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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 565 Records
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2001 (10) TMI 1178 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... heir laxity lies the liberty of the detenu. 19. We are not oblivious to the fact that the consequence of our judgment would be that a person against whom there is material for smuggling under Section 2(e) of the COFEPOSA Act would go scot free. But, that cannot be helped. A preventive detention order can only be sustained by this Court in its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India if it is in conformity with law. And where it is not, as is the case here, this Court would have no compunction in striking it down. After all bad men are as much entitled to the fundamental right of deprivation of personal liberty in accordance to the procedure established by law (Article 21) as good men are. 20. In the result we allow this writ petition; quash and set aside the impugned detention order; direct that the detenu Nedumpurambil Poulose George be released forthwith unless wanted in some other case and make the rule absolute. Issuance of certified copy is expedited.
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2001 (10) TMI 1177 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nciple can apply to the case in hand where the allotments made prior to the judgment of this Court in center for Public Interest Litigation , are the subject matter of scrutiny and had been made indiscriminately, as there had been no guiding principle for making such allotments. Consequently, the principles evolved in Civil Appeal No.6840 of 2001, will have no application at all to the present appeals. The said contention, therefore, must fail. In view of our concisions on the nine issues, as mentioned above, these appeals fail and are dismissed. There however will be no order as to costs. While, we are dismissing the appeals, we are also aware of the fact that these appellants are operating the allotments made in their favour since 1993-94 and even after the judgment of the High Court, they are continuing by virtue of an interim order of this Court. In these circumstances, we direct that they shall be allowed to wind-up their respective businesses by 31st of December, 2001.
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2001 (10) TMI 1176 - SECURITIES APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, MUMBAI
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... ... ..... but punitive in effect as it takes away the appellant's right to mobilise funds from the public to carry on its business. According to Webster's Encyclopaedic Unabridged Dictionary 'penalty means a punishment imposed or incurred for a violation of law or rule'. In the instant case it is seen that the order is made in the light of the finding - by the authority, that the appellant has violated the regulations. This nexus also strengthens the view that the order debarring the appellant from accessing the capital market is a penalty. In this view of the matter the order has no legal backing and therefore cannot sustain. 109. As already stated above, in the absence of sufficient material evidence to establish that the appellant had directly or indirectly indulged in market manipulation, the impugned order holding the appellant guilty of violating regulation 4(a) and 4(d) cannot sustain. 110. In the result the appeal is allowed and the impugned order is set aside.
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2001 (10) TMI 1175 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... uated outside the State of Gujarat and in that event the bar under Section 4(1)(a)(iv) would not operate. 14. In the result, in view of the foregoing discussion, Appeal No. 837 of 2001 and Appeal No. 838 of 2001 succeed. The order of the learned Single Judge insofar as it relates to Chamber Summons No. 361 of 2001 and Chamber Summons No. 365 of 2001 is set aside. Chamber Summons No. 361 of 2001 is dismissed. Chamber Summons No, 365 of 2001 is allowed. The Receiver is directed to hand over possession of Nylon Plant and Tyre Cord Plant to the appellants forthwith. Appeal No, 864 of 2001 is dismissed. The learned counsel for the appellant states that the appellant will not sell, transfer or create any third party rights in respect of their assets except in due course of business. On the request of Ms. Iyer, the operation of this order is stayed for four weeks. 15. Copy of this order duly authenticated by the Associate/Personal Secretary of this Court be supplied to the parties.
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2001 (10) TMI 1174 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... rwal, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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2001 (10) TMI 1173 - COMPANY LAW BOARD, NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... ption is exercised, the same will be binding on both the sides. In either case, since we have given time for payment of the consideration, it is necessary, to protect the interests of both the sides, that, in addition to the four existing directors, that is, 2nd and 7th respondents and 2nd and 3rd petitioners, there should be an independent director to function as the Chairman of the Board to manage the affairs of the company during that period. Both the sides are at liberty to suggest a suitable person to be the Chairman of the Board failing which we shall appoint the Chairman on 6-11-2001 when the parties are to appear before us for exercising the option. There should be at least one director present in the Board meetings to constitute the quorum. 44. This petition is disposed of in the above terms subject to our appoint-ing the Chairman and giving consequential directions in regard to the conduct of the affairs of the company including appointment of a valuer, if need be.
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2001 (10) TMI 1172 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... elf imposed limitation on the power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. As rightly pointed out in New Delhi Holy Family Hospital Society v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi (supra), this is a question of discretion and not of jurisdiction. The appeals have been pending in this Court for a long period of time. In the circumstances, therefore, at this stage it will not be in the interest of justice to ask the appellant to invoke the alternative remedy of appeal. 22. For the foregoing reasons, the appeals succeed and the orders of the learned Single Judges dated April 27, 1989 and October 7, 1996 are set aside. Accordingly, the assessing authority is directed to grant exemption from levy of property tax to the appellant in respect of the premises of the appellant which are being exclusively occupied and used for research purposes. The assessing authority is also directed to issue revised bills in consonance with this order. Both the appeals stand disposed of.
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2001 (10) TMI 1171 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... while deciding the case of levy of penalty has held that the estimation of value by the departmental valuer at higher figure than shown by the assessee cannot be said as concealment without evidence to show that the assessee had understated the value. Section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act which is in pari materia to the section 18(1)(c) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957. The assessee has also given plausible explanation for the two values he has given. 7. That there is no mala fide intention on the part of the assessee is established by the fact that he voluntarily filed the second valuation report. The first valuation report was originally filed out of oversight and was subsequently substituted with the latest valuation report which established the bona fide act of the assessee. We, therefore, hold that the assessee neither concealed his asset nor furnished inaccurate particulars thereby and cancel the order of penalty. 8. In the result, the assessee’s appeal is allowed.
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2001 (10) TMI 1170 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... cent stages. We may however proceed on the basis that 'Public Policy of India' for purposes of Section 34, refer to the principles and standards constituting the general or fundamental policy of the State, established by the Constitution and the existing laws of the country, and the principles of justice and morality. 35. RITES has not been able to make out that the award is in conflict with public policy of India. Nor has RITES made out any other ground mentioned in Sub-section (2)(a) or (2)(b) of Section 34. It is, not permissible for the Court exercising power under Section 34 of the Act or this Court in an appeal under Section 37 of the Act, to examine the correctness or validity of the award on any ground other than what is specified in Section 34. Therefore, the challenge to the award on the ground that it is erroneous, is liable to be rejected. 36. There is no merit in this appeal and the appeal is accordingly dismissed. Parties to bear their respective costs.
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2001 (10) TMI 1169 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ng to put off the fire and taking his wife to hospital also improbabilises the theory of his having abetted suicide. In our opinion there is no evidence and material available on record wherefrom an inference of the acucsed-appellant having abetted the commission of suicide by Seema may necessarily be drawn. The totality of the circum-stances discussed hereinabove, especially the dying-declaration and the suicide notes left by the deceased herself, which fall for consideration within the expression "all the other circumstances of the case" employed in Section 113-A of Evidence Act, do not permit the presumption thereunder being raised against the accused. The accused- appellant, therefore, deserves to be acquitted of the charge under Section 306 IPC. The appeal is partly allowed. The conviction of the accused-appellant under Section 306 IPC and sentence passed thereon are set aside. His convic-tion under Section 498-A IPC and sentence passed thereon are maintained.
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2001 (10) TMI 1168 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... fact which has to be decided in each case by the authorities concerned." In the present case, the contributors to the common fund of the society are not entitled to participate in the surplus because all such contributors make these payments only when their flats/offices are transferred. Therefore, the question of contributors to the common fund must be entitled to participate in the surplus does not arise. This issue is squarely covered with the decision of the Tribunal in the case of Oval Shivshanti Bhuvan Co-op. Housing Society Ltd. (supra) and Presidency Co-op. Housing Society Ltd. (supra) wherein the Tribunal has decided the issue in favour of the Department. The Tribunal cases relied upon by the learned counsel have been taken into consideration by the Tribunal while passing the orders in the above said cases. In view of the discussion above and also following the precedent, we decide this issue in favour of the Department. 5. In the result, appeals are dismissed.
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2001 (10) TMI 1167 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... Lord Justice Ranganath Misra, while delivery his judgment in the case of McDowell & Co. Ltd. (supra), has observed at page 171 of the report as under "Tax planning may be legitimate provided it is within the framework of law. Colourable devices cannot be part of tax planning and it is wrong to encourage or entertain the belief that it is honourable to avoid the payment of tax by resorting to dubious methods. It is the obligation of every citizen to pay the taxes honestly without resorting to subterfuges." In our opinion, the series of transactions entered into by the assessee were colourable device for avoidance of applicability of section 40(b). Therefore, in our opinion, the Assessing Officer was fully justified in holding that the payments made by the assessee to EE and KM & Co. were effectively payments made to partners and rightly disallowed the same by invoking section 40(b) of the I.T. Act. 5. In the result, the assessee’s appeal is dismissed.
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2001 (10) TMI 1166 - CESTAT KOLKATA
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... ... ..... be regarded as deposit and not duty. When appeal filed by the petitioner is subsequently allowed by the Tribunal doctrine of unjust enrichment is not applicable to such deposits nor the provisions of Rule 230B of Central Excise Rules, 1944 are applicable. 8. I also find force in the appellants' submission that the deposits were made by the appellant not as duty, but as deposits. This also flows from the fact that during relevant period there was no duty confirmation against the appellant and as such the deposits made by the appellant cannot be equated to any duty so as to invoke the provisions of Section 11B. As such I do not find any merits in the Revenue's contention that the amounts so deposited by the appellant during the investigation period is not liable to be refunded to them, even when the adjudication proceedings have been held to be in their favour. Accordingly I set aside the impugned order and allow the appeal with consequential relief to the appellants.
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2001 (10) TMI 1165 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nly to that part in the self-occupation of an ex-ruler as his official residence and to deny the benefit of exemption to the other portion of the palace rented out by the Ruler, since the entire palace is declared as his official residence. Hence, even if only a part of the palace only is in the self-occupation of the former ruler, and the rest has been let out, the exemption available under section 10(19A) will be available to the entire palace. 5. In coming to this conclusion, this Court has followed another decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in CIT v. Bharatchandra Banjdeo 1985 154 ITR 236 (M.P.). The decision of this Court in CIT v. H.H. Maharao Bhim Singhji 1988 173 ITR 79, we are informed by the learned counsel, has not been appealed against. 6. In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the application under section 256(1) has rightly been rejected by the Tribunal and do not deserve further consideration. 7. Accordingly, the application is rejected.
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2001 (10) TMI 1164 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tatutory requirement. On the contrary the Tribunal has recorded a clear finding that there was due compliance with the statutory requirements. In view of such findings of fact recorded by the Tribunal holding that the case of the assessee fell beyond the ken of section 13 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, no question of law, much less a substantial question of law arises from the order of the Tribunal. We find no merit in this appeal, which is accordingly dismissed.
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2001 (10) TMI 1163 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the commanding Officer at the time of hearing of a charge against a person subjected to Army Act, 1950, but the said form was not duly filled up by the Commanding Officer." We are unable to accept that the above observation show that in the Writ Petition there was a challenge to constitution of the General Court Martial. The above observations are in respect of a preliminary hearing under rules 22, 23 and 24 of the Army Rules, 1954. This is a hearing which precedes the Court Martial. In any event the High Court has held against the Respondent on this point and no Appeal was filed by him. This point not having been raised in the Writ Petition cannot now be urged before this Court for the first time. We therefore did not permit Mr. Sharma to argue this point. Under these circumstances, we set aside the Order passed by the learned single Judge as well as the impugned Order. The Writ Petition filed by the Respondent shall stand dismissed. There will be no Order as to costs.
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2001 (10) TMI 1162 - ITAT GAUHATI
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... ... ..... he amount received by the assessee was at least prima facie. As the Assessing Officer had accepted the return of the three creditors it should go to mean that the amounts given by us these creditors were also genuine. In the instant case similar to the fact of case narrated above, the Assessing Officer has accepted the return filed by the creditors showing the loan given to the assessee. The Revenue did not make any endavour to give any cogent reason why the income-tax returns filed by the creditors and accepted by the Assessing Officer should be ignored. Further the CIT(A) after properly appreciating the materials before him arrived at the conclusion that the creditors had the capacity the advance the loans to the assessee. In the circumstances, respectfully following the decision of the jurisdictional High Court we have no hesitation in holding that the CIT(A)’s order does not call for any interference. 6. In the result, the appeals filed by the Revenue is dismissed.
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2001 (10) TMI 1161 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... x or the proprietrix, representing the proprietorship concern, as both the things convey the same meaning. Anyhow, this question does not arise in the facts of the present case. 6. In this case, accused No. 1 is the proprietary concern and accused No. 2 is the proprietor and both the accused are one and the same person. Accused No. 1 is not a legal entity or juridical person and the prosecution cannot be maintained against it. At the same time, the prosecution against accused No. 2 is maintainable and can be continued. For the reasons stated above, the proceedings against accused No. 1 are liable to be quashed, 7. In the result, this petition in respect of second petitioner/accused No. 2 is dismissed as withdrawn. The petition is allowed insofar as the first petitioner is concerned and the proceedings as against accused No. 1 in C.C. No. 5890 of 1997 on the file of V-Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Chennai, are hereby quashed. Connected Crl. M.P. No. 1238 of 2001 is closed.
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2001 (10) TMI 1160 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... plainant also. Therefore, by following the above proposition, it can be safely held that the prosecution by the proprietor representing the proprietorship concern or the proprietorship concern represented by its proprietor are one and the same, as both things convey the same meaning. 15. Therefore, even without amendment, the complaints are maintainable, because the complainant in these cases is only the proprietor Subramaniam representing the proprietorship concern. 16. Under those circumstances, it can be safely held that the amendment, which has been permitted by the trial court, would not change the character and basic structure of the complaints. 17. Therefore, both these revisions are liable to be dismissed as devoid of merit. The trial court is directed to continue the trial and dispose of the same in accordance with law as expeditiously as possible, 18. In the result, these criminal revision cases are dismissed. Consequently, the connected Crl. M.Ps. stand dismissed.
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2001 (10) TMI 1159 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... #39; from Entry 45 and the above judgments of the Supreme Court cited by the learned Counsel would not support that contention. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the absence of 'comma' in Entry 45 as amended by Amendment Act 49/76 between the words 'lithographic' and 'printing' does not exclude the 'newspaper printing' manufactured and sold by the petitioner - dealer from the purview of Entry 45 as amended by Amendment Act 49/76. In other words, the said goods manufactured and sold by the petitioner falls within Entry 45. We hold that the phrase 'lithographic printing' and 'duplicating inks' occurring in Entry 45 of First Schedule of APGST Act as amended by Amendment Act 49/76 includes three kinds of inks viz., (1) lithographic ink (2) printing ink and (3) duplicating ink. ( 7. ) IN the result and for the foregoing reasons, we do not find any merit in the TRCs and accordingly they are dismissed, with no order as to costs.
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