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Showing 21 to 40 of 401 Records
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1996 (10) TMI 510 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... f the transferor-respondent. A similar situation arises in the present case. As the Agreement to Sell does not create any interest in favour of the transferee and such land can be treated to be a part and parcel of the holding of the transferor, the result is inevitable that the appellant-State is entitled to succeed. It must be held that despite the Agreements to Sell in favour of the transferees concerned, that had taken place in 1970, the said lands which continued to remain in the ownership of Respondent No. 3 could be legally included as a part of his holding. 8. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, therefore, the appeal is allowed. The judgment and order of the High Court as well as the lower Appellate Court are quashed and set aside and the decision rendered by the Prescribed Authority determining 31 Bighas 10 Biswas 15 Biswansis land as surplus holding of Respondent No. 3, is restored. In the facts and circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.
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1996 (10) TMI 509 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... d any merit in the appeal or any reason to disagree with the Tribunal’s reasoning. The Civil Appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs.
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1996 (10) TMI 508 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... sion of the respondent. When a doctor, like the respondent, discharges his duties of attending to the patients and, in addition thereto supervises the work of the person subordinate to him, the only possible conclusion which can be arrived at is that the respondent cannot be held to be regarded as a workman under Section 2(s) of the Act. 13. For the aforesaid reasons while allowing this appeal the judgment of the High Court, under appeal, and the decision of the Tribunal, are set side. The effect of this will be that the termination of the Services of the respondent was valid. The respondent will refund to the appellant the sum of ₹ 81,838 received by him from the appellant pursuant to the interim orders passed in this case. The Appellant will also be entitled to the refund of ₹ 29,540 from the Income-tax Authorities being the income tax which was deducted and was Liable to be deposited with the Income-tax department. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
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1996 (10) TMI 507 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... natural justice. The High Court obviously acted as an appellate authority and that too as a benevolent appellate authority. There is no room for any benevolence under Article 226 of the Constitution. If the court departs from law and enters the arena of benevolence the perils and pitfalls are too many to recount. There will be no objective standards of judging. Justice becomes personalised. It would vary from Judge to Judge. In the absence of any procedural irregularity, the High Court had no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. The High Court also failed to notice that the respondent is guilty of not paying the installments as undertaken by him. By interfering on the basis of unverified and unsubstantiated plea of financial stringency, the Court would be encouraging contumacious conduct and breach of undertakings. 5. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The Judgment of the High Court is set aside. The writ petition filed by the respondent shall stand dismissed. No costs.
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1996 (10) TMI 506 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... made illegally and defence by the tenant, the tenant not only suffers the said direction of removal at present but become liable to be evicted from the suit premises for such defence construction by him. Similarly, the finding against the tenant on the question of running a permit room cannot but seriously affect the tenant's right to operate a permit room and is also likely to expose him to the risk of being evicted from the suit premises. In the aforesaid facts, the impugned order cannot be held to be justified, we therefore, allow the appeal and set aside the impugned order. It will be open to the receiver to bring appropriate legal action against the tenant appellant for removal of the alleged defence structure and for preventing him from running a permit room in the tenanted premises, besides instituting a suit for eviction under the Rent Act. By way of abundant caution, we make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the respective rights of the parties.
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1996 (10) TMI 505 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Civil Court" have to be exercised "while investigating any matter referred to in Sub-clause (a) or inquiring into any complaint referred to in Sub-clause (b) of Clause 5". All the procedural powers of a Civil Court are given to the Commission for the purpose of investigating and inquiring into these matters and that too for that limited purpose only. The powers of a Civil Court of granting injunctions, temporary or permanent, do not inhere in the Commission nor can such a power be inferred or derived from a reading of Clause 8 of Article 338 of the Constitution. 12. The Commission having not been specifically granted any power to issue interim injunctions, lacks the authority to issue an order of the type found in the letter dated March 4, 1993. The order itself being bad for want of jurisdiction, all other questions and considerations raised in the appeal are redundant. The High Court was justified in taking the view it did. The appeal is dismissed. No costs.
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1996 (10) TMI 504 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... on account of delay in reimbursing the amount incurred towards medical expenses, the State should be liable to pay also interest on the delayed payment? We are of the view that it is inexpedient and not proper to direct the State to pay interest for delay in payment of the reimbursement amount. It requires verification of the amounts spent by the petitioner and similar person. His right only is to get reimbursement and it does not follow that for the delay in the payment of medical reimbursement, he should also be entitled to interest thereon. The order passed by this Court on an earlier occasion was to the effect of dismissing the special leave petition in limine. Therefore, it does not furnish any ratio decidendi for following the same. Under these circumstances, we do not think that it would be proper to direct payment of interest on the delayed reimbursement of the medical expenses incurred by a Government servant. 5. The special leave petition is accordingly dismissed.
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1996 (10) TMI 503 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... d a final report before the Chief Judicial Magistrate Dhanbad. The report, however, was pending and had not been accepted when the Central Government with the consent of the State Government issued the impugned notification. As a result. the C.B.I. has been directed to further investigate the offences registered under the said F.I.R. with the consent of the State Government and in accordance with law. Under Section 173 (8) of the Cr.P.C. 1973 also, there is an analogous provision for further investigation in respect of an offence after a report under sub-section (2) has been forwarded to the Magistrate. We fail to see any requirement of law under which the reasons for further investigation by the C.B.I. are required to be recorded in the notifications of the kind in question. The reasons can be shown independently. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the impugned judgment and order of the Single Judge of the Patna High Court is set aside and the writ petition is dismissed.
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1996 (10) TMI 502 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of area, if the Court ultimately tends that the plaintiff is the owner of only a lesser extent of area. The power of the Court to grant relief with reference to the correct measurement of the suit property cannot stand in the way of the plaintiff in seeking to amend the plaint to bring to the notice of the Court the correct extent and the exact boundaries of the suit property. It is clear that the claim of the plaintiff over the suit property is to the property situate on the eastern side of the original suit property and by virtue of the amendment, the plaintiff is not claiming relief to some other property other than the suit property. I am of the view that the amendment sought for is bona fide. Consequently, I am inclined to interfere with the order of the learned District Munsif in rejecting the application for amendment of the plaint and accordingly, I allow the civil revision petition. There will be no order as to costs. Consequently, C.M.P. 10532 of 1996 is dismissed.
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1996 (10) TMI 501 - COMPANY LAW BOARD, MUMBAI
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... ... ..... . Meswani, the directors of the company, each separately from their personal account ; (ii) on payment of compounding fee of ₹ 10,000 by S/Shri Vinod M. Ambani, secretary of the company, and Rohit C. Shah, Assistant Vice-President--Secretarial, each separately from their personal account. (c) on payment of compounding fee of ₹ 10 lakhs by Reliance Consultancy Services Limited, the share transfer agents of the company. 20. The parties would have to follow the procedure prescribed under Section 621A(7) for obtaining the court's permission. The payment is to be made within 15 days of the court's according permission for the compounding of the offence, by way of demand draft in favour of "Pay and Accounts Officer, Department of Company Affairs, Mumbai". 21. The Registrar of Companies, Maharashtra, on being satisfied about the compliance with the aforesaid order, shall take necessary further action under Section 621A(4)(d) of the Companies Act, 1956.
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1996 (10) TMI 500 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Such enquiries were definitely called for, the Assessing Officer earlier having taken notice of the investments made by the assessee." We find that the Commissioner in his order gave details of reasons by which he came to the conclusion that the order of assessment passed on 4-10-1988 was erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the revenue. In view of the above, in our view, the Tribunal was not justified in holding that the Commissioner had not made out a case as to how and in what manner the order dated 4-10-1988 was erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of revenue. In view of the above, we answer the question No. 2 in the negative, i.e., in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. In view of the answer given by this Court against question No.l as affirmative, the question No. 3 is also answered in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
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1996 (10) TMI 499 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... y account after the judgment of this Court. The mere fact that the University has given permission to redeposit the amount with the appellant does not enable the respondents to take shelter thereunder for non-deposit of the amount in the Fund. Under these circumstances, we do not think that there is any justification in the contention for waiver of the penalty imposed by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner. As held earlier, there is no discretion left to the Commissioner to totally waive the penalty. What was left to his discretion is the rate at which it is to be computed by way of penalty. In this case, admittedly, 25 of the damages was computed as penalty. Since the respondent had deposited the amount in fixed deposit and it earned 9 interest thereon, the balance amount is required to be deposited and the respondent is directed to deposit the balance amount within six weeks from today. The appeals are accordingly allowed. The writ petition stands dismissed. No costs.
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1996 (10) TMI 498 - CEGAT- CALCUTTA
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... ... ..... would be admissible. However, I feel, the said goods are also covered by the general definition of clauses (a), (b) and (c) and it is only by way of abundant caution that clause (d) has been introduced to set at rest any controversies and doubts. I am, therefore, further of the view that clause (d) is only of a clarificatory nature and it should be given a retrospective effect. Keeping that reason in view also, I feel that the benefit of the transformers of capacity exceeding 75 KVA would be permissible to the Appellants even before 16-3-1995. The question of nullity as raised by the learned JDR does not at all arise. That is still to be seen with reference to the meaning given in the clauses (a), (b) and (c). Since these are not the goods before us, I would not express any view on this submission whether transformers not exceeding 75 KVA or upto 75 KVA would be permissible or not. 8. In view of the above, I allow the Appeal with consequential relief to the Appellants.
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1996 (10) TMI 497 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... ty for owning the flat was made sine qua non by agreement. Therefore, what society charges is not a voluntary contribution. It is cost for effecting the change. This is a continuous process. On these facts, I find that identity between the contributors and participators did not exist. The contributors goes out after executing the transfer. In his place a new person enters. In these circumstances, the concept of mutuality cannot be extended to the facts of the present case. The income becomes liable to tax as soon as the mutuality is lost. The benefit flowing due to the principle of mutuality cannot be conferred on the society. 14. Having regard to the facts and respectfully following the decision of the jurisdictional High Court I am of the opinion that the amount of ''transfer fee'' received by the society is exigible to tax. I, therefore, find no infirmity in the impugned order. Accordingly, I uphold the same. 15. In the result, the appeals stand dismissed.
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1996 (10) TMI 496 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... dings would obviously stand abated on the ground that right to sue would not survive for the other heirs of the deceased husband to get any decree of divorce against the wife as the marriage tie has already stood dissolved by the death of the husband. No action, therefore, survives for the court to snap such a non-existing tie, otherwise it would be like trying to slay the slain. At this stage there remains no marriage to be dissolved by any decree of divorce. Consequently, now the ex parte decree is set aside, no useful purpose will be served by directing the Trial Court to proceed with the Hindu marriage petition by restoring it to its file. The Hindu Marriage Petition No. 25 of 1989 moved by Shri Basappa, the husband of the respondent, on the file of the Court of Civil Judge, Gadag will be treated to have abated and shall stand disposed of as infructuous. The appeal is disposed of accordingly. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
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1996 (10) TMI 495 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... ned counsel for the assessee, are with regard to the valuation of closing stock. It was held in these cases that the closing stock can be valued without including the overhead cost, including the interest expenditure. These decisions, in our opinion, have no bearing on the issue to be decided as to whether the interest paid by the assessee relating to a project, the profits of which are being offered on completion of project method, is to be allowed in the year to which the expenditure relate or in the year in which the project is completed. As aforesaid, the assessee is following the ‘Project Completion Method’. Therefore, the entire expenditure relating, which is identifiable with the project, has to be accumulated and allowed in the year when the project is completed and the income is offered from the project. In these circumstances, we do not find any merit in this ground of the assessee. It is accordingly rejected. 10. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.
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1996 (10) TMI 494 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... with the deep pits of an extent of 8 to 10 feet requires further enhancement of the compensation ? It is not in dispute that the compensation granted ₹ 40,000/- per bigha was only in respect of a small piece of land. In all the other case compensation ₹ 7,000/- per bigha of the land in which there are deep pits of the depth 8 to 10 feet has been awarded and become final. The lands require development and expenditure in that behalf is needed. The High Court has considered all the relevant facts and found that uniform rate of ₹ 7,000/- per bigha for the land with deep pits of 8 to 10 feet depth would be the proper compensation. In the absence of any compelling material, nor the High Court refused to advertto, we cannot enhance the compensation from that awarded by the High Court which was not challenged by the Union of India. Under these circumstances, we do not find any circumstance warranting any interference. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No costs.
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1996 (10) TMI 493 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... n that case this Court observed as under (SCC p. 154, para 3) "3. We have considered the same very minutely and carefully and it appears to us that in fact there were not two grounds but only one ground and the non-placement of the retraction of the confessional statement by the detenu before the detaining authority and non-consideration of the same while arriving at his subjective satisfaction in making the order of detention goes to the root of the order of detention and in our considered opinion makes the order of detention invalid." The ratio of that decision applies on all fours so far as the present case is concerned as the facts are almost identical. 5. In the result, we allow this appeal, set aside the order of detention and quash it. However, since the detenu has been released after the detention period was over, our quashing of the detention order may appear to be academic but may become relevant if any proceeding under SA FEMA or allied law is initiated.
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1996 (10) TMI 492 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the appellant’s brother. This portion measures 23’ x 7-1/2’. It has been purchased from Smt. Zubedabi, wife of appellant’s brother, in whose share tho said portion had fallen on partition, and who had gifted that portion to his wife. The copy of the sale-deed has been filed in this Court, to which no objection has been taken by the counsel for the respondent. The respondent does not deny the transaction. He having purchased the remaining portion of the shop, became the owner thereof and his interest as a tenant merged in his right as an owner of that portion. He, therefore, remained a tenant only in respect of the disputed portion and consequently the suit filed by the appellant in respect of that portion was clearly maintainable. 41. In view of the above, the appeal is allowed. The judgment and order dated 17.1.1992 passed by the High Court is set aside and the suit of the appellant for the eviction of the respondent is decreed with costs throughout.
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1996 (10) TMI 491 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... an order of a competent Magistrate under Section 155 (2) Dr. P.C. but, admittedly, no such order was passed in the instant case. That necessarily means, that neither the police could investigate into the offence in question nor submit a report on which the question of taking cognizance could have arisen. While on this point, it may be mentioned that in view of the proviso to Section 2 (d) Dr. P.C., which defines 'complaint', the police is entitled to submit, after investigation, a report a relating to a non-cognizable offence in which case such a report is to be treated as a 'complaint' of the police officer concerned, but that explanation will not be available to the prosecution here as that related to a case where the police initiates investigation into a cognizable offence - unlike the present one - but ultimately finds that only a non-cognizable offence has been made out. On the conclusions as above we allow this appeal and quash the impugned proceedings.
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