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Showing 21 to 40 of 71 Records
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1966 (2) TMI 83 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... bility, the assessee had only obtained an advantage of getting the advances at a lower rate of interest. It is by reason of accepting the joint liability that the assessee had to pay the entire amount and the assessee had expended the money in order to recover the amount, which it had to pay on behalf of Sadasukh Gambhirchand to the bank. The expenditure incurred on legal expenses to recover the said amount had no direct connection or relation with the business of the assessee. It is in these circumstances we find it difficult to accept the contention of Mr. Mehta that the assessee is entitled to deduction in respect of the legal expenses under section 10(2)(xv) of the Act. It is for these reasons that we answer the question referred to us in the following manner The sum of ₹ 50,369-13-6 is a proper deduction as a trading loss incurred on the ground of commercial expediency under section 10(1) of the Income-tax Act. The Commissioner shall pay the costs of the assessee.
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1966 (2) TMI 82 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... that the expenditure of ₹ 3 lakhs and odd incurred by the assessee-company is to meet the statutory liability of making contributions to the provident fund. In respect of these contributions effective arrangement has been made by reason of the provisions in section 58H for deducting at source the tax payable thereon. It therefore cannot be said that it was necessary for the assessee to have made any such arrangement at the time it transferred the accumulated balance to the provident fund. That being the position, it cannot be said that there is any non-compliance of clause (c) of sub-section (4) of section 10. The assessee-company, in our opinion, therefore is entitled to claim deduction of the said expenditure under section 10(2)(xv). Our answer to the second question therefore will have to be in the affirmative. In the result, we answer the first question in the negative and the second question in the affirmative. The Commissioner shall pay the costs of the assessee.
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1966 (2) TMI 81 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... private party. The Provident Fund Commissioner did not think it necessary to refer the matter to the Central Government under the provisions of Section 19-A of the Act and when he contemplated a prosecution against the company and the directors, he did not feel any difficulty about the interpretation of the notification and about the question whether the establishment of the company was covered or not by the notification. Therefore, not referring the question to the Central Government under Section 19-A of the Act is of no consequence. (24) Since I hold that the Act is applicable to the establishment of the company and admittedly the breaches have been committed by the company in three matters as aforesaid, the company was rightly held guilty of those offences and was rightly convicted. I see no reason to interfere with the order of convictions and sentences in all the six cases. (25) In the result, all these six revision applications are dismissed. (26) Petition dismissed.
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1966 (2) TMI 80 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... . The borrowings were not with the object of purchase of shares by way of investment with a view to earning dividend thereon. The object with which the borrowings were made was for the purposes of carrying on its business activities of purchasing and selling shares and securities. The accrual of the dividend income had only been incidental in the course of the business. As the figures of income would show, the income of the assessee-firm from business, that is, the business of purchase and sale of shares, had been very nearly ₹ 2 lakhs. The decision on which reliance is placed can, therefore, have hardly any application to the facts of the present case. It is for these reasons, with respect to the learned Members of the Tribunal, it is not possible for us to concur in the line of reasoning adopted by them. In the result, our answer to the question referred to us is in the negative. The assessee shall pay the costs of the Commissioner. Question answered in the negative.
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1966 (2) TMI 79 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... be sustained on the ground that the differentiation arises from geographical classification based on historical reasons. The contention raised by the learned counsel therefore fails. There remains a minor contention which is that the Staff rules were not properly made by the Board of Directors. It is stated that cl. 3 of the Regulation Order, which provides for a minimum number of six members, was not complied with and that since the Staff rules were made by four members instead of six, they were invalid. As pointed out by the learned Judges of the High Court, under the law governing corporations a majority of the members of the corporation is entitled to exercise the powers of the corporation and that the rule regarding corporations is equally applicable to a company. We are in agreement with this view. As a result of the conclusions reached by us, this appeal must fail and is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1966 (2) TMI 78 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... o the particulars disclose who the legal representatives are. In our opinion, therefore, the application made by the assessee in the present case could not be said to be a proper application made for the registration of the firm which was in existence during the account year. Since the firm of which the assessee had asked for registration could not be granted registration for the relevant account year and since there is no proper application for the registration of the firm, of which registration could have been granted during that year, the Income-tax Officer was right in refusing registration and the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was also right in confirming the order. In that view of the matter, the first question referred to us must be answered in the negative. If the first question is answered in the negative, the second question must obviously be answered against the assessee. We accordingly answer it in the affirmative. The assessee to pay the costs of the department.
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1966 (2) TMI 77 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... y sale of shares and securities held by it was its profits and gains from business assessable to tax. The reason was that "the purchase and sale of shares and securities are so much linked with the deposits and withdrawals of clients that with the existing articles of association the purchase and sale of shares and securities are as much part of the assessee's business as receiving deposits from clients and paying them off are (page 645, Viscount Maugham, quoting the Assistant Commissioner). My answer to the question, therefore, is that the two amounts are exempt from tax under section 14(3)(i). A copy of this judgment should be sent under the seal of the court and the signature of the Registrar to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal as required by section 66(5) of the Act. The assessee should get its costs of the reference which may be assessed at ₹ 300 from the Commissioner of Income-tax. Counsel's fee may be assessed at ₹ 300. MANCHANDA J.- I agree.
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1966 (2) TMI 76 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the cancellation was done after liability of the assurer under the policy had commenced or the loss had become inevitable?
Held that:- As concerned with two dates in particular and they are June 18, 1950 when Ghose visited Dhulian and July 6 when the policy was cancelled. The houses according to Lalchand Jain (P.W. 1) were 400/500 feet away when the proposal was made. The river remained calm till the second week of June. It only began to rise in the third week of June. Thus on June 18, when Ghose visited the place, there was no flood and no erosion. Ghose's report has not been produced but he could have only estimated the possibility of loss and no more. Even in the third week of June there was no erosion and it began by the end of June. Even on July 15 the distance between the river and the houses was 250 feet (see Q. 179). As the rate of erosion was about 20/25 feet per day (vide Bijoy Kumar P.W. 4) the houses were 400/500 feet away even on July 6. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the loss had commenced or that it had become so certain as to be inevitable or that the cancellation was done in anticipation and with knowledge of inevitable loss. The cancellation was done at a time when no one could say with any degree of certainty that the houses were in such danger that the loss had commenced or became inevitable. There is no evidence to establish this. The assurers were, therefore, within their rights under condition 10 of the policy to cancel it. As the policy was not ready they were justified in executing it and cancelling it. The right of the plaintiff to the policy and to enforce it was lost by the legal action of cancellations. Appeal allowed.
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1966 (2) TMI 75 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the Municipality had not established the precondition for the re-assessment?
Held that:- The burden is certainly upon the Commissioners before they could amend the valuation and the assessment already made to establish that the previous assessment was in-correctly made by reason of fraud, misrepresentation or mistake. The High Court said that not a word had been said in the evidence adduced by the parties that the rental taken into consideration by the Special Officer while making the re-assessment in 1952 did not exist at the time of the periodical revisional assessment. This observation was made on the assumption that the burden was upon the assessee. Indeed, when the appellant filed a petition in the suit under Order XI of the Code of Civil Procedure for the discovery of the relevant records of the three assessments and though the learned Munsif made an order directing the Municipality to do so, it failed to produce them. In the circumstances we must hold that the Municipality had not established the precondition for the re-assessment, namely, that the original periodical revisional assessment was vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation or mistake. Appeal allowed.
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1966 (2) TMI 74 - SUPREME COURT
Whether in a service where recruitment is partly by promotion and partly by direct recruitment, the system of fixing seniority by rotation is followed and that this is being done in a number of services under the Union?
Held that:- The present method by which the respondent puts a direct recruit from the grade of Appraiser, though he is promoted later, above a promote who is promoted to the grade of Principal Appraiser on an earlier date clearly denies equality of opportunity where the grade of Principal Appraiser has only one source of recruitment, namely, from the grade of Appraisers. In such a case the seniority in the grade of Principal Appraisers most be determined according to the. date of continuous appointment in that grade irrespective of whether the person promoted to that grade from the Appraisers' grade is a direct recruit or a promotee. This will as we have already said be subject to the government's right to revert any one promoted as a Principal Appraiser if he is not found fit for the post during the period of probation. The petition therefore will have to be allowed. with respect to the method by which seniority is fixed in the grade. of Principal Appraisers. That method denies equality of oppor- tunity of employment to the Appraisers who are the only source of' recruitment to the grade of Principal Appraisers. What the impugned method seeks to do is to introduce a kind of reservation in respect of the two categories of Appraisers from which the promotions are made, and that cannot be done when the source of promotion is one. Appraisers is concerned but allow it so far as the seniority of Principal Appraisers is concerned and the method used by the respondent in that connection must be struck down, and we further direct the determination of their seniority in the manner we have stated above. Appeal allowed in part.
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1966 (2) TMI 73 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e profit and loss account and that the amount would be available for distribution amongst its shareholders. Now, on the language of section 10(2A), the benefit that is contemplated is a benefit by way of remission or cessation of liability . Any other benefit is not contemplated. We have already said that this is not a case in which it could be said that there has been any remission of the liability on the part of the employers or there has been any cessation of the said liability. Assuming that the said amount is distributed by the company to its shareholders, it cannot get rid of its liability when it is called upon to meet it either by the employees under the Industrial Disputes Act or by the Government under the Bombay Labour Welfare Funds Act. It is for these reasons, in our opinion, the answer to the question referred to us will have to be in favour of the assessee. We accordingly answer the question in the negative. The Commissioner shall pay the costs of the assessee.
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1966 (2) TMI 72 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of the paper book. So, when the refund has been received by the assessee, there is no condition imposed upon the refund that the money must be paid back to the purchasers. It may be that the purchasers may resort to some litigation to try their luck to have a share of the money which was refunded by the State and it is in that sense that the Supreme Court observed in Abdul Quader s case 1964 15 S.T.C. 403 (S.C.). that the question of any recovery by the purchasers was one as between the dealer and the purchaser. That question was not decided by the Supreme Court in that case nor are we deciding that question in the present case. What suffices for the purpose of this reference is that there is no statutory right of the purchaser to recover any portion of the money which has been received by the dealer by way of refund. The question referred to must, therefore, be answered in the affirmative and I concur in the answer proposed by my Lord. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1966 (2) TMI 71 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... had to fall back on his own inspection. According to him, he visited the premises more than once and as a result thereof found that part of the raw material was being used for manufacturing agricultural implements and part of it for other purposes. Therefore, he was justified in levying tax on half the turnover for the purpose of sales tax. It is well settled that the quantum of tax cannot be the subjectmatter of the dispute before this Court. It is only when the assessment is arbitrary and without jurisdiction that the Courts can interfere. In the instant case the appellant having failed to produce any reliable data, the assessing authority was within its jurisdiction in imposing the tax according to section 12 of the Hyderabad General Sales Tax Act. I think the order of the lower court, therefore, refusing to interfere with the finding of the Sales Tax Authorities is in conformity with the data on record. In the result the appeal is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1966 (2) TMI 70 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ve stated above we find that although the summonses issued in the case are not in accordance with law in every respect we should not be justified in setting aside the order moved against and directing issue of fresh processes in the light of our findings above. The order of the learned Judge is upheld with this modification that the correspondence files and the sales tax returns of M/s. Bengal Hosiery Mills, M/s. Golden Hosiery and Cotton Mills and M/s. Madhusudan Hosiery Mills as called for in the case are not liable to be disclosed. The rest of the documents called for from the petitioners are not entitled to the protection of section 25 of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941, and are as such liable to be disclosed. So far as the sales tax files are concerned the same minus the papers, statements and evidence as specified in section 25(1) of the Act will be liable to disclosure. With this modification the rule stands discharged. R.N. DUTT, J.-I agree. Rule discharged.
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1966 (2) TMI 69 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... appellant or not. This duty he has failed to discharge, as a result of which the appeals eventually suffered the fate of summary rejection. In such cases it is perfectly within the powers of this Court to interfere with the order passed, in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction and direct the officer to act in accordance with law. Such power is exercisable notwithstanding that an appeal against the order of summary rejection lay to the Appellate Tribunal for it is obvious that that remedy is not quite handy and is onerous, besides. The writ petitions are therefore allowed with costs in W.P. No. 240 of 1964. The order dated 31st July, 1963, rejecting the appeal is quashed and the Appellate Authority is directed to deal with the appeals in accordance with law from the stage immediately prior to the notice dated 20th May, 1963, calling upon the petitioner to pay the balance of tax or produce proof within 10 days of the reference. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. Petitions allowed.
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1966 (2) TMI 68 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... order having been passed on 15th February, 1957, in relation to the year 1955-56 exempting the entire turnover, turnover for the year had escaped assessment (assuming it was taxable) and that no steps could have been taken after 31st March, 1959 (after the lapse of three years from the close of the year of assessment) for assessing that turnover. This is so provided in rule 33(1) of the General Sales Tax Rules. So the action taken by the Deputy Commissioner, South Zone, Quilon, after 31st March, 1959, which resulted in the service of notice on the assessee on 16th February, 1960, was clearly without jurisdiction and the assessment orders in the tax revision case and which followed could not stand. We therefore rightly set aside the orders. Apart from the clarification which we have made in this order, we do not think that the decision in T.R.C. No. 45 of 1963(1) calls for interference. We therefore dismiss this petition but without any order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1966 (2) TMI 67 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... make no difference, that in the present case, the limitation is provided by a statutory rule. Following the principle of the above decisions of the Supreme Court, it must be held that the proceedings evidenced by exhibits P-3 and P-4 are beyond the period indicated by rule 33 of the General Sales Tax Rules. If so, there was no argument that the petitioner was not entitled to the relief of quashing these orders. 4. It is unnecessary to deal with the other contention advanced by the petitioner s counsel, namely that in any event, the revenue recovery proceedings taken in this case are without jurisdiction as the revenue recovey certificates have been issued in favour of the Revenue Recovery Officer, Mysore, and that the same could validly be issued only in favour of the Collector. In view of my conclusion on the main point, I express no opinion on this contention. 5. The O.P. is allowed and exhibits P-3 and P-4 are quashed. There will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1966 (2) TMI 66 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ion Act, and, consequently the time requisite for obtaining a certified copy of the order sought to be revised is to be excluded in computing the period of limitation prescribed for the revision In the result, the second question must be answered as under Section 29 of the Limitation Act does not enlarge the scope of section 12(2) of the said Act, but the petitioner is entitled to exclude the time spent in obtaining the certified copy of the impugned order, under section 12(2) of the Limitation Act. There remains then the third question. The mere requirement that a revision petition should be accompanied by a certified copy of the order, does not by itself permit a petitioner to exclude the time requisite for obtaining such a certified copy in computing the period of limitation. This question must, therefore, be answered in the negative. I would answer the reference accordingly, but leave the parties to bear their own costs. DULAT, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1966 (2) TMI 65 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Commissioner, Sales Tax, U.P. 1963 14 S.T.C. 534., to which one of us was a party, it was stated that if an assessee does not file a return he is in the same position as if he had filed a return which was not accepted as correct or complete by the Sales Tax Officer and he had failed to prove that it was complete and correct in spite of a reasonable opportunity having been given to him. Consequently no question of want of opportunity arises when no return has been filed. In Maheshwari Devi Jute Mills v. State of U.P. 1966 17 S.T.C. 106., our brother Satish Chandra set aside an assessment order passed under rule 41(3) on the ground that the dealer was not heard before the return submitted by him was rejected as incorrect or incomplete. In the instant case the return has not been rejected as incorrect or incomplete and, therefore, the decision is of no avail. In the result I would dismiss this and connected writ petitions with costs. MANCHANDA, J.-I agree. Petitions dismissed.
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1966 (2) TMI 64 - PUNJAB HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the goods must precede the sale before it can be an inter-State sale, is wholly untenable. Mr. Sarin, learned counsel for the assessee, relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income-tax, Delhi v. P.M. Rathod and Company 1959 10 S.T.C. 493., for his contention that the sales in the present cases are not inter-State sales. This decision does not help the contention of the learned counsel. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court were not considering the provisions of the Sales Tax Act, with which we are concerned in the present cases. For the reasons given above, we answer the question referred to us in the negative, that is, the goods sent by V.P.P. from Punjab to Uttar Pradesh are liable to Central sales tax and such tax is leviable by the Punjab authorities. We further direct that the assessee will pay the costs of these references to the department. The costs are assessed at Rs. 100 in each case. FALSHAW, C.J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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