|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 68 Records
-
1962 (11) TMI 71 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... assistance or even relevance. The amending Act does not purport to be declaratory but seeks in terms to carry out an amendment, in other words, to effect a change. The mere fact that the change effected conforms to a particular interpretation which the words which previously existed might bear and which found acceptance at the hands of the courts in a few cases, is, in our opinion, a wholly insufficient foundation to base an argument that it is declaratory and further that it must be taken to have declared the law from the commencement of the parent Act so as to invalidate all proceedings validly taken on a proper construction of the law as it then stood. We find therefore that there is no substance in the argument regarding the effect of the amending Act upon which reliance is placed for the purpose of imputing the jurisdiction of the special court and, we have no hesitation in repelling that argument. The result is that the appeal fails and is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
-
1962 (11) TMI 70 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... tion casts its net wide enough to embrace in its sweep income from assets which may have been transferred before the enactment of Act XIV of 1953. In cases arising under the Income-tax Act where the provisions of section 26(3) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, came to be inserted by section 2 of the Indian Income-tax (Amendment) Act, IV of 1937 (and those provisions are in pari materia with section 4A of the Act), it was held that the said section would apply to income which arises from assets transferred before the enactment of the section on January 14, 1937 see the decisions in the cases of Pandit Gaya Prasad Tewari v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1942 10 I.T.R. 308, H.P. Banerjee v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1941 9 I.T.R. 137, Sardarni Narain Kaur, In re 1943 11 I.T.R. 448 and Sheikh Mohammed Naqi v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1945 13 I.T.R. 452. For the reasons given above, these petitions are without merit and are accordingly dismissed with costs. Petitions dismissed.
-
1962 (11) TMI 69 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... y Establishment Code and was, therefore, outside the purview of Art. 311 of the Constitution. It is not disputed that there is no provision in the Rules relating to Posts and Telegraphs Service corresponding to r. 148 of the Railway Establishment Code. In the instant case, therefore, the premature termination of service before the age of superannuation could be justified only by virtue of r. 3. As r. 3 had not been attracted to the appellant's case for reasons given above, it follows at the premature termination of the appellant's service would be tantamount to removal from service by way of penalty. In that view of the matter, the appellant certainly had a grievance which he could ventilate under Art. 226 of the Constitution, and on the findings arrived at by us on the main question he is entitled to the declaration that his service was not legally terminated in accordance with r. 3 of the Security Rules. The appeal is accordingly allowed with costs. Appeal allowed.
-
1962 (11) TMI 68 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... late Tribunal only adverted to the circumstances that there was a unity of control for the reason that all the individual activities of the assessee were controlled through the main cash book maintained at the head office. It is not pretended by the assessee that the film distribution business, which was apparently engaged in for a single year only, constituted such a vital and integral part of his business structure that the entirety of the business should be regarded as a single and indivisible one. It seems to us that applying the tests indicated by the decisions referred to, which in our opinion should be cumulatively applied, the result is that that business in which the loss was incurred in the assessment year 1950-51 was not carried on in the following assessment year 1951-52. The question is therefore answered in the negative and against the assessee. The assessee will pay the costs of the department. Counsel's fee, ₹ 250. Question answered in the negative.
-
1962 (11) TMI 67 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... person not being a licensee upon (1) (1865) L. R. I C. P. 69, such terms and conditions as the board may from time to time fix having regard to the nature and geographical position of the supply and for purposes for which it is required without showing undue preference to any person. Mr. Vishwanath Sastri contended that a dispute might arise if the Board unreasonably refused to supply electricity to a private consumer or showed undue preference to someone else and such a dispute might be taken to arbitration under s. 76. I do not wish to pronounce any opinion upon this matter because the present dispute is not a dispute of this character. For these reasons I am of opinion that the Additional District judge, Bangalore, was right in granting the declaration sought by the appellants. 11 would, therefore, set aside the order of the High Court and restore that of the Additional District judge, Bangalore, with costs on the respondents throughout. One hearing fee. Appeals allowed.
-
1962 (11) TMI 66 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ication had passed. Now on the dates when the State Transport Authority and the High Court passed their orders, the period of thirty days so counted had passed. On those dates the respondents could not successfully ask for an amendment of their application under s. 64A. It, therefore, seems to me that if the order of the Regional Transport Authority is to be taken as having been, made, on June 28, 1960, then the respondents' petition under s. 64A was incompetent because it sought anorder for setting aside the Regional Transport Authority's resolution of December 3/4, 1959 and under s. 64A that order could not be effected at All. in. my view, the appellant municipality was clearly entitled to a writ quashing "I order of the; State Transport Authority of January 6, 1961. I would, therefore; allow the appeal with cost. By COURT By majority judgment the appeals are allowed and the matter sent back for disposal in accordance with law. Parties to bear their own Costs.
-
1962 (11) TMI 65 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ider that it is implicit in the provision granting an appeal from the order of the revenue officer that even if the rules do not so provide, he should so conduct it that the right of appeal granted by the statute is not nullified. In saying this we should not be understood to mean that he is bound to follow the procedure prescribed for civil courts for the recording of evidence. Only he should maintain some record from which the appellate authority would be able to gather the materials which the officer had before him in arriving at the decision which is the subject of the appeal. The result is that Civil Appeal 105/60 fails and is dismissed, while Civil Appeal 106/60 succeeds and is allowed. As a result of the orders passed in these two a peals the revision under Art. 227 preferred by the appellant to the High Court will stand dismissed. The respondent will be entitled to his costs in this Court (one hearing fee). C.A. No.105 of 1960 dismissed. C.A. No. 106 of 1960 allowed.
-
1962 (11) TMI 64 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... und of law in this case. This point was not canvassed before us or in any of the earlier stages of the hearing of this matter. It has not been touched in the cases cited before us. But none the less I am of opinion that a broad fact found in the records and embodied in the statement of case permits me to deal with this aspect of the matter. There is this much on the record and in the statement of the case that there was cessation of the business by reason of enemy action. The legal effect, in my opinion, is beyond doubt. The contract became void and was incapable of being performed. Therefore, in law, there could not be any business which could be carried on after February, 1942. Hence, the payment cannot partake the nature of a profit or cannot fill up the hole in the profit chain because, in law, there could not be any business and, consequently, no profit. Hence, in my opinion, on this ground also the answer should be to the same effect. Question answered in the negative.
-
1962 (11) TMI 63 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... in, the same Law Lord in the course of his opinion referred to with approval the dictum in Ryall v. Hoare 1923 2 K.B. 447, 454, namely, "...a casual profit made on an isolated purchase and sale, unless merged with similar transactions in the carrying on of a trade or business is not liable to tax" and also the following dictum of Lawrence L.J. in Leeming v. Jones 1930 1 K.B. 279, 362 "It seems to me in the case of an isolated transaction of purchase and re-sale of property there is really no middle course open. It is either an adventure in the nature of trade, or else it is simply a case of sale and re-sale of property." In the light of these decisions and the authoritative pronouncement of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Saroj Kumar Muzumdar v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1959 37 I.T.R. 242., we have no hesitation in answering the question referred to us in the negative with costs. Advocate's fee ₹ 100. Question answered in the negative.
-
1962 (11) TMI 62 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... al's marriage no consideration passed from the bridegroom to the bride's father, the father must be held to have made a gift of the girl to the bridegroom. To put in other words there was 'Kanyadhan' in Bangaru Ammal's marriage. We therefore reject this contention. Lastly reliance is placed on the conduct of the appellant in not questioning the correctness of the finding given by the learned Subordinate judge in his application for delivery that the marriage was in Asura form. The learned counsel for the appellant sought to explain his conduct but in our opinion nothing turns upon it. If the marriage was not in Asura form as we held it was not, the conduct of the appellant could not possibly make it an Asura marriage. In this view it is not necessary to give opinion on the other questions raised in the appeals. In the result the decrees of the High Court are set aside and both the suits are dismissed with costs throughout. One hearing fee. Appeals allowed
-
1962 (11) TMI 61 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ted without being used or consumed in the municipal area. In this view of the matter it was not necessary for the Municipality to follow the procedure for imposing taxes when the section was amended. The tax still remained the same. Its nature, incidence or rate were not altered. In our opinion, the company was liable to pay octroi tax on goods brought into local area, (a) to be consumed by itself or sold by it to consumers direct and (b) for sale to dealers who in their turn sold the goods to consumers within the municipal area irrespective of whether such consumers bought them for use in the area or outside it. The company was, however, not liable to octroi in respect of goods which it brought into the local area and which were re-exported. But to enable the company to save itself from tax in that case it had to follow the procedure laid down by rules for refund of taxes. For the reasons above stated this appeal must fail. It will be dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
-
1962 (11) TMI 60 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... satisfied that the assessee's principal place of business since 1955 is Hyderabad, and that he accordingly determined the place of business as Hyderabad and falling within the jurisdiction of the Income-tax Officer, Wealth-tax Circle, Hyderabad. The notice of assessment specified therein dealt with the assessment of Devidayal & Co., unregistered firm for the years 1960-61 to 1961-62 and on the individual for the said years 1960-61 and 1961-62 under the Income-tax Act, the Wealth- tax Act and the Expenditure-tax Act. Apart from this, there is a notice under section 34 for the year 1952-53. In any case, as we have stated, we are not called upon to consider that question in this writ petition, because it is the jurisdiction of the Commissioner to determine the place of business that is challenged, and we are of the view that that order is valid and cannot be quashed. In this view, the petition is dismissed with costs. Advocate's fee ₹ 250. Petition dismissed.
-
1962 (11) TMI 59 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ringed. But it cannot be forgotten that in the first instance Government of the State admitted the ’Provincialised’ teachers into a single unit of employment and thereafter by retrospective provision they have sought to provide a differential treatment between the two sections constituting one unit. It is against this differential treatment that the protection of Art. 16 is claimed and in our judgment avails. In our view the High Court was right in holding that the rules in so far as they provide for differential treatment between the members of the’ State Cadre’ and the ’Provincialised Cadre’ in the matter of promotion to the higher scale must be regarded as invalid. The appeal must therefore fail. BY COURT In view of the opinion of the majority, the appeal is allowed and the order of the High Court striking down r. 2(d) and (e) and r. 3 in so far as it relates to promotions is set aside. There will be no order as to costs in this appeal.
-
1962 (11) TMI 58 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ome-tax purposes is not of any relevance in the present case, for one reason, the said owner did not say so in his evidence and for the other, it was not indicated in the charge or in the evidence. In the charge framed, she was alleged to have defrauded the insurance company and the only evidence given was that if it was disclosed that Nalini was a minor, the insurance company might not have paid the money. But as we have pointed out earlier, the entire transaction was that of Dr. Vimla and it was only put through in the name of her made minor daughter for reasons best known to herself. On the evidence as disclosed, neither was she benefited nor the insurance company incurred loss in any sense of the term. In the result, we allow the appeal and hold that the appellant was not guilty of the offence under ss. 467 and 468 of the Indian Penal Code. The conviction and sentence passed on her are set aside. Fine, if paid, is directed to be refunded to the appellant, Appeal allowed.
-
1962 (11) TMI 57 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... f 1952 is struck down as unconstitutional and of no force and effect. We may add, however, that learned counsel for the respondents has stated before us that if a claim is made even now under Chap. II by the petitioner within thirty days of our judgment, even though it' may be time-barred as from the date of the proclamation issued under S. 6, the Forest Settlement Officer will entertain it and consider the claim as required under Chap. II. We therefore allow the petition in part and strike down the U. P. Land Tenures (Regulation of Transfers) Act, No. XV of 1952 as unconstitutional. The rest of the prayers in the petition are rejected, subject to the petitioner being free to take such steps as may be open to him in law to establish his right whatever it may be under the registered lease of June 1952 and subject to the State having the right to contest the said claim. In the circumstances, the parties will bear their own costs oft this petition. Petition allowed in part.
-
1962 (11) TMI 56 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... slature. We must therefore hold that the Validation Act is not ultra vires the powers of the legislature under entry 54, for the reason that it operates retrospectively." The State Lagislature has power to levy a fee under the Seventh Schedule, List III, Item 28 read with item 47. The Legislature was, therefore, competent to levy a fee for rendering services in connection with the maintenance, supervision and control over the religious institutions and it was competent to levy the fee retrospectively. If the amounts received by the State have been expressly regarded as fee collected by the Commissioner tinder the provisions as amended and account has to be made on that footing between the Government and the Commissioner, challenge to the vires of s. 82 (2) must fail. In our view the High Court was right in declaring ss. 52(1)(f), 55, 76(1) & (2), 80, 81.,and 82 intra vires. The appeals therefore, fail and are dismissed with costs. One hearing fee. Appeals dismissed.
-
1962 (11) TMI 55 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... d one because with the efflux of 3 or 5 years' period, they will automatically come under the scheme framed under the Act. The operation of s. 17 has already been discussed, and it has already been indicated that an establishment coming under the exemptions granted or to be granted under s. 17 does not mean that the establishment bears less burden of its share of contribution to the fund. It has not been contended before us that the petitioners' establishment does not come within the general rule laid down in s. 1 (3) of the Act or within the scope of the scheme framed under s. 5. It is equally clear that all hotels and restaurants come within' the scope of the notification impugned in this case. Hence, there is absolutely no reason for complaint that the petitioners' establishment of that class has been chosen for hostile discrimination. As all the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners fail, the petition is dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed.
-
1962 (11) TMI 54 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... provision. Reading the deed of wakf as a whole, the dominant intention appears to be charitable. The question which we are asked to answer is the following "Whether, on the facts and circumstances of this case, on a true construction of the several clauses of the trust deed dated July 6, 1953, as a whole the income of the assessee is exempt from taxation under section 4(3) of the Indian Income-tax Act?" In view of what we have stated above, our answer to the question is in the affirmative. The learned Advocate-General, who appears for the Commissioner of Income-tax, intimated to us that the correct copy of the deed of wakf was never supplied to the department and that reliance was only placed on the translation which, in our view, is incorrect in material particulars. In this view of the matter, we consider that the fair order to make as regards costs would be that each party should bear its own costs and we order accordingly. Question answered in the affirmative.
-
1962 (11) TMI 53 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... inserted so that after the amendment the rule that a suit by a creditor should be brought in a representative capacity would apply as much to a suit set aside a summary order under O. 21, r. 63, as to other suits. It was not suggested that there was anything in the terms of the amended s. 53 (1) which referred to a defence to a suit and, in fact, learned Counsel did not contend that if a defence under s. 53 (1) could be raised by defeated attaching-creditor such a defence had to be in a representative capacity, and we consider that learned Counsel was correct in this submission. From a provision as to how a plaintiff, if he filed a suit, should frame it, we can see no logical process by which it could be held that a defendant cannot impugn the validity of the sale which is voidable at his instance. We have, therefore, no hesitation in rejecting the legal point urged on behalf of the appellant. The result is that the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed,
-
1962 (11) TMI 52 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the rule can be said to be valid and the practice prevailing irregular inasmuch as in some cases security may perhaps have been demanded from the petitioner without full examina- tion as to the special features of the case?
Whether the rule cannot be sustained in so far as it vests the discretion in the highest Court of this country and can be used only in cases where for reasons like those contemplated by Order 25 r. 1 & 2 and 0.41 r. 10 an order of security is made?
Held that:- It is true that if the discretion is exercised by the Court in favour of impecunious petitioners and orders for security are not passed in their cases, no hardship will be caused to them. But it seems to us that what would be left to the discretion of the Court on this construction of the rule, is really a matter of the right of impecunious petitioners under Art. 32. That is why we think that the impugned rule in so far as it relates to the giving of security cannot be sustained.
The petition is allowed and the order passed against the petitioners on December 12, 1961, calling upon them to furnish security of ₹ 2,500/- is set aside.
|
