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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 32 of 32 Records
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1952 (12) TMI 29 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... no substance whatever in this contention. Peti- tioner No. 7 is the firm of Metro Motors. It is well-known and well understood that a firm has no legal entity. It is merely a compendious name of the partners of whom it is constituted. Therefore we have on the record not a corporation or a legal entity consisting of Metro Motors, but what we have on record before us is the partners of that firm, and the petitioners on oath state that both the partners of that firm are citizens of India and that allegation has not been denied in the affidavit in reply by the Government. Therefore, if we were called upon to give relief under Article 19, we could certainly have given that relief at least to the seventh petitioner whose partners consist of citizens of our country. The result therefore is that the petition succeeds and there will be an order issued against the respondents in terms of prayer (a) of the peti- tion. Respondents must pay the costs of the petitioners. Petition allowed.
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1952 (12) TMI 28 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... condition precedent paid in, the amount admitted in the return, when the return was filed, and to the extent admitted therein. This however will not apply to any excess paid because to that extent it is not a tax payable under the Act and the question does not arise (b) Where the dealer has not filed a return or filed a return which is not correct or complete, then as to the amount assessed under Sec- tion 11(1) and (2), or the amount so assessed less the amount already paid under Section 10(3), together with penalties, if any, payable under the Act, immediately upon the notice under Section 11(3) being served upon him in the prescribed form. In this particular case, notice in Form VII was served on the com- pany on 17th May, 1950, which is well within twelve months prior to the date of the winding up order and clearly therefore the Government is entitled to priority in payment thereof. I therefore agree with the order made by my Lord the Chief Justice. Ordered accordingly.
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1952 (12) TMI 27 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... supports the tax, and the State has not given the less merely because it has conditioned the demand of the exaction upon happenings outside its own borders. The fact that a tax is contingent upon events brought to pass without a State does not destroy the nexus between such a tax and transactions within a State for which the tax is an exaction . In view of these authorities it is manifest that the constitutional objection raised by the learned counsel must fail. It is also important to notice that the explanation to Article 286(1)(a) of (1) 1948 16 I.T.R. 240 75 I.A. 86. (3) 311 U.S. 435. (2) 1948 F.C.R. 121 17 I.T.R. 63. the Constitution expressly confers upon the State the power to tax sale or purchase of goods which are actually delivered for consumption inside the State. For the reasons I have expressed I am of opinion that this applica- tion is without merit and must be dismissed with costs. Hearing fee five gold mohurs. SARJOO PROSAD, J.-I agree. Application dismissed.
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1952 (12) TMI 26 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hed by, or on behalf of, the dealer to an address outside Bihar. It is manifest that the principle laid down by the Board of Revenue in Case No. 64 of 1948 has been superseded by the decision of this Court reported in Tobacco Manufacturers (India) Ltd. v. State of Bihar(1). It is obvious that the answer to the question formulated is that the Board of Revenue was wrong in directing the Sales Tax Officer to follow the principle laid down in Case No. 64 of 1948. It is, on the contrary, clear that the Sales Tax Officer must follow the principle laid down by the High Court in Tobacco Manu- facturers (India) Ltd. v. State of Bihar(1), and then decide the question whether the assessee is entitled to the deduction he has claimed under Section 5(2)(a)(v) or under Section 5 (2)(a)(ii) of the Bihar Act VI of 1944. We accordingly answer the reference in the terms stated above. There will be no order as to costs. Reference answered accordingly. (1) (1950) I.L.R. 29 Pat. 746 1 S.T.C. 282.
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1952 (12) TMI 25 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... but outside that State. There is undoubtedly prima facie much force in the contention of Mr. Ghosh, and Article 286 requires very careful examination. The matter will have to be decided at one stage or another either by the Revenue Authorities themselves or by this Court on an appropriate reference made for that purpose. As at present advised, I do not consider it necessary to deal with this problem, as I am also of the view that even assuming for the sake of argument that the Sales Tax Authorities relied upon an ultra vires provision of the Sales Tax Act in making the assessment, the action of the authorities was not without jurisdiction, and the party aggrieved is entitled to have his grievances redressed by the appropriate procedure which the machinery of the Act itself provides. This view, as my learned brother has rightly held, is fortified by the decision of the judicial Committee in Raleigh Investment Co., Ltd. v. Governor-General in Council(1). Application dismissed.
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1952 (12) TMI 24 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Winding up - Preferential payments ... ... ... ... ..... under section 10(2) and as a condition precedent paid in the amount admitted in the return, when the return was filed, and to the extent admitted therein. This however will not apply to any excess paid because to that extent it is not a tax payable under the Act and the question does not arise (b)Where the dealer has not filed a return or filed a return which is not correct or complete, then as to the amount assessed under section 11(1) and (2), or the amount so assessed less the amount already paid under section 10(3), together with penalties, if any, payable under the Act immediately upon the notice under section 11(3) being served upon him in the prescribed form. In this particular case, notice in Form VII was served on the company on 17th May, 1950, which is well within twelve months prior to the date of the winding up order and clearly therefore the Government is entitled to priority in payment thereof. I therefore agree with the order made by my Lord the Chief Justice.
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1952 (12) TMI 23 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Style, etc., of liquidator and Penalty for wrongful withholding of property ... ... ... ... ..... re in this connection. We do not think that we can accept the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant on this aspect of the case. In our view, the conduct of the appellant cannot be brought within the scope of the rule laid down in these decisions. On a consideration of all the contentions and the arguments placed before us by the learned counsel for the appellant, we do not think that any sufficient ground has been shown to us to dissent from the order of the learned trial Judge. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the charges have been proved against the appellant on the evidence that has been placed before the trial court and the conviction and sentence by the learned trial Judge are correct. We, therefore, while confirming the conviction and sentence, dismiss this appeal. The official liquidators will have their costs of this appeal from out of the assets of the bank in their hands. The appellant will surrender before the Registrar on the 19th December, 1952.
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1952 (12) TMI 22 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the company had by the conduct of its two members abandoned its right to challenge the forfeiture?
Whether the form of the order could not be supported as one validly made under section 38 of the Indian Companies Act?
Held that:- In our opinion there is no evidence of abandonment of the company's right to challenge the validity of the purported forfeiture
he mills had also reduced its capital by having the face value of the 84,000 shares which had been issued reduced by repaying to the shareholders ₹ 5 in respect of each of those shares. There were, however, 16,000 unissued shares of ₹ 10 each which were not affected by the reduction. While, therefore, it was clearly impossible for the court to direct that the company should be replaced on the register in respect of its original shares, the court could, under section 38, give notice to the persons to whom the shares had been re-allotted or those claiming under them and make them parties to the proceedings and then make an appropriate order for rectification and, if necessary, also direct the mills to pay damages under that section.
Principle to the present application under article 181. If article 181 applies then time began to run after the company came to know of its right to sue. It is not alleged that the company had any knowledge of the forfeiture between the 5th September, 1941, when the resolution of forfeiture was passed and the 9th September, 1941, when the company became defunct. After the last mentioned date and up to the 16th February, 1945, the company stood dissolved and no knowledge or notice can be imputed to the company during this period. Therefore, the company must be deemed to have come to know of its cause of action after it came to life again and the present application was certainly made well within three years after that event happened on the 16th February, 1945. If article 181 does not apply then the only article that can apply by analogy is article 120 and the application is also within time. In either view this application cannot be thrown out as barred by limitation.
The result, therefore, is that this appeal must succeed. We set aside the judgment and decree of the High Court in appeal and restore the order of the trial court.
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1952 (12) TMI 4 - SUPREME COURT
Appeal To Supreme Court, Appellate Assistant Commissioner, Foreign Income, High Court, Income Tax, Tribunal's Order
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1952 (12) TMI 3 - SUPREME COURT
Whether, in the circumstances of this case, the assessee Company had any business connection in British India within the meaning of Sections 42(1) and 42(3) of the Income-tax Act ?
Whether any profits could reasonably be attributed to the purchase of entire cotton made in British India by the secretaries and agents of the assessee-company within the meaning of Sections 42(1) and 42(3) of the Income-tax Act ?
Held that:- In this case the raw materials were purchased systematically and habitually through an established agency having special skill and competency in selecting the goods to be purchased and fixing the time and place of purchase. Such activity appears to us to be well within the import of the term "operation " as used in Section 42(3) of the Act. It is not in the nature of an isolated transaction of purchase of raw materials. The first contention of the assessee is therefore negatived.
In this case there was a regular agency established in British India for the purchase of the entire raw materials required for the manufacture abroad and the agent was chosen by reason of his skill, reputation and experience in the line of trade. The terms of the agency stated in the earlier part of this judgment fully establish that Messrs. Best & Co. Ltd. were carrying on something almost akin to the business of a managing agency in India of the foreign company and the latter certainly had a connection with this agency. We therefore negative this contention of the learned counsel as well. Appeal dismissed.
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1952 (12) TMI 2 - SUPREME COURT
Whether on a true construction of Section 25(4) of the Act, and on the facts stated the period the profits of which were entitled to exemption from the payment of tax is the period between 1st July, 1939, to 29th February, 1940, (a period of eight months) or the period commencing from 1st July, 1938, and ending with 29th February, 1940, (a period of 20 months)?
Held that:- After a careful consideration of the different provisions of the Act relevant to this enquiry, we have reached the conclusion that the expression " end of the previous year " in sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 25 in the context of those sub-sections means the end of an accounting year (a period of full 12 months) expiring immediately preceding the date of discontinuance or succession, (in this case 30th June, 1939). We are satisfied that Viswanatha Sastri, J., was right when he held that having regard to the object of the legislature in enacting sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 25 and having regard to the plain language of these sub-sections, the assessee's contentions could not be upheld. We are, however, unable to subscribe to the conclusion reached by the learned Judge that the expression " previous year " in sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 25 was co-related to the year of assessment 1940-41.
We allow the appeal and hold that the answer given by the senior Judge to the question referred was wrong and that the answer given by Viswanatha Sastri, J., was the correct one.
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1952 (12) TMI 1 - SUPREME COURT
Whether no return was filed at any stage of the case disclosing an income, profits or gains at all?
Whether proceedings were later take under Section 34?
Whether in the course of these proceedings the assess claimed that a certain loss should be determined and recorded?
Held that:- Question referred was rightly answered in the negative by the High Court. Appeal dismissed.
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