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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 355 Records
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1995 (11) TMI 463 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... t "no appeal shall lie from any order passed in appeal under this Section". It would, therefore, be clear that when an appeal was filed against the order of the City Civil Court, Bombay to the learned single Judge under Order 43, Rule 1(r) as provided in sub-section (1) of Section 104 by operation of sub-section (2) of Section 104, no further appeal shall lie from any order passed in appeal under this Section. In Khimji's case (supra) the suit was filed on the original side of the High Court and the learned single Judge on the original side passed an interlocutory order. Against the orders of the learned single Judge, though it was an interlocutory order, since the appeal would lie to the Division Bench under the Letters Patent, this Court held that against the interlocutory orders passed by the single Judge, Letters Patent Appeal would be maintainable. That ratio, therefore, is clearly inapplicable to the facts in this case. The SLPs are accordingly dismissed.
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1995 (11) TMI 462 - COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE (APPEALS), MADRAS
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... ... ..... on VIII of the notification." In the instant appeal before me, the appellants have produced before me samples of the packing boxes. In that I find that except for the words “Marketed” by “Medopharm Laboratories 1, Thiru Vi Ka Road, Madras 6", there is no other monogram or lable, or trade name, or brand name etc., of any other person. As such I am of the opinion that the Tribunal’s decision relied on by lower authority has no application to the facts of the case. Further the letter dated 2-5-1994 of Assistant Collector, Madras IV Division, from file C. No. IV/16/619/92 VC addressed to “The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers’ Association of TAMIL NADU,” also supports the case of the appellants, although the authority for these views is not known. Having regard to above, I do not, concur with the findings/reasonings of the lower authority. Therefore the impugned order is set aside and the appeal is allowed with consequential relief.
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1995 (11) TMI 461 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... w of the findings made by the Commissioner (Appeals) which is upheld by the Tribunal that all the five conditions laid down in rule 4 have been fully complied with, the question of bad debt could not be challenged and the revenue could not urge that the same should have been disallowed contrary to the provisions of rule 4. So far as the legal expenses are concerned, the same benefit was given to the earlier years but that was not given this year. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we do not find that the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal has committed any error in granting any relief. In the instant case, we do not find any merit in the submissions made by the revenue. 10. Accordingly, the question No. 1 is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. Question No. 2 is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. Question No. 3 is also answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. 11. There will be no order as to costs.
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1995 (11) TMI 460 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the present case, the appellate Tribunal has clearly held that the amount in question does not belong to the accused and it cannot be included in the income of the accused persons. The prosecution on the same amount cannot be allowed to continue, otherwise it will be a sheer abuse of process of the Court. Hence in my view, the prosecution of the petitioners cannot be continued. Even accused No.5 was included as an employee of the petitioners. Hence the prosecution of the entire firm, its partners and employee is liable to be quashed in view of the specific finding of the Tribunal mentioned above. However if accused No.5, who is not before this Court, has committed any offence individually on his own, it is always open to the INcome-tax Department to take necessary action according to law. In the result, the criminal application is allowed. The issue of process and the prosecution of the petitioners in the criminal case mentioned above are hereby quashed. Application allowed.
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1995 (11) TMI 459 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... not disputed or questioned before us. One this is so, the very theory of bread-down of the quota rule falls to the ground. In such a situation, it is not necessary either to deal with the decisions cited by the parties on the question when the quota rule can be said to have broken down or with the question whether the principle contained in Office Memorandum dated February 77, 1986 can be given retrospective effect. The factual situation concludes the issue against the promotees. For the above reasons, Civil Appeal No.4340 of 1995 is allowed and the Civil Appeal No. 9831 of 1995 arising from Special Leave Petition (C) No.3930 of 1988 is dismissed. The promotees' challenge to the seniority lists prepared in the years 1982, 1983 and 1985 fails as also their challenge to the promotion of direct recruits to the post of Assistant Foreman earlier than the petitioners in Original Application No.380 of 1987 on the file of Bangalore Tribunal. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1995 (11) TMI 458 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... fitted into the category of semi- skilled, consequent to the recommendation of the III Pay Commission. Obviously, realising this mistake the latter Bench had held to fit them into the category of semi-skilled and assign the appropriate scale of pay. Being semi-skilled, their scale of pay indisputably is ₹ 210-260. Accordingly, their fitment is correctly assigned as semi-skilled and it is not a case of reversion but one of proper fitment. Under these circumstances, the view of the first Bench of the Calcutta CAT is clearly erroneous in law. It is settled law that even the dismissal of Special Leave Petition in limine without assigning reasons does not operate as res judicata. Under these circumstances, we are of the view that the view of the latter Bench of the CAT, Calcutta and of the Cuttack Bench are clearly consistent with the above reasoning. Therefore, we do not find that these are fit cases warranting interference. The appeals are accordingly dismissed. No costs.
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1995 (11) TMI 457 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... therefore, hold that the respondents and others employees of the Government-Mint who are occupying Government accommodation are not entitled to include the house rent allowance as a part of the "ordinary rate of wages" for computing the over-time allowance. We allow the appeals, set aside the impugned judgments of the Tribunal. We, however, direct that the respondents or other employees of the Government-Mint similarly situated who have already been paid over-time allowance in terms of the Tribunal judgments shall not be asked to refund the same. In OA 13 of 1987 the Tribunal directed that the Government instructions relied upon by the Tribunal be implemented. Since we have interpreted the Government instructions and also the provisions of Section 59 of the Act, it would be in the interest of justice that the law laid down by us be made applicable to the applicants in OA 13 of 1987 (respondents in SLP 4854/90) prospectively from the date of this judgment. No costs.
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1995 (11) TMI 456 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... subsequent good or bad performance of the petitioner became meaningless. We find that the approach adopted by the High Court cannot be said to be unjustified. Even the strong reliance placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the report of the learned District Judge indicates that he needed improvement in disposal of the cases which would show that the Full Court of the High Court considered his performance as not satisfactory. Under these circumstances, the High Court was justified in discharging the petitioner from service during the period of his probation. It is not necessary that there should be a charge and an enquiry on his conduct since the petitioner is only on probation and during the period of probation, it would be open to the High Court to consider whether he is suitable for confirmation or should be discharged from service. It is thus not a fit case warranting our interference under Article 136 of the Constitution. The S.L.P. is accordingly dismissed.
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1995 (11) TMI 455 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rashtra having accorded sanction and thereafter, the charge having been filed, there was absolutely no justification for the High Court to have stopped the normal procedure of the trial being allowed to continue. It cannot be presumed that there was no application of mind when the First Information Report was prepared and the sanction of the Government obtained. The allegations as made in the First Information Report and the order granting sanction, if true, would clearly establish that the respondent was rightly prosecuted and was guilty of criminal mis-conduct. The truthfulness of the allegations and the establishment of the guilt can only take place when the trial proceeds without any interruption. There was no justification for the High Court to have exercised its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution and Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. in quashing the prosecution. For the abovesaid reasons, the appeals are allowed and the judgment of the High Court is set-aside.
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1995 (11) TMI 454 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... purchase thereafter is obviously illegal as it does not bind the State after the notification under Section 4(1) was published. Under these circumstances, the High Court was wholly unjustified in quashing acquisition in respect of three plots of land of respondents 1-3. It is brought to our notice that after the notification was quashed by the High Court, no further steps were taken by the Government. It is not necessary since it is being challenged in the appeal in respect of these three plots. A submission was made that the Corporation does not need these three plots. A submission was made that the Corporation does not need these three plots of lands for the employees. So long as there is no notification published under Section 48(1) of the Act withdrawing from the acquisition, the Court cannot take notice of any subsequent disinclination on the part of the beneficiary. The appeal is allowed and the writ petition stands dismissed. But, in the circumstances, without costs.
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1995 (11) TMI 453 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ive declaration on the invalidity of the procedure contemplated under the Act. The only right an aggrieved person has is to approach the constitutional courts, viz., the High Court and the Supreme Court under their plenary power under Articles 226 and 136 respectively with self-imposed restrctions on their exercise of extraordinary power. Barring thereof, there is no power to the civil court. It is true that the Gram Panchayat had initially expressed about its lack of funds but soon thereafter it came forward to proceed with the acquisition and thus lack of funds with the Gram Panchayat does not divest the power and jurisdiction of the Land Acquisition Officer to proceed with the enquiry under Section 11 and to make the award thereunder. The Land Acquisition Officer does not lack jurisdiction or power to make the award. The Civil Court as well as the High Court thereby committed no error of law warranting our interference. The Special Leave Petition is accordingly dismissed.
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1995 (11) TMI 452 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the provisions of section 80A(2), read with section 80M, of the Income-tax Act, 1961 ?" There all the questions were answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. Turning to the facts of this case, the ITO also estimated such expenditure as 5 per cent notionally without any further opportunity in this behalf. The question of expenditure is given on fact (sic) and must be based on materials. There is no finding of the ITO that the assessee had incurred expenditure in respect of other sources of income. In that view of the matter, the first question of law is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. The second question is answered by saying that the Tribunal was right in holding that the relief under section 80M should be computed on the basis of the gross dividend and not after deducting the proportionate expenditure as done by the ITO in the facts and circumstances of the case. 7. There will be no order as to costs.
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1995 (11) TMI 451 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... t may be noted that the respondent-company had given a notice terminating the distributorship after about 15 days from the date of receipt of said notice, The said period of 15 days cannot be said to be unreasonable for termination of distributorship. 15. In the present case also as noticed above, it is clear from the evidence that the contract provided that the distributor will pay the price of the vehicles ordered and delivery was to be given to the plaintiffs an payment of the price, The defendant-company took no risk with regard to the damage caused to the vehicles during transit and the same had to be suffered by the plaintiffs-firm. Thus the contract between the plaintiffs and the defendants would be one of purchase and sale and not of any agency. In these facts and circumstances the view taken by the two courts below cannot be said to be erroneous so as to call for any interference. 16. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed but without any order as to costs.
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1995 (11) TMI 450 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ed in the instrument presented before him for registration. The statutory language clearly indicates that as and when such an instrument is presented for registration, the sub-Registrar is required to satisfy himself, before registering the document, whether true price is reflected in the instrument as it prevails in the locality. If he is so satisfied, he registers the document. If he is not satisfied that the market value or the consideration has been truly set forth in the instrument, subject to his making reference under Sub-section (1) of Section 47A, he registers the document. Thereafter, he should make a reference to the Collector for action under sub-section (2) and (3) of Section 47A. Accordingly, we hold that the offending instructions are not consistent with sub-section (1) of Section 47A. It would, therefore, be open to the State Government to revise its guidelines and issue proper directions consistent with law. The appeals are accordingly disposed of. No costs.
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1995 (11) TMI 449 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e find that the said interpretation also receives support from sub-section (2) of section 3. While providing for a presumption to be raised in prosecution for the offence punishable under that section the phraseology used by the legislature is "if any sketch, plan, model, article, note, document or information relating to or used in any prohibited place, or relating to anything in such a place, or any secret official code or password is made, obtained, collected, recorded, published or communicated". From the way the said sub-section is worded it becomes apparent that the qualifying word 'secret' has been used only with respect to or in relation to official code or password and the legislature did not intend that the sketch, plan, model, article, note, document or information should also be secret. As we do not find any substance in the second contention raised on behalf of the appellant it is also rejected. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed.
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1995 (11) TMI 448 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... had the occupation of a house owned by him nor the right to its immediate possession. The legal maxim 'lex non cogit ad impossibilia' has to be borne in mind, i.e, the law does not compel a person to do the impossible. In the present case, in view of the subsisting lease in favour of the tenant, the commencement of the lease being prior to 1.1.1976 and the entire period in question being covered by the period of that lease, the provisions in clauses (3) and (4) could not be applied to the appellant, even if the he is assumed to be the owner of the house for this purpose. Recovery of the higher rent/damages from the appellant in accordance with clauses (3) and (4), as aforesaid, is therefore, not justified. In the circumstances, we hold that the levy and collection of 'excess license fee' at the market rates amounting to ₹ 8696.10 is not sustainable and the appellant is entitled to get refund of the same. In the result, the appeal is allowed with costs.
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1995 (11) TMI 447 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... or the laches, we find that there is some justification for the appellant to file the proceedings at belated stage. However, the relief cannot be granted here since no counter-affidavit has been filed in the circumstances, we remit the matter to the Tribunal to examine the case on merits and dispose of the matter according to law. The appeal is disposed of accordingly. No costs.
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1995 (11) TMI 446 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... was reiterated in paragraph 2 of G.O. No.342 dated December 8, 1971. It would thus be seen that no discrimination, much less invidious discrimination, was meted out to the appellant. Even if a benefit is wrongly given in favour of one or two, it does not cloth with a right to perpetrate the wrong and the court cannot give countenance to such actions though they are blameworthy and condemnable. Equality clause does not extend to perpetrate wrong nor can anyone equate a right to have the wrong repeated and benefit reaped thereunder. Considered from this perspective, we are of the opinion that the appellant is not entitled to the benefits of the Land Policy. The High Court rightly did not extend the benefits to the appellant. Hence our interference under Article 136 of the Constitution is not warranted. The appeal is accordingly dismissed but, in the circumstances, without costs. C.A. No.4549 of 1984 For the reasons given in the above appeal, this appeal also stands dismissed.
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1995 (11) TMI 445 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... me of writing its order or judgment, which fact was duly brought to its notice by the assessee, there would be an error apparent from the record which could be rectified under section 35 of the Act. In the circumstances of this case, where the Tribunal would appear to have conceded that the material fact that a substantial reduction in the total income, as a result of appeal, was brought to its notice but which fact was inadvertently lost sight of by it at the time of writing its judgment and in the absence of any counter-affidavit by the department on this point, it would in any event make it difficult, if not impossible, to say that there was any patent error of law or want of jurisdiction in the order of rectification passed under section 35 of the Act so as to warrant interference under article 226 of the Constitution. For the reasons given above the petition is dismissed. There will, however, in the circumstances of the case, be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1995 (11) TMI 444 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 80HH of the Act, the gross total income of the assessee has to be worked out after deducting unabsorbed loss and unabsorbed depreciation and the income eligible for deduction under s. 80HH will be the net income as computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and not the gross income." For the reasons given in Vishnu Oil Mills case (supra), the question No. (ii) is answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. 4. Consequently, the reference is answered as under Question No. (i) Question No. (i) is answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue and it is held that the amount of subsidy received by the assessee should not be deducted from the cost of the assets for the purpose of allowing depreciation. Question No. (ii) Question No. (ii) is answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee and it is held that the investment allowance has to be deducted from the commercial profits for determining relief under s. 80HH of the Act.
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