by applying principles of res judicata. It is well settled that there can be no estop- pel on a pure question of law and in this case the question of jurisdiction is a pure question of law. In our view, therefore, the High Court was, with re- spect, right in its conclusions arrived at and the appeal must be dismissed. The appeal is dismissed. Looking to the facts and cir- cumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1990 (10) TMI 365 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ith no alternative but to remit the matter to the Assessing Authority with a direction to permit the appellant as well as the State Board to place on record such material as is considered relevant and thereafter give the parties an opportunity of being heard before deciding the matter. The Assessing Authority should do so without being influenced by the previous orders of the authorities as well as the High Court. In the meantime i.e. till the Assessing Authority decides the matter afresh, the appellant will continue to pay 30% of the cess amount and will file an undertaking in this Court within eight weeks from today to the effect that in the event the appellant is finally found liable to pay the balance of 70% the appellant will pay the same with interest at 15% per annum within six months from the final determination. The appeals are allowed accordingly. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of these cases, we make no order as to costs. Appeals allowed.
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1990 (10) TMI 364 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... hearing learned counsel for the parties, we do not find any merit in these appeals. The appeals are accordingly dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1990 (10) TMI 363 - SUPREME COURT
Whether clause (iii) of sub-section (3) of Section 1 of the Jammu & Kashmir Houses and Shops Rent Control Act, 1966 is in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution?
Held that:- The challenge to vires of S. 1(3)(iii) of the Act is not well founded. In its supreme wisdom it denied the protection of the Act to ten- ants whose annual income exceeds ₹ 40,000.
Keeping in view the object which the legislation seeks to achieve, it can be safely said that there is reasonable nexus between the classification made by the legislature in the impugned section and the object sought to be achieved. We also find that there is an intelligible differentia between the tenants who are sought to be protected by the Act from those who are denied the protection of the Act. Appeal dismissed.
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1990 (10) TMI 362 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the High Court in the present case while reversing the Trial Court's finding on the question of landlord's reasonable and bone fide requirement of the suit premises exceeded its jurisdiction?
Whether the subletting made by M/s. Bhoolchand Chandiram to M/s. Super Dry Cleaners of one shop which is a part of the suit premises w.e.f. 1.4, 1948 was unlawful being contrary to any provision of law then in force?
Held that:- It is clear that the written consent of the landlord for sub-letting was necessary under the relevant statute applicable on 1.4. 1948 when the sub-letting was made in the present case. The landlord's consent in the letter dated 4.10.1943 was not available on 1.4.1948 after expiry of the contractual tenancy. The rest is only a logical corollary to this conclusion leading to the inevitable result that induction of the sub-tenant M/s. Super Dry Cleaners w.e.f. 1.4.1948 by the tenant M/s. Bhoolchand Chandiram was unlawful being made contrary to the provision of law then in force which constitutes the ground for eviction contained in clause (f) of Sub-section 1 of Section 21 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961. There is, thus, no ground to differ with the conclusion reached by the High Court that the ground of sub-letting has been made out, even though our reasons are different.
the ground of sub-letting also was rightly held proved by the High Court in addition to the ground of landlord's reasonable and bona fide requirement, the question of applicability of Sub-section 4 of Section 21 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 does not arise and, therefore, it is not necessary to examine the question of comparative hardship. In that view of the matter, the appeals must fail. Appeal dismissed. Grant to the appellants time till 31.3.1991 for vacating the suit premises
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1990 (10) TMI 361 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... . It enables the imposition of taxes on goods from other States if similar goods in the State are subjected to similar taxes, so as not to discriminate between the goods manufactured or produced in that State and the goods which are imported from other States. This means that if the effect of the sales tax on tanned hides or skins imported from outside is that the latter becomes subject to a higher tax by the application of the proviso to sub-rule (2) of rule 16 of the Rules, then the tax is discriminatory and unconstitutional and must be struck down. The notifications challenged in this writ petition also bring about discrimination in the matter of levy of sales tax on television sets imported into the State and those manufactured within the State. Following the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court, the notification dated June 20, 1986 (annexure B) and the notification dated March 28, 1987 (annexure D) impugned in this writ petition are quashed. Writ petition allowed.
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1990 (10) TMI 360 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... bmission that the envelope manufactured out of printed paper must be treated as multi-point goods and therefore exigible to tax again. The learned Additional Government Pleader is definitely of the view that the envelope manufactured out of the printed paper will again fall under entry 117 of the First Schedule. If so, because the Revenue had made a mistake in collecting multi-point tax on the first sale of the paper which fell under entry 117, it cannot again be subject to tax on the second sales of the envelope made out of the same paper. The proviso says that if any paper has suffered tax under any of the items mentioned, that shall not be subjected to tax again. Therefore, the criteria for examination is whether the sale is first sale or second sale and not with reference to levy of rate of tax. Accordingly, we are not able to agree with the learned Additional Government Pleader. The tax case fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1990 (10) TMI 359 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... entation. Therefore even though there may be an ultimate finding that the goods are not covered by the certificate of registration no offence under section 10(b) would be made out, if there is no false representation. To bring home the offence under section 10(b), guilty animus or mens rea is essential. In the absence of mens rea, no penalty can be imposed under section 10-A. 5.. The learned Additional Government Pleader contends that the view taken by the Tribunal is far-fetched and cannot be sustained. On a perusal of the items included in the certificate and the items purchased as set out above we are not in a position to hold that the view taken by the Tribunal is any way arbitrary or totally unrelated to the items mentioned in the certificate. The reasons given by the Tribunal for coming to the conclusion are also well-founded. Accordingly, we do not think that there is any case for interference. 6.. Accordingly, this tax case is dismissed. No costs. Petition dismissed.
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1990 (10) TMI 358 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ation of the best judgment assessment. 6.. Counsel for the assessee pleaded that liquor was taxable at the first point and in the instant case, for the second sale of liquor, tax has been levied. This plea does not seem to have been raised before the Appellate Tribunal. There is no adjudication on this score. Under section 41 of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, this Court can revise an order of the Appellate Tribunal only if it decides erroneously or failed to decide a question of law. Admittedly, that is not the case herein. The further plea of the counsel that the fixation of Rs. 40 as the price per litre was not proper. The Appellate Tribunal has given cogent reason to fix the price per litre at Rs. 40, in paragraph 9 of its order. This is a finding of fact. 7.. We are of the view that the decision of the Appellate Tribunal does not suffer from any infirmity. No interference is called for in this revision. The tax revision case is dismissed in limine. Petition dismissed.
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1990 (10) TMI 357 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e. It is only on such further opportunity being given and if any material is produced, such material be considered and thereafter authority may proceed to exercise its discretionary power under section 12-B(3) of the Act. 11.. Before parting with this case we caution that this Court s jurisdiction under section 23 lies within a very narrow compass. We can only interfere and correct erroneous orders involving only pure questions of law and we will not entertain revision petitions which relate to finding of facts recorded by the authorities below unless such finding of facts are perverse and therefore will give rise to jurisdictional question of law. 12.. So far as S.T.R.P. No. 9 of 1985 is concerned we think the appellate authority has given the relief which in our opinion should enure to the benefit of Revenue and therefore we dismiss that petition. 13.. In the circumstances there will be no order as to costs. Petition No. 8 of 1985 allowed. Petition No. 9 of 1985 dismissed.
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1990 (10) TMI 356 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... portion of the tax levied, which they were not liable to pay, had already been paid by some of the petitioners, as interim orders were granted subject to the condition of such payment and in some cases the entire amount of tax had been paid under protest, and therefore there should be an order for refund of the amount. In the light of our judgment, such refund has to be made. 11.. In the result, we make the following order (i) The writ petitions are allowed. (ii) The impugned orders in so far as they relate to levy of tax under section 3 of the Act in respect of such quantity of goods brought and sold within the local area which were intended to be re-exported or transported outside the local area, are set aside. (iii) Respondents 1 and 2 are directed to re-do the orders, in accordance with the law and in the light of this order. (iv) The authorities are directed to refund the amount to which each of the petitioners is entitled to within three months. Writ petitions allowed.
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1990 (10) TMI 355 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ificate the delay occurred since he was under treatment. It is obvious that the assessee was advancing mutually inconsistent pleas. The plea put forward did not inspire confidence before the statutory authorities. The question as to whether there was sufficient cause in not filing the appeals within the time allowed by law, is largely one of fact. The first appellate authority, as also the second appellate authority, concurred in holding that no proper or sufficient reason existed to condone the delay in filing the appeals. As a final fact finding authority, the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal was competent to enter a finding of fact as to whether the assessee (appellant) had sufficient cause in not filing the appeals within the time allowed by law. The Appellate Tribunal, on facts, held that no sufficient cause was alleged or proved. There is no error of law in the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal. The revisions are without merit. They are dismissed. Petitions dismissed.
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1990 (10) TMI 354 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... er as a condition precedent. Upon a consideration of the decisions aforesaid, we are of the view that unlike section 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 and the provisions contained in the sales tax laws of some States providing for service of notice as a condition precedent, the Orissa Act does not prescribe service of notice on the dealer to confer jurisdiction on the assessing officer. We respectfully follow the decision of this Court in Sri Gurumurty Patra s case 1973 31 STC 160. Notice in form VI prescribed in rules 22 and 23 of the Orissa Sales Tax Rules is only a method of providing reasonable opportunity. 8.. Having come to the conclusion-no other point having been urged-that service of notice was not a condition precedent to the initiation of a proceeding under section 12(8), we see no merit in these writ applications which are accordingly dismissed. In the circumstances, there would be no order as to costs. V. GOPALASWAMY, J.-I agree. Writ applications dismissed.
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1990 (10) TMI 353 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... f the Act that penalty can be imposed under it for failure to furnish returns if the assessing authority is satisfied that the dealer has, without reasonable cause, failed to furnish the same within the time allowed. In the absence of a finding that the assessee has failed to furnish returns without reasonable cause, no penalty under this section can be imposed. Such a finding is a condition precedent for imposition of the penalty under section 7AA of the Act. Admittedly, it is not the case of the petitioner that such a finding was recorded while passing the order imposing penalty under section 7AA either provisionally or finally. There is also nothing on the record to indicate that an opportunity of hearing was given to the assessee before imposing this penalty. As such the order dated May 12, 1986 imposing penalty of Rs. 3,526 under section 7AA of the Act has rightly been set aside by the learned Tribunal. The revision petition is accordingly dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1990 (10) TMI 352 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n that view of the matter, the appellate authority was correct in treating the transactions in peanuts and groundnuts distinctly as separate transactions attracting different rates of tax. This aspect was totally overlooked by the Commissioner and what was not really an erroneous order was taken to be an erroneous order by the Commissioner. Thus the Commissioner assumed jurisdiction under section 22-A where none existed. Nor can it be said that charging a lower rate as prescribed by the Legislature after the amendment for the given period, i.e., between April 1, 1983 and November 17, 1983, was prejudicial to the interest of Revenue. As such, the Commissioner could not assume revisionaI jurisdiction, in view of the catena of decisions of this Court and the Supreme Court on the question of revisional jurisdiction in similar circumstances. 12.. We, therefore, for the reasons given, must allow the appeal and restore the order of the appellate authority. No costs. Appeal allowed.
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1990 (10) TMI 351 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nt case, there was/is scope to say that even on the basis of the findings recorded by the Appellate Tribunal, there were/are materials to hold that conditions to attract section 12(3) of the Act exist. But the course to be adopted in such a situation will be to remit the case for a rehearing as indicated above or else this Court itself would be required to embark upon an enquiry into the facts. In either case, in our view, it will be inappropriate, after such an inordinate delay, to decide to reopen the issue of imposition of penalty. The judgment of this Court in Kathiresan Yarn Stores v. State of Tamil Nadu 1978 42 STC 121 FB was challenged before the Supreme Court in S.L.P. No. 9161 of 1982 and it was dismissed on September 28, 1984. The law stated in the said case is the law that must hold the field. 6.. For the reasons aforementioned, we do not find any merit in this tax case. The tax case is accordingly dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1990 (10) TMI 350 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hich the petitioner would have paid otherwise on the goods had it not purchased the same at a concessional rate utilising C forms, minus the amount already paid by it as tax thereon. The value of the goods for the purpose of imposition of tax shall be determined by the Sales Tax Officer, Keonjhar Circle, after deducting the value of refractories and the value of various equipments, weighing machines, weigh bridge, etc., which, in an earlier paragraph we have held, are essential for and integrally connected with the manufacture of goods. 11.. In the result, we quash the orders of the Sales Tax Officer as per annexure 3 and the revisional order as per annexure 7 and remit the matter to the Sales Tax Officer, Keonjhar Circle, to conclude the proceeding after giving the petitioner an opportunity of hearing. The writ application is accordingly disposed of. In the circumstances, there would be no order as to costs. V. GOPALASWAMY, J.-I agree. Writ petition disposed of accordingly.
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1990 (10) TMI 349 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... r that the sale in this case is complete immediately on the appropriation of goods to the orders of the customers. In short, there is transfer of the property in the goods to the purchasers. In the light of this finding, the charges incurred for taking out the goods sold from the godown of the assessee and loading it in the vehicles of the purchasers (handling charges) charged separately without including it in the sale price should be given deduction from the total turnover as per rule 9(f)(i) and (ii) of the Kerala General Sales Tax Rules, 1963. The said conclusion arrived at by the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal is justified in law. It is in accord with the Bench decision of this Court in K.P.M. Kunhammed s case 1978 42 STC 298. 3.. The common order passed by the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, dated December 12, 1989, in T.A. Nos. 41 and 42 of 1987 does not merit interference in these revisions. The T.R.Cs are without merit. They are dismissed in limine. Petitions dismissed.
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1990 (10) TMI 348 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... o. 3) was simultaneously acting both as an assessing authority and Recovery Officer as neither the Commercial Taxes Officer, Circle B, Jodhpur (non-petitioner No. 3) in any capacity nor the Assistant Commercial Taxes Officer, Circle B, Jodhpur (non-petitioner No. 4) gave the aforesaid finding required under section 9(1) of the Act. It may be mentioned here that such a case was not put forward by the non-petitioners in their reply dated May 4, 1987 to the stay application. Thus the writ petition deserves to be allowed. 11.. Consequently, the writ petition is allowed with costs which are assessed at Rs. 1,000. The notices, annexures 6, 7 and 8 and sale proclamation annexure 10 are quashed. The attachment of the properties of the petitioner effected through attachment-memo dated June 13, 1979, annexure 9, is withdrawn. 12.. The non-petitioners are restrained from recovering the said amount outstanding against the assessee, Srikrishna, from the petitioner. Writ petition allowed.
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1990 (10) TMI 347 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... not exceeding double the amount of tax leviable in respect of the goods under transport. The above passage does not amount to stating that the person-incharge of the vehicle or someone else may produce the documents required to be carried under sub-section (2) of section 28-A of the Act subsequently in any proceeding initiated. All that the learned Judges have said is that the Check Post Officer may detain the vehicle if the required documents are not produced after granting of time. That granting of time is not initiation of proceedings, but granting of time to the person-in-charge of the vehicle whether it is driver or someone else to produce the prescribed documents that should accompany the goods in transit. Therefore, the learned counsel cannot derive any support from the cited decision. If his view has to be accepted by us, then, it will amount to rendering sub-section (2) of section 28-A nugatory. There is no merit in this petition. It is rejected. Petition dismissed.
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