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Showing 21 to 40 of 305 Records
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1994 (12) TMI 334 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nt bags into wagons or trucks were not coming under section 194C was turned down by the Supreme Court. In para 15 of the judgment, the Bombay High Court said that "we are of the clear opinion that the provisions of section 194C are not applicable to contract that do not include any other goods loaded or unloaded". Therefore, in the light of the discussion above, I am of the view that the case of the petitioners that they are merely carrying out the transportation only and loading or unloading was only incidental and, therefore, they are outside the penumbra of section 194C has to be accepted. 5. In fine, I have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that a ratio laid down by this Court in S.R.F. Finance Ltd.'s case (supra) would completely govern this case and, therefore, the writ petition is allowed and the Circular No. 681, dated 8-3-1994, issued by the CBDT, is quashed, insofar as the petitioners are concerned. However, there will be no order as to costs.
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1994 (12) TMI 333 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... constrained to approach the government requesting to acquire the land. The government did consider the circumstances and exercised that power. The Act does give the power to negotiate by private sale or even during pending acquisition proceedings negotiations by private sale could be made in which event the need to determine the market value under the Act would be obviated and the compensation would be determined in terms of the agreement reached between the Land Acquisition Officer and the owner of the land or person having an interest in the land, subject to the prior approval of the Govt. Therefore, the failure to purchase the land by negotiation and the exercise of the power under s.4(1) thereafter, by no stretch of imagination, be considered to be a mala fide or colourable exercise of the power. Therefore, we do not find any infirmity or illegality in the notification published under s.4(1) warranting interference. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed but without costs
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1994 (12) TMI 332 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... and otherwise enforceable throughout the territory of India under Article 142 of the Constitution. The High Court was bound to come in aid of this Court when it required the High Court to have its order worked out. The language of request oftenly employed by this Court in such situations is to be read by the High Court as an obligation, in carrying out the constitutional mandate, maintaining the writ of this Court running large throughout the country. 12. Therefore, in these circumstances, we upturn the order of the High Court dated August 18, 1994 and reiterate our request to it to dispose of O.S.A. Nos.6973 of 1993 expeditiously, at any rate now within one month from the date of communication this Order, as this Court awaits the result thereof. Orders be communicated to the High Court forthwith. Copies thereof for information be also sent to the Hon'ble Judges of the Division Bench with our utmost respect. 13. The special leave petitions be listed on January 31, 1995.
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1994 (12) TMI 331 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... y the Metropolitan Authority after it was quashed by the High Court must be treated as an order under Section 13(3) of the Act for the purpose of appeal and the limitation must be counted from the date of the fresh order. But that does not answer the question whether the time-limit for passing an order under sub- section (3) of Section 13 will apply to the fresh order which will now have to be passed. That question has been answered in the case of Pooran Mall2 referred to earlier in the judgment. 29.In the premises this appeal is allowed. The judgment under appeal dated 15-6-1994 is set aside. The appellant will be at liberty to proceed in accordance with law. There will be no order as to costs. Civil Appeals Nos. 9153-54 of 1994 Arising out of SLPs (C) Nos. 15942 & 15982 of 1994 30. Leave granted. 31. In view of our judgment in Civil Appeal No. 9152 of 1994 arising out of SLP (C) No. 14848 of 1994 , the above appeals are also allowed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1994 (12) TMI 330 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... to films with licensed persons keeping Video Library for films other than those meant for public exhibition, cannot arise, as rightly contended for on behalf of the appellants. Hence, the view taken by the High Court that section 10(2) is invalid and unworkable, cannot be sustained. 19. Thus, the view of the High Court that section 9(2) was invalid and ultra vires being enacted by State Legislature without the required legislative competence and its view that section 10(2) was invalid and unworkable because it applied to films other than those which are meant for public exhibition and hence both of them were liable to be struck down, require to be interfered with, in that, in our opinion, section 9(2) and Section 10(2) of the Act are constitutionally valid. 20. In the result, we allow these appeals and dismiss the writ petitions in the High Court out of which the present appeals have arisen. However, in the circumstances of the present appeals, we make no order as to costs.
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1994 (12) TMI 329 - ADVANCE RULING AUTHORITY
Whether the applicant, an individual residing in the U. A. E. is entitled to claim the benefit of the provisions of the tax treaty entered into between India and U. A. E. ?
Whether in terms of article 13(3) and article 4 of the tax treaty between India and U. A. E., the applicant, an individual Indian national residing in U. A. E., is liable to capital gains tax on the transfer effected in India of movable assets in the nature of shares, debentures and other securities ?
Whether the applicant is liable to capital gains tax on the transfer effected in India of movable assets in the nature of shares, debentures and other securities read with section 112 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and the provisions of the tax treaty between India and U. A. E. ?
Whether in terms of the tax treaty between India and U. A. E., the applicant is liable to capital gains tax on the transfer effected in India of movable assets in the nature of shares, debentures and other securities are :
(a) acquired prior to the coming into effect of the tax treaty between India and U. A. E. ;
(b) acquired prior to his becoming a non-resident ;
(c) after his becoming a non-resident but from out of nonrepatriable funds in India.
Whether in terms of article 10 of the tax treaty between India and the U. A. E., the income received/receivable by applicant in India by way of dividend is liable to tax in India at 15 per cent. ?
Whether in terms of article 11 of the tax treaty between India and the U. A. E., the income received/receivable by the applicant in India by way of interest on debentures/bonds/balance in the capital account in partnership-firm is liable to tax in India at 12.5 per cent. ?
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1994 (12) TMI 328 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... authorities below and so far as the circulars were concerned the dealer may approach the Government. This approach was legally erroneous because as repeatedly held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court beneficial circulars explaining the legal position or the manner in which certain provisions are to be put to action are binding on the authorities administering the Act. In the present case the Government's letter had been issued at the instance of the U. P. State Sugar Corporation Limited itself which referred the matter to the Government and of which the dealer-revisionist is a 100 per cent subsidiary. 8. For the above reasons, these revision petitions deserve to be allowed. The Tribunal's order dated 19th November, 1988 is, therefore, set aside and it is ordered that the revisionist's second appeals mentioned above stand allowed and the orders passed by the assessing officer under Section 3-G (3) referred to above stand annulled. Parties shall bear their own costs.
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1994 (12) TMI 327 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
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... ... ..... ssess an assessee on an amount, which is not taxable in law, even if the same is shown by an assessee. There is no estoppel by conduct against law nor is there any waiver of the legal right as much as the legal liability to be assessed otherwise than according to the mandate of the law (sic). It is always open to an assessee to take the plea that the figure, though shown in his return of total income, is not taxable in law. The Tribunal, therefore, in our view did not commit any error in directing to fix the correct annual letting value of the premises in question, in accordance with the provisions of section 23 of the said Act with reference to the municipal valuation, although such sum was lower than the figure shown by the assessee in his returns of total income. 9. For the reasons aforesaid, we answer the second question in this reference in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. 10. This reference is, therefore, disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.
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1994 (12) TMI 326 - AUTHORITY FOR ADVANCE RULINGS
Whether the applicant is liable to income-tax on the sum received by him on July 6, 1992, towards arrears of rent for the period up to March 31, 1992, in the assessment year 1993-94?
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1994 (12) TMI 325 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... ould not be ordered. In that view of the matter without expressing any opinion on the merits during the interregnum Gram Panchayat was entitled to collect the octroi, since respondents arc not entitled to the refund of the amount which is already collected and passed on the burden to the consumers these appeals are to be allowed. The appeals are accordingly allowed and the writ petitions in the High Court stand dismissed.
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1994 (12) TMI 324 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... oornan, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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1994 (12) TMI 323 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... for which such a heavy amount of duty was imposed. Since the petitioners are entitled to prefer appeals against such orders, the first respondent should have passed a speaking order with reasons instead of merely issuing a notice calling upon the petitioners to clear the goods from the warehouse on payment of duty. The first respondent should have first considered as to whether in spite of Ext. P4 notice of relinquishment of title to the goods, it was just and proper to issue Ext. P5. 4. In view of my above finding, the other contentions raised by the learned counsel for the parties are not considered. 5. For the reasons stated above, Exts. R1(b), Ext. R1(d) and Ext.P5 are quashed. The first respondent is directed to issue a show cause notice to the petitioners and afford an opportunity of being heard before any further notice is issued calling upon the petitioners to pay the duty and such an order should be a speaking one. 6. The Original Petition is allowed.
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1994 (12) TMI 322 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ovenant under the contract was that the respondents are entitled to forfeit the money paid under the contract. So when the contract fell through by the default committed by the appellant, as part of the contract, they are entitled to forfeit the entire amount. In this case even otherwise, we find that the respondents had suffered damages firstly for one year they were prevented from enjoying the property and the appellant had cut off 150 fruit bearing coconut trees and sugarcane crop was destroyed for levelling the land apart from cutting down other trees. Pending the appeal, the respondents sought for and were granted permission by the court for sale of the property, Pursuant thereto, they sold the land for which they could not secure even the amount under contract and the loss they suffered would be around ₹ 70,000/-. Under those circumstances, their forfeiting the sum of ₹ 50,000/cannot be said to be unjustified. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.
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1994 (12) TMI 321 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the Tribunal to become effective alternative. institutional mechanism and to dispense with High Court’s power of judicial review. Ramaswamy, J., however, opined that such tribunals being creature of statues can in no case claim the status of the High Court or parity or as substitutes. 10. The aforesaid post-Sampath Kumar cases do require in our considered view, a fresh look by a larger-Bench over all the issues adjudicated by this Court in Sampath Kumar’s case including the quest ion whether the Tribunal can at all have an Administrative Member on its Bench, if it were to have the power of even deciding constitutional validity of a statute or 309 Rule, as conceded in Chopra’s case (supra). Examination of this aspect would be necessary to instill confidence in the minds of people (and litigants) which is the greatest prop of the judiciary. 11. Let the records be placed before Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India for constitution of an appropriate Bench.
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1994 (12) TMI 320 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... essary to give reasons while dismissing the stay application. 6. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that the impugned order is unsustainable. It is a non-speaking order and suffers from non-application of mind. The Sales Tax Tribunal while disposing of stay application must indicate the reasons in its order. Mr. Sarin rightly drew our attention to an unreported decision of this Court on identical facts in D.L.F. Recreational Foundation (P) Ltd., Gurgaon v. State of Haryana (C.W.P. No. 6377 of 1994 decided on May 26, 1994). The impugned order dated September 7, 1994 (communicated on September 8, 1994) cannot be, thus, sustained and it is accordingly quashed and set aside. The stay application is revived and the matter is remitted back to the Sales Tax Tribunal, Haryana, Chandigarh, which will hear the parties and pass speaking order in accordance with law. 7.. This writ petition to stand allowed in the above terms. No costs. Petition allowed.
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1994 (12) TMI 319 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... presence of the counsel appearing on both sides, pointed out that there is no nexus between the alleged letter and the subject-matter in issue. All these aspects would go to show that the assessee was not correct in purchasing the machineries by using C forms, when the machineries are not included in the registration certificate. This would amount to false representation warranting penalty under section 10(b) of the Act. Thus considering the facts arising in this case, in the light of the decision stated in Vijaya Electricals v. State of Tamil Nadu 1991 82 STC 268 (Mad.), we hold that the Tribunal was not correct in deleting penalty sustained by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. In fact, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was very reasonable in restricting the penalty to Rs. 1,826. Therefore, we set aside the order passed by the Tribunal and restore the order passed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. In the result the appeal is allowed. No costs. Appeal allowed.
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1994 (12) TMI 318 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ficer found that the extra amount collected by the assessee from the second sales is based upon the prices fixed by the assessee in the second sales. Inasmuch as the sales tax and surcharge collected by the assessee in the second sales is in excess of the sales tax and surcharge paid by the assessee to his sellers, the provisions of section 22(1) get attracted. This view, we have taken on the basis of the decision reported in 1979 44 STC 8 (Arunachalam Chettiar Co. v. State of Tamil Nadu) cited supra. Thus considering the facts arising in this case in the light of the above said decision cited supra, we are of the opinion that the Tribunal was not correct in deleting the penalty levied under section 22(2) of the Act. In that view of the matter, the order passed by the Tribunal in cancelling the penalty under section 22(2) of the Act stands set aside. 12.. In the result, the revision filed by the department stands allowed. There will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1994 (12) TMI 317 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Officer (OFA), Punjagutta Division, Hyderabad 1992 85 STC 552. The earlier two decisions of the Andhra Pradesh High Court also considered the definition of the word turnover as given in section 2(s) of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957. It was also held in the aforesaid Allahabad decision to be substantially in pari materia with the definition of the term as contained in section 2(i) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, hence following the said two decisions of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, this Court finally held that the subsidy given by the Government of India could not be covered within the definition of turnover, as defined under section 2(i) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act. In view of this the writ petition is allowed. Respondent No. 3 is restrained from imposing any tax on the petitioner on the amount of subsidy for the assessment years 1988-89 to 1993-94, both under the U.P. and Central Sales Tax Acts. The parties are directed to bear their own costs. Petition allowed.
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1994 (12) TMI 316 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... inspite of a prima facie case. 5.. Learned counsel sought to urge that a prima facie case to the effect that the new amendment introduced by Act 19 of 1994, specifically with reference to sub-section (7B) of section 7 of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963, would be violative of articles 265, 366(29A) and article 14 of the Constitution of India. Be that as it may, it is not possible to consider the aspect at this appellate stage with reference to the interlocutory nature of the proceedings. 6.. We do not find any error in the approach that places reliance on the well-known dictum based on the doctrine of unjust enrichment under the law of contract. There is no dispute that the burden has already been passed over to the consumer, in a process of indirect taxation. The learned counsel submitted that at least the future will be saved. It is not possible to accept the submission. For the above reasons, appeals stand dismissed at the stage of admission. Writ appeals dismissed.
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1994 (12) TMI 315 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... cordingly granted to the assessee by sustaining the actual suppressed turnovers. In that view of the matter the turnovers determined by the authorities below, were modified and reliefs were granted. On the basis of the modified turnover, penalty was also modified and it was levied to a lesser extent of Rs. 7,000, than what were fixed by the assessing authority. 6.. We consider that the reason given by the Tribunal for reducing the suppressed turnovers as well as the penalty, appears to be an acceptable one. Accordingly, we are not inclined to interfere with the order passed by the Tribunal in respect of fixing the turnover for both the assessment years under consideration and the reduction of penalty. We consider that the estimate made by the Tribunal in respect of the suppressed turnover and the fixing of penalty, appears to be more reasonable, warranting no interference by this Court. Accordingly, both the Revisions are dismissed. No order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.
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