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2014 (11) TMI 1265 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Addition u/s 68 - funds in the form of share capital came from persons other than the company - HELD THAT:- The issue No.1 is already answered by this Court in favour of the assessee and against the revenue in the decision rendered in [2010 (8) TMI 1135 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] as relied upon by the learned advocate for the appellant held that as having traced out the source of funds to specific persons who had invested the same in shares of the assessee company, it was open for the Assessing Officer to proceed against the said persons. The funds not having emanated from the assessee company, there was no warrant for making addition of the said amount as undisclosed income under section 68 of the Act in its hands. In the circumstances, the Tribunal was justified in deleting the addition.The issue No.1 is already answered by this Court in favour of the assessee and against the revenue.
Charging of interest u/s 217 when the assessment under Section 143(3) read with Section 147 has to be treated as an original assessment - ITAT deleted the addition - HELD THAT:- Issue concluded by the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Darshan Lal Gulati [2008 (3) TMI 683 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT] wherein, it is held that in case an assessment had been framed in response to original return filed by assessee, first or initial assessment made by Assessing Officer would be treated as regular assessment and in that situation, assessment in pursuance to reassessment proceedings could not be termed as ‘first assessment’ so as to come within the meaning of expression ‘regular assessment’ and, accordingly interest under Section 217 could not have been charged. Thus, the question No.2 is also answered in favour of the assessee and against the revenue.
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2014 (11) TMI 1264 - ITAT DELHI
Penalty u/s 271B - not maintaining the books of account in respect of investments made - sales of Future and Options had been made by the assessee, which were business receipts but not included and shown by the assessee and no tax audit report had been submitted by the assessee of these business receipts - default u/s 44AB - HELD THAT:- As per section 44AB the assessee is required to get his accounts audited if the particular criteria as prescribed in the section is fulfilled. Once the accounts are audited u/s 44AB, in any view of the matter, merely because a particular item of income has not been included in the said tax audit report, it cannot be held that there was default of not getting the accounts audited.
In the present case, admittedly the assessee did not claim loss on share transactions in its return of income on account of bona fide belief that the transactions with India Bulls Securities Ltd. were investment transactions. The assessee was under bona fide belief that it was not in share trading business because his main business was advertising etc., as is evident from the tax audit report. Under such circumstances, we are of the opinion that the penalty is not exigible in the present set of facts. Accordingly, we cancel the penalty levied u/s 271B. - Decided in favour of assessee.
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2014 (11) TMI 1263 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Dishonor of Cheque - insufficiency of funds - Seeking leave to appeal - acquittal of the accused - issuance of summon to face the trial for the commission of an offence punishable u/s 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - whether the trial Court has committed such jurisdictional error to acquit the respondent and there are substantial and compelling reasons to set aside the judgment of acquittal or not in this respect?
HELD THAT:- The complainant was only competent to advance agricultural loan if he holds the pointed valid licence/registration certificate. Having a money lender's license is a condition precedent to advance the loan to the Farmers. The advancement of loan by the complainant to the respondent without any valid licence is not only illegal, but, at the same time, he can be prosecuted u/s 4 of the Money- lender's Act as well.
Once it is proved and the entire facts that the alleged Bahi entries are not negotiable instruments, which can be enforced, not alone sufficient to charge any person with liability, sequelly, the complainant was legally debarred to recover the alleged loan, as envisaged under the indicated provisions of the Money lender's Act and in view of such legal disabilities attached to the complaint, as discussed here-in-above, are put together, then, in that eventuality, to my mind, the conclusion is irresistible and inescapable that he (complainant) cannot adhere to initiate the criminal prosecution against the respondent within the meaning and in the garb of complaint u/s 138 of the NI Act.
Meaning thereby, the trial Magistrate has examined the matter in the right perspective and recorded the cogent grounds in this behalf. The learned counsel for complainant did not point out any material, much less cogent, so as to warrant any interference in the present matter. Such articulated impugned judgment of acquittal, containing valid reasons, cannot possibly be interfered with by this Court, in exercise of limited jurisdiction u/s 378(4) Cr.PC, unless and until, the same is illegal, perverse and without jurisdiction - Since no such patent illegality or legal infirmity has been pointed out by the learned counsel for complainant, so, the impugned judgment of acquittal deserves to be and is hereby maintained in the obtaining circumstances of the case.
There is no merit, therefore, the instant petition for leave to appeal is hereby dismissed as such.
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2014 (11) TMI 1262 - ITAT PUNE
Deduction u/s.80IA - operating of Container Freight Station (CFS) - scope of term infrastructure facilities - As per AO assessee company has not entered into an agreement with the Central or State Govt. or a local authority or any other statutory body for developing or operating and maintaining or developing, operating and maintaining a new infrastructure facility making it ineligible for availing the benefit u/s. 80IA(4) - CIT-A allowed the deduction - HELD THAT:- Respectfully following the decision of the Tribunal in assessee’s own case in the immediately preceding assessment year [2012 (8) TMI 893 - ITAT MUMBAI] wherein held ICD is not a port but It Is an inland port. The case of CFS is similarly situated In the sense that both carry out similar functions. i.e.. warehousing, customs clearance and transport of goods from. Its location to the seaports and vice versa by railway or by trucks in containers. Thus, the issue is no longer res integra. Respectfully following this decision, it Is held that a CFS is an Inland port whose Income is entitled to deduction under s. 80-IA(4).
As in absence of any contrary material brought to our notice by Ld. Departmental Representative , we find no infirmity in the order of the CIT(A) allowing the claim of the assessee. Accordingly, the order of the CIT(A) is upheld and the grounds raised by the Revenue are dismissed.
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2014 (11) TMI 1261 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Dishonor of Cheque - legally enforceable debt or not - rejection of petitioner's application for sending certain documents tendered by him in evidence, to the handwriting expert for examination and his opinion - section 138 of NI Act - HELD THAT:- Here was a case where the accused had come with a specific plea that he had already paid the amounts due and payable by him to the complainant, and as such, the cheque could not have been said to have been issued in discharge of any legally enforceable debt, or other liability. He had categorically stated that the complainant had acknowledged the receipt of the said amounts. It is shocking that in spite of this categorical stand taken by the accused, neither the Magistrate, nor the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, felt the necessity of giving an opportunity to the accused to adduce evidence in support of his contention.
It goes without saying that the accused is entitled to have an opportunity to adduce evidence in defence. In fact, if the accused is denied an opportunity to adduce evidence, the trial would be vitiated - The approach of the Magistrate and also that of the Addl. Sessions Judge was totally erroneous and contrary to the well settled principles of law. Denying the accused an opportunity to establish the stand taken by him, would be totally unfair and unjust - It was a simple case where the accused wanted to adduce defence evidence. It was nobody's case that the evidence intended to be adduced, was irrelevant or inadmissible. When that was so, it was not open for the Magistrate to say that it was not necessary for the accused to adduce that evidence.
The impugned orders are patently illegal and contrary to the settled principles of criminal jurisprudence. The principle that defence evidence (which is not irrelevant or inadmissible) can be prevented from being adduced only if the Court considers that the prayer to adduce such evidence, is made for the purpose of vexation, or delay, or for defeating the ends of justice, has been recognized by the Code of Criminal Procedure - Petition allowed.
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2014 (11) TMI 1260 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Non-fulfilment of export obligation - failure to furnish the bank guarantee - Section 4I of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947 read with Section 20(2) of the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992 - HELD THAT:- Indisputably, the bank guarantee was furnished by the petitioner prior to the order dated 13.10.1997 passed by the Appellate Authority and as such the said order is erroneous.
The learned counsel for the respondent argued that the petition is barred by delay and latches as the petitioner has approached this Court after over 15 years. However, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, where there is no evidence that the order dated 13.10.1997 was served on the petitioner and it is clear - by the fact that the bank guarantee had been kept alive by the petitioner - that the petitioner continued in its belief that its appeal was pending, the delay is liable to be condoned.
It is deemed appropriate that the order dated 13.10.1997 of the Appellate Authority be set aside and the matter be remanded to the Appellate Authority to decide it afresh in accordance with law - petition disposed off.
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2014 (11) TMI 1259 - SUPREME COURT
Conviction of Appellant/1st accused Under Section 498A Indian Penal Code - award of punishment/sentences - whether the sentence can be made to run concurrently, instead of running consecutively? - HELD THAT:- Section 31 Code of Criminal Procedure relates to the quantum of punishment that the court has jurisdiction to pass where the accused is convicted for two or more offences at one trial.
Section 31(1) Code of Criminal Procedure enjoins a further direction by the court to specify the order in which one particular sentence shall commence after the expiration of the other. Difficulties arise when the Courts impose sentence of imprisonment for life and also sentences of imprisonment for fixed term. In such cases, if the Court does not direct that the sentences shall run concurrently, then the sentences will run consecutively by operation of Section 31(1) Code of Criminal Procedure There is no question of the convict first undergoing the sentence of imprisonment for life and thereafter undergoing the rest of the sentences of imprisonment for fixed term and any such direction would be unworkable. Since sentence of imprisonment for life means jail till the end of normal life of the convict, the sentence of imprisonment of fixed term has to necessarily run concurrently with life imprisonment. In such case, it will be in order if the Sessions Judges exercise their discretion in issuing direction for concurrent running of sentences. Likewise if two life sentences are imposed on the convict, necessarily, Court has to direct those sentences to run concurrently.
When the prosecution is based on single transaction where it constitutes two or more offences, sentences are to run concurrently. Imposing separate sentences, when the acts constituting different offences form part of the single transaction is not justified. So far as the benefit available to the accused to have the sentences to run concurrently of several offences based on single transaction, in VK. BANSAL VERSUS STATE OF HARYANA AND OTHERS [2013 (8) TMI 488 - SUPREME COURT], in which one of us (Justice T.S. Thakur) was a member, this Court held has held that the legal position favours exercise of discretion to the benefit of the prisoner in cases where the prosecution is based on a single transaction no matter different complaints in relation thereto may have been filed as is the position in cases involving dishonour of cheques issued by the borrower towards repayment of a loan to the creditor.
Thus, Section 31 Code of Criminal Procedure leaves full discretion with the Court to order sentences for two or more offences at one trial to run concurrently, having regard to the nature of offences and attendant aggravating or mitigating circumstances - there are no reason to hold that normal rule is to order the sentence to be consecutive and exception is to make the sentences concurrent. of course, if the Court does not order the sentence to be concurrent, one sentence may run after the other, in such order as the Court may direct.
The trial court directed the sentences imposed on the Appellant/accused Under Sections 498A and 306 Indian Penal Code to run consecutively, which was affirmed by the High Court. When the trial court declines to exercise its discretion Under Section 31 Code of Criminal Procedure in issuing direction for concurrent running of sentences, normally the appellate court will not interfere, unless the refusal to exercise such discretion is shown to be arbitrary or unreasonable. When the trial court as well as the appellate court declined to exercise their discretion, normally we would have refrained from interfering with such direction of the courts for consecutive running of sentences. But in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the sentences imposed on the Appellant could be ordered to be run concurrently.
Appeal allowed in part.
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2014 (11) TMI 1258 - ITAT MUMBAI
Deduction u/s.80IB(10) - AO observed that commercial area exceeded the prescribed percentage of 10 of the total construction area, therefore, the assessee is not eligible for deduction u/s.80IB(10) - HELD THAT:- AO has carried out verification of these two flats and found that Flat No.103 was sold by the assessee company to Shri Dharmendra Dhade vide agreement dated 22.06.2000 and Flat No.104 was sold by assessee company to Shri Suresh Kadam. vide agreement dated 4.7.2000. Subsequently, vide agreement dated 3.3.2005 flat No.103 was sold by Dharmendra Dhade to Smt. Pratima Suresh Kadam, wife of Shri Suresh Kadam.
AO also reported that as per floor plan these two flats were separate from each other by a brick wall and also had two separate entrances and separate kitchens. We found that both the residential units independently capable of being use of stand alone basis, and area of each unit was within 1000 sq.ft.. With regard to the commercial area the CIT(A) also recorded a finding to the effect that in terms of decision of jurisdictional High Court, there was no condition of 1000 sq.ft. for shops and this condition was only for residential unit.
CIT(A) also recorded a categorical finding that the project was commenced on 9-3-2000 and a completion certificate was also issued on 23-1-2003. AO has included the commercial area at 6% on the basis of the certificate of architect and occupancy certificate after inclusion of club house.
AO has also computed the area which neither form part of residential area nor of built-up commercial area, accordingly, following the decision of case of Brahma Associates[ 2011 (2) TMI 373 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] wherein as held that deduction should not be denied to projects which include commercial area when the project is approved by the local authority, even where commercial area exceeds 10%. After relying on various judicial decision of coordinate benches of the Tribunal, the CIT(A) has followed the decision of the Hon’ble High Court in the case of Brahma Associates - Decided against revenue.
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2014 (11) TMI 1257 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Notice in name of the transferor or amalgamating company - corporate death of an entity upon amalgamation - Curable defect u/s 292B - HELD THAT:- These appeals by the Revenue have to be dismissed as the issue is covered by decision of this Court in Spice Entertainment Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Income Tax [2011 (8) TMI 544 - DELHI HIGH COURT]
Our attention is also drawn to another decision in Commissioner of Income Tax-III vs. Dimension Apparels Pvt. Ltd[2014 (11) TMI 181 - DELHI HIGH COURT]
It is stated that Dimension Apparels Pvt. Ltd. is a sister concern of the respondent assessee in the present appeals. What is noticeable is that during the course of block assessment proceedings, it was pointed out to the Assessing Officer that the respondent assessee has merged and was no longer in existence but the AO did not take remedial and corrective steps.
In view of authoritative pronouncement of this Court in the case of Dimension Apparels Pvt. Ltd. (supra), the appeals have no merit and are accordingly dismissed.
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2014 (11) TMI 1256 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Recovery of electricity charges - arguments advanced by respondent is that on one hand petitioner has not installed any meter to record consumption in auxiliaries but at the same time has claimed that for computation of auxiliaries consumption the total load of 462 KW should be taken into consideration although part of this load was also being used in sugar manufacturing process by the petitioner - HELD THAT:- The factual controversy on record seems to involve mixed question of fact and law. Power of appellate Court or the Civil Court is much wider than the power of this Court available under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India in DWARKA PRASAD AGARWAL (D) BY LRS. AND ANR. VERSUS BD. AGARWAL, RAMESH CHANDRA AGARWAL AND ORS. [2003 (7) TMI 481 - SUPREME COURT] and DIPAK CHANDRA RUHIDAS VERSUS CHANDAN KUMAR SARKAR [2003 (7) TMI 691 - SUPREME COURT].
It shall not be possible for this Court while exercising power conferred by Article 226 of the Constitution of India to resolve the factual controversy on record. Whether the assessment order has been passed imposing duty is based on correct appreciation of facts and material on record or not is a disputed question of fact. Further whether petitioner has installed meter or it was possible to find out the actual consumption by the auxiliaries is also a disputed question of fact. Appellate authority has got wider power then this Court to enter into factual controversy on record and also to decide question of fact and law - It is well-settled proposition of law that where mixed question of fact and law are involved ordinarily this Court should refer the matter to statutory authority.
The petitioner to prefer an appeal within a month from today before the appellate authority under Rule 13A of the U.P. Electricity Duty Rules 1952 - Petition disposed off.
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2014 (11) TMI 1255 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Disallowance of Interest - investment by assessee in the share capital of its 100% subsidiary company - profits of the entire business and the sale proceeds were all deposited in the mixed overdraft account - AO held that borrowed funds were utilized for the purpose of the aforesaid investment and therefore, interest at the rate of 18% amounting was disallowed - HELD THAT:- Tribunal missed the fact that in case the assessee had put in the amount of income earned during the year, which in this case was ₹ 12 crores approximately, in a separate account which the assessee was entitled to do, the debit balance as at the last day of the accounting year would have been further increased by ₹ 12 crores. The fact that the liability on account of secured loan and unsecured loan increased is not ipso facto evidence of the fact that the company is running through an unhealthy financial position.
When a profit making company has increased its liability on account of secured or unsecured loan, that may be a pointer to show that the company has increased its capital asset. In this case, there can be no denial that the company earned ₹ 12 crores which was offered for taxation. It cannot in the circumstances be said by looking at the secured or unsecured loan account or by the constant increase thereof that borrowed funds were utilized for the purpose of investment in question which was evidently for a sum of less than ₹ 1 crore. That can possibly be said if it is a loss making company.
Therefore, it has to be held that the investment was made from out of the profits of the year and not from out of the overdraft account. There is, as such, no question of making any disallowance on account of any interest - in a case where the profit of the entire business including the sale proceeds were deposited in the mixed overdraft accounts and in case the investment is less than the amount of profit earned or which could reasonably be deemed to have been earned, regard being had to the date of expenditure, it has to be presumed that the investment was from out of the profits. Question raised is answered in the affirmative
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2014 (11) TMI 1254 - ITAT COCHIN
Levy of penalty u/s. 271E - violation of provision of section 269T in respect of deposit in three different bank accounts of the assessee firm and repayment of the same in cash - Explanation to "reasonable cause” - whether the amount received by the assessee from Shri K.A. Thomas can be termed as ‘loan’ or ‘deposit’ so as to attract the provisions of section 269T? - HELD THAT:- The amount taken by the assessee from Shri K.A. Thomas was for custody. There is no evidence to show that there was any stipulation as to the period of custody. It is, therefore, a matter of grave doubt as to whether the receipt of money from Shri K.A. Thomas can be characterised as loan or deposit. In our view, it was recived only for temporary custody. Such temporary custody fall outside the purview of section 269T of the I.T. Act. The facts in the present case show that the monies are not used for the purpose of business and it lied idle with the assessee in the form of fixed deposits and thereafter the same was returned to Shri K.A. Thomas.
There was a reasonable cause as provided under section 273B of the Act as the assessee has received the amount as custodian in view of family arrangements. It can be safely held that the bona fide belief constitute all reasonable cause, as provided under section 273B.
In these circumstances and also keeping in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. vs. State of U.P. [1978 (12) TMI 45 - SUPREME COURT](1979) (118 ITR 326), it was held that there was a reasonable cause within the meaning of section 273B and, therefore, no penalty is leviable under section 271E of the Act. The facts and circumstances of the present case clearly indicate that there was a reasonable cause and, therefore, no penalty is leviable.
In the present case, it is noticed that the amount was kept in the form of bank deposit and not used for business purposes and later repayments were made to Shri K.A. Thomas and it is obvious that the assessee entertained a bona fide belief that no contravention of any provisions of Income-tax Act was being made while making the transaction and it cannot be considered as violation of contravention of sec. 269T of the Act. Accordingly, we delete the penalty and the appeal of the assessee is allowed.
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2014 (11) TMI 1253 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Prayer for taking out Judge’s Summons that the Official Liquidator be directed to pay the amount to workmen of the Omex Investors Mills Limited-the company in liquidation - HELD THAT:- The present Application is required to be granted to the extent of the prayer regarding disbursement of the amount. Accordingly it is directed that the Official Liquidator shall disburse ₹ 14,00,00,000/- to 1,874 workers proportionately.
For the purpose of above payment, the forms shall be submitted by individual workers in individual names signed individually. The same may be submitted to the office of Official Liquidator either by workers individually or through Union as may be opted by the worker concerned. As stated and recorded above, the process of distribution of forms has already commenced at the end of the Official Liquidator.
Application allowed.
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2014 (11) TMI 1252 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Protection of deposits made by the public in the Financial Establishments and matters connected therewith or incidental thereto - Madhya Pradesh Nikshepakon Ke Hiton Ka Sanrakshan Adhiniyam, 2000 - scope of jurisdiction and interference under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. - HELD THAT:- The agreement allegedly executed between the applicant and respondent/complainant appears to be a camouflage exercise intended to solicit deposits in the name of franchisee royalty and security deposits with the promise to pay with interest. There is no explanation as to why customers are required to be registered and for what purpose. It is not deducible from the agreement, as to what is the nature of franchisee been given to the respondent/complainant for which royalty is charged.
Upon perusal of different clauses of the agreement, it appears that the entire agreement is misleading in nature prepared only to cover the deposits received from the customers in the form of so-called franchisee royalty and security deposits with the promise of payment with interest - While investigation is in progress and the applicant remained absconding, he has filed the instant petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure seeking quashment of the FIR on the ground that on the face of the FIR no offence is made out against any Act much less the Act of 2000.
The Court has noticed various clauses of the agreement executed by the parties only to ascertain the nature of activities of the applicant's company with due advertence to what has been averred in the petition. Various clauses of the agreement do not suggest that the company is a mere financial consultant, as claimed in the petition. Allegations have been made by the complainant in the FIR that under the garb of aforesaid franchisee agreement the applicant has fraudulently taken deposit of ₹ 2.5 Lakh as franchisee royalty and Rs. Two Lakh towards expenses and Rs. One Lakh as security deposit through cheques and cash with the assurance of 40% dividend - Considering the definition of deposit as contained under Section 2 (b), financial establishment under Section 2 (c) and the penal provisions under Section 6 of the Act, this Court is of the view that in the backdrop of facts and circumstances narrated above as regards the complaint made and registered as FIR, it cannot be said that the dispute between the parties is of the nature of civil liability only arising out of financial transaction simplicitor. In fact under the cover of the said agreement prima facie there appears to be a systematic activity of the applicant/company to solicit deposits from investors with the promise of payment of dividend/interest camouflaged by execution of agreement. Thus, there is sufficient scope of investigation in the matter.
Petition dismissed.
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2014 (11) TMI 1251 - SC ORDER
Reassessment order u/s 147 r.w section 148 of the Act - Whether an order passed by the AO on the objections of an assessee can be assailed before the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India ? - HELD THAT:- Issue notice. Dasti, in addition, is permitted.
In the meantime, the reassessment order shall not be framed by the Assessing Officer, if not framed so far.
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2014 (11) TMI 1250 - SC ORDER
Applicability of block assessments as per section 158BB - return of income had been filed by the assessee beyond the date prescribed under section 139(1) - genuineness of this income from agriculture - deduction under section 54 and section 54F - Valuation of closing stock of immovable properties - Undisclosed income of the assessee during the block period - Undisclosed investment towards purchase of NSC - HELD THAT:- No reason to entertain this Special Leave Petition, which is, accordingly, dismissed.
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2014 (11) TMI 1248 - ITAT DELHI
Nature of expenditure - expenditure incurred on payment of royalty to M/s Macnaught Pvt. Ltd., U.K - HELD THAT:- As decided in own [2014 (11) TMI 191 - ITAT DELHI] expenditure incurred on royalty is a Revenue expenditure, incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of business. As a result, the claim made by the assessee is allowed and disallowance is deleted.
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2014 (11) TMI 1247 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Dishonor of Cheque - defendants have not paid the valid dues of the plaintiff inspite of due service of the legal notice - territorial jurisdiction - jurisdiction to intervene where there is an arbitration clause/ agreement - presumption in favour of the plaintiff or not - Order XXXVII CPC - HELD THAT:- No evidence of any oral agreement or statement can be admitted when the terms of any such contract have been reduced in the form of a document. Thus, the grounds mentioned in the application for leave to defend as defence, it is merely a moonshine defence. The said grounds have no application in law. The present case is clearly covered in guiding principles of (d) and (e) of the judgment of MECHELEC ENGINEERS AND MANUFACTURERS VERSUS M/S. BASIC EQUIPMENT CORPORATION [1976 (11) TMI 194 - SUPREME COURT]. The defendants have no defence who are not entitled for leave to defend.
It is stated that as per Section 5 of the Act, no Court shall have jurisdiction to intervene where there is an arbitration clause/ agreement. Further as per Section 8 of the Act, it is clear that a judicial authority before which, an action is brought in a matter, which is the subject matter of an Arbitration Agreement shall be referred to the Arbitration - there is an existence of arbitration clause as per the settled law and conditions between the parties and the dispute raised in the suit relates to the subject matter of the Arbitration and the dispute be referred to arbitration.
Having considered the undertaking/affidavit executed by the defendant No.2 as well as the dishonouring of the cheques issued by the said defendant, since the presumption is that the defendants have admitted their liability of the outstanding amount of the plaintiff, thus there is no dispute between the parties whereby the defendants have to pay the amount to the plaintiff - In the present case, since there are written documents raising presumption against the defendants with regard to the undertaking and dishonouring of the cheques, no ground has been made out by the defendants to grant the leave to defend in the present case.
The application for leave to defend as well as the application under Sections 5 and 8 of the Act are dismissed.
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2014 (11) TMI 1246 - SUPREME COURT
Grant of Statutory Bail - sanctions as required under Sections 18 and 18A of the UAPA - HELD THAT:- The materials adverted to show that it was a final report on the facets investigated into by the investigating agency. Furthermore, the requisite sanctions as required under Sections 18 and 18A of the UAPA and so also under Section 7 of the Explosive Substances Act were also accorded by the concerned authorities. The charge-sheet so filed before the learned Special Court was complete in all respects so as to enable the learned Special Court to take cognizance in the matter. Merely because certain facets of the matter called for further investigation it does not deem such report anything other than a final report.
Section 167(2) of Cr.P.C. stood fully complied with and as such the petitioners are not entitled to statutory bail under Section 167(2) of Cr.P.C.
SLP dismissed.
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2014 (11) TMI 1245 - SC ORDER
Reassessment order u/s 147 r.w. section 148 - HELD THAT:- Issue notice. Mr. Mukul Rohtagi, learned Attorney General, appearing on behalf of the respondent-Authority, waives notice.
Notice be issued to the other respondents. Dasti service, in addition, is permitted. List all the matters on 17th November, 2014.
In the meantime, the reassessment order shall not be framed, if not framed so far.
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