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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 382 Records
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1990 (11) TMI 410 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... on this ground. We make it clear that wherever there has been an Inquiry Officer and he has furnished a report to the disciplinary authority at the conclusion of the inquiry holding the delinquent guilty of all or any of the charges with proposal for any particular punishment or not, the delinquent is entitled to a copy of such report and will also be entitled to make a representation against it, if he so desires, and non-furnishing of the report would amount to violation of rules of natural justice and make the final order liable to challenge hereafter. ( 9. ) ON the basis of this conclusion, the appeals are allowed and the disciplinary action in every case is set aside. There shall be no order for costs. We would clarify that this decision may not preclude the disciplinary authority from revising the proceeding and continuing with it in accordance with law from the stage of supply of the inquiry report in cases where dismissal or removal was the punishment.Appeals allowed.
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1990 (11) TMI 409 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... lying upon Sections 82 and 83 of the Forest Act, 1927 and would make it clear that the liability of the appellant shall be confined to two instalments which were due for the second and third years in terms of the contract after setting off the security deposit and the amounts that have been recovered being ₹ 2200/- and ₹ 28,000/- respectively. The Certificate Officer before proceeding further shall apply his mind to the facts and if necessary hear the certificate debtor, ascertain the exact due, make an appropriate amendment in the certificate as required under Section 11 of the Act and proceed to recover the amount that he finds is still recoverable under law. The appellant shall not be burdened with any claim of interest or other charges until the Certificate Officer, modifies the certificate and liability for interest under Section 17 would run only from that date provided any amount has remained unpaid. Parties are directed to bear their own costs throughout.
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1990 (11) TMI 408 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... alig Ram v. Munshi Ram, 1962 1 SCR 470, referred to. In the instant case, the custom was confirmed and regu- lated by the Punjab Laws Act, 1872 and the Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Act, 1920 and it was done away with by the Punjab Custom (Power to Contest) Amendment Act 1973. No statute was passed on the basis of the custom itself so as to transform the custom itself into a higher statutory right. Therefore either before or after the custom has been done away with by the Amendment Act, the rights of the parties under Hindu Law remain unaffected and will provide the rule of decision where alienations are contested under Hindu Law. 246F-G the cases of the appellants under Hindu Law were not gone into by the High Court or lower Courts, the cases were sent back to the High Court with a direction to examine the cases of the willing appellants under Hindu Law after hear- ing the parties and, if needed, giving them an opportunity to adduce further necessary evidence. 247C &
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1990 (11) TMI 407 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e building or land is capable to fetch. Due to erection of the tanks whether the value of the demised property had appreciated or not, is also yet another consideration. Undoubtedly, when the tanks are erected and used for commercial purposes, the value of the demised property would get appreciated. The annual letting value is capable of increase. However, the rate of increase is a question of fact but the fact remains that the value of the land gets increased by virtue of erection of the storage tanks. Considering from this perspective we have no hesitation to hold that the petroleum storage tanks are structures or things attached to the land within the definition of Sections 3(s) and 3(r) of the Act. Thereby they are exigible to property tax. In this view the appeal is allowed and the judgment of the High Court is reversed and that of the Court of Small Causes is affirmed. But in the circumstances each party is directed to pay and receive their respective costs throughout.
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1990 (11) TMI 406 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... de absolute in terms of para 19 (B). Respondents are permanently restrained from levying and collecting entertainment tax on the lift charge of ten paise which the petitioner is charging from passengers who voluntarily wish to utilise the facility of lift at the petitioners' theatre. In view of the said decision of ours, and the relief which is given to the petitioner, the alternative submission that the provisions may be declared as ultra vires would not survive. Hence, prayer 19(A) is not granted as it has become of academic interest in the light of our granting prayer 19(B) to the petitioners. As the petition is being allowed, whatever deposits of lift charges have been kept by the petitioner in a separate savings bank account as per the interim order dated 24-9-1979 will now be permitted to be appropriated by the petitioner to his own use. The petitioner will be entitled to operate the said bank account in accordance with law. Order accordingly. 6. Order accordingly.
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1990 (11) TMI 405 - CEGAT BOMBAY
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... ... ..... nt rebate of cess on export read with Rule 3 of the Automobile Cess Rules. When no such notification is issued, it is clear that the policy makers have not thought it fit to grant rebate of cess on export. Moreover, it is not an empty formality or an unnecessary ritual that the Government is performing every year by issuing a seperate notification under Rule 12 read with the relevant provisions of the Finance Act to make the special excise duty also eligible for rebate of cess. In the circumstances, we do not see any merit in the argument of Shri Pikle. Since the citations made by the ld. SDR are directly on the point and the order of the Collector (Appeals) does not appear to have taken into account this legal position as set out by the Supreme Court, we allow the appeal of the revenue, set aside the order of the Collector (Appeals) and restore the orders of the Assistant Collector. Since we disposed of the appeal itself, stay application does not survive for consideration.
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1990 (11) TMI 404 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ve or reward for allowing the farmers to graze their cattle in the forest. 11. Under these circumstances, we are unable to agree with the finding of the High Court that the prosecution has established the charges levelled against the second appellant. In the absence of such, evidence regarding the demand of the mamools as a motive or reward the explanation offered by the appellant cannot be simply thrown away as unworthy of acceptance. 12. For all the reasons stated above, we hold that the prosecution has not satisfactorily established the charges levelled against the second appellant whose appeal is now considered and both the Courts below have failed to advert to this aspect of the case. 13. In the result, we allow the appeal of the second appellant (T. Nanne Sahib) and set aside the conviction and the sentence imposed by the Courts below and acquit him. Accordingly, while the appeal of the first appellant abated on his death, the appeal of the second appellant is allowed.
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1990 (11) TMI 403 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... r Shaikh v. Union of India . In that case, the detenu, after unsuccessfully making two earlier attempts, again contended that certain documents which he had asked for were not given to him, and, therefore, there was failure of justice. Rejecting that contention, this Court stated that the documents he had asked for had no relevance to his detention and no injustice had been done to him by refusing to give him those documents on which no reliance whatsoever was placed by the detaining authority. 9. The principle stated by this Court in Abdul Sattar Abdul Kadar Shaik v. Union of India with regard to the irrelevant documents sought by the detenu, has no relevance to a case such as this, the facts of which are squarely covered by the decision in M. Ahamedkutty v. Union of India . 10. Accordingly, we set aside the judgment under appeal and the impugned orders of detention and declaration. The detenu shall be released at once. 11. The appeal is allowed in the above terms. No costs.
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1990 (11) TMI 402 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... adu 1983 54 STC 382 (Mad.) 1983 4 SISTC 105 (Mad.) and Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Ratna Fine Arts Printing Press 1984 56 STC 77 (MP). (Emphasis supplied) 2.. In view of the above recent judgment of the Supreme Court, we have no doubt that the sales of printed materials like cinema tickets, wall posters, etc., cannot be subjected to tax. Likewise, the view of the Tribunal that the purchase of wax, cotton waste for cleaning the printing machinery will come under section 7-A of the Act cannot be sustained. As a matter of fact, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner granted relief on the said turnover of Rs.1,413.30. But the Tribunal on the enhancement petition filed by the Revenue included the same in the taxable turnover. We are of the view that the Assistant Commissioner is right and the Tribunal is not right in including this turnover in the taxable turnover. In the result, we allow the tax case. However, there will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed. Here italicised.
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1990 (11) TMI 401 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nnot be said to be an impediment or unreasonable restriction imposed on the right to carry on the trade. 8.. In this context it may not be out of place for us to mention that as held by the Supreme Court in the case of Cooverjee B. Bharucha v. Excise Commissioner and the Chief Commissioner AIR 1954 SC 220, right to trade in intoxicants is not a fundamental right at all. That decision, is since followed by the later decisions of Supreme Court and this Court, particularly in the case of Jagadale and Sons v. State of Karnataka ILR 1989 Kar 101. Therefore, even if this Court were to hold that the amendment Act is a restriction on his right to vend toddy, then it will not affect his fundamental right. 9.. Even in that view, the challenge is frivolous and motivated in order to avoid payment of tax and in order to gain unjust enrichment at the cost of the exchequer and the consumer. We, therefore, dismiss this petition with costs. Advocate s fee is Rs. 500. Writ petition dismissed.
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1990 (11) TMI 400 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... fruit (brown coconut (watery coconut) would fall within item 55 of Rule 14 of the rules and is exigible to octroi. 8. Shri Krishan kumar, learned Counsel for the appellant repeatedly asked this Court to make a reference to the larger bench on the ground that the similar question would frequently arise in various High Courts under the respective sales-tax Acts, the Central Sales-tax Act and the Octroi Rules of the respective States and after the issue of the notice to all the learned Advocate Generals of the States and the Attorney General and the law may be authoritatively laid by a larger bench. In view of the settled legal position, we find no such necessity to make a reference to the larger bench. 9. Thereby we have no hesitation to hold that the High Court is well justified in coming to its conclusion that watery coconut (brown coconut) is exigible to octroi only under item 55 of Rule 14 of the Rules. Accordingly we dismiss the appeal with costs quantified at Rs. 10,000.
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1990 (11) TMI 399 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... territory of this State and the seller would not pay the required tax. In case of unregistered dealer, such an allegation can be made almost in every case even registered dealers would not be able to escape easily the grip of the Officer-in-charge. We need to say nothing further in this regard in this case except to reiterate that the power of the kind asked for by the learned Standing Counsel in favour of the officer-in-charge has not been conferred in its wisdom even by the State Government on such an officer. 14.. Another general observation may be made before concluding. The same relates to form VI-B which requires reasons to be stated in case the waybill is found defective/incomplete. It would be in consonance with justice if this form also requires the officer-in-charge to state as to why according to him there is evasion of tax. This would stop arbitrary exercise of power and ensure ungrudging payment of the demanded amount. S.K. MOHANTY, J.I agree. Petition allowed.
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1990 (11) TMI 398 - HIMACHAL PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nsistent with the provisions of the Sales Tax Act. In the view that we have taken on the interpretation of section 6(3) of the Sales Tax Act, it is unnecessary for us to go into the question of promissory estoppel argued by the learned counsel Shri D.V. Sehgal on the basis of notifications annexures P16 and P18 issued by the Government under sections 42 and 6 respectively of the Sales Tax Act. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the quantity of the timber sold by the Forest Department of the State to the petitioner-S.S.I. unit for its use in the manufacture and sale of other goods within the State is not exigible to tax under the H.P. General Sales Tax Act and a writ of mandamus will issue directing the respondents to forbear from levying or collecting sales/purchase tax from the petitioner S.S.I. unit in respect of timber sold to it for the aforesaid purpose. The writ petition is allowed as indicated above. The parties will suffer their own costs. Writ petition allowed.
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1990 (11) TMI 397 - WEST BENGAL TAXATION TRIBUNAL
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... ... ..... ent proceedings till the disposal of the revisional application by the respondent No. 2. The learned State Representative, Mr. D. Majumdar, concedes that pending disposal of the revisional application by the learned Additional Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, West Bengal, assessment proceedings in respect of the applicants will not be completed and that the applications for declaration forms will be entertained by the appropriate authority concerned and will be disposed of, in accordance with law. He further concedes that the order of rejection for grant of eligibility certificate will not stand in the way for issuance of declaration forms, if applied for by the applicants. In the circumstances, on the basis of this undertaking by the learned State Representative, we are to reject the main application which cannot be admitted for reasons already stated. In the circumstances, the application is rejected and is disposed of. We make no order as to costs. Application dismissed.
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1990 (11) TMI 396 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ead and salt, I have drunk your water and wine. I have eaten your bread. (Departmental Ditties Prelude). There does not appear to be any violence in attempting similar substitution whether it be in the hymns of common prayer ( Wine that maketh glad the heart of man .... and bread to strengthen man s heart. ) or in the Shakespearian lines ( Eating the bitter bread of banishment ). The lengthening of the list would be awfully wearisome when the point is demonstrated almost convincingly. At the end of the discussion, we come to the conclusion that bun would rightly come under the category of bread occurring in entry No. 14. It could be taxable only as coming under that item. The Notification G.O. Rt. No. 408/82/TD dated July 5, 1982, containing contrary declarations are unsustainable. The petitioner will be entitled to resultant benefits. It is accordingly quashed. The original petitions to that extent will stand allowed. We do not make any order as to costs. Petitions allowed.
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1990 (11) TMI 395 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... unsel for the petitioner/State has thus read something more than what has actually been decided by the Full Bench. The words if such total turnover exceeds Rs. 50,000 he is liable to pay tax either under section 3(1) or on his option under section 7(1) and in addition he will have to pay tax at the rate as specified under section 4 or 5 or section 7-A if the goods fall under section 4 or 5 or under section 7-A in the judgment/order of Padmanabhan, J., will have to be read along with sub-section (2) of section 7-A. Read as above, it shall lead to the only conclusion that having once realised tax under section 7(1) of the Act on the total turnover, if there is an attempt to further tax the assessee under section 7-A(1) of the Act, that may amount to double taxation. 10.. We thus conclude in the light of the discussions above that the Appellate Tribunal has not committed any error in making the impugned order. The revision is accordingly dismissed. No costs. Petition dismissed.
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1990 (11) TMI 394 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 19 STC 1 and the Director of Supplies and Disposals 1967 20 STC 398 only laid down and explained when an activity can be construed as business and in both the cases the said conclusion was based on the particular facts. Those decisions, therefore, do not help in deciding the question that arises for decision in these cases nor do they support the petitioner s contentions. (iv) So far as the second point as to the definition of dealer is concerned, the contention of the petitioner has to be rejected in view of what was stated by the Supreme Court in Abdul Bakshi s case 1964 15 STC 644 AIR 1965 SC 531 wherein it was held, a commodity may be used as an ingredient or in aid of manufacturing process leading to the production of another salable commodity and one need not sell the very article to become a dealer. 10.. In view of the above, we are in agreement with the judgment of the learned single Judge and, therefore, this appeal fails and the same is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1990 (11) TMI 393 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... opinion of our own and on that basis declaring that the Appellate Tribunal has erred, because, if we do so without recording a finding that the opinion expressed by the Appellate Tribunal cannot be that of a reasonable person, we shall be violating the settled rule of prudence that the appellate or the revisional court should not, for its own opinion, hold that any case decided has gone wrong unless it finds that the opinion expressed in the impugned order of judgment is so unreasonable that no reasonable person can come to the said conclusion. We have quoted in extenso the view of the Appellate Tribunal. Its emphasis may not be of the nature as suggested by the learned counsel for the appellant (respondent herein) and a contrary view may be possible. That, however, in our opinion, is not enough to invite interference in exercise of the revisional powers of this Court. We accordingly find no merit in the petitions. The petitions are dismissed. No costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1990 (11) TMI 392 - WEST BENGAL TAXATION TRIBUNAL
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... ... ..... ses 4 and 5 of 1969-70. The views expressed by the Patna High Court in 1974 33 STC 469 (Commissioner of Commercial Taxes v. North Ramgarh Coal Company Private Ltd.), which was relied on by Mr. Majumdar, the learned State Representative, are consistent with those adopted by us. 6.. In the result, the question referred will be answered to the effect that the West Bengal Commercial Taxes Tribunal was not correct in entertaining revision petitions against the order of rejection of review application by the Additional Commissioner (i.e., against the order dated March 10, 1970), as the said Tribunal fell into an error in holding that the refusal to review the revisional orders by the Additional Commissioner amounted to a revisional order. The question referred is answered in the negative accordingly. The reference case is thus disposed of. No order is made as to costs. S.P. DAS GHOSH (Chairman).-I agree. P.C. BANERJI (Technical Member).-I agree. Reference answered in the negative.
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1990 (11) TMI 391 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e is whether the Tribunal was justified in making observations with regard to the orders passed in reassessment. To my mind, it appears that there was no occasion for the Tribunal to do so. If the reassessment proceedings have not taken place within the period stipulated by law, the same would be invalid on that ground. It may, however, be pointed out that the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals), Jodhpur, remanded the case on June 7, 1984 and that was communicated to the assessing authority on August 7, 1984. If two years are calculated on the basis of the amended section 1013, quoted above, reassessment made on August 5, 1986, would be well within time. However, as stated above, I am not called upon to go into this controversy on merits. What is required only is to clear off the parties of the effect of the observation of the Tribunal s judgment extracted above. Those observations will have no effect on the rights of the parties. Subject to the above, the revision is disposed of.
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